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NOTICES

ANNUAL DINNER

It has been arranged that the Annual Dinner of the Society will be held this year on Thursday, July 8, 1954, at Claridge's Hotel, London, W.1. Further particulars will be sent out in due course to all members in Great Britain, and those coming home on leave from abroad are asked to get in touch with the office if they are thinking of attending.

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following accessions to the Library :

Britain and the Middle East, author and donor Sir Reader Bullard.

Desert Journeys, 1933-50, author and donor Mr. Wilfred Thesiger.

Atlas of China, Land, Sea and Air Routes, by M. Rajchman. Presented by R. Sinclair.

And some Fell by the Wayside. Story of the North Burma Evacuation, by A. R. Tainsh.

East of Siam, by H. A. Franck.

Presented by Dr. Lindgren

Jummoo and Kashmir Territories, by F. Drew. 1875.

The Romance of Isobel, Lady Burton, by W. H. Wilkins.

The Making of a Pioneer, by Mildred Cable and Francesca French.

Unknown Karakoram, by Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg.

Presented by Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg

Government of Bahrein Annual Report, October 1951—September 1952. Presented by Adviser to the Behrein State Government.

The Honorary Secretaries will be grateful if members will please notify the office of any change of address, and in particular if anyone can give the present addresses of the following members: Prof. J. Heyworth-Dunne; John Fraser (formerly Karachi); Captain R. A Livesey Haworth; A. F. Rose, Esq.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

THE MA'DAN OR MARSH DWELLERS OF SOUTHERN IRAQ

By WILFRED THESIGER, D.S.O.

Lecture given on February 4, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Thesiger, who not so long ago gave a most interesting talk on the Badu of Southern Arabia, is here today to tell us of the Marsh Arabs. Mr. Thesiger, born in Abyssinia, is intensely interested in the peoples of the countries in which he travels. Before the last war he was in the Sudan Civil Service. In 1940 he was in Abyssinia and volunteered for service there with the Ethiopian Patriot Force; it was during this period that he was awarded his D.S.O.

Later, while on special duty in Damascus, he was able to resume his Arabic studies. He has since been able to travel and explore in places almost unknown to many of us. We are now to hear about people who live on the marshes of Southern Iraq.

NEARLY 6,000 square miles of Southern Iraq consists of marshland,* a vast patchwork of reed-beds, lagoons and watercourses, dotted with a few small islands and occasional villages and rice fields. This waste of mud, water and monotonous vegetation, infested by clouds of mosquitoes and midges, is a natural sanctuary, where man has evolved a primitive means of livelihood in harmony with his surroundings. The marsh dwellers, known as the Ma'dan, dwell in reed huts clustered on islands or raised above the water level on sodden platforms of piled-up reeds and rushes. They travel about the marshes in bitumen-coated canoes, and live largely on fish and the milk of their water buffaloes. It is a hard land, cold in winter, hot and humid in summer; a shut-in land where narrow inconspicuous waterways are bordered by almost impenetrable reed-beds often twenty feet in height.

There are two pronounced seasons, summer and winter, for spring and autumn last only about a month. Summer begins in May and ends early in October, while winter lasts from November until early April. Almost the whole rainfall† occurs in the winter and spring. In summer the heat‡ is very great and the humidity in the marshes makes life extremely unpleasant. In winter the days are often warm with temperatures as high as 85°, but the nights are always cold and when the wind blows off the Kurdish snows the cold is intense. The difference between the day and night temperatures can be as much as 55°. There is no fuel, other than dried reeds and buffalo dung, and the houses of the Ma'dan, though generally waterproof, are cold and draughty in the winter months.

The marshes extend southwards from Amara on the Tigris, and east-

* The Arabs of Southern Iraq call The Marshes *Al Haur*. This is a comprehensive term which covers both the areas of permanent and of seasonal marsh, and the open water as well as the reed-beds. A lagoon is called a *Birka*.

† The mean annual rainfall at 'Amara from 1936 to 1939 was 8·3 inches and at Shaiba from 1923 to 1939 was 5·7 inches.

‡ In July, 1916, the temperature near Kut rose to 128° and temperatures of 124° in August have been recorded both at Shaiba and Diwaniya. At this time of the year the relative humidity may be as much as 50 per cent. with very high temperatures and the wet-bulb temperatures approaching blood heat.

wards from Suq al Shuyukh on the Euphrates, to Qurna, where the two rivers join to form the Shatt al Arab. They can conveniently be divided into the Eastern Marshes, between the Tigris and the Persian frontier, the Central Marshes, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, and the Southern Marshes, to the south of the Euphrates round the Hammar Lake.* These marshes have resulted from the overflow and dispersion of the Tigris and Euphrates. Rising temperatures in March, April and May melt the snow on the Turkish and Persian mountains and cause high floods. From June onwards both rivers subside and they reach their lowest levels in September and October. In November there is usually a slight rise which increases throughout the winter, but sudden short floods may occur during the winter and spring whenever there is heavy rain. The high flood of the Tigris caused by melting snow is often a month earlier than that of the Euphrates. The Eastern and Central Marshes draw their water from the Tigris and it has been estimated that 80 per cent. of the discharge at Baghdad is dispersed into this area.† The Euphrates is dispersed below Nasariya by numerous canals and its scattered waters gradually drain into the Hammar Lake. All the Euphrates water which reaches the Shatt al Arab comes down the channel of Qarmat Ali a few miles above Basra, the water which flows across the old Euphrates channel from Suq al Shiyukh to Qurna having escaped from the right bank of the Tigris. There is also some permanent marsh at the southern end of the Shatt al Gharraf below Shatra, and some seasonal marsh where the Tib and Duaraij rivers overflow from the Persian foothills‡ on to the plains north of 'Amara. In April and May the floods from the Tigris and the Euphrates extend over the surrounding desert and cover a large area from Kut al Amara to the outskirts of Basra, but as they recede the land outside the marshes becomes once more a dusty plain of sun-cracked mud, inhabited by shepherd tribes or in places by cultivators§ growing wheat and barley. This country adjoins the marshes but is not part of them.

Southern Iraq is very flat. Basra is seven feet above sea-level, Qurna is

* The Ma'dan call the greater part of the Hammar Lake the Haur al Sinaf and only refer to its western end as the Haur al Hammar.

† It has been estimated that at Kut al Amara the discharge of the Tigris is the same as at Baghdad. Below Kut the Butaira takes 26 per cent. of the discharge, and the Shatt al Gharraf and Chahala together take a further 35 per cent. Below 'Amara the Tabar, Majar and Michariya draw off 20 per cent., leaving only 19 per cent. in the Tigris channel.

‡ Four perennial streams enter Iraq from Persia between Badra and Amara. They are the Galal Badra, the Galal Chankula, the Ṭib and the Duarij. Some water from the Chankula reaches the Tigris, but all the water from the other three streams is dispersed on the plains east of the Tigris, where at certain seasons it forms extensive but shallow lagoons and marshes.

§ These tribes are the Bani Lam, the Al Bu Daraj, Azairij, Al 'Isa and the Al Bu Salih. The Tigris below Kut al Amara has built up its course above the surrounding country, and the canals in the cultivated areas are sometimes raised three or four feet above the fields on either side. If a dyke breaks, large areas of cultivation may be submerged and the crops destroyed. In 1951 the Al 'Isa lost all their wheat and barley in this way. The floods are at their height during April and May when the wheat and barley are being cut and gathered. They subside in June and cannot therefore be used for cultivating rice, which is sown in May, and would be left without water as the floods receded.

nine feet; Nasariya is sixteen and 'Amara is only thirty, although it is 100 miles from Basra, but from marks on the reeds in the Central Marshes I have estimated that sometimes there is here a rise and fall in the water-level of as much as four feet. During the height of the floods much of the country round the marshes is covered by extensive sheets of open water; where there are depressions in the desert the water is often more than six feet deep. On the other hand, in a year of exceptionally low water, such as 1951, a great part of the marshes dries up during September and October. In the autumn of that year it was only possible to cross the Central Marshes from north to south by the chain of lagoons from Daima to Zikri. Travel becomes very difficult whenever the marshes are too dry to float a canoe, since it is extremely exhausting to force one's way on foot through the mud and the reed-beds. The Ma'dan go everywhere in canoes, and when the water is high they can penetrate into most parts of the marshes. They are experts at finding their way by inconspicuous tracks through the reed-beds, but their knowledge is usually very local and few of them know the country far from their own villages.

The Ma'dan inhabit both the seasonal marsh, which is mostly covered by bulrushes and sedges, and the permanent marsh, where *qaṣṣab* (*Phragmites communis*), a giant reed, sometimes twenty feet in height, flourishes in dense reed-beds and in the lagoons often forms floating islands. To the Ma'dan this is by far the most important of the marsh plants. Its young shoots are the buffalo's favourite food, and large quantities are gathered daily by the marshmen and fed to their animals during the night. Great stretches of marshland are regularly burnt by them during the autumn in order to ensure a plentiful supply of this pasture. They use *qaṣṣab* stems. which are two inches and more in diameter, as poles (*mardi*) with which to punt their canoes; and they split the smaller stems and weave (*sana'*) them into mats (*bāria*). There is a never-failing demand for these mats in the towns and villages throughout Southern Iraq, where they are used for roofing houses. The Ma'dan construct their huts entirely of *qaṣṣab* and they use the dried stems for fuel and lighting. They also peel and chew the green reeds, like sugar-cane. *Birdi* (*Typha augustata*), a bulrush, usually about eight feet in height, is not confined, like *qaṣṣab*, to the permanent marsh but flourishes in areas subject to regular seasonal flooding. The marshmen use it as fodder for their buffaloes in default of *qaṣṣab*. Inside the marshes most of the houses are built upon great heaps of *birdi* collected to form artificial mounds (*chabasha*, pl. *chabaish*) rising above the level of the water. The Ma'dan eat the roots of the *birdi* and in the spring the women collect the flowering heads (*ḳharaiṭ*) and make them into a hard yellow cake much esteemed as a sweet. Buffaloes can acquire a taste for *ḳaulan* (*Scirpus brachyceras*), a sedge which covers large areas round the outskirts of the marshes. *Sijil* (*Cyperus rotundus*) and *jaraiḥ* (*Cladium mariscus*) are two other sedges indigenous to the marshes. *Jaraiḥ*, which has a leaf like sword grass, flourishes among the *qaṣṣab*, especially on the small floating islands in the lagoons.* At low water the watercourses are choked with *ghazaiza* (*Salvinea natans*) and *shiliblān* (*Ceratophyllum sub-*

* These islands (*tahl*, pl. *tahūl*) are often a tangled mass of *qaṣṣab, jariah, ḳinbār* (*Trachomitum venetum*), *shabābaḳ* (*Pluchea* sp.), *'Alḳa* (*Rubus* sp.), *marair* (*Sonchus*

mersum), and these weeds become so matted that it is almost impossible to force a canoe through them. The deepest lagoons, some of which are over sixteen feet deep, are generally clear of weeds other than *suwaiḳa* (*Najans marina*). In March and April much of the open water is carpeted with the small white flowers of *zahair al baṭ* (*Ranunculus sphærospermus*), and in April is ablaze with the vivid yellow or snow-white flowers of the *ḳa'iba* (*Nymphoides peltata* and *indica*). Several grasses grow in the marshes: *murān* (*Panicum repens*), *dhail al 'athwi* (*Polypogon monspeliensis*), *ḥau* ( ) and *ḥalayan* or *gharib* (*Paspalum distichum*), which is said by the Ma'dan to have been introduced by the British and is widely distributed. There are, however, surprisingly few kinds of plant in these marshes. During the spring and summer of 1952 I made as comprehensive a collection as possible but only obtained thirty-two species.*

The Ma'dan have acquired an evil name. The aristocratic Arab tribes despise them for their dubious lineage and willingly impute to them every sort of perfidy and wickedness, while townsmen, travelling up and down the rivers, fear them, shun them and readily believe all that they hear against them. Among the British too their reputation is bad, a legacy from the first World War, when, from the shelter of their marshes, they murdered and looted both sides indiscriminately as opportunity offered. During the few years that the British administered Iraq the political officers were too busy with other and more important problems to be able to concern themselves with the Ma'dan. In general they were left alone if they were well behaved, and bombed if they were troublesome. Since then few people have had the time or inclination to travel among them. I first visited this country in the autumn of 1950 and remained there for a month. I returned for another month in the spring of 1951, for two months in the autumn of that year, for five months in the spring and autumn of 1952 and for six months in the spring and autumn of 1953. I spent much of this time in the Central Marshes but I also travelled extensively in the Eastern Marshes and visited the part of the Southern Marshes near Suq al Shiyukh. Since my purpose was to study the Ma'dan,† I penetrated at once into the heart of the Central Marshes, instead of settling down among the cultivators and big sheikhs nearby and making brief excursions from there into the

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maritimus), *dhan al far* (*Epilobium parviflorum*) and *halablab* (*Oxystelma esculenta*), but *qaṣṣab*, wherever it grows to a considerable height, tends to kill off the other vegetation. *Qaṭ* (*Polygonum senegalense*), *na'na'* (*Mentha* sp.), *lisān al thaur* (*Potamogeton lucens*), *ḳauban* (*Jussiæa diffusa*) and *abu rachiba* (*Alternanthera sessilis*) grow thickly at the water's edge round the reed-beds and in the shallower watercourses.

* I also collected *has al haur* (*Samolus valerandi*), *zamira* (*Marsilea quadrifoliata*), *mukharab al Qa'* (*Lycopus* sp.), *hausan* (*Cyperis alopecuroides*), *tabliq* (*Limnophila*), *abraibija* (*Sphenoclea zeylanica*), *Gharab* (*Salix* sp.), *asaf* (*Crucifer*). My collection is at the British Museum (Natural History).

† Almost nothing has been written about the Ma'dan. P. A. Buxton and V. H. W. Dowson wrote a short paper, "The Marsh Arabs of Lower Mesopotamia" (*Indian Antiquary*, 1921). Lady Drower contributed an article on "Arabs of the Hor Hawiza" in Henry Field's *The Anthropology of Iraq*, Part I, Number 2, but much of this article deals with the Al Bu Muhammad cultivators of the Chahala. There is also a collection of stories, *Haji Rikḳan : Marsh Arab*, by Fulanain (S. E. Hedgecock), and a novel, *The Blood Feud*, by C. E. Corry.

marshes. When once I had established myself among the Ma'dan I made contact with the neighbouring sedentary and shepherd tribes, and have since then spent much time with them. I went among the Ma'dan by myself, without a servant, camp kit or provisions, to live with them in their villages, entirely dependent upon them for food, shelter and transport. I had hoped to persuade some of them to join me and to travel with me round the marshes. However, as they live a very secluded life and have little contact with the outside world, few of them having even visited 'Amara, Nasariya or Basra, they were at first far too suspicious to accompany me further than the next village. At each village I had to start all over again, a stranger in a strange land. Gradually I won their confidence and now I can count on as many paddlers as I need to take me where I wish to go and to remain with me as long as I require them. They are a genial, happy people, welcoming and friendly, and but little troubled by blood feuds. Although they have a well-established reputation as thieves, they have not, as yet, in all the months that I have lived with them, stolen anything from me. Their code is not the strict code of the desert, their hospitality is far less lavish, their patience and fortitude are less great and their loyalty to one another is probably less staunch, but if their qualities fall short of the exacting standards of the Badu they compare not unfavourably with those of the Arab villagers.

The Ma'dan comprise several different tribes and sections of surrounding tribes. Some of these Ma'dan are possibly of Arab origin, but others, such as the Shaghanba and Faraijat, are probably descended from races who were in these parts before the Arab invasion. All the Arab tribes in Southern Iraq, other than the real Badu tribes, have undoubtedly absorbed a large amount of alien blood. If the Arab of the Najd and the Hajaz is the prototype of the Arab, most of the tribes in Southern Iraq, judged by their physical characteristics, are racially of very mixed origin. One would expect this to be especially so in the marshes, which must have afforded a safe refuge to broken remnants of conquered peoples since early times. The almost insuperable difficulty of carrying out military operations in these marshes was proved during the first World War whenever British forces tried to round up Ma'dan who were giving trouble. The nomad camel-owning Arabs would certainly have shunned these marshes when first they invaded Iraq, but in course of time some of these tribes, or sections of these tribes, probably already much infused with foreign blood, may have been forced into them, and compelled to adapt their way of life to this environment. Today some sections of the large and powerful Al Bu Muhammad tribe, such as the Shadda and Bait Naṣr Allah, live in the marshes, though most of the tribe live as cultivators between 'Amara and Qallat Salih; similarly some of the Bani Assad, of the Bani Khaikan and most of the Fartus, are Ma'dan. Each of these sections claims Arab ancestry in common with the tribe to which it now belongs, although in reality it may well be of different origin, since powerful Arab tribes everywhere absorb weaker tribes, who have allied themselves to them for protection.* In Oman, for instance,

* Most of the Chab live in Persian territory to the east of the Haur al Hawiza, but one section, who are Ma'dan, live to the west of the Tigris near 'Ali al Sharqi and have been incorporated into the Bani Lam.

there is even a section of Baluch incorporated in the Wahiba. Although nearly indistinguishable in appearance, habits and speech from the Wahiba, these Baluch still acknowledge their separate origin, but in course of time they will almost certainly claim to be descended from the same ancestor as the Wahiba, because, in the Middle East, descent from one of the famous Arab tribes has the same " snob value " as a claim to Norman descent in this country. It would not therefore be wise to accept the assertion of any of the Ma'dan that they are Arabs. The Shaghanba and some of the Faraijat admit even today that they are of Ṣubbi origin, which seems to imply that, while they are ignorant of their true lineage, their ancestors were certainly in these parts before the Arabs. In view of this it is significant that the Al Bu Muhammad trace their origin to a marriage fourteen generations ago between one of the Zubaid Aza and a woman of the Faraijat. They tell how an Arab named Muhammad sought refuge with the Faraijat after killing his cousin, and remained with them for about fifteen years. His sister Basha was with him. Muhammad fell in love with Mahaniya, the daughter of a Faraijat sheikh, who promised her to him in marriage if Muhammad would give Basha to him. Muhammad agreed to this bargain, but the Faraiji substituted his uncouth daughter the Kausha for the beautiful Mahaniya. Muhammad, unaware of this deception, received her into his house, but on unveiling her and discovering the trick which had been played on him, accepted his fate and kept her as his wife, saying, " Praise be to God. This is the one who has fallen to me." The Kausha gave birth to two sons, Sa'ad and 'Abud, from whom are descended the two branches of the Al Bu Muhammad, the Amla and the Al Bu 'Abud. Today the battle-cry of the Al Bu Muhammad is " I am the sister of Basha," and that of the Faraijat is " I am the sister of the Kausha."

Although the Arabs have imposed their language, their religion and their culture on the Ma'dan, it is doubtful how much real Arab blood there is in such tribes as the Faraijat, Shaghanba, Fartus, Shadda, Suai'diyin, Sua'id, Kauliba and Chab.* I am, however, convinced that it is a mistake to regard the Ma'dan as ethnologically distinct from the surrounding tribes. There is no hard-and-fast line between them. It would be wrong to assume that the cultivators are of Arab and the Ma'dan of earlier stock, for most of these tribes are too intermixed. There is probably much less Arab blood in some of the Ma'dan tribes than in the cultivators living outside the marshes, but it is simply a matter of degree. The difference between them is not one of race, but of habitat and to some extent of occupation. It would be easy to pick out a Badui in the settled areas surrounding the desert or in an Arab town; his appearance, manners and voice would proclaim him to be from the desert; but it would be extremely difficult today, when they dress alike, to recognize a Ma'di among a crowd of the neighbouring cultivators, or to distinguish one in the markets of 'Amara or of Majar al Kabir. Although they dress alike, speak the same dialect and live very similar lives, the Al Bu Muhammad, who grow rice on the edges of the marsh, would describe themselves as

* The Faraijat usually claim to be descended from Al Bu Dhahir and the Fartus and Suai'diyin from Al Ghazi.

Falah, or cultivators, while others of the same tribe who live four or five miles inside the marsh would call themselves Ma'dan. They both keep buffaloes, grow rice, move about in canoes and spear fish. Among the Ma'dan the emphasis is on their buffaloes and among the cultivators on their rice-growing—but some cultivators keep more buffaloes than others, while some of the Ma'dan grow more rice than their neighbours. Ma'dan simply means a dweller in the marshes. It might be contended that only the nomadic buffalo-owning marshmen should really be called Ma'dan and that the villagers who grow rice, whether inside the marshes or on its fringes, are *Falah*. Glubb, for instance, maintains that the use of the word Badu should be confined to the nomadic camel-owning Arab tribes of noble origin; yet the term is frequently used by Arabs in the Hajaz of tribes such as the Bani Hilal, who own sheep, goats and cattle but hardly any camels. As a matter of fact, Arabs use such terms very loosely. In the past the Ma'dan lived almost entirely on their buffaloes, whereas today many of them grow rice, but both herdsmen and cultivators are marsh dwellers and therefore Ma'dan. It is interesting, and I think significant, that while a Badui will always boast that he is a Badui, and many villagers, townsmen and even *effendis* proudly claim Badu origin, the word Ma'dan outside the marshes is synonymous with yokel, and even the marshmen themselves boast only of being Ma'dan when they wish to claim for themselves the technical skill proper to a marshman. I have frequently heard one Ma'di say to another who is being clumsy with his canoe, "Are you an Arab? Are you a Kurd?"

To the Ma'dan, who can be divided into nomads and villagers, their buffaloes (*Jamus*, pl. *Duab*) are all-important. The nomads consist of certain sections of the Faraijat, the Suai'diyin, some of the Sua'id, a few Shaghanba, the Kauliba among the Al Bu Daraj, and the Chab among the Bani Lam. They regulate their lives according to the needs of their buffaloes, but there are many marked and surprising variations in their seasonal movements. Thus the Faraijat and Suai'diyin winter in the marshes and congregate in large numbers in such areas as Abu Laila to the east of the Tigris. In the spring they move slowly northwards so as to arrive in the cultivated area along the banks of the Adil, the Wadiyah and Majar after the wheat and barley have been harvested. In July they move again either further northwards into the Azairij country, or westwards to Jindala, where I found large encampments of these nomads at the end of July. They move back again into the marshes in the autumn. The nomadic Sua'id, on the other hand, winter on the northern edge of the Eastern Marshes and, as the country dries up in May, move deeper into the marshes towards the Haur al Hawiza. These nomads own great herds of buffaloes. Most families possess twenty to thirty buffaloes and a few of the Faraijat own between 120 and 200.

The majority of the Ma'dan are settled in villages, and of these villagers many cultivate rice which, since it is sown in May and harvested in November, ties them to their villages throughout the summer. Others have no cultivation but remain throughout the year in large and permanent villages, such as Baidha and Sauda, Dibin, Turaba and Baidhat al Nuafil in the Eastern Marshes, and Qubur and Al Aggar in the Central Marshes,

tending their buffaloes, fishing and making reed mats; some of them, however, for instance the Amaira, tend to evacuate their villages during the height of the floods and to settle on islands in the flooded areas outside the real marshes; while yet others, such as the western Fartus, remain in their villages while the floods are out, and then move deeper into the marshes with their buffaloes in the autumn. All of them adjust their lives according to local conditions and their arrangements vary from place to place and from season to season. They possess but few buffaloes. A man who owned a dozen would be reckoned well off, and most of them own only five or six. Since the bride price amongst these tribes is usually three buffaloes, this prevents early marriages. Although these sedentary Ma'dan own but few buffaloes, they are nevertheless the most important thing in their lives. They spend much time cutting shoots of *qaṣṣab*, of *birdi* or even *ḳaulan* if there is no *qaṣṣab* in the area, as fodder (*hashish*) for their animals during the night. Soon after dawn in warm weather, or later in the morning during the winter, the village or encampment empties. Men, women and children set forth in their canoes for the reed-beds, and they will often travel a considerable distance to reach the best places. Most men and boys are naked while gathering reeds, but the women and girls keep themselves covered. They cut the reeds with a saw-edged sickle (*minjal*), wading about up to their waists in water and piling cut reeds into their canoes amid much shouting, laughter and song. The buffaloes, which have spent the night standing outside their owners' houses, plunge into the water soon after sunrise and wade or swim to some favourite haunt where they spend the day grazing* or resting nearly submerged in the water. The nomads herd their buffaloes† while out grazing, but the sedentary Ma'dan do not do so. The village buffaloes return of their own accord at sunset, or earlier if the weather is cold. There is a certain amount of buffalo theft, especially in the Eastern Marshes where the thieves can take their loot across the frontier. Buffaloes are usually stolen in the daytime while they are grazing. Canoes—the other great temptation to the Ma'dan —are often stolen from the villages during the night. Towards evening everyone returns home. They unload the reeds from their canoes and scatter them in front of their buffaloes, which have climbed out of the water on to the sodden platforms in front of the houses. They then light smoke fires to keep the midges and mosquitoes away from their animals. The men now milk the buffaloes. Women never milk them, and I was surprised to find how many boys did not know how to do so.‡

Buffaloes provide the Ma'dan with milk, cream, butter and in some places with cheese. They would never slaughter a buffalo for food unless

* The buffaloes of the Ma'dan eat *hashish* (*qaṣṣab* shoots), *birdi*, *ḳaulan*, *jaraiḥ*, *sijl*, *qaṭ*, *ḳaubān*, *abu rachiba*, *ḥalablab*, *ḳa'iba*, *hau*, *muran*, and *ḥalayan*.

† The nomads tether their buffaloes at night, since they generally camp together on dry land, whereas the villagers, whose houses are usually separated from one another by water, leave their animals loose on the rush platforms in front of their houses. To call them all Ma'dan use a yodelling cry.

‡ Women milk the sheep and goats among the shepherd tribes, such as the Bani Lam and the Al 'Isa. Men will hold the animals while they are being milked but would not milk them. Among the Badu of Southern Arabia women may not milk camels.

it were already sick and they were afraid it was going to die. A good buffalo is worth about £25, and these marsh buffaloes are much sought after. Merchants, known as *Jalalba*, visit the marshes to buy them and later sell them as far away as Baghdad, but few tribesmen would sell one unless in need of money to buy a canoe or a rifle. When their herds are struck by an epidemic they sell the hides of the dead animals to the *jalalba,* who collect in the area like crows. Some of the Ma'dan own a few small cows and nearly every home is guarded by a watch-dog which is usually large and savage. There are a few cats in the villages and some chickens. The chickens are very small but sell for as much as a quarter of a *dinar* (five shillings) each, and in consequence are rarely killed except to feed a guest. The 'Amaira in the western edges of the Central Marshes own a certain number of sheep. These are usually grazed out in the desert for them by shepherd tribes, but in 1952, when there was a drought in the desert, the 'Amaira kept them in their houses, feeding them on grasses gathered in the marshes. In consequence of this the flies in their villages at that time were appalling.

The nomadic Ma'dan build temporary shelters (*shaḳaṣ*) by throwing a few split-reed mats over two or three ribs, made from bundles of reeds, or by leaning mats against paddles thrust into the ground. These structures can be quickly pulled down and loaded with their few other possessions* into their canoes when they wish to move. Some of the sedentary Ma'dan live in shelters which are but little more elaborate, but most of them live in fairly well-constructed houses. Sometimes their houses are clustered upon small islands known as *ishan*. These islands are probably the sites of ancient villages and towns, and many of them are believed by the Ma'dan to conceal buried treasure. All the Ma'dan firmly believe in the mysterious island called Ḥufaidh, which is said to exist in the heart of the Central Marshes to the north-east of Kubaish and to be guarded by jins who have the power to make the island invisible. Here there is said to be buried treasure, date groves and gardens with pomegranates and other fruit. At night a light is believed to burn on the island, which many of the Ma'dan claim to have seen.

There are, however, few islands in the marshes,† and most of them, such as Gubur, Abu Shajr and Abu Sukhair, are only inhabited during the winter. Al Aggar is one of the few islands in the Central Marshes which is permanently inhabited. In most villages (*salaf*, pl. *silāf*) the houses are built on stacks of rushes, packed behind a low reed fence to form a sodden platform (*chabasha*), resembling a giant dabchick's nest. This platform constantly subsides and its level is always being raised again by laying down new layers of rushes. During the floods the water sometimes rises inside a house and its inmates have to squat on the raised reed platform (*sarir*) which is built in the middle of each house and divides the family quarter from the men's side. Among the Ma'dan there is, however, little if any attempt to keep the women apart from the visitors. The family side of the

* The nomads keep most of their possessions in large wooden chests.

† In the Eastern Marshes Ishan Wajif is thirty feet high and Azizah is fifty feet high. Most of the islands, however, only rise a dozen feet or so above the level of the marsh.

house is used for cooking, and for this reason visitors are invited to sit at the other end. Anyone can, however, enter from either side and sit and talk to the women, who are never veiled. At night the whole family and their guests sleep together on the platform or in the men's side, as the other end is usually crowded with cooking pots, sacks of grain or young buffaloes.

The more permanent houses (*bait qaṣṣab*) are built of split-reed mats (*baria*) laid, so as to overlap, over five or more parallel ribs (*shaba*) made from bundles of reeds. Each rib is constructed by setting two long, tightly bound bundles of reeds into the ground opposite each other, the width of the house apart, and inclined outwards. The tops of the bundles are then pulled inwards and spliced one into the other to form a horse-shoe arch. In warm weather the two ends of the house are left open, but in cold, wet or windy weather they are closed with mats.* From this simple type of house have been evolved the spacious barrel-vaulted *mudhifs*, or guest houses, which are such a conspicuous feature of the larger villages round the marshes. There is a particularly beautiful *mudhif* at Saigal. It consists of eleven arches and is sixty feet in length, twenty feet wide and eighteen feet high. The rib of each arch is nine feet in circumference at the bottom and tapers to about two and a half feet at the top, and is made from a great number of thin reeds carefully bound together. Transverse bundles of reeds some six inches in diameter are fastened close together along the length of these ribs and the mats are then sewn on to this framework with sufficient overlay to ensure a treble or quadruple thickness of matting. Four thick but tapering pillars of reeds support the two end walls, which consist of alternating matting and trellis work. The inside of this *mudhif* conveys the impression of great space, so that one has the curious feeling of being inside a cathedral, and this effect is enhanced by the heavy ribbed vaulting and the trellis-covered windows. This impression is not altogether lost outside the building, where the heavy tapering columns supporting the façade break the skyline above the arched roof. The longest *mudhif* which I have seen was at Madina on the Euphrates, and consisted of fifteen arches and was eighty-five feet long. It lacked proportion, however, being too long for its height, which was only about fifteen feet and therefore produced the effect of a tunnel. All *mudhifs* are built with an odd number of arches, either 7, 9, 11, 13, or occasionally 15,† and the number of the arches is traditionally fixed for each tribe and family. The entrance always faces Mecca. The floor is covered with reed mats, and carpets are laid down on these as required. A *mudhif* contains no furniture other than a large porous water-jug (*qus*) supported by a wooden frame and placed near the entrance. The *sarir*, or platform, which is a prominent feature of dwelling-houses, is never constructed in a *mudhif*. The coffee hearth is situated a third of the way into the *mudhif* on the right-hand side and round it centres the social life of the village.

Canoes are indispensable to the Ma'dan. Without them they would

* The cultivators on the Chahla and in the Azairij country frequently build a single dwelling shaped like a T from two of these houses. I have not seen any of these T-shaped dwellings among the Ma'dan.

† I have been told that some *mudhifs* on the Euphrates have seventeen arches. Among the Al Bu Muhammad the Bait Wadi always build their *mudhifs* with eleven arches, and Bait Saihut with nine.

be immobile, unable in many cases to move from one end of a village to the other, and quite unable to gather reeds as fodder for their buffaloes, or to spear fish. They call their canoes by the generic term *mashuf* (pl. *mashahif*).* A *mashuf* is made from planks, carvel built, flat-bottomed and coated outside with bitumen (*jir*). The top half of the ribs (*'auja*) are planked along the inside. The outer planking is carried forward and upward to form a long, thin, tapering stem (*'anj*) which parts the reeds as the canoe is forced through the marshes. About two feet of both the stem (*akhair*) and bows (*sidr*) are often decked. There is a thwart (*jisit*) about a third of the way forward, and a strengthening beam (also *jisit*) across the boat two-thirds of the way forward. Passengers always sit in the bottom of the *mashuf*, never on the thwart.

The *taradas*, which were once the war canoes of the marshes and are still used by the sheikhs owing to their speed and comfort, are as much as thirty-six feet in length but are only about three and a half feet across at their greatest beam. They will carry twelve people. Unlike the ordinary *mashuf*, these *taradas* have floor boards (*takht*) and the inside planking or ceiling is decorated with rows of flat-headed iron nails (*qarsa*) two inches across. There is a silver model of a canoe from Urr in the Baghdad Museum which closely resembles a present-day *mashuf*.† In general the marshmen favour a broad, roomy canoe known as *barkash* which can carry a large load of reeds. The canoes of the nomads are especially large and spacious, since they are used to carry the whole family and their possessions on frequent journeys. The Ma'dan also use small shallow canoes called *mataur*‡ when shooting wild-fowl. They punt (*dafa'*) their canoes where the water is shallow but paddle them (*gharaf*) where it is deep, and there are many places in the marshes where the water is more than twelve feet in depth. A *tarada*, or a large *mashuf*, usually has a crew of five, two in the bows and three in the stern, who punt or paddle in unison first on one side and then on the other. The Ma'dan always prefer to punt rather than paddle their canoes, since they then travel faster and with less effort. They travel fifty or sixty miles in a day with ease. When travelling up a river outside the marshes, where the banks are firm, they tow the canoe by a rope (*sharufa*) fastened to its bows, but while doing so have to keep a sharp look-out for savage dogs as they pass through the successive villages along the banks.§ Although these canoes have very little free-board, the Ma'dan move about in them freely, often jumping from them into deep water and scrambling back without swamping them. They learn to handle a canoe almost before they can walk, but they are afraid of open water in bad weather. Last year a marriage party was caught on a large lagoon by a sudden storm and several canoes were swamped and many people drowned. The marshmen also own a number of larger boats which they call *balam*

* Different types of *mashuf* are *chalabia*, *barkash* or *daniq*, *kada* and *tarada*. The smaller *mataur* does not rise up in front to a stem.

† I have not seen any *quffas* (coracles) on the Tigris south of Ali al Gharbi. There are some clay models of *quffas* from Urr in the Baghdad Museum.

‡ The Ma'dan sometimes tie together bundles of bulrushes to make a small primitive boat called *shasha*.

§ It is customary for the party travelling downstream to salute the boat travelling upstream.

(pl. *bilam*), as distinct from *mashuf*. These *balams* vary greatly in size but are distinguished from the *mashufs* by being double-ended and by having a bollard at stem and stern head. They either punt the *balams* by walking along inside the boat or they sail them. Large *balams* (*'aniya*) from Basra and 'Amara come to the marshes to collect reeds and reed mats, and I have seen several at Baidhat al Nuafil in the Eastern Marshes which had two masts. The *Barbara* or fishermen use small *balams* when they are fishing with their nets.

There is no wood in the marshes and boats are made of imported wood. The boat-builders are generally Sabæans, but the Bait Abu Dharwa and Hajal are also skilled in this craft. The best canoes are built at Huwair on the Euphrates, a few miles above Qurna. There are usually some Sabæan families in the larger villages in and around the marshes, where they make a living by repairing canoes and are easily distinguished from the Arabs by their large beards. Most of the Sabæans,* of whom there are only a few thousand all told, live in Baghdad, Basra, Suq al Shiyukh and 'Amara, where they are famed as silversmiths. They worship a supreme being, and their religion is said to contain elements of Manichæism but not of Islam. In fact they appear to be pagans, although some of them claim to be Gnostics and they are sometimes known as the Christians of St. John, since they practise baptism by immersion every Sunday and every time they have incurred pollution or infringed their code of purity. Their ceremonial language is Aramaic. The Arabs know them as *Ṣubba*, and it is these Sabæans or Mandæans, and not the pagan tribe of Sabæans who lived in Southern Arabia, who are the Sabæans three times mentioned in the Quran with Jews and Christians as "People of the Book." They are in consequence tolerated by Muslims, but all of them live a life very much apart from their Muslim neighbours.

The Ma'dan spend much of their time spearing fish. The fishing spear or *falih* has five barbed prongs and is attached to a bamboo shaft about ten feet in length. These bamboos are imported from India. The spearman stands in the stern of the canoe, which another man punts or paddles stern foremost so that the spearman when throwing is not inconvenienced by the high stem of the *mashuf*. Parties of marshmen when out spearing fish are called *Ṣuaid*. They will spend the greater part of the day thrusting their spears at random into likely-looking water among reeds, or the roots of *qaṣṣab* at the edge of reed-beds. A marshman will throw his spear at the ripple of a moving fish and if he misses will recover it, follow the fish and try again, until he either spears or loses the fish. A man will usually get three or four fish in the course of a day. When spearing fish from a river bank they attach a cord to the spear so as to recover it after each cast. In a river they will frequently stick a few reeds upright and close together behind a strip of matting placed in the water to break the current, so that when a fish shelters there it moves these reeds and by so doing warns the waiting spearman of its presence. They spear fish at night by the light of reed torches. Ma'dan seldom travel in a canoe without their spears and, when armed with them, are prepared to attack a wild boar in the reed-beds. If they can get close enough they will throw their spears at coots,

* See *The Mandæans of Iraq and Iran*, by E. S. Drower.

herons, duck, or dabchicks and will hunt a diving cormorant often with success. The Ma'dan poison fish with powdered *zahra* (*digitalis*) made up into pellets with flour and chicken droppings or inserted into fresh-water shrimps (*raubian*). The fish, stupefied, rise to the surface and are easily collected. The professional fishermen, or *Barbara*, who use nets, are, however, a caste apart and are despised by the tribesmen. But destitute tribesmen will sometimes assist the *Barbara* and the prejudice against them is weakening. The *Barbara* never use spears but catch fish with seine-nets (*shabach*), worked from a *balam*, or with fixed or floating nets in a river. I have seen casting nets (*siliya*) used at Majar al Kabir and at Basra, but not in the marshes. Many of the *Barbara* live in the Azairij country, on the Majar, or at Kubaish. Some villages are inhabited entirely by them, but on the whole they do not remain in one place, but fish in different localities according to the season and level of the water. During the height of the floods they visit the great expanse of water which temporarily covers the desert north of the marshes; later in the year they net the river branches which flow down towards the marshes, and when the water is low move into the marshes, where they often take large hauls of fish in the lagoons.

I visited Umm al Binni in late November, 1951, when the water was exceptionally low. This lagoon lies to the north-east of Kubaish in the heart of the Central Marshes and covers about five square miles. Some *Barbara* who were netting fish from a dozen *balams*, and a couple of hundred tribesmen using spears, were catching between them about 40,000 fish a day and had been doing so for ten days before I arrived. I obtained these figures from two merchants who were there buying the fish at £3 a hundred irrespective of their size, which, however, averaged about 2 lb. a fish. They had engaged a number of *balams* to collect the fish each evening and to take them to Shataniya on the northern edge of the marshes, where they were collected in lorries and taken to Baghdad. The merchants were paying the marshmen as much as £1 a day to pole these *balams* across the marshes, which was heart-breaking work, owing to the low water in the narrow weed-filled waterways. The *Barbara* were casting their nets in the open water and most of the fish which they caught there were *binni*, whereas the tribesmen were spearing fish round the edges of the reed-beds and taking mostly *qaṭan*.* I heard that the Ma'dan cut a way for their canoes through the reeds to another small lagoon nearby called Al Khazna, but that when they got there they found the surface of the water covered with dead fish killed by overcrowding. Several tribesmen made a small fortune, but the conditions were quite exceptional. In general they can scarcely catch sufficient fish for their own requirements and often buy them from any *Barbara* who happens to be in the neighbourhood.

Some of the Ma'dan leave the marshes at the end of April to help harvest the wheat and barley on the Gharraf, the Majar and the Chahla, where they are paid for their labour in kind. A few of them also go to Basra to work in the date-packing stations in September and October. They can always make money by selling reed mats or bundles of *qaṣṣab*,

* Edible fish in the marshes are *binni*, *qaṭan*, *shabut*, *shilij*, *hamaria*, *sabara* and *khashnia*.

for both of which there is an unfailing demand in the villages and towns. This demand can only be met from the marshes. In 1952 and 1953 thirty of these mats were selling in the Eastern Marshes for the equivalent of £1. Enormous numbers of these mats and great piles of *qaṣṣab* are exported in the spring from the Nuafil country east of the Tigris. The *qaṣṣab* is made into great rafts (*ḳara*) as much as sixty feet long and twelve feet high, which are poled an inch at a time to the river and then floated down to Basra. Large numbers of mats are also exported by the Bani Assad round Kabaish. There are pedlars' (*'aṭār*) shops in nearly all the villages which can be distinguished from the other houses by small white flags. Here the marshman can buy sugar, tea, salt, matches and a few dates or a little flour or cloth. I have seen two or three looms in their villages on which they weave a rough cloth for cloaks, but they have to fetch most of their requirements from the nearest market-town. The Ma'dan of the Central Marshes do their shopping at Majar al Kabir or Kubaish.

On the whole the Ma'dan seem to me to be better fed than most of the other tribes in Southern Iraq, since they have more milk and fish. They generally eat some bread and drink a few glasses of tea, if they have any, for breakfast. When they set out to spear fish or to gather reeds they take some bread and a little butter or cheese with them in their canoes. Their main meal is in the evening soon after sunset and consists generally of grilled fish and of rice (*tabiḳh*) or girdle cakes (*raqfan*), made from millet flour and eaten with milk or cream. During the winter they shoot a certain number of wild-fowl with old muzzle-loading guns, loaded with locally made powder and scraps of iron. They will eat duck, geese (*baṭ*), coots (*jijaj mai*), herons (*raḳhawi*), dabchicks (*barazji*) and cormorants (*haliḳi*). They will shoot pelicans (*najat mai*) for their pouches, which they use to cover their hand-drums, but will not eat these birds. Milk and tea are the marshmen's drink. The tea they drink strong, sweet and without milk, out of small glasses. Today, few if any of them make coffee, which is very expensive and is served only in the guest houses of the larger sheikhs outside the marshes. Most of them smoke, even small boys, four and five years old. *Qaṣṣab* and dried buffalo dung cakes (*maṭāl*) provide them with sufficient fuel. There is always a risk of fire, especially in a high wind, and such fires can be especially disastrous on an island where the houses are crowded closely together. The houses blaze up in a few seconds and the greater part of a village can be destroyed before people can get their possessions out of their homes.

The Ma'dan wear few clothes. Small children are usually naked, but the boys frequently wear a silver collar set with coloured stones. A man's usual dress is simply a long Arab shirt (*dishdasha*) which he pulls up or slips off when wading about in the water. No true marshman wears drawers. In cold weather or on formal occasions he throws a coarse brown woollen cloak (*hidim*) over his shirt, and when paddling or punting his canoe often wears nothing but this cloak wrapped round his waist. Today the Ma'dan either shave their heads or cut their hair very short, although a few years ago they wore it very long and in plaits. Many of the older men grow beards, but the younger ones generally shave. They nearly always cover their heads with a cotton headcloth (*shatfa*), usually of black-

and-white check, the kind worn by the Shia' of Southern Iraq. Few of them put on a head-rope (*fatil*) in their own villages. They frequently wear curved narrow-bladed daggers (*khanjar*) fastened round their waists with a piece of cord. Some of them own rifles (*tafaq*), but these are usually in bad condition and much of their ammunition (*fashaq*) is locally made. Their other weapons are clubs (*sakhair*) weighted with lumps of bitumen, and fishing spears.

All Ma'dan enjoy singing and dancing and only at Saiqal, where the Al 'Isa, one of the Muntifiq shepherd tribes, have encroached on the marshes, are song and dance (other than the war dance [*hausa*]) forbidden by their sheikhs as unseemly amongst Moslems. Elsewhere men and boys with good voices acquire considerable fame. New songs (*basta*) are frequently composed and are sung by the Ma'dan as they paddle about in their canoes, cut reeds or sit round their fires in the evenings. A young and very rich sheikh, of a tribe living on the edge of the marshes, recently married a girl from a distant town, but the marriage was a failure and he soon divorced her. She retaliated by composing a song beginning "The Arabs told me about you, a tyrant despite your tender years." This song had a very catching tune and it was soon known over most of Southern Iraq. In the evenings the Ma'dan assemble in the headman's or some other large house in the village. They sit round talking, drinking tea and smoking. After a time someone probably starts to sing, others then join in, and a boy is soon sent round the village to collect drums (*khashba*) and tambourines (*zinjāri*). The drum used by the Ma'dan is made of clay and is shaped like a vase, about eighteen inches long and eight inches across at the widest end, which is covered with thin skin. The other end is left open. They play this drum by tapping on it with their fingers. Pipes (*māsūl*) are played by the shepherd tribes but not by the marshmen. A band usually consists of two or three drums and two or three tambourines, and there are always plenty of people present who can play these instruments. Soon everyone in the village knows that there is to be a dance, and men and boys arrive, paddling across to the house where it is to take place. The house is soon surrounded by their empty canoes. Women are not present at these dances. Everybody sits on the ground and most of them join in the singing while they keep time to the music by beating the ground with the heel of one foot, and clicking their two index fingers together. Boys are then encouraged to get up and dance, either singly or two or three together. Their dancing varies a certain amount, since each boy develops his own distinctive style, but the broad pattern of their dances is uniform and erotic but seldom obscene. Most of the young men and boys, some of them quite small children, can dance, and the most manly of these lads are usually the most skilful. They enjoy dancing as they enjoy singing, but would bitterly resent being called *rāqus* (dancers), since this word is usually only applied to professional dancing boys, although *raqas* used as a verb (to dance) is not offensive. The dances performed by the village boys and the dancing boys are, however, very much the same, but the villagers do it for fun and the dancing boys as a profession. Most of the professionals live in villages and towns outside the marshes. They travel about the country in order to dance at important weddings or other

festivities. The first one I met was only about ten years old. While he danced he became a parody of a gipsy dancing girl, his expression languid and yet inviting and his movements sensuous and wanton, yet when he came and sat down beside me after the dance he proved to be a surprisingly unsophisticated and attractive little boy. This can certainly not be said of the other dancing boys whom I have seen there, though as dancers they are both graceful and indefatigable. Most of them were about eighteen years old and were contemptuously known as *dhaḳar bintha*. When they dance they dress as girls, but usually in scarlet, with padded breasts, plucked eyebrows and made-up faces, and they sometimes wear ropes of artificial pearls and gold ear ornaments. They always have long hair, reaching to below their shoulders, and this they keep carefully oiled and toss it to and fro while they dance. They use castanets (*ṣikamigh*), which I have not seen used in these parts except by these dancing boys or by gipsy girls in the towns. Once in the Eastern Marshes I noticed a handsome lad sitting outside a *mudhif*, who was remarkable by reason of his long plaited hair. Later I discovered that what I had supposed to be a boy was really a girl. My companion told me that she always dressed as a man, lived with men as one of themselves and even fed with them. They called her a *mustarjil* and accounted for her eccentricity by saying she had the heart of a man. There are apparently several of these *mustarjil* in the marshes.*

A marriage among the Ma'dan is always an occasion for great festivity. If the bride belongs to another village the bridegroom's friends set out in the morning in their canoes to fetch her. The bridegroom never accompanies them but remains behind in his house. The greater part of the day is spent at the bride's village in feasting and dancing. Towards evening everyone collects at the bride's home where they dance the *hausa*, or war dance. One man sings a couple of lines, which the others then repeat in chorus as they stamp round in a circle, brandishing their weapons and firing off their rifles. The bride is then placed in a canoe and is taken to her new village, accompanied by a great crowd in canoes, singing and firing off shots. The party, known as *zuafif*, stops at any village through which it passes, and lands at one or more of the houses to dance the *hausa*. The rejoicing reaches its climax as they approach the bridegroom's home. I recently attended the wedding of an orphaned boy called Dakhil. He had disposed of almost everything which he possessed in order to pay the bride price, and had not even a hut of his own. He had erected a small red mosquito net as his bridal chamber at the end of his cousin's house, which he had spent the greater part of the day in lengthening. Since he belonged to a different tribe from the rest of the village, it seemed likely that his marriage would be a small affair, but as he was an old friend of mine I turned up with a party and we fired off a considerable number of shots while we fetched his bride. This firing attracted the marshmen from the surrounding villages and his marriage became, for this village at any rate, the event of the year. In the evening the house was packed to suffocation and many people had to sit in their canoes outside, while inside the singing and dancing was continuous. At midnight I left, thinking

* I was told by C. J. Edmonds that once when he was in the house of a Kurdish Agha he was handed his coffee by a girl dressed and armed like a man.

that Dakhil would be glad if the party broke up. When I saw him in the morning he was without his head-rope and his new shirt was sadly torn. His friends, who had remained behind in the house, laughingly maintained that when he went to his wife she had thrown him out into the water, a charge which he indignantly denied. With these Arabs it is customary for a man to fire off a rifle as soon as he has consummated his marriage. Dakhil certainly fired off a shot.

Amongst other Arab tribes circumcisions are celebrated with dancing and feasting, sometimes lasting for a week or more, but amongst the Ma'dan they are not occasions for any particular rejoicing, except in the case of sheikhs' sons. Sometimes a few shots are fired and there is a little ululating by the boy's mother. The operation is always performed in warm weather, the boy sitting on a large upturned grain mortar (*jawan*) in the centre of a large crowd, which usually includes some women. After he has been circumcised the boy stuffs up his nostrils and hangs some onions round his neck until the wound is healed.* Circumcision is generally regarded as obligatory by Muslims, especially by Arab tribesmen, most of whom would refuse to eat meat from an animal slaughtered by a boy as yet uncircumcised. Many of the Ma'dan are however remiss about undergoing this operation, which amongst them is usually performed on boys between the ages of ten and twenty, although it is sometimes postponed until a man is considerably older. Some of these tribesmen excuse themselves from submitting to it on the grounds that an angel circumcised them at birth (*Ṭahura al Malaika*), whilst others, who have put it off until they are grown up, refuse to have it done, since they say there would be no one to look after their buffaloes while they were laid up, which might be for a month or more.† The Ma'dan apply the name *Ṣubbi* as a term of reproach to such people, since the Subæans do not circumcise. Female circumcision appears to have been recently abandoned by most of these tribes.

The Ma'dan, like most of the Arabs in Southern Iraq, are Shia'. A considerable number of them claim to be *Sayids* or descendants of the Prophet and differentiate themselves from the other tribesmen by wearing green-and-black instead of black-and-white check headcloths. There is scarcely a village but contains one or two families of *Sayids*, and there are a few villages inhabited entirely by them; indeed I suspect that as many as 5 per cent. of the Ma'dan make this claim for themselves. These *Sayids* command great respect among the tribesmen but in general live the same sort of life as the others and are not parasitic, as are so many of the *Sayids* in the Hadhramaut. Some of them are indeed very poor. Most of the Ma'dan are lax about their religion. Few of them know how to pray and fewer of them keep the fast. I have twice watched Ma'dan during their dances perform a blasphemous and indecent parody of Muslim prayer. All Shia' place a small tablet of holy earth (*turba*) in front of them when

* Among the shepherd tribes, but not among the Ma'dan, boys who have been circumcised wear one or more bead necklaces until they are healed. These tribesmen all believe that the wound would become swollen if the patient should smell baking bread or any scent, or if he ate fish, curds, cream or water-melons.

† In a large Kauliba encampment I was told that only two old men were circumcised. This was certainly exceptional, but many of the Shia' tribes of Southern Iraq, both shepherds and cultivators as well as the Ma'dan, are very lax in this matter.

they pray and touch it with their foreheads when they prostrate themselves. On the occasion of these dances they put a brick on the ground, which one of the two boys taking part in the dance touched with his forehead at intervals whilst he prostrated himself with his back turned to Mecca, while the other boy postured behind his back. The audience meanwhile chanted *subhan Allah—Allah akbar*. A number of Ma'dan make the pilgrimage to Mashad al Ridha in Persia and are then known by the title of *Zair*. Few of them have been to Mecca, although this pilgrimage is probably no more difficult or expensive than the journey to Mashad. Many of them visit the Holy Cities in Iraq, or local shrines such as Ali al Gharbi, Ali al Sharqi, or the tomb of Bin Ali near Al Azair. When a man dies his family will if possible take his corpse to Najaf for burial. Women and small children are, however, buried on any of the islands in the marshes. As soon as someone dies his family fire off their rifles, and it is usually possible to assess the importance of the person who has died by the number of shots which are fired. Visits of condolence are paid to the family by their friends, and each party of mourners wails and laments on arrival at the house and continues to do so as long as it remains there. In 1952 I was in the marshes during *Muharam*. In some places the villagers collected in the evening and mourned while a *Sayid* recited the story of the martyrdom of Hussein, but in other villages they made no attempt to commemorate this event, which elsewhere in the Shia' world is recalled and re-enacted during these ten days with so much emotion. Like most Shia', they swear by Ali and Abbas more often than by Allah. Many of them swear by Fuwada, a female *Sayid* who is buried on the Gharraf. Some of the Al Bu Muhammad use a curious oath—*wa laban ummak* (by your mother's milk). I have also heard marshmen swear by the sun and the moon (*wa ḥat hadha al qamr*) and frequently on a *mudhif* (*wa ḥat hadha al mudhif wa bakhathu*). Shia' usually regard it as a defilement to drink from a cup which has been used by a Christian unless it has been washed, but this has seldom happened to me amongst the Ma'dan, few of whom are fanatical. Non-Muslim names are common among them. Animal names are especially popular and it is surprising to meet men called *Khanzir* (pig), *Dhauba* (hyena), *Jahaish* (little donkey), *Barghush* (flea), *Jarad* (locust), *Kausaj* (shark), or *Afrit* (jin) and *Barur* (dung).*

The Ma'dan suffer much from sickness and disease as a result of the conditions under which they live. The Iraqi Government maintains hospitals in Basra, 'Amara and Nasariya, and dispensaries in some of the smaller towns near the marshes, such as Majar al Kabir, Qallat Salih and Kubaish, but it is often difficult for a marshman to spare the time from tending his buffaloes or his rice to go to one of these places to get himself treated. Most of them have had little contact with the world outside the marshes, and prefer, when they fall sick, to remain in their villages and to

* Other unusual names used by the Ma'dan are: *Chilaib* (little dog), *Jaraizi* (rat), *Bakur* (sow), *'Atwi* (cat), *Haulia* (little buffalo), *Wawi* (jackal), *Qunfudh* (hedgehog), *'Anza* (goat), *Shibil* (young pig), *Barhan* (purple gallinule), *Haliki* (cormorant), *Gharab* (crow), *Tawaira* (little bird), *Barghash* (gnat), *Raqa* and *Rafash* (terrapin), *Shabut, Qatan, Binnia, Hamria, Jari, 'Ajid, Shalij* (names of fish), *Shauka* (thorn), *Handhal* (bitter melon), *Rajia* (water-melon), *Khalila* (date), *Tabikh* (a dish of rice), *Sahain* (little dish), *Adhaim* (little bone), *Jild* (skin). Diminutives are frequently used.

hope for the best. I always take with me a well-stocked medicine chest, and although I have no medical training I have acquired during twenty years' wandering in remote places some practical knowledge of medicine and first aid. Living among these marshmen I have sometimes been able to help them, but all too often I have been defeated by my ignorance.

Bilharzia, dysentery and *bajal*, or *bashal* as it is called by the Ma'dan, are the scourges of these marshes. Bilharzia is endemic in this area, and by far the greater number of these people inevitably suffer from it. Dysentery, both amœbic and bacillary, is also rife. The water round the houses is always contaminated, and this is especially the case when Ma'dan are living crowded together on an island and using the foreshore as a public lavatory. Women when fetching water seldom wade out more than a few feet to fill their pots. *Bashal*, which is akin to yaws and in some cases produces appalling sores, is very common, although it is often difficult for a layman to distinguish it from syphilis. I have seen few cases of gonorrhœa. The Ma'dan are much inflicted with hookworms and with roundworms, the result of eating under-cooked fish, and many of them, especially the children, suffer from thread-worms. As a result of bilharzia, dysentery or worms many of them are anæmic. Ringworm is common among children, often covering their entire heads so that many of them become permanently bald.* Almost all the Ma'dan complain of stomach-ache, and most of them as they grow old of rheumatic pains. A large number of the old men suffer from chronic lumbago. Like all Arabs, the Ma'dan are frequently afflicted with piles. They suffer less than the Badu from eye troubles, but cataract, trachoma and conjunctivitis are not uncommon. I have seen one leper in the marshes and several cases of dropsy. There appears to be little malaria inside the marshes, despite the clouds of mosquitoes in the summer, although it is quite common around their edges.† Infant mortality is of course very high. In the autumn of 1951 there was an epidemic of whooping cough which killed many of the smaller children. Flies are numerous in the spring and die off in the heat of the summer, but, except in the fishing camps, are not the curse which they so often become at this season on the mainland. Fleas, however, are far worse. They swarm in the dwellings of the Ma'dan during the spring months, allowing their occupants but little sleep. At night there are often hundreds hopping about on one at the same time. In spring dense clouds of midges (*barqash*) frequent the beds of bulrushes, and although they do not bite are none the less tiresome, filling ones eyes and nose. During the heat of summer, when the flies and fleas have largely disappeared, the mosquitoes (*buk*) flourish, in some places in myriads. In the autumn sandflies (*harmis*) often make the night a misery, but they are worse on the mainland than in the marsh villages.

During the winter months the marshes are alive with wild-fowl. I have

* One very still day, when I was in a village of Al Bu Muhammad, my host declared that if anyone could name forty bald people we should get a badly needed breeze. Owing to the prevalence of ringworm they had no difficulty in naming the required number.

† *Anopheles pulcherrimus*, the dominant species of mosquito in the marshes, is a poor carrier of malaria. *Anopheles Stephensi*, which is generally found outside the marshes, is a much more effective carrier of malaria.

seen duck flighting on to rice fields while the sun was still well above the horizon in numbers which reminded me of swarms of locusts. All kinds of European duck winter here, as well as the marbled duck (*malha*), which remains to breed. I have watched spellbound while seemingly endless skeins of geese passed overhead and the cold air rang with their calling. These geese are the white-fronted and the greylag. A few of the greylag linger on to breed in March among the vast expanses of bulrushes, and the Ma'dan seek out their nests in order to take their eggs and hatch them out under chickens. I have seen their goslings in villages in both the Eastern and Central Marshes and on the Dijaila. Great bands of coots also arrive here in the autumn and remain for a while in the spring after the ducks have left. They collect in hundreds on the lagoons and wider water-ways, and whenever a questing eagle comes into sight flying low over the reed-beds they bunch together and beat the water into spray with their wings. There are great numbers of pelicans, some of which also breed here, and I have seen the marshmen spearing the young birds, still unable to fly, on Umm al Binni in October. I have only once, at the end of March, seen flamingos in these marshes. Common cormorants, pigmy cormorants, darters, grebes, herons, including the goliath heron, spoonbills, ibis, curlews, stilts, avocets, sandpipers, and snipe, gulls, terns, ospreys and harriers, enliven these marshes during the colder months, and Ma'dan armed often with primitive muzzle-loading guns go out shooting from dawn till dusk. Crouching naked behind a handful of reeds, a marksman will wade slowly through the icy water towards a bunch of duck or coots, intent on getting as many birds with one shot as possible. But by far the greatest number of ducks are taken in nets on ponds outside the marshes and are later sold in the towns. During the summer a stillness and emptiness descends on the marshes. Nearly all the birds have left and only the purple gallinule (*barhan*)* skulking along the edge of the reed-beds offers a target for the marshman's gun. This is the time of hunger in the marshes, for the water is still high and fishing difficult, and the stores of rice in the houses are running low. The villagers are now busy sowing and planting out their next year's crop which they have to guard at night from the ravages of wild pig. Pig abound in this country. In two years I shot 488, walking them up in the reed-beds or stalking them in a small canoe as they lay asleep on the banks of water channels on the edge of the marshes. I used a 275 Rigby high-velocity rifle and found it most effective. These pig (*Sus scrofa*)† are the same as the Indian wild boar. They vary greatly in colour. Some of them have long matted coats of reddish hair, others are covered with short grey bristles, and many of them are rubbed nearly naked so that they look almost black. They run to a great size, and several which I have shot must have weighed over 300 lb. In swampy bulrush beds they build for themselves great sodden nests of rushes (*chabasha*), six feet across and often two feet or more in height, on which they sleep during the day. I found that once I had marked down one of these nests I could usually

* I have found their nests in May, containing three or four eggs.

† The Indian and the European wild boar are now considered to belong to the same species *Sus scrofa*. See *Check List of Palearctic and Indian Mammals*, by Ellerman and Morrison-Scott, pages 344-5.

return and kill the pig on it. When they lie up on the banks of canals they often carry some reeds to their wallows where they make rudimentary nests, even though the ground is nearly dry. They breed in April and May and usually produce four or five in a litter. Once when I visited an 'Amaira village in the Central Marshes they told me that a number of pigs always spent the night there in some empty houses. This village was surrounded by open water about three feet deep, beyond which were thick beds of rushes. At sunset I waited in a canoe beside one of these empty houses. The villagers were milking their buffaloes, lighting fires and shouting and talking in the houses all around us. As the sun set three pigs splashed through the water towards the village. I killed one of them with a shotgun as it passed us about twenty-five yards away. We chased the other two in our canoe and eventually killed both, after much shouting and shooting. As we returned to the village, some men called out to us that several more pigs had just entered an empty house next to their own and about four yards from it. When we looked into this house half a dozen pigs bolted out of it. We chased them and killed four of them. The marshmen, being Muslims, will not eat pig,* but are delighted to see them shot, since not only do they do so much damage to their crops but sometimes attack and wound them when they are cutting reeds. When the floods are high and large numbers of pig have collected on the *qaṣṣab* islands the sheikhs occasionally organize hunts. The marshmen assemble in small canoes. Some of them land on the islands and try to drive the pig out of the tangled masses of vegetation into the water, where the waiting Arabs spear them or club them to death. The beaters, who are armed with fishing spears, are frequently attacked and often severely injured. When the floods are at their height great numbers of pig leave the marshes and move into the fields of wheat and barley, and when these fields are cut lie up in the palm gardens.

Otters (*ḳalb al mai*) are common in the marshes. The Ma'dan shoot them for their skins and sometimes capture and tame their young ones. One marshman shot forty in three months. I have several times seen Indian jungle cats here, one of which was speared by my companions while swimming across some open water. Persian mongoose live on the islands and at low water in the beds of rushes. Wolves, jackals and foxes occur on the mainland round the marsh and I once saw a hyæna on the outskirts of 'Amara.

Snakes are plentiful in the marshes and are constantly to be seen swimming about during the floods, but I have not met any of the Ma'dan who have been bitten by one, though they particularly dread a large dark snake (*arbid*). Both the small, hard-shelled terrapin or *raqa* (*Clemmys caspia*) and the large, soft-shelled terrapin or *rafash* (*Trionyx euphraticus*) are common. P. A. Buxton and V. H. W. Dowson in their paper, "The Marsh Arabs of Lower Mesopotamia," say that these *rafash* are celebrated for their ferocity and for the fact that they occasionally emasculate swimmers. I have never seen a marshman pay any attention to them. Sharks

* The Ma'dan use various parts of a pig for medicine and for casting spells. They believe that a pig's gall-bladder will cure snake-bite, and that a person can cure himself of rheumatism by removing the stomach from a still warm pig and then sitting inside the pig.

(*kausaj*) probably occur as far up the Tigris as 'Amara and are both plentiful and dangerous in the river at Al Azair. I have not heard of them in the marshes.

I have tried to describe the Ma'dan and their environment, but there is much on which I have not touched, either from lack of space or from lack of knowledge. In a few years' time these marshes will be drained, and a culture and way of life which have endured for centuries will disappear. Like many others, I regret the forces which are inexorably suburbanizing the untamed places of the world and turning tribesmen into corner-boys.



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF BRITISH COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA

By H. J. COLLAR, C.B.E.
(*of the China Association*)

Luncheon lecture given on September 30, 1953, Mr. Edward J. Nathan, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: In the unavoidable absence of the chairman of Council, I have been asked to take the chair at this meeting and introduce to you our lecturer today. It gives me very great pleasure to do so. I have known Mr. Collar for some twenty years and he tells me that he has been in China for thirty years. He was connected throughout that time with the Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, and he is therefore, I think, probably in a unique position to speak to us on this subject of recent developments in British trade with China.

This subject may sound somewhat off the track of the lectures and subjects which this Society presents, but I think if you will reflect for a moment you will realize that our commercial policy in China nowadays is so closely bound up with politics and political issues that it is in every way a fit subject for us to have expounded to us. I am quite sure that Mr. Collar will do so in a very constructive and informative manner and I have pleasure in introducing him.

I FIND it rather hard to know where to begin a talk of this kind. The old adage says, " Begin at the beginning," but in trying to understand the present it is often necessary to go back some way into past history, which means beginning at some far-off rather indefinite period. So I am going to start at what I shall optimistically call the middle—the present. I say " optimistically " because we have had a past and I think that we shall have a future.

I think there is no question about the fact that today we are at a turning-point in our relations with China, both politically and economically. As Mr. Nathan has said, one cannot separate those two factors. I shall touch on the present, then go a little way back into the past and, if time permits, try to see what the future may hold for us.

The position of British commercial interests in China today is thoroughly unhappy. We are not today the masters of our own destiny. We are to a very large extent at the mercy of Chinese officialdom. Of all our particular problems, one of the largest is the fact that most of us have far more staff on our pay-rolls today than we can possibly afford to keep. Virtually, we are not allowed to discharge them, and many unfortunate employers have found that not only do they have to pay their normal staff, but added to their pay-rolls are many who in the past have been only casual employees.

The reason why we have that large surplus of staff is interesting, and it arises from the difference in the methods by which we can trade today. In the past, if we were importers, not only did we bring in the goods; we stored them, distributed them, perhaps to thousands of customers, and we

had technicians to advise our customers on modern methods, as well as accountants and salesmen. If exporters, we had to collect the goods, sort them, grade them, prepare them for shipment, and get them away.

The most we can do in China today is to act as brokers—I am speaking of the merchant class—and for that we need only a small staff. Therefore, we have many more staff than we can afford to keep, but we are not allowed to discharge them without permission of the Government, and that is not given unless at the same time we virtually close down.

We have also problems regarding European staff, particularly those concerning their entering and leaving the country. If one wishes to get someone out, one probably needs to replace him, and it is necessary to apply for an entry permit for the replacement. The reply may be received in nine months or six months, or there may be no reply. Meanwhile the man in the country who is waiting to be replaced is having rather more of it than he likes. That is quite a serious matter, and not the smallest difficulty it raises is that under those conditions it is not easy to get people who are willing to go in.

Living conditions in the country are quite tolerable. There is very little interference indeed with personal liberty, except in so far as movement is concerned. One cannot move outside the town in which one lives. But even these living conditions can be quite intolerable if one is in the position of the unfortunate man in one port who is the only business man left there. He has not been granted an exit permit, although his business has been closed down for two years and no reason has been given.

Then there is the doctrine of personal responsibility. This is not new in China, but perhaps the occasion has not arisen in the past of a large number of businesses wanting to close down. Under this, the senior staff are held responsible for every act of their company, present and past, and the matters of particular concern are those of the past, because, as so frequently can happen, old claims may be raked up if individuals or the authorities wish to make any difficulty.

The fact that profits cannot be remitted is not a very serious problem. In the first place, very few people have profits to remit, and it is so common a feature of the exchange control regulations of many parts of the world.

Further, we have our European staffs there, perhaps fewer in numbers than before, and we have the whole of our Chinese staff, but we do find it extremely difficult to get ordinary merchant business in order to try to make a bit of money in the country with which to meet expenses, and here I am referring particularly to merchants as opposed to those in industry.

This situation derives very largely from the creation of the new Chinese trading organizations. Peking has tried to operate the whole of the commerce and economic life of the country through official organs. But they have not been able to do so; they realized quite quickly that there is much they cannot do, so there is still room in the country for private enterprise of a fairly limited nature. All the bulk business, however, in both exports and imports is handled by large Government monopolies. Not only do they handle the imports in bulk but also do the whole of the distribution.

They have adopted, too, a very definite policy of trying to buy direct from the producer and of selling direct to the consumer. The reason is

understandable: they want to eliminate the middle-man where they feel he does not serve a useful purpose.

In trying to carry out that policy I think they are going a lot further than is wise or necessary, but our people in China are very rarely able to obtain business from Government organizations. Whereas in the past we had many thousands of customers, today we have virtually one—the Government, with perhaps a handful of private customers who are under fairly close Governmental supervision, even if they are not actually controlled.

The position of industry is rather different—that is, industry under foreign management or control. Practically the whole of that industry is providing consumer goods which are of first importance to China today, so it is compelled to keep in full operation, and although for a time it was not able to do so profitably, it is in general able to do so today. I think some of the industries are making quite handsome profits in the country, although none has any expectation of being able to keep those profits for long. The profits will almost certainly be swallowed up by some sort of taxation or perhaps some special contribution to Government bonds.

As regards the movement of foreign staff, technicians are of first importance to China and to withdraw a technician is very nearly impossible.

As a result of these conditions a good many of the British and other companies in China have tried to close. They have applied for permission to do so, and a number of notes have been put in by our *chargé d'affaires* in Peking asking for the assistance of the authorities in this. Where replies have been received they have been quite formal and straightforward and have simply said, "All you have to do is to comply with the routine and you will have no further difficulties." In fact, all those concerned have done their best to comply with the routine, but it is quite clear that until a directive is received from Peking by the local authorities to give assistance in completing that routine one has no hope whatever of doing so and thereby qualifying for final closure.

There has been a certain amount of progress towards closure and small merchant firms in general have been able to get away, but, as far as the larger enterprises are concerned, closure has been possible only under two main headings.

The first group—and these we consider to be the fortunate ones—are those whose properties or enterprises have been requisitioned, such as the oil companies and the public utility companies. Those in this group retain technically the title to their properties and if there should ever be a day of reckoning they will have something to claim.

The other group consists of those companies which have been willing to hand over the whole of their assets in China against their outstanding liabilities. I think it is fair to say, without going into particulars, that in probably every case the true actuarial value of those assets has been enormously in excess of the real liabilities, but in all cases the liabilities have been so manipulated as to exceed the assets, so the companies have been only too glad to hand over on that basis if they could. The people in that group, I fear, have lost any hope of making a claim if it should ever be possible to do so later on.

There have also been some signs of progress in the small offices in the outports. Many of the larger organizations in China had offices throughout the country, nearly all with head offices in Shanghai, and it has appeared lately as though there is a chance (one cannot put it higher than that) of it being possible to close down these outport offices, but so far as Shanghai is concerned we appear to be up against a complete brick wall.

With all this, I should make it clear that although there are these conditions, which we claim are intolerable, there is no real discrimination. We are being treated in the same way, broadly speaking, as the Chinese. Indeed, if anything, we have in some cases received rather better treatment. But the difference lies in the fact that the Chinese merchant who is in the same situation is in his own country—he has to live there, he has no alternative and, therefore, at least he has some reason for trying to make the best of it. Also, a Chinese merchant does not have the European staff problem, which for us is very serious.

We do not see why we should have to go on under these conditions and therefore we are applying to withdraw, but I do wish to emphasize the point that there is no real discrimination between the foreign merchant or trader and the Chinese.

Coming back now to the fairly recent past, our position today presents an incredible contrast with that of Western enterprise in China in the early part of the century, up to the middle 'twenties. We had then extra-territoriality, which meant we were not subject to the laws of China. We were able to operate from the Treaty ports, in a number of which there were Concessions. The Concessions provided a haven of refuge for business, both Western and Chinese, and a very large proportion of the trade of the country gravitated to them and was finally channelled by the Chinese through the foreign merchant, in respect both of imports and exports.

We did, therefore, come to have a very large measure of influence over the internal as well as the external trade of the country. The majority of industries were set up as a result of Western enterprise, probably with Western capital, and many were under Western direction. In the field of communications, many railways were built and many more financed by the West. As for water-borne traffic, the whole of the ocean shipping was in foreign hands, and a very large proportion of the coastwise and river-borne traffic.

The same is true, broadly speaking, of the ancillary services, such as banking and insurance. The whole of the overseas business was in the hands of Western banks and insurance companies, and very much of the domestic trade. We had an enormous influence over the economic life of China and our position was not confined purely to the economic side. Even on the administrative side, we had an unprecedented amount of power over the fortunes of a friendly country. I am referring particularly to the Customs, Posts and Telegraphs, which between them produced the majority of the revenues of the country. They were under foreign control and all the senior positions were staffed by foreigners.

That was not a position towards which we had worked. It arrived to some extent by accident. These organizations were originally set up and

staffed by Europeans at the request of the Chinese Government, whose servants they were. They did not touch the revenues whose collection they arranged. The revenues all went to Peking. But during the course of the internal struggles after the revolution in 1911 it became extremely hard to know which was the Government of the country. Accordingly, it became the custom for the Inspector-General to retain the revenues, to use them for the service of foreign bonds and other obligations, and to remit the balance to what he considered was for the time being the Government of the country.

That caused a lot of resentment, for the revolution started in the South and there was for a period a complete cleavage between the North and South, yet all Customs and other revenues from the South were sent to Peking.

The position which Western enterprise attained in China no doubt brought very great material benefit to the country, but one says that with a little hesitation. Those benefits were material because of the disturbed state of the country, and one has the uneasy feeling that had we not taken this exceptional part in the affairs of China there might not have been quite so much internal disruption to benefit from our activities. Be that as it may, it was of great benefit to the country as it was at that time, torn by internal dissension, but it did naturally provoke a great deal of resentment.

It is always difficult to say, even at the time, to what extent such resentment is real, or to what extent it is artificially stimulated for political or other purposes.

It was rather interesting, if I may turn aside for a moment, to listen to a talk on the radio last night on Morocco, where the French occupy somewhat the same position as we did in China. The narrator was talking of the conditions in the capital, of the wonderful buildings, the roads, industry, and the improvement in the standard of living; but in referring to the recent disturbances there he said there are a few intelligentsia in the country who are against the French, but the average man in the country wants merely to be able to live and work in peace and does not mind who governs him.

That is precisely what we used to say of China, and I think that just as we were wrong then, so the attitude expressed last night is probably equally wrong. The resentment is there, but because such a large proportion of the population is illiterate, or unable to express itself, we do not appreciate its feeling.

There must have been elements of that feeling right throughout China in the past, because it did not appear difficult to arouse anti-foreign feeling when it was wanted, and there is no doubt that this anti-foreign feeling and the abolition of what is called the "unequal Treaties" was an essential part of the political platform of any party in China which wished to obtain power.

It was utilized to the full by the Kuomintang, both in 1911 and afterwards, when it acquired full power and sovereignty over the country. Sentiment in the country was all the time changing and this led to a progressive loss or abandonment of privileges as the régime became more firmly established. This movement reached its culmination during the

war, when there was voluntary surrender of rights and concessions to Chiang Kai-shek in order to raise the morale of the Chinese at the time when there was a real fear that there might be some compromise with Japan.

No doubt this was done in good faith and in the hope that, after the war, Western enterprise in China would at least be on a basis of equality with the Chinese and there would be an equal opportunity for trade. But that did not in fact prove to be the case. There was a great deal of discrimination against the foreign trader after the war.

It was particularly evident when after the extravagances of the first year of free trading it became necessary to impose strict controls over imports, exports and exchange. This provided an ideal opportunity for manipulation, and British and Western merchants in general were very badly treated. At the same time the Kuomintang set up monopolies, particularly for the handling of exports, and semi-official companies for the handling and distribution of imports, which received preferential treatment throughout.

Conditions in general went from bad to worse, especially with the very serious currency inflation, so that by the time the Communists started to take over the country the situation of the Western merchant in China was already at a fairly low ebb. I think a good many of us who were there, because we did not like Communism as such, found it difficult to believe that these people really were Communists, and certainly thought that things could not be much worse under the Communists than they had been in recent times under the Kuomintang.

But for us even those poor hopes were not fulfilled, and conditions finally reached the state that I have described at the beginning of my talk. I think all one can say is that the Communists have simply completed an inevitable historical process. They have speeded things up, the change has taken place faster, and they have done it in a manner which has not been pleasant; but I do not think we can blame our position today solely on the Communists. It is rather the completion of an historical process which has perhaps also gone further than it would otherwise have done.

We now come to what is perhaps the most interesting point, and that is that they have not finished the process. We have been more or less in a state of stagnation in the past year. In all other Iron Curtain countries the authorities have not been able to chase the Western companies out fast enough, but in China we are still there. We want to get out and they will not let us go. It is quite the opposite to what has happened elsewhere, and it is interesting to speculate on the reasons.

There is no doubt a very great need on the part of China for Western trade. We must assume definitely that the people in Peking, for personal reasons or otherwise, want to build a strong and independent China. Their first step in that process was the land reform, which had two main objects. The first was to obtain the support of the peasants on whom the Revolution has been based, and the second, to provide a means of eliminating the landlords, who would have proved the focal point of any genuine counter-revolutionary action. Another motive was to try to increase production.

As regards increased production, they hoped that this would be achieved in part by having the peasant working for himself instead of for his land-

lord. There is initially a retrograde effect in the breaking-up, the fragmentization, of the large landlord holdings into small ones, but the authorities have in mind ultimate collectivization, which is apt to lead to unemployment for the farmer. But the farmer is going to grow more only if he can buy more, and that leads to an increased demand for consumer goods. Therefore, on the grounds of the need for an increased supply of consumer goods and of the unemployment which is almost certain to result from collectivization, China will have a very urgent need for industrialization, particularly for the production of consumer goods. Most of the emphasis from Peking has been on building up heavy industry, but I have already seen signs of weakening, and they are beginning to realize that consumer goods come first, or at least have an equal importance with the building up of heavy industry. So both these factors postulate the need for industrialization.

China has turned first to the Iron Curtain countries for her needs, and it is fairly clear that she has not been able to get the things she requires. Our embargo has hit them, not so much perhaps because they cannot get the goods they require—they may not have suffered much in that direction —but they have undoubtedly had to pay heavily for what they have had to buy from the Iron Curtain countries.

There is specific evidence of this in so far as Eastern European countries have been reselling China's produce at prices far below those at which China is willing to sell on the open market. That can be done only if large profits have been made on what has been sold to China. It has not taken China long to learn how unsatisfactory this is.

We know that certain Eastern European countries have not kept their side of the bargain and have held up programmes of delivery. Quite apart from that, the Iron Curtain countries, and Russia in particular, are concerned with industrialization also, so it is quite understandable if they cannot spare the goods required by China, whose needs will be practically insatiable.

I think that on these counts I have shown the Chinese need for industrialization and the probability that she cannot obtain what she wants from the Soviet *bloc*, so that it is essential for her to turn to the West. We have seen her apparent attempts to do this through the Moscow Economic Conference and various subsequent trade discussions. This situation is of interest for the light that it may throw on Chinese policy for the next few years. It is clear from all that we have seen and learned that the embargo has hit China very much. The Minister of Finance said quite specifically in regard to the Moscow Conference last year that one purpose was to break the embargo, although they have stated since that it does no harm at all.

China does realize that for so long as she is engaged in actual aggression she will be hit by embargoes, perhaps even stronger ones if she does the same thing again, and that, I think, does offer real grounds for the belief that China will not engage further in active aggression, such as in Indo-China.

It is possible that what I have said hitherto may have given you the impression that we have been doing no trade with China. That is not correct. We have not been trading *in* China, but trade *with* China has

continued at a fair volume, and in fact the volume is higher than we would have anticipated.

We have lost by not being able to send certain "embargoed" goods, but the goods which may be shipped have been greater in quantity than might have been anticipated.

There has, however, been a great change in pattern, particularly in that whereas in the past we undertook both importation and distribution, all that we can do today is to make the bulk sales. In China's efforts to eliminate the middleman she has apparently been trying to short-circuit Hongkong.

She has also set up an office in East Berlin, which has operated with a certain measure of success, and has organized various trade conferences, all with the intention of cutting out the middleman. But whereas she has to some extent succeeded, she has, I think, run up against many difficulties, since it is the middleman who knows the business and who has an intimate knowledge of China's requirements. She has enlisted the aid of people who do not know the country, and it is clear there have been many difficulties. This is particularly evident in regard to the handling of Chinese exports, which needs a lifetime of experience, both in the selection of goods and knowing the proper channels of distribution. In that connection I think China is going to have to go back to the established channels of trade.

In the same way, I think China will have to give up the attempt to cut out Hongkong. Hongkong occupies a quite extraordinary position. We have in Hongkong today banks, insurance companies, merchants and manufacturers, representatives of almost every trading nation in the world. One could go into Hongkong and do millions of pounds' worth of business on an extremely competitive basis—and that is the important thing, a competitive basis—within a matter of a few hours. Nearly all nationalities are represented there and they will compete energetically to get trade. That is the strength of Hongkong in relation to China trade today, and it will, I think, be recognized by the Chinese. When it comes to trade, the Chinese will not be unduly influenced by political considerations.

That is also, I think, the strength of the British merchant—his knowledge of the people and of how trade should be conducted.

Time is getting rather short, but I should like just to deal briefly with the future. I have said that China has great need of the West. As merchants, and in so far as we are anxious to fill the stomachs of our own workers here, we are anxious for Chinese trade, but we must consider carefully where we are going. Do we want to meet all China's needs for her programme of industrialization? What are we going to build if we do? A Frankenstein monster, another enormous adjunct to Soviet power in the Far East? Or is there a chance we may be able to build a powerful but friendly nation? It is an extremely important question and one we must try to answer. One cannot, however, give an answer one feels happy about.

There are perhaps two main questions involved. First, what are the relations between China and Russia? What are they now and what will they be?

The second question is as to whether the present rulers in Peking are

Chinese first and Communists afterwards, or *vice versa*. Perhaps the Russian angle is the one on which we have the most evidence on which to base an opinion.

Russia has always been expansionist. She pushes forward when she thinks the time is opportune. If she is pushed back, she tries again, and she never gives up trying. This tendency has been seen in the Baltic, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Pacific. It has been particularly evident during the last century in Manchuria. Past tendencies therefore give grounds for the possibility of future conflict between the two.

What help has Russia given to the Chinese Revolution? Very little. Russia did help the Revolution initially. She was invited by Sun Yat-sen to help organize the Kuomintang in 1923, which she did with considerable success, and helped greatly in the initial stages of the northward advance. The Kuomintang forces got as far as the Yang-tse and brought about the rendition of the Hankow Concession. It was at that time that Chiang Kai-shek decided to break with the left-wing extremists and to throw in his lot with the bankers and the industrialists of Shanghai. He drove the Communist party underground and from then onwards he continued to harry them. During the whole of that time there is no evidence that the Communists received any support or help from Russia. In fact, I think Stalin stated quite definitely they were not worth supporting, since they were basing their revolution on the peasants instead of on a rising of industrial workers, who were, of course, very small in numbers in China.

During the war Russia gave quite substantial help to the Chinese armies. Much of it had to go past the Communist-held area, but Russia made no attempt to make sure that any of those supplies were diverted to them. I think we can say with reasonable accuracy that Russia gave neither help nor recognition to the present powers in Peking until they had completed their occupation of the country.

Mao went to Moscow and he was practically lost for six weeks. All sorts of stories were going round about his being liquidated or held prisoner, but he did finally emerge after what must have been a very stiff argument, and, to my mind, victorious. His major achievement was in reducing the old agreement made by Chiang Kai-shek, providing for Russia's occupation and control of the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchurian railway, from twenty years to two, thereby again pushing back Russian expansion towards the Pacific. That was a very real achievement. There was in addition a disappointingly small economic agreement.

That was the position up to the time of the intervention in Korea, when China established herself, I think, as a junior partner in the Communist world with Russia. But the happenings of Korea have undoubtedly forced China to move much closer to Moscow. She has been the only country on which China could rely under these conditions of near-war.

There are still signs of mistrust of Russia on the part of China.

One rather interesting thing, I think, was the inauguration last year of what Peking calls the pro-Asian movement, which in the opinion of some is designed to create a strong Asian *bloc*, including India, which can hold the balance between Moscow and the West.

I think all one can say is that in Sino-Russian relations there are today more points of agreement than of disagreement. It pays them to work together, but those points of potential disagreement do remain, and since they are rather major ones, and conditions may change, they point to the possibility that China will drift away.

The question as to whether the rulers in Peking are more Chinese than Communist is a very difficult one. I cannot try to give an answer to it. All one can say is what the outward appearances have been and are.

I think that when the Communists took over in China they did appear to be working primarily for the benefit of the people. They had their ideas, good or bad, and they appeared to be willing to change those that did not look like working.

There was practically no bloodshed—I am not speaking of the actual warfare but of the imposition of measures of administration. Land reform was put through virtually without bloodshed, and there did appear to be grounds for hoping that it would be a very Chinese form of Communism and one we could live with, but I feel the position has changed very much as a result of the Korean war.

It caused the Communists to speed up their plans. Much more severe methods were used, and this has led undoubtedly to much bloodshed and misery in the country. I think that this arose from a real and genuine fear on their part of the attitude of the West as typified in their minds by the United States, and from fear of Japan, which is being built up by the United States.

So long as conditions remain in this state of tension there are no signs that the Communists are likely to slacken in their programme of trying to turn China into a real Communist State.

The CHAIRMAN: The subject-matter of this lecture is now open to discussion. I would ask members to be brief in making the remarks they have to offer, because time is limited.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: First of all, I should like to say what a tremendous pleasure it has been to listen to somebody who is really a master of his subject. To us who left China quite a long time ago it is most refreshing to be brought really up to date, though indeed it might be said that the lecturer's story is a gloomy one.

There is one point I have to make. The lecturer mentioned the probability of collectivization of farms. I cast my mind back to the days when in Mongolia the farms were collectivized. Russia found it impossible to do this with the independent Mongol, and she may have the same difficulty among the Chinese agriculturists. It is, therefore, possible that this collectivization may not succeed.

One sees today signs that it has not been a success in Russia, and I should like the lecturer to say whether he thinks the character of the Chinese agriculturist will permit this collectivization.

Mr. COLLAR: The one thing every Chinese has always wanted to have is a piece of land, and a lot of them have been given a piece for the first time in their lives. There are already quite a number of reports—though one never knows how true they are—saying that where collectivization is

being tried out the difficulty referred to is being met with—the reluctance of the peasants to give up land once they have got it.

Lord CORK: The lecturer spoke a good deal about the discharge of all these employees for whom there is no work, or, rather, the inability to be able to discharge them. Is the position of the firms that they can discharge all British overseers, technicians and such people and yet still have on their hands all their Chinese employees for whom there is no work to do?

Mr. COLLAR: That is the position. They have in many cases no work for their Chinese staff, and all, except those who have died or retired of their own accord, are still on the pay-roll. Also the rates of pay are invariably higher than those of local standards.

Lord CORK: When a firm has gone broke, what happens?

Mr. COLLAR: No firms have allowed that to happen so far. They have been sending money in. If bills are unpaid there is a great chance of the employment of the doctrine of personal responsibility for the manager, and he will find himself in prison, or, what is even worse, in the hands of his own employees.

Miss KELLY: It is really a form of blackmail?

Mr. COLLAR: The short answer is Yes, but I would repeat that the Chinese companies are in the same position.

The CHAIRMAN: If nobody else wishes to contribute to the discussion, it is my great pleasure and duty to thank the lecturer on your behalf. I am sorry that not more people have contributed to the discussion, because the subject is a very absorbing one and it has been put before you this afternoon with quite exceptional clarity.

A point that seems to me to arise is one that was touched on by the lecturer—namely, whether it is in our interests to build up China by trading with her. That is only part of the much bigger question, it seems to me, and a fundamental question in the world today—the question of building up trade everywhere in whatever country trade is required. It is only if all the countries in the world are, both as producers and consumers, working to full capacity that enough goods can be manufactured to meet the needs of the world and enough can be produced to feed and clothe the people and enable the world to develop. Therefore I feel that whatever the political implications are it is the duty of every country to assist in trading and industrialization and in improving the standard of living of the people.

The lecturer has had unique opportunities of discovering what the position is in China, and if you have listened to him as attentively as I have, I think you will not go away with quite such a pessimistic view as you perhaps had when you came. Those of us who have been to China are not pessimists. We could not be pessimists, we would not have spent our lives in China if we were. China is a country of optimists and realists, and to my mind it is the optimists and realists who are going to make the world of the future.

I have very much pleasure on your behalf in asking you to accord a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Collar for his most able and interesting lecture.

1952 EXPEDITION TO WESTERN NEPAL

By OLEG POLUNIN

Luncheon lecture, illustrated by a film and slides, given to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, October 14, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my pleasure today to introduce to you Mr. Polunin, who has very kindly come to lecture to us this afternoon. Mr. Polunin by profession is a master of Charterhouse, but in his spare time he goes off for the sort of thing he is going to talk to us about this afternoon.

He carried out a previous expedition to Nepal in 1949. His expeditions were primarily botanical, but today he is going to talk more about the country and the people.

I THINK that before I start the narrative of the expedition it would be just as well to give you a short outline of the previous explorations that have taken place in Nepal.

As most of you are no doubt aware, Nepal has been—and still is—very much a closed country to European visitors. It was as late as 1814 that the first direct contact was made with Nepal when the Gurkhas, in an aggressive mood, sent military sorties southwards over the borders in an attempt to annex British Indian territory in the Gorakhpur district. A small expeditionary force was sent into the treacherous Nepal terai to deal with these able fighters from the hills. As a result of this minor war and the treaty that followed in 1816, the King of Nepal agreed to allow a British representative to take up residence in Katmandu. From this developed the firm and prolonged friendship that we have held with this remote country. The Nepalese have, however, continued to guard their country jealously and only a few selected people have been allowed to travel to Katmandu, and no Europeans have been given permission to travel in the mountainous districts before 1949.

In outlining the exploration of the flora and fauna of the country, there are a few names I should mention. Wallich, the great Asian botanist, stayed a year in Katmandu in 1820-21 and made a classic collection of plants. He was not allowed to travel outside the valley, but he sent out native collectors who brought back specimens from the surrounding mountainous districts—particularly from Gosainkund. His extensive collection from Nepal was a landmark in the study of the Himalayan flora. It is only quite recently that we have been re-collecting some of the plants that Wallich found over a hundred years ago.

Then mention must be made of Sir Brian Houghton Hodgson, who for over twenty years was the British Resident in Katmandu. He made extremely fine collections of mammals, birds and reptiles, and he contributed 127 papers on the fauna of the Himalaya. He was perhaps even better known as a scholar of Sanscrit Buddhist manuscripts, and he formed a large collection which is distributed among the museums and libraries of the world.

The first authentic scientific expedition to the mountains was made, as far as I am aware, by Sir J. D. Hooker in 1848. He travelled from Sikkim up the Yangma valley to a high pass leading into Tibet. He made an important collection of plants and wrote a memorable account of the journey in his Himalayan Journals.

From the botanical point of view, two native collectors should also be mentioned. They are Lall Dworj and Sharma, who collected plants and seeds from central and eastern Nepal between the years 1927 and 1937. Their collections were sent back to this country where they caused a great deal of interest, for they included many species which had never before been seen. Among them were species of *Primula* and *Meconopsis*—some of extreme beauty—and from their gatherings of seed a few have now been established in our gardens as rare and exotic plants.

Consequently, until 1949 we had but a tantalizing glimpse of the flora and fauna of the more remote parts of Nepal given to us by the people mentioned above and by other explorers and mountaineers who had, in some cases surreptitiously, spent a few days within Nepalese territory.

The new era of exploration began in 1949, when the Nepalese Government came to favour the policy of allowing a few selected European parties to travel in the remote parts of the country. I think I am right in saying that the first of the more extensive expeditions took place in 1949, when H. W. Tilman led an expedition—of which I was a member—to the Langtang Himal, lying north of Katmandu. Thereon followed a series of expeditions, mostly mountaineering and exploratory, but in a number of cases a certain amount of primary collecting of plants and zoological specimens was carried out. I should like to emphasize that the enumeration of species is all that we can hope for from these first collections.

In 1950 there followed Tilman's and the French expedition to Annapurna; the Everest reconnaissance expedition in 1951; the Swiss attempt on Everest and the British Cho Oyu expedition in 1952; while the present year has seen not only the conquest of Everest but several other expeditions to the mountains, as well as journeys of anthropologists, ornithologists, etc., who are making a start on the investigation of the many problems of life in Nepal.

The 1952 botanical expedition, about which I shall speak, selected an area which was quite unknown. The film which I am going to show you, and which I must explain is an amateur affair of my own, was taken in country which no European has ever before visited.

The region to be explored lies between the Karnali and the Kali Gandaki rivers, a highly mountainous area, mainly in the provinces of Sallyana and Jumla. The expedition was largely botanical and it was sponsored by the British Museum (Natural History) and the Royal Horticultural Society: its aim was to make a full collection of plants growing in this area. Herbarium specimens—*i.e.*, dried plants—were collected for the Museum and live plants and seeds for the Royal Horticultural Society.

The expedition members were Mr. L. H. J. Williams of the Natural History Museum, Mr. W. R. Sykes from the Royal Horticultural Society

Gardens at Wisley, and myself. We took with us six native plant collectors, kindly arranged for us by Mr. F. Ludlow.

We planned to make our base at Jumla and from there split into three independent parties in order to investigate as wide an area as possible.

There were many initial difficulties in planning such an expedition. From Katmandu we could get no reliable information about porters, food, or even the kind of currency used. About Jumla, our prospective base and the capital of the province of that name, the only information we could obtain was that the people were called Jumlies and that in the winter they came down to the lower villages, bringing partridges and other birds to sell! But important details such as the possibility of being able to exchange currency or of buying quantities of basic food like rice and flour were not known to us. One great asset was, however, the Indian Survey maps—made by native surveyors—which we found very useful. But, as you will see, Jumla proved to be a well-chosen base for our exploratory journeys.

[A film describing the expedition, entitled "The Nepal Himalaya," was then shown, and Mr. Polunin gave the following commentary.]

From the railhead of Jarwa, in India, we took to our feet and penetrated the first low range of hills in Nepal—the Siwalik. We collected forty coolies to carry our thirty-six collecting boxes and stores of "luxury" foods like butter, sugar and tea. After each day's march we had to engage a fresh lot of coolies, which caused endless delays and minor difficulties. The journey to Jumla took us twenty days. The first part lay through the low country of the terai and outer foothills. We passed through dense Sal forests and across hot dry slopes of Chir Pine and cactus-like Euphorbia. A race of people called the Tharu lives here: their villages are situated in the valleys and they cultivate rice, maize and other cereals. They are able to withstand the virulent form of malaria which occurs in this low-lying district—the Nepalese hill races will only pass through these regions in the dry or cold seasons. The Tharu carry their loads by a yoke across the shoulder, while the hillman uses the familiar headband or "namlo."

There were many rivers to cross and a number of methods were adopted. The first large river was crossed by dug-out canoe carrying three or four passengers, so that you can imagine the time it took to take across our party of nearly fifty and our equipment.

On the fifth day we climbed higher into evergreen oak forests. Numerous villages occurred here, and wherever the gradient of the slope allowed cultivation there were many terraces.

In early spring (March) harvesting of the winter crops was in progress in the lower valleys. Very primitive methods are adopted. The women cut off the ears of corn with small curved sickles—in Central Nepal I have seen them pull off the individual ears with two bamboo sticks. The ears are tied into little sheaves and laid on the mud roofs of the houses to dry, while in wet weather they are stacked and covered in birch-bark for protection against rain. Flailing is the regular method of separating the grain from the chaff. Winnowing is done in the wind, while grinding is carried out with small hand grindstones or by water mills; in some cases

the grain is pounded with heavy wooden trunks in a hole in a rock. The flour is generally mixed into a dough and made into a thick pancake and is often eaten with chillies and salt. We did not find this very digestible and made our own bread with dried yeast. Rice was our second staple food.

In spring the narrow terraces were also being prepared for the summer rice crop. Ploughing is done by ox teams pulling a light wooden plough in which even the ploughshare is made of a hard kind of wood. The only iron articles widely used were small single-handed hoes and sickles. After ploughing, the terraces are irrigated—water often being carried over dykes in wooden aqueducts—then the flooded fields are churned up with a kind of long-pronged harrow; they are now ready for planting.

A short fishing sequence shows one method by which fish are caught in the middle hill rivers of Nepal. In a fast run where there is a considerable fall in water level, small artificial waterfalls are constructed by placing bamboo rods across the flow of water. The fish collect in the fast water below and attempt to leap the waterfalls, which are 6 to 8 feet high and beyond their powers. When fish are required a net is thrown into the pool and the fish are driven into the net. Generally several youths jump into the pool and drive the fish from under the waterfall. The fish—a species unknown to me, I am afraid—went to form a very bony curry.

Bridges are very rare indeed. One spanned the Bheri river below Jajarkot. It was carried in pieces by coolies from Jarwa, eighty miles away, and erected on the site by Indian engineers. It came from Aberdeen, Scotland!

We visited for the first time the town of Sallyana. Here there is a bazaar, and on our shopping expeditions we were accompanied by a hundred or more inquisitive villagers, who obviously had never seen anything quite like us before. We were equally interested in them, and such a following had the advantage that no shopkeeper would dare to overcharge us with so many present at the deal. There is a Governor, elected by the Government at Katmandu, and a small number of local militia stationed at Sallyana, but no regular troops.

North of Jajarkot the hills and passes grew progressively higher. To reach Jumla we had to cross a pass of over 13,000 ft. in height. It was in deep snow in early April. To get to it we climbed through heavy forests of Himalayan silver fir and birch. The scarlet-flowered tree rhododendron was coming into bloom, while primulas were in flower in the meadows.

The pass could only be crossed by night, when the snow was firm, and accompanying us were many flocks of sheep and goats carrying loads. Each animal had two saddle-bags tied across its back. They contained grain—about 30 lb. of it—which was to be taken to the higher villages, where it was exchanged for salt from Tibet. Several shepherds attended each flock, and they too were heavily laden with cooking and camping equipment necessary for months of travelling in the high mountains. Fierce sheep dogs—a protection against bears—followed each party.

Jumla lies at 7,624 feet above sea level in the fertile valley of the Tila river. It is surrounded by low hills covered in pine forests while round the horizon there are a number of higher mountains, snow-covered in April; the Great Himalaya lie further back, out of view. This town is the

administrative centre of a district the size of Wales. It has a Governor, appointed by Katmandu, a wireless operator, a number of local officials and a small local militia force. A school has recently been started and there is a small bazaar, but there is no doctor or hospital. As there are no roads or transport other than man porterage, a relatively small amount of trade is carried on. Architecturally the place is disappointing. The temple with its tin cupola and tall flagpoles is the only vertical feature. The houses are low with flat mud roofs; only the Governor's " palace " has two stories.

We happened to be in Jumla during the August festival—Jantra—and I was fortunate enough to film the various dances. The populace collected each afternoon in the court of the Governor's palace and for an hour or two before sunset there was much dancing and music-making. It was not a simple matter to interpret the dances, but the Governor did his best to explain to us what was happening—he was the only English-speaking person in the province. On the first day the children dressed up as cows for the " cow festival " and shuffled in formation round the courtyard. At the same time a maypole-like effigy, carried by a dancer, swung into the centre; to it were attached ribbons. Each dancer held a stick in one hand and a ribbon in the other, and while the maypole twisted and turned the dancers circled round holding the ribbon and beat the sticks of the adjacent dancers. The maypole was surmounted by the image of a human figure and from its arms hung clothing. We were informed that these were the clothes of a wealthy person who had died during the previous year and that the dance was commemorative of this person.

On the second day the children were rouged and powdered and they performed the " rice-planting festival." It was a simple figure in which the stooping motion of planting rice was apparent. There were also a number of other dances danced by youths, such as the Gurkha dance, which, I was told, the soldiers dance on their return from service in other countries. The " English " dance was a comic affair in which the dancers, with umbrellas and suspenders over their trousers, strutted about to the first few bars of the tune " Coming through the rye."

On the third day the " military and shikar festival " took place. In this there was a fine Tibetan mask with long flowing mane and glinting mirrors set in a fearsome face. An agile male dancer danced in this mask and struck many frightening attitudes at the audience.

There were other small groups of dancers showing their paces while these main dances were going on, and most of the time there were three separate " bands " playing hard. The official militia band consisted of European drums and clarinets, but the peasants of the surrounding villages brought in batteries of long native drums, and there was a third hybrid band with melodion, cymbals and drums in the Indian style.

On the eighth day, the Governor informed us, the god Siva fights and overcomes the Devil in the streets of Jumla, but, alas! we were not able to wait to see this culminating spectacle.

From Jumla, Williams, Sykes and I took separate routes. As I owned the ciné camera, it follows my route; this was to cut through the Great Himalaya and explore the Tibetan-like country to the north of the main range. I took two plant collectors and several Jumla militia men for escort

and planned to be away for two months. I travelled eastwards to the Barbung Khola and soon found myself in very steep country. A faint track ran across the great cliffs of the gorge or dropped down among the huge boulders of the river bed. Towering two miles above me were the snow and ice peaks of the Himalaya, 20,000 to 25,000 ft. high. The Dhaulagiri Himal formed a screen to the monsoon and there was a sudden change in climate, vegetation and human culture. I passed from alpine meadows and heavy forest to dry stony slopes covered in low-growing shrubs; and from a Hindu to a Buddhist community. Groups of gaily coloured chortens and long lines of mani walls appeared suddenly in the wilderness of rock and cliff, and rounding a bend one sometimes came across a small village surrounded by narrow terraces with strips of bright green corn. Bhotia tribes inhabit these villages during the summer. They cultivate a little corn, but most of their time is spent bringing in yak-loads of salt from over the high passes in Tibet.

I was able to photograph a tented trading post where the Bhotia bartered his salt with the shepherds who brought up grain from the lower villages in the foothills. The small sheep saddle-bags are exchanged for large horse-hair sacks and each yak will carry 150 lb. over passes exceeding 19,000 ft. The highest pass over which I saw sheep carrying loads was over 18,000 ft.

Chharkabhotgaon was the highest Bhotia village and it was situated at an altitude of over 17,000 ft., according to the map. The houses were built in the form of tall castle-like towers and each was surmounted by piles of brushwood, for there are no forests in this semi-arid area and fuel is very scarce. On each side rose steep, stony hillsides to the mountain tops, which were at the general level of over 20,000 ft.

On my way westwards I crossed several passes of over 19,000 ft. and at one point went up to the Tibetan border at the Marem Bhanjyang pass (19,600 ft.). Even at this altitude there were flowering plants. A vast landscape of brown mountains with an occasional summit in snow stretched before me, and I could just see a corner of the Chungphari Tal—a lake in Tibet with a salt depot in the vicinity.

I was unable to continue my journey westwards, as the onset of the monsoon had made some of the river crossings impossible. I went southwards instead across the Great Himalaya again and eventually returned to Jumla.

Mr. POLUNIN showed a final film sequence and some slides of some of the most attractive plants that were collected. He explained that in making these collections it was necessary to gather plenty of material of each species, and where possible whole plants should be collected. One of the greatest problems was that of drying the specimens—the quicker and more carefully they were dried the better the results. The specimens had to be changed every day into fresh drying paper, and this would often mean three or four hours' work daily on changing papers alone. Seeds were collected and dried in the sun. After separating the seeds from the chaff they were stored in the dry in cloth bags. The seeds and live plants were flown back from India. On the return journey the crucial time was the slow march through the low-lying hills on the borders of India, where

conditions were moist and hot; if there was no delay here plants could often survive the journey unharmed.

A total of over 5,000 herbarium specimens were deposited at the Natural History Museum, while 150 gatherings of seeds and about 250 live plants were sent to the Royal Horticultural Society for culture at their gardens at Wisley and for distribution.

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is nearly up, but we have about three minutes left, so there is an opportunity if anybody wishes to ask a question or make some brief remarks.

Colonel COBB: Did Mr. Polunin come across any game?

Mr. POLUNIN: The only things we saw were the blue sheep; and there were, of course, bears.

Colonel COBB: Red?

Mr. POLUNIN: No; black. I also remember seeing a wolf, but that was all.

The CHAIRMAN: In the absence of any other questions, I know you would wish me now to thank Mr. Polunin very much indeed for coming here and giving an interesting lecture and showing wonderful pictures. He has given a wonderful description of this little-known and entirely primitive country and we are very grateful indeed.

THE ABUL CAMP IN CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN

By H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE AND DENMARK, LL.D., G.C.R., R.E., C.B.(Mil.)

ON June 16 last, the Danish Scientific Mission to Afghanistan (Henning-Haslund-Christensen Memorial Mission) 1953-54, of which I had been appointed leader, arrived at Kandahar in Afghanistan, having motored up from Karachi, over Quetta and Chaman. It consisted of two ethnologists, L. Edelberg and K. Ferdinand from the Ethnographical Collection of the Danish National Museum, of a moving-picture operator and photographer, P. A. Rasmussen, and of myself, deputed from the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia, the headquarters of which are still in Kalimpong, West Bengal, India.

We went on almost immediately to Kabul over Gazni, arriving in the capital city of the country two days later. The Government was contacted shortly afterwards, and within a few days we had all the necessary permissions required to travel to where we intended.

The object of the Mission—which is still in Afghanistan until the middle of 1954—is purely ethnographical. It has been commissioned to study the people of Nuristan, of the Central Hazarajat, the Chahar Aimak tribes in the west and the Pashtoo-speaking nomads of the south and south-west. I am happy to say that the Afghan Government did not put any serious hindrances in our way, and told us that we might go wherever we pleased, provided we did not visit the strategically important town of Sar-i-Pul.

During the time we were awaiting our permits in Kabul we came into contact with many people, both Afghan and foreign, the latter mainly of other scientific missions in the capital, of the United Nations Technical Mission, and of the accredited diplomatic corps. From them we heard about a mysterious camp in central Afghanistan.

To begin with it was only a rumour. It was said that in the heart of the country, in an inaccessible part of the high mountains, there existed a nomad meeting-place, where tribes from all parts gathered once a year to elect a government of their own, a king, and to transact business both civil and commercial between themselves. One Afghan told us that he had a friend who had managed to reach the camp, not without incredible difficulty, but that unfortunately he had arrived too late, just after it had broken up. It was situated, he said, "somewhere in the neighbourhood of Daulat Yar."

Should such a camp really exist, we felt, it would be essential for us to visit it. Its importance for a study of tribal nomadism in Afghanistan seemed beyond question, and so we decided that we would make an attempt to find it. Unfortunately, nobody in an official position was able to help us. Those from whom we asked information in various government offices professed total ignorance of the matter.

When we requested that we be given permission to reach Daulat Yar over Panjao, we were not encouraged to attempt it. The road had become impracticable since the spring rains, we were told—something that proved not quite correct, for when we did eventually reach Panjao by another way, we found that three lorries a day, on an average, had been plying on the direct road from Kabul for some three months already.

Undaunted by these attempts at discouraging us, we started off on July 5, travelling to Daulat Yar by the more usual route of Charikar, Ghorband, Bamyan, Band-i-Amir and Panjao.

Our first stop was at the foot of the nearly 11,000 ft. Shibar pass, where we put up a camp and went visiting the Sheikh Ali Hazara-wa-Turkoman tribes in the neighbouring valleys. We spent some time in the Urdugalli area, living with these semi-nomadic people, in their summer camps, at over 13,000 ft.

Then, by way of Bamyan and its intriguing Buddhas, the entrancing blue lakes of Band-i-Amir, where we stayed for some time in a large camp of Mohmands from Afghan Turkestan, we reached Panjao, headquarters of the Dei Zanghi Hazara district, by one of the most difficult roads upon which I have ever been in Afghanistan. In many places the Chevrolet station wagon, which we had hired from the Kabul bus *sherkat* (company), was unable to drive up the steep gradients, and we were obliged to unload and take our luggage up to the top of the pass on pack animals.

The military commandant received us in Panjao's red mud fort. He told us that the governor was away in Beisud, and very kindly, as everywhere in Afghanistan—which is surely one of the most hospitable countries in the world—invited us to stay with him. In subsequent conversation we heard that two hundred *kotchis* (*gutchis*—that is, Pathan nomads) were expected to arrive the next day, on their way to the camps of Garmao and Abul.

Immediately on the alert, we enquired what these camps were. He said that they were meeting-places for Pathan tradesmen, large fairs held every year during the summer, where goods from the plains were sold and bartered in exchange for products of the local population. Asked if it were true that a government and even a king were elected in these camps, the commandant said Yes, that it was so, "for how otherwise would it be possible to keep the peace when so great a number of people come together?" "How many tribesmen would you say go there?" we enquired eagerly. "Some twenty thousand roughly, I think," he answered. Thrilled, we felt that we were definitely getting "warmer" in our search for the camp.

Next morning, very early, at 3.30 a.m., before sunrise, the Pathans started arriving. I was awakened by the commotion they made—the ringing of camel bells, the cries of drivers and followers, the barking of dogs, the neighing of horses and the sound of many hooves beating on the dry earthen paths. I got up and stood watching the long lines of animals and men coming along the two roads, the old and the new, from Kabul, in the growing light of the rising sun.

Very quickly I saw that these were not *kotchis* but traders. Heavily armed, with cartridge belts over their chests and round their waists, with rifles slung over their shoulders and pistols dangling from their hips, fierce-looking bearded and turbaned men, *and men alone*, rode up in batches to a level place above the river from the north and started putting up their white Indian Army tents. The horses they rode were unsaddled and tethered, the camels were made to kneel, unloaded by their drivers, and led off into the surrounding hills to graze, arms were stacked and fires were lit, so that blue curls of smoke soon began to rise above the two hundred or so tents. Later the commandant, escorted by two uniformed Afghan soldiers carrying antiquated Russian rifles, issued from the fort and went over to the camp to parley with its leaders. On his return he invited us to visit it too.

This we did in the afternoon, being well received by the travelling tribal salesmen. In an incredible confusion of cloth bales, green fodder for the animals, camel and horse droppings, arms, saddles and kitchen utensils, bags of rice, tea and grain, in and out of crowded tents, where Pathans and Hazaras were already bargaining for goods in loud Persian and guttural Pashtoo, dodging kicking horses, cud-chewing slobbering camels and aggressive loudly barking mastiffs, we gathered from an interpreter whom we had with us that the camp we sought and to which these men were proceeding was at Abul, and that the latter was in the neighbourhood of Daulat Yar.

The next day, over Lal, we got as far as Garmao, where a camp had also been reported. The quaint Hazara village, made up of windowless mud houses, with dried cow-dung cakes stacked on all the roofs as a winter supply of fuel, knew however nothing of Pathans gathering there. Had we been misinformed? We drove on the following morning, somewhat anxious again of not succeeding in our quest.

But it need not have been so. At Daulat Yar, where we arrived in the afternoon, we found a huge brick building standing in a beautiful green wide part of the Hari Rud valley. Some Chahar Aimak tribesmen who were camping there in round, gaily decorated, *yurt*-type tents told us that this was a hotel built by Herat's former governor, Abdullah Khan, and that the headquarters of the district were some thirty miles further at Kala Kausi. We enquired about Abul, and they assured us that it was not far from the next stop, where we would have no difficulty in finding out all about it.

We crossed the Lal Rud at Shinya over an old brick bridge. The road then went inland for quite some distance before we came out again into the Hari Rud valley only a few miles before Kala Kausi. This place consisted also of a three-storied brick building, presumably an hotel like the other, but used at the moment by the local Hakim as the administrative offices. We drove past an ancient kala, from which white-turbaned bearded Afghans in striped *alachas* (coats) stared at us at the beginning of the road that led to the modern building. Here the *mudir* (chief clerk), representing the Hakim, and the local commandant received us.

These officers told us that their superior was away—at Abul. He had gone there, as was usual every year, to accompany the *Hakim-i-ala* of Ghor.

both men having always to be present at the huge Pathan gathering. Asked where the camp was, our informants waved vaguely in the direction of the southern hills, saying that it was somewhere beyond them.

We were thoroughly aroused now. "Could we go on to Abul the next day?" we enquired. It all seemed too good to be true. We could, we were told, if horses were available. It took eight hours to get there, they said, and we would need nine animals. They promised to try and get them for us by the following afternoon at 3 p.m.

We camped that evening on the banks of the Hari Rud, and eagerly awaited the appointed hour to leave. But when the time came the horses did not, and only two miserable ponies turned up. Imagining that "technical impediments" were being put in our way, we waxed impatient and threatened to leave on foot if mounts were not immediately forthcoming. Discussion followed in which tempers were frayed, but eventually seven animals arrived and we set out at about 5 p.m.

The distance being too great for us to reach Abul that evening, we stayed the night in a Chahar Aimak camp, somewhere high up in the row of hills to the south, at a place called Tilak. The people were Sultan Yar tribesmen, a subdivision of the Firozkohi, and their Khan invited us to dine and to sleep in his very clean and comfortable felt-lined tent. In the morning, crossing an 11,000 ft. pass to the south, we descended into a long valley which, branching into another broader one running from west to east, led us eventually by narrow stony paths—although far from deserted and upon which we met many travellers and flocks of sheep—to the eagerly sought-for Abul camp.

Edelberg and I arrived first. It was about 11 a.m. and we had been riding from Tilak since 6 o'clock. As we approached we could see long lines of white Indian Army tents exactly as in Panjao, although much more numerous, set up to the right and to the left of the now larger track which we were following, on a level piece of ground, below which a broad but shallow river flowed. The ample supply of water appeared to me the reason for which the site had been chosen.

There were literally thousands of Pathans standing about here and there among their animals, which, as when we had met them before, presented a wide variety of species. We had ridden over a low ridge and were now approaching the first tents. Men came forward and started beckoning to us. They spoke in Persian and in Pashtoo and, waving in the direction of a white tent which stood alone, about a quarter of a mile below on a patch of grass to the left of the river, made us understand that we should proceed there.

We rode through the camp. Right and left, heavily armed fierce-looking tribesmen emerged from beneath the canvas under which they were sitting and started escorting us down to our destination. Of course, we were not yet quite aware of what was expected of us, and wondered, although without any apprehension because everybody seemed smiling and well-disposed, what exactly was going to happen.

After crossing the stream, through which our horses waded while the men who were following us jumped from stone to stone, the latter disposed

for that purpose at regular intervals, we had only a couple of hundred yards to cover. As we advanced over them, two individuals in imitation European clothes came out of the tent and walked towards us. Pathans in national dress followed behind. One of the foreign-clad gentlemen, elderly, with a white beard, had on a grey woollen suit with knee-breeches and stockings; he wore brown leather boots, while on his head was an Indian Army sun-helmet worn back to front, with the broad, sweeping brim over his eyes like a peak. His companion was attired in a dark check suit the trousers of which had buckles at the ankles as if he had been bicycling; on his head was the usual karakul cap which seems to be the mark of the Afghan government servant.

The older of the two came forward, and, after we had dismounted, shook hands with us, welcomed us and presented himself and the other official as respectively Kwadja Mohammed Khan, Hakim-i-ala of Ghor (headquarters, Kala-i-Ghor or Taiwara), and Abdul Aziz, Hakim-i-Kalan of Chak Charan (headquarters, Kala Kausi), the latter being subordinate to the former. We followed them into the tent which had, we discovered, been prepared specially for our reception. Two seats made of empty boxes covered over with carpets were offered us, but we preferred to join the rest of the party and to sit on the floor with them.

On my right, pouring out tea into a bowl for me, was a lean, elegant man with a curled-up moustache and lively eyes in national dress, a bandolier of revolver cartridges across his chest. When I asked the old governor who he was, I was told that he was one of the two *mirs* of the camp: Mir Ahmed, a Tagar tribesman of the Ahmedzai division of the Soliman khel. Then the other *mir* of the camp stood up, on the Hakim-i-ala's invitation, a big, burly fellow with completely European features and colouring, incongruously dressed in an Indian chaprassi's blue coat. His name, we were told, was Mir Shah Gul Khan, and he was of the Ala-ed-din Khel of the same Ahmedzai.

It was true after all, then, that there were kings of the Abul camp—there were two, however, instead of one. Asked how they were appointed, we heard that they were elected, but as it was added that the same men had been *mirs* for the last twenty-five years, we presumed that once put into office thus they must remain there until removed by general consent. Mir Ahmed told us later that he was a land-owner in Panjao and Gardez, while Mir Shah Gul Khan modestly admitted to being an "arms merchant." Asked where he had got the extraordinary coat he was wearing, he enigmatically answered "Kashmir"—a laconic explanation rich in possible interpretations.

A big show now began. Thousands of Pathans—all Jenubi, or southerners, as we were told—collected in a wide circle outside the tent, and lifting their rifles in the air, let off an ear-splitting volley in our honour. Wild cries followed, and an old drummer having started to beat a most effective tattoo on a huge instrument which he held strung over his body, a long string of dancers, without turbans, their bobbed hair flying round their heads as they twirled, advanced rhythmically towards us. This was the *Atan* dance, it was explained to us, and a most strenuous exercise it appeared to be. Turning and twisting in time with the drumming, which

was the sole accompaniment, they kept this up for three solid hours, without ever showing any signs of fatigue or of giddiness.

Atan, the venerable old governor said, came from Athens. It was originally a Greek dance which the Macedonians had brought to Pakhtoonistan. And this was the overture for a patriotic and complimentary speech. Freely mixing Greece and Denmark in his mind (for which I cannot blame him, considering more enlightened people do the same on first meeting me), he spoke at length about the similarity of our "two" countries; how the Pakhtoons, like the Greeks, had always fought for their freedom and independence, and if Denmark was free today it was because its people had always opposed enslavement by force of arms; how he, like us assuredly, had killed many "foreign invaders from overseas," personally, with his own hand; how he had suffered, as we had he was sure, for the freedom of his country, having been imprisoned by Batcha-i-Sakao in 1928 for his loyalty to the reigning royal family.

I answered appropriately, I think, stressing such points of similarity as he had left out. He seemed pleased and thanked me effusively. We then rose, and on receiving permission to do so, took photographs and cine camera shots of the whirling dancers and the sprawling, armed spectators behind. Everybody endeavoured to look as fierce as he could, and many a rifle was brandished before our lenses in a warlike gesture.

In the afternoon, after an excellent lunch of roast mutton and rice, we were invited to take part in a shooting competition: we four against a selected team of Pathans. We naturally accepted, although rather dubious as to our own ability. Targets made of two stones one upon the other were put up some two hundred yards away against the side of the mountain, and surrounded by nearly every inmate of the camp, we lay down in turn on a piece of felt carpet to lean our rifles over a camel saddle. We were beaten, of course, by our opponents, who, all except one, dislodged the upper stone with every one of the three shots they fired. Rasmussen, however, hit the target with his first shot, and immediately became the hero of the afternoon.

We were taken to tea afterwards in the tent of Mir Ahmed. There, seated on the floor, facing the entrance where the rest of the company squatted, we were entertained with a political talk. We were told of the tribesmen's undying loyalty to King Zaher Shah of Afghanistan (whom they all called "our king"); of their desire to start hostilities with Pakistan, which they would have begun long ago, they said, but for the restraining influence of the Afghan Government; of their experiences in the Kashmir fighting, where they complained that they had been tricked; of Sheikh Abdullah, whom they looked upon as a good man and whom they would treat as a guest if he came over to them; of Bakshi Gulam Mohammed, for whom they did not profess the same liking. In the light of later happenings in Kashmir this conversation was most enlightening.

We spent the night in the Hakim-i-ala's camp. There being a curfew after 8 p.m. in the main one, and everyone seen approaching it being shot at on sight, the old man prudently had his tents fully two miles further downstream. Dinner was served at the very late hour of 11.30 p.m., but

we were entertained while we waited by our host with a most interesting amount of information, to which I shall return later.

The next day they had arranged a cavalry display for us. I rode back to the camp on a big grey horse I had been given, side by side with Kwadja Mohammed Khan, riding the little black pony upon which he had come from Taiwara over a month ago. As we entered the camp a significant enough incident occurred. At the first tents we came upon a Pathan sleeping on the side of the road. The governor went straight up to him and struck him a sharp blow with his riding whip. The man sprang up, half groggy, whereupon we rode on, but the escort coming behind unfurled long, nasty-looking leather thongs and chased the unfortunate fellow right into his tent with them. He should not be sleeping when authority went past, they shouted at him with a lot of abuse, but should be standing up respectfully.

The cavalry show consisted of rides past, counter parades, mock attacks of one lot on the other, trick riding exhibitions and the display of the best horses. We were most impressed by the quality of the animals used, as well as by the horsemanship. We were encouraged to film and photograph to our hearts' content.

One more meal was taken by us at midday in the governor's tent, and then we prepared to leave. As we were about to thank our host for his kindness and hospitality, before passing through the camp to do the same with the two *mirs*, a group of prisoners, heavily chained together three at a time, were brought before the old magistrate. They were murderers and thieves, we heard. The first lot, who were *kotchis*, had killed a man with knives in a brawl, while the others, local Chahar Aimaks, had attempted (incredible folly) to raid the Abul camp. Both were remanded for transport, still in chains, to Taiwara, where they would be judged.

We returned to Tilak for the night, that evening, although we were greatly encouraged to go by another way further east. As none of the routes is marked on the map, I am unable to say in which direction the latter lay.

While we sat cross-legged on the floor and waited for dinner in his tent, Kwadja Mohammed Khan, Hakim-i-ala of Ghor, in answer to our questions, told us many interesting things about the Abul camp. It was open from the beginning of May to the end of July, he said, during which time 60,000 Pathans went through it. There were, however, never more than from 5,000 to 6,000 at a time, which was approximately the number which we estimated the attendance to be when we were there. All, like the two *mirs*, came exclusively from the southern provinces and belonged only to the Soliman khel.

The camp used to be at Kerman, a village of Lal in the central Hazarajat. It had, however, been moved some thirty years ago to this place, as being a better one. There was another minor camp close by at *Gumao* (Hidden Water), and not at *Garmao* (Hot Water) as we had heard (which accounted for our disappointment at the latter place). Abul being in the Ghor division of Herat province, he, the governor, always attended the

meeting. He had been doing so for the last ten years. Pointing to his two guards, unarmed Afghan soldiers in uniform, he proudly stated that that was all he needed to keep order. "The Pakhtoons know and respect me," he said, "and I have never had any trouble with them," a pronouncement which, despite the lack of force at his disposal, we were inclined, on its face value at least, to believe.

The governor did not come alone. With him were six elders from Ghor, whom he solemnly presented to us as being the representatives of the inhabitants of his administrative division, all Chahar Aimaks, 32,000 strong. There was also a subordinate *Ala Kalar* (District Commissioner) in attendance on him, who spoke Osmanli Turkish (he was very proud of it), having been educated in Istanbul.

The function of the camp was mainly economic. It was a bazaar, and it was called that. It was established primarily for the benefit of *kotchis* from Kandahar and Herat provinces, who never went near large urban centres in their wanderings, but were always in the neighbourhood of Abul during the summer. The Pathans purchased goods in Pakistan and Kabul and brought them here for sale, obtaining in exchange such goods as live sheep, sheep's fat, wool and agricultural produce which they took away with them on their return journey. A certain amount of trade also took place with the Hazaras on the way (we had been witnesses to this in Panjao) and with the Chahar Aimaks when their country was reached. They too bought manufactured goods which they could not obtain otherwise.

When we asked them what the Pathan traders did the rest of the year, one of them was taken as an example who was present because he had accompanied us to the governor's camp. He had, he said, some property in Panjao. His wife and children were there now while he was away at Abul. There were seven other people travelling with him, five of his brothers and two nephews; business, with him, was a family affair. He came to Abul with his goods on camels, himself riding horses with some of his brothers, while the other younger ones and the nephews acted as pack animal drivers. He did not stay there more than three weeks, after which he would return to Panjao in stages by another route than the one by which he had come, in order to sell to other villages.

There the party would break up. Leaving his white Indian Army tent behind, he would take out his black *kotchi* one, and with his wife and children travel to Gazni, where he owned some more land. He would remain there another twenty days or so, collecting the rent from his tenants, paying his servants who grew crops for him, and taking delivery of the harvest. Then he would go on down into Pakistan (he first said "Hindustan," but corrected himself with an apology), where he would gather supplies for the summer business. For those things which he bought (he winked at us when we asked him if everything he had had been acquired thus legitimately) he paid in Afghan notes, the Peshawar banks readily exchanging these for Pakistan rupees. He did not have to show a passport, and on the whole he had little trouble to cross the frontier, although he said (on what justification we did not find out) that "in olden days it was better."

In the spring he travelled back, this time over Kabul. There he would purchase further goods, cotton cloth from India being available in the capital, and at cheaper prices than that manufactured in Pakistan. He would also buy second-hand clothes, which, as we could see from the labels on them, all came from the United States of America. He would go as far as Panjao with his family, leave them there on his property, and taking with him the hallmark of a trader, his white Indian Army tent, move up to Abul as he had done the year before.

There seems little doubt that the principal reason for the existence of the camp is economic. But there appears to me to be other, complementary motives too. Thus, the fun and games to which we were treated were not, I gather, exceptional pleasures indulged in only for our benefit. They are regular occurrences during the summer months, manly sports in which these warlike tribesmen delight to exert themselves. The martial atmosphere of the camp was very noticeable, and women are not as a rule admitted. Although we did see one, an old decrepit hag who did not veil herself or run away at our approach as is usual in Afghanistan, even with nomads, she was, we were assured, the exception that proves the rule. On the other hand, there were a lot of quite young boys about, whose effeminate gestures and passive submission to all kinds of rough treatment by their elders made us wonder. Besides this, Abul is a nice cool place (it was even quite cold at night) where it is pleasant to be when the temperature is so high lower down. It is ideal for these wild tribes to come together in complete seclusion to exchange views and make plans once a year for their winter operations.

Quarrels between them, which are bound to spring up when so many people come together, are settled by either of the *mirs*. Their authority is accepted unquestionably, and considering their "reign" has already lasted a quarter of a century, they are apparently very experienced persons. We saw two such quarrels. One was about some banknotes which a trader accused another of having passed on to him when they were bad; the other, between a buyer and a seller of bags of sheep's fat, the latter having defaulted on the date fixed for the delivery of the goods. Mir Ahmed settled both cases by favouring the complainant, and the other party submitted to the judgment without a murmur. Kwadja Mohammed Khan told us that all matters were thus decided by the Pathans themselves, and that he had never to interfere.

We were assured that no Europeans had ever visited the camp at Abul before. This is probably true, because at Kabul, where I enquired from various embassies if anyone knew about it, I was told no. For this reason I have thought it well worth giving a full description of our experiences, even at the risk of it being somewhat lengthy, as is the case here.

We were extremely well received and hospitably treated by both the Afghan and the Pathan authorities in the camp, for which we are very grateful. On returning to the capital we were told of all sorts of wild rumours that had been circulating about our arrest and removal from Abul, probably coming from those who objected to us visiting the place, and to which it was easy for us to give the lie.

Those of my readers who would like to obtain more information than is contained in this article are referred to the coming publication on the Abul camp, to be issued in time as part of the work of the Danish Mission to Afghanistan (Henning-Haslund-Christensen Memorial Mission) 1953-54, National Museum, Copenhagen, Denmark.

REVIEW OF THE PRESENT POSITION IN INDOCHINA

By COLONEL MELVIN HALL, D.S.O.

Colonel Melvin Hall, D.S.O. (U.S.A.F. ret'd.), was chief of a special liaison mission to Indochina in 1952.* He travelled extensively round Indochina and had the opportunity to observe what the French and the Associated States were accomplishing on that vital anti-Communist front. He has kept in close touch with developments in this area since his return to France.

THE situation in Indochina is so fluid, with such latent potentialities as could completely alter it almost overnight, that any attempt at analysis can at best be valid as of the date written and may well be inapplicable soon after. Under such circumstances, predictions or prophecies are both futile and dangerous, yet it may be permissible to survey the consequences of certain developments at least within the range of possibility.

Among the potentialities that could gravely affect the situation not only in Indochina but throughout South-east Asia and probably the whole of Asia, the following may be noted. They are not the only factors which could upset the balance and bring disaster, but they are the most disquieting.

The first is the effect of the so-called Korean truce; a truce which appears fraudulent on the part of the Sino-North Korean Communists and of dubious permanent advantage to those member-States of the United Nations which fought to resist aggression in that area. It is giving the Chinese the time to recuperate from the pounding their "volunteers" suffered in Korea, where they were being decimated both in trained manpower and effective equipment and could, in the opinion of many qualified to judge, have been so shattered that their Korean venture would have held little continuing appeal. It has been highly damaging to Western and United Nations prestige in Asia: the Communist propaganda having skilfully turned their own defeat into a defeat of the United Nations, especially of the United States—which is now fairly generally accepted in Eastern Asia. And it is allowing the Chinese to build up a massive and well-equipped military machine, substantial elements of which can easily be diverted to other Communist ventures, such as the support of the Viet Minh in Indochina.

The second and most disturbing potentiality for uprooting the whole South-east Asian situation stems partly from the first, as outlined above, though the latent threat existed before the Korean truce. That is an open invasion of Chinese "volunteers" or "liberation army" into Indochina in support of Ho Chih Minh. This, if undertaken, would hardly be done in driblets, and the Franco-Vietnamese forces presently engaged would be unable to stop or contain an invasion on the scale that would have to be

* See p. 204, Vol. XL, July/October, 1953.

expected for more than a very few days or at most weeks. In such event all of South-east Asia would unquestionably collapse to the Communists, in short order. Indochina is the present key to the anti-Communist lock on South-east Asia; once this door is wide open none can say where the onrush would end. But the political and psychological effects, at least, would assuredly spread to the Middle and Near East, and to Africa.

The third potentiality is correlated to the second, though it could be used either as an accompaniment of a direct invasion of Chinese ground forces or by itself, but in effective support of the Viet Minh. That is Communist air support, with modern equipment including jet aircraft. The French have at present complete control of the air, apart from climatic conditions and anti-aircraft fire, since the Viet Minh possess no air force. There are, however, no jet aircraft in Indochina—they are not required under present circumstances—nor are there more than one or two fields from which jet aircraft could be operated, these far from ideal. An air cover of Viet Minh operations on the ground, by Chinese " volunteer " pilots flying from bases within the Chinese frontier and including jets, could be disastrous to the Franco-Vietnamese forces, gallant as they are.

The fourth potentiality that could disrupt the situation is one of morale and war-weariness. This in no wise reflects on the Franco-Vietnamese troops engaged in Indochina. Their morale is superb, and there is no defeatism in their attitude, rough as the going is. But in Paris it is different: the difference between the enthusiasm of the troops when they can *see* their enemy and get to grips with him, which unhappily is too seldom the case, and the cold grey light through which some of the politicians look, seeing no future in all this, but only the cost in money and in lives—which has been and continues to be great—and the inevitability of eventual withdrawal. They have their arguments, some of them irrefutable; yet the alternative to a continuance of the struggle would be a major disaster to the western world. And when they talk of " negotiating " with Ho Chih Minh it may be pointed out that even Jawaharlal Nehru, who has recently expressed his willingness to be the intermediary for a negotiated settlement when the time may be appropriate, feels unconvinced that at the present moment his intervention would serve any useful purpose.

There appears little possibility of negotiating with Ho Chih Minh unless he be soundly defeated or forced to recognize imminent defeat; or the anti-Communists accept defeat by him and bow to his conditions. They would not be negotiable conditions, as long as Communist China and the U.S.S.R. continue to support him, even without direct intervention of Chinese troops. There is no evidence that such support is likely to be withdrawn.

During the past six months the situation of the anti-Viet Minh forces—the Franco-Vietnamese—has improved moderately. They have passed from the defensive throughout the whole of the infiltrated area to a series of limited but destructive offensives, which may or may not have upset Viet Minh plans for the latter's expected dry-weather offensive in northern Tonkin. General Navarre, the new French commander-in-chief, and General Cogny, commanding in the north, have shown great energy in

developing a new strategic plan. In carrying this out they have already obtained several notable successes. They have also received some reinforcements from Metropolitan France and from Korea (most of the French volunteer battalion that did such splendid work in Korea has been transferred to Indochina), and the Vietnamese army is being built up. American support of the Franco-Vietnamese operations, in equipment and financial aid, has been augmented to a point where the United States are bearing approximately two-thirds of the cost of the military effort.

Yet the opposing forces remain too evenly in balance to give hope of an early decision. The war is not being fought in trenches nor where heavy equipment can be the deciding factor, but in the rice-fields and jungles and heavily forested mountains; and while the Vietnamese army may be, as it is, growing in size, an army is rarely better than its officers and it takes time to train officers, especially in a country without an officer caste or tradition. There are still too few trained and disciplined troops to launch vigorous, decisive attacks and at the same time to keep infiltrated areas cleaned up, where the enemy by night is often a simple, law-abiding peasant by day.

Should the French, by political pressure in Paris, decide to withdraw their military support of the new-born Indochinese states, the whole of Indochina would collapse like a house of cards. But the French, with the stout and loyal but limited co-operation of the anti-Communist mountain tribes of Tonkin and the Laotians (the last-named operating only in Laos), do not have the forces sufficient to obtain, in the immediately foreseeable future, a satisfactory decision, and no one is prepared to suggest from where the additional troops required to this end might be drawn. The growing Vietnamese army, stiffened and led by the French through many months to come, may be the ultimate answer; it cannot be the immediate solution.

The political situation is likewise confused. Recent assurances by the French Government have created a more favourable atmosphere than pertained some months ago and more confidence is being felt by the "Associated States" of Indochina in French promises of early full independence. Considerable progress has been made in turning over to the three States various functions of government heretofore administered by the French or under their over-riding control. Inevitably, immediate independent military command is restricted by the fact that the French military effort in Indochina is the one factor holding together a tenuous situation, and further because there are exceedingly few indigenous officers presently qualified to exert high command effectively.

Of the three Associated States, the most stable at the moment is Laos, whose ageing King Sisavang Vong recently signed an agreement with the French which appears basically satisfactory to both sides. Laos has taken no active part in the anti-Viet Minh operations except within its own frontiers, where the small but sturdy Laotian army, supported by the French (and fortuitously by the south-west monsoon), offered a stout and successful resistance to the Communist invasion of that country last spring. The Laotians—the King, his Government and the people—want no part of the Communists and will defend themselves ardently, but are disinclined

to engage their limited effectives in the mêlée beyond their boundaries. They are not over fond of their Vietnamese neighbours. Except when their own territory is invaded, they see no good reason to throw themselves into what they have looked upon in the past as generically a Vietnamese civil war. The Viet Minh invasion of Laos in the spring of 1952 rather shattered this contention, but the Laotian forces are held, which now seems well advised, for the defence of Laotian integrity.

In Cambodia the political situation is so equivocal and confusing as to make any reasoned survey all but meaningless save from day to day. The thirty-three-year-old King Norodom Sihanouk, who was placed on his throne by the French at a time when there was some question of succession, "put on an act" a few months ago by leaving his capital for Bangkok; later—since the Siamese found his presence there embarrassing—retiring to a smallish town in his own country, Siem Reap (from where one visits the massive Khmer ruins of Ankor Vat), as a protest against the slow progress of the French in according Cambodia full independence.

This gesture popularized him with some elements of his country, and he returned to his capital, Pnom Penh, in triumph after the French had conceded certain of his demands. But the demands for "full independence" sometimes go too fast, particularly in a country unable to protect itself in a military sense. Furthermore, there are conflicting parties in Cambodia, not all of which are heartily in favour of maintaining the King on his throne. He has recently agreed to further talks with the French, and proposes to head the Cambodian delegation which will negotiate in Paris the details of Cambodia's future status. At the same time he announced his intention of turning over his powers to the people after the next general elections—whatever that may precisely mean. The King has also stated that Communism is the number one enemy of Cambodia, which he will use all his efforts to extirpate. In this he is doubtless sincere, but unlikely to be able to do much about it alone, despite his pleasant personality.

In Vietnam, much the most populous of the three States and the only one possessing the nucleus of an army of substantial size, the political situation is also complicated. The recent Assembly of "Nationalists" at Saigon threw a number of verbal bricks into a confused atmosphere, which quite confounded the Vietnamese government as well as the French, who thought they were then proceeding logically towards the full independence of Vietnam within the fabric of the French Union. The Nationalists also want to alter the pattern of the French Union. At the end, the Assembly came out with an expression of confidence in and support for His Majesty Bao Dai, the Chief of State of Vietnam (hereditary Emperor of Annam, now Central Vietnam), which was not completely in accord with some utterances on the Assembly floor.

But the Nationalists of Cochin China in the south and of Tonkin in the north do not see eye to eye. It now appears that Bao Dai may be forced to replace the present President of the Council, Nguyen van Tam, an able and energetic patriot with a reputation for honesty, and a realistic Francophile, by someone from Tonkin. Bao Dai is definitely in somewhat of a dilemma, which may be in part of his own making. He is intelligent, quite a big

man for an Indochinese, in his early forties, courageous and personable. I have described him occasionally, and would still do so, as a prince and potential leader who has put on his spurs but has not yet mounted his horse.

For reasons I do not pretend to know, and if I thought I did they would be too complex to analyse here, he seems to show reluctance to assume real leadership which, if he has it in him—and I think he may have if he were shaken out of a seeming political lethargy—could exert a considerable and beneficial influence on the future of Vietnam. He is not a shy man, yet he seems to lack any profound conviction in himself as a leader. He is not a play-boy, in the sense of the ill-esteemed Farouk, though he plays heartily, both indoors and out: the latter being principally the shooting of tigers and elephants in the jungle. But he seems to be dragging his feet in the political situation of Vietnam today, and this is a matter of regret for many who believe in his political capabilities. There is no one at the moment who shows the requisite capacity and prestige to replace him.

I venture to conclude this sketchy review of the Indochinese scene today with a story. It is a factual story, which may or may not have any bearing on the future. I would preface it by saying that I am not superstitious, do not take much stock in miracles, nor do I greatly believe in prophets.

But when the Viet Minh launched their surprise attack on Laos somewhat less than a year ago—with no possible basis of " liberating " a country which had no desire to be liberated (from what?)—the following things occurred. The Viet Minh, in four columns of considerable strength, attacked without warning from the heavily forested mountains of north-western Tonkin. They advanced through northern Laos under cover of the jungle, with only such light equipment as they could carry on their backs, barefooted, sweating and bedevilled by blood-sucking leeches. But they kept on going.

Laos, the high command not having anticipated such an attack, was lightly defended. As the Viet Minh columns approached the royal capital, Luang Prabang, the French threw their aviation support into the defence, but this was seriously hampered by the jungle, where they could not see their enemy, and by bad weather. They flew up reinforcements and equipment to the narrow air-strip of Luang Prabang, located between the hills along the Mekong river, and vigorously started building defence works around the town. Realizing that they could not hold Luang Prabang, they so advised the King, saying that they would take him out by air to Vientiane.

But the King, whose sonorous name of Sisavang Vong sounds so much like the sculptured bronze drums of Laos reverberating through the forest, refused to be taken out. " I am here," he said, "and here I shall stay. I shall stay with the Prabang " (the gold and silver statue of Buddha which is the patron saint of the town). " He will protect his town," said the King. The French were unable to persuade the King to budge from his stand.

At the same time there was in Luang Prabang a blind bonze—a Buddhist monk—squatting in a pagoda in a dirty yellow robe. This bonze

had a local reputation as a prophet, and the populace of Luang Prabang flocked around him, asking to know what was going to happen. The blind bonze looked skyward with sightless eyes, and said: "The enemy will come, in great numbers. They will come to within twenty-five kilometres of Luang Prabang and there they will be defeated, turn around and go home." The populace were content with this prediction, though they continued leisurely to build up the defences of the town under the stimulus of the French.

Now the extraordinary part of this story is that both these things happened. The enemy came to exactly twenty-five kilometres from Luang Prabang. They were no doubt pretty well exhausted by their long infiltration through the jungle, but there was no military action at that point. The south-west monsoon came down in full fury, three weeks before it should normally have been expected, inundated the tired Viet Minh troops, who turned around and crept back wetly to their lairs, and the assault on Luang Prabang was abandoned.

"I said," the King observed calmly, "that the Prabang would protect his town. Well, as you see, he brought the monsoon three weeks early."

And the blind bonze said: "Yes, I knew the enemy would be defeated at twenty-five kilometres from our town, turn around and go back."

Perhaps one needs the blind bonze to tell us what is going to happen in Indochina, though his prescience may be valid only in Laos. I am not a blind bonze and do not attempt to predict. I have merely ventured to outline certain eventualities, by no means unforeseen by others who have studied the situation on the spot, should we—the anti-Communist forces—for whatever reason it might be, withdraw our support from that area.

This article was written before the report, through the Swedish newspaper *Expressen*, of Ho Chih Minh's readiness to negotiate a truce in Indochina with the French, and on his terms.

MELVIN HALL,
November 29, 1953.

IN MEMORIAM

H.M. KING ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN AL FAISAL AL SAUD

THE GREAT IBN SAUD

KING ABDUL AZIZ of Saudi Arabia died on November 9. With his passing there closed a chapter unique in the annals of Arabian history, for it is a commonplace that never since the days of the Prophet Muhammad himself has there been an Arab leader so to inspire the imagination of more than half the world. He started in exile, on the Persian Gulf: he ended, not in the Najd which was the home of his forefathers, but in Taif, the pleasant city of the Hijaz, from which country he had ejected the Hashimite family nearly thirty years ago. More than that, he began life as a poor wanderer, and he died, thanks to the discovery of oil in the Hasa, a man rich beyond the wildest dreams of any who knew him at the beginning of this century.

Ibn Saud, who was brought up, and brought others up, in the strictest tenets of Wahhabism, was no bigot; the explanations of how he overcame the dislike of certain of his fanatical Ikhwan to modern inventions, such as the wireless, are not yet fully told. In his prime—and his later years were years of perceptible decline—he could hold his own in any company, provided that it was not godless nor patently anti-Arab. It is true that, at one time, he offended the susceptibilities of some Muslims, but time was on his side, and long before his end grumblings ceased to be heard that he should be Keeper of the Holy Places of Islam.

It is fitting that in this Journal one should recall Ibn Saud's admiration for Britons—for Britons, too, who made no secret that they were "Nasranis." One thinks of Sir Percy Cox, who years before anyone else perceived the lengths to which young Ibn Saud might go; of Captain Shakespeare, killed in desert Arabia in 1915 while watching Ibn Saud's inconclusive fight against Ibn Rashid of Hayil; and of others still living whom it might be invidious to name. He vastly loved Britain, of that there can be no doubt; and though he was forced, particularly in more recent times, to side with certain causes of one or more of the Arab States against Britain, it was always with the prayer that the dispute might soon and amicably be settled.

By contrast, Ibn Saud disliked intensely some Arabs with whom Britain was on the friendliest footing. It was this sense of rivalry that made him, in many matters which concerned the Arabs as a whole, side with Egypt and with any Arab country which he could persuade was not serving its best interests by identifying itself with the cause of the Hashimites. But, though he felt himself obliged, by the desert laws of hospitality, to give refuge to such a one as Rashid Ali, he never concealed his opinion that it was a crime for any Arabs to have fought against Britain in the second World War.

Ibn Saud will become a legend. Of that there can scarcely be a doubt. Fortified morally, in his early years, by the benevolence of Britain or, more

accurately, of the few Britons who knew him, reinforced in his later years by the material wealth which the American oil companies brought to his kingdom, he passed through almost every phase of human unhappiness and happiness. Whether he spent his wealth wisely, whether he did all that might have been done to prevent a sapping of the moral fibre of the peoples who obeyed him implicitly, are questions on which perhaps more than one opinion is possible. But his essential character, confident but the reverse of haughty, firm but generous and humane, remained unaltered to the end.

May his eldest surviving son, King Saud, weld and consolidate the immense kingdom which Ibn Saud erected! He has at least started extremely well, and with him will go all the good wishes of those Britons who admired his towering father.

K. W.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ROBERT BROOKE-POPHAM, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ROBERT BROOKE-POPHAM was for twenty-four years a member of the Central Asian Society, for six of which he was a member of the Council. He was born on September 18, 1878, the son of Henry Brooke of Wetheringsett Manor, Suffolk. Having passed through Haileybury and Sandhurst, he joined the Oxford Light Infantry in 1898. Thus his boyhood was passed in that East Anglia which gave to England the New Model Army, that great example of the importance of quality over quantity, and as a young man he gained experience in a famous Light Infantry regiment which had handed down to it by the 52nd a tradition of training and discipline as taught by Sir John Moore and practised in the Peninsula in the early years of the nineteenth century. With a stout heart and a good brain, he was thus well equipped to play a leading part for thirty years in forming the character of the air service as it developed from the Air Battalion R.E. and the R.F.C. to the Royal Air Force of the late war. I feel sure Sir John Moore would have recognized in him a worthy successor.

On inheriting some property in the Quantocks he added " Popham " to his surname, which occasioned the " Brookham " by which he was so affectionately known in his Service.

In 1912 he joined the R.F.C., newly formed from the Air Battalion R.E., from the Staff College, being the first officer from Camberley to do so. My first meeting with " Brookham " was in the early summer of that year at daylight at Lark Hill, to which I had been driven through the night by Sir Frederick Sykes. I remember seeing him take off at dawn in one of the primitive aircraft of those days. I believe he was selected about this time to raise No. 3 Squadron, for which he always retained an affectionate interest in after years.

In the Kaiser's war he served in France from August, 1914, until the end, first as D.A.Q.M.G. at Headquarters and later as the head and organizer of that great expansion which grew to supply the R.F.C. (from 1918 the R.A.F.) with its requirements in " material " in all its aspects.

When that war was over he was appointed to the Air Ministry as Director of Research, an appointment he held until he went to the R.A.F. Staff College as its first Commandant in 1921. In his time at the Air Ministry, among the many projects and problems which engaged the attention of his directorate was the first remote-controlled aircraft, later to become the "Queen Bee" and the progenitor of the guided missile of to-day.

On leaving the Staff College in 1926 he was selected to command the Fighting Area, part of the newly formed Air Defence of Great Britain, where the experiences of 1914-18 were applied to build up the organization of fighters, A.A. guns, searchlights and observer corps under one command. By 1940, with the addition of radar and short-wave telephony, this provided a prepared battlefield over which the brave young men of the second World War were to fight and win the Battle of Britain. In 1928 he assumed command in Iraq, where the later phase of the attempt of the Muhtair, one of Ibn Saud's Akhwan tribes, to dominate the Bedouin of Iraq, and so to bring the Euphrates cultivated area under threat from the desert, was brought to nought when Ibn Saud himself intervened, realizing that, with the British Government supporting the Iraqis, his method of expansion, which had given him his kingdom extending from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, had lost its potency, and his kingdom had reached its limit.

On his return from Iraq he became the first R.A.F. Commandant of the Imperial Defence College in 1931, and after two years in this appointment he became the Air Officer Commanding in Chief of the Air Defence of Great Britain.

In 1935 he was appointed Inspector-General, a newly created post, but was soon sent to Egypt as A.O.C. in C. Middle East when it seemed that the policy of sanctions against Mussolini for his aggression in Abyssinia might lead to war with Italy. It was largely due to his tact and personality that the three services worked together in a whole-hearted harmony which was something new and was, I like to think, a precedent which bore fruit in the dangerous years of 1940-42.

In 1937 he retired and was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Kenya, a post he held until 1939, when he was recalled to active service. He became C.-in-C. Far East in 1940, where in 1942 he was faced with the impossible task of defending Malaya against the pick of the Japanese army with troops mostly newly raised, armed with little more than rifles, and a small R.A.F. contingent equipped with obsolete aircraft. He finally retired in 1942.

Throughout his service with his enviable personality he inspired the respect and affection of all those with whom he worked, and among the many officers I have known he was one of the three who most noticeably placed the interest of their service before their personal advancement, and carried out the tasks that fell to their lot with equal devotion and good grace, whether they were congenial or otherwise.

He will be greatly missed by all those who knew him, but the R.A.F., whose reputation owes so much to his conduct and example, will long keep his memory green.

E. E.

REVIEWS

Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., 1863-1942. Explorer and Mystic. By George Seaver. John Murray. 1952. Pp. xi + 391. 25s.

It is particularly appropriate that this book should be reviewed in this Journal, since Sir Francis Younghusband was one of the prime movers in the founding of the Society in 1901 and its first Honorary Secretary for a brief period until he was recalled to duty in India.

Sir Francis was bred to be a soldier and an explorer, for his father was one of five brothers who all distinguished themselves in the Indian Army and his mother was the sister of Robert Shaw, who was well known for his journeys to Central Asia. He was destined to acquire fame as both. He emerged from Clifton and Sandhurst a shy and serious young man and was gazetted to the King's Dragoon Guards, stationed at Meerut. His impatient spirit chafed at the easy-going life of the cavalry subaltern in those halcyon days until his perspicacious Colonel made him Adjutant at the early age of twenty-two, and even then he had upon occasion to learn to curb his excessive zeal. But his thoughts were already turning to the hills, and when in April, 1884, he was granted two and a half months' leave he spent them travelling light in the Himalayas. It was his first taste of adventure and he revelled in it and dreamt of visiting the mysterious country of Tibet, beyond that mountain wall, little thinking how dramatically that dream would be fulfilled.

There followed a succession of staff duties. We were exercised over the Russian menace and Younghusband was sent on a reconnaissance to the Kohat frontier to report upon roads and supply-lines in case of invasion. The Penjdeh incident confirmed our worst fears and brought us to the brink of war. Younghusband was concerned in making arrangements for the durbar to which the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, invited the Emir of Afghanistan, and rode escort to the Duke of Connaught. All passed off quietly, but we were still apprehensive. Younghusband was sent for to Simla to revise the Military Gazetteer of Kashmir. It was an unexciting task, but in the course of it he made a special study of the Russian position in the east and concluded that their next advance would be in the direction of Manchuria. Our knowledge of that country then was scant, and he determined to go there himself to supplement it. At this moment he was lucky enough to meet Mr. James, then Director-General of the Post Office in India, who had the same thought in mind, and, having secured leave, sailed with him for China in March, 1886.

After a long and fruitful nine months Younghusband returned to Pekin, whence he intended to return to India by sea, but the unexpected arrival there of his chief in the Intelligence Department, Colonel Bell, caused a complete change in his plans. Bell had decided to make the journey back overland through Chinese Turkestan along the main caravan route and suggested that he should travel by the Gobi Desert, a way till then untrodden by any European, and that they should meet half-way at Hauri. Here was Younghusband's chance and he jumped at it. After many adventures he accomplished the journey of 1,250 miles in seventy days and arrived at Hauri to find that Bell had already left. Accordingly he set out immediately for Kashgar, where the Russian Consul, Monsieur Petrovsky, surprised him by his intimate knowledge of India and of Central Asian affairs, and thence to Yarkand, the city of which he had heard so much in his youth from his uncle. But the most exciting part of his journey was yet to come: without mountaineering experience or proper mountaineering equipment he made the first crossing of the Mustaqh Pass.

Henceforward Younghusband was a marked man. He was congratulated by Sir Frederick Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, and given three months' leave to lecture upon his journey to the Geographical Society, of which he was elected the youngest Fellow. Upon his return to India and his regiment it was not long before the Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, instructed him to explore the northern passes into the State of Hunza and to report upon any Russian activity. He was to spend the next two years in the Pamirs, traversing much unexplored country, and

to be involved in an international incident. Russia had determined to annex that part of the country and sent an expedition for that purpose under Colonel Youoff, who put him under arrest and ordered him to return to Gilgit. When this was known a sharp protest was immediately despatched to St. Petersburg, which resulted in the Russians climbing down and agreeing to the establishment of a satisfactory boundary in that region, from which they never issued again.

Younghusband reported to the India Office upon his return to England and there met for the first time Lord Curzon, then Under Secretary, and was much impressed by his grasp of Indian affairs. It was the beginning of a friendship which lasted till the latter's death. They were to meet next in very different surroundings, for Younghusband after a time as Assistant Resident in Kashmir had been appointed to the congenial post of Political Officer in Hunza, and after the murder of the Mehtar of Chitral had been posted there as Political Agent to keep the peace, and Lord Curzon, whose party had been thrown out of office, chose to make a tour of that part of the world. It might have been thought that the two men were unlikely to get on, but Younghusband did not allow Lord Curzon's pompous arrogance to blind him to his vision and ability, and Lord Curzon respected Younghusband's fearlessness and good sense. Their views coincided upon the advisability of retaining the British hold upon Chitral, and if the Indian Government had listened to Younghusband the recrudescence of trouble there, which culminated in the Relief Expedition, might have been avoided. It was largely due to the advocacy of Lord Curzon, then Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that we did not subsequently withdraw.

The Chitral campaign was for Younghusband the beginning of an interlude as a journalist, for, being on leave at the time, he was given permission to act as Special Correspondent of *The Times*. His services were so satisfactory to his employers that during the next year he was twice sent by them to South Africa to report upon the political situation. 1896 was the year of the Jameson Raid, and his subsequent book, *South Africa of Today*, is an admirably balanced account of the Raid itself and of the influences which led up to it.

Upon Younghusband's return to England he married and the next few years were spent in minor posts in Rajputana and Indore. But he was not destined to remain in such humdrum occupations for long, for in 1903 his friend Lord Curzon, then Viceroy, showed his confidence in him by appointing him to lead a Mission to Tibet. How fully he justified that confidence and how successful the Mission proved is well known. He was now at the zenith of his career, his name a household word as the first European to set foot in Lhasa for nearly a hundred years. But his triumph was soon to be mingled with gall for he was severely censured by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Brodrick, for exceeding his instructions in the indemnity demanded as part of the Treaty. He was deeply hurt and was only somewhat mollified by the personal approbation of the King, who insisted upon his being knighted. To the public, however, he preserved a dignified and discreet silence in the matter. Final amends did not come until 1917, when Mr. Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State made a formal apology and recommended him for the K.C.S.I.

Younghusband concluded his official career as Resident in Kashmir. This pleasant post gave him an opportunity to show his ability as an administrator. He belonged to a time in which imperialism was not, as now, derided and was himself a firm believer in the benefits conferred by British rule. But his aim was always to encourage the native officials to take responsibility themselves and only to intervene when absolutely necessary. With his character and experience he was bound to impress those with whom he worked, and his departure in 1909 was universally regretted.

From now on, apart from employment in the India Office during the first war, his time was his own and he used it to forge closer links between East and West. As a result of the war he came to regard as inevitable and desirable the ultimate transfer of power in India to the Indians themselves and from the first urged the Government to make a timely offer of Constitutional Reform. In this he was far-sighted, but political delays in England and agitation in India were to falsify his hopes of a speedy and statesmanlike solution of the problem. No one more than he would have deplored the bloodshed which attended the birth of the new India and Pakistan.

Yet it was not for greater political trust alone that Younghusband strove but for fuller spiritual understanding. To this end he founded the World Congress of Faiths, which he looked upon as the culmination of his life's endeavour. Brought up in a puritanical atmosphere, he had little patience with organized religions. His faith was essentially simple and his heart echoed the cry of the psalmist, " I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help." Although a convinced Christian, his long experience of hardship and danger shared with men of different race and creed had borne in upon him that the goal of every religion was the same, though the paths to it might differ, and that the Christian had as much to learn from the Buddhist or Moslem as to offer them. Ultimately he was a mystic, and three times in his life was to be caught up in the spirit. His ordered mind, however, compelled him to seek a rational basis for his belief. He did not find this easy, but persevered in reading philosophy to such good purpose that he was made a member of the Aristotelian Society, which comprised many of the leading thinkers of the day. His own thoughts were crystallized in two books, *The Living Universe* and *Life in the Stars*, in which he endeavoured to bridge the gulf between religion and science.

Although a man of action Younghusband was a ready writer with a felicitous turn of phrase, and every phase of his career he made the excuse for a book. His accounts of his earlier explorations in particular caught the public imagination, and those who read Mr. Seaver's book will be well repaid if they are encouraged to take up the original volumes from which he quotes. In fact, it would have been an advantage if he had included a list of Younghusband's works in an appendix.

But even this does not exhaust the list of Younghusband's activities. For, besides taking an interest in many societies such as our own, as President of the Royal Geographical Society he was the inspiration of all our expeditions to Mount Everest between the wars, without which its ascent fully this year would never have been possible.

He was fortunate in his wife, who, though she may not have shared his intellectual bent, fully sympathized with his spiritual aims. She was popular as a hostess, and after his exacting days of adventure he was glad to come back to the comfort of his home.

Such a many-sided man makes exceptional demands upon his biographer, but Mr. Seaver possesses the sympathetic understanding necessary to draw him in proper perspective. It is a pity that the book is marred by a series of misprints, which careful proof-reading should have eliminated. The maps, too, leave something to be desired. But these are minor blemishes upon the otherwise excellent account of the life of a great English gentleman.

H. O. CLARKE.

Soviet Empire. By Sir Olaf Caroe. Macmillan. 1953. Pp. 300. 25s.

In the first part of his new book the author of *Wells of Power* traces with much illuminating comment and picturesque metaphor the confused history of what is now Soviet Central Asia from the Mongol deluge of A.D. 1219-24 to the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917. He describes the secular conflict between the settled inhabitants of the Transcaspian oases and the nomadic inhabitants of the northern and western steppes and shows its relation to the wider struggle between East and West in the Turanian basin, East being represented by the inextricably intermingled "Turkic" and Mongolian strains and West by medieval Persia and nineteenth-century Russia in turn. He rightly emphasizes the overriding influence of geography on the history of Transoxiana, divided as it is between two totally different though interlacing regions and two climates; but he gives full weight also to external factors, such as the decay of the caravan traffic of Central Asia which followed the establishment of the sea route between Europe and the Far East.

The latter part of the book fills many gaps in our knowledge of the course of events in Central Asia since the Russian Revolution. Apart from his researches among little-known Turkish and Russian sources, Sir Olaf's intimate knowledge of Central Asian affairs gained during a long and distinguished career in the political service of the Government of India, both in the North-west Frontier Province and

at headquarters, enables him to write with authority on a little-known but highly important subject. His main themes are the unavailing struggle waged by the Eastern Turki nationalists against Russian domination; the "Russianizing" policy by which the Soviets have consolidated their power over their Central Asian empire; and the new economic, industrial and social pattern imposed by Moscow on the Five Republics of Kazakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan and Kirghizia. Sir Olaf's chief source and inspiration throughout is a book in modern Turkish called *Bugünkü Turkili* ("Turkistan Today"), published in 1929 by a remarkable Bashkir patriot and historian, Zeki "Velidov" Togan, a man who was once a leader of the Bashkir and Uzbeg nationalists in their struggle against the Soviets and is now a professor at Istanbul University. Sir Olaf has done a service to Western students of Central Asia by rescuing this author from oblivion.

The story of the "Basmachi" rebellion of 1921-4, and in particular the light thrown on the strange, rather romantic part in it played by Enver Pasha, who died leading a forlorn hope on the Pamirs, will be new to most readers. Another interesting and little-known episode is that of the 180,000 Turki deserters and prisoners of war from the Red Army who were recruited for the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS by Hitler's Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg. Among the survivors of this force, some still in exile, others back in their native Turkistan and Caucasia, may well be the leaders of a future revolt against the soul-destroying materialism of the Soviet Empire in Central Asia. The question, indeed, poses itself to any student of Turki nationalism: to what extent have the Russians succeeded in destroying the spiritual inheritance of Turkistan, the pride, the traditional way of life, the distinctive civilization of the peoples of the Turanian basin? It cannot be said that either Sir Olaf or Professor Togan whose views he expounds gives any clear answer to this question. The overwhelming power of the new régime and the pressures set up by Soviet industrial development—irrigation, hydro-electric power, railways and waterways, textiles—seem indeed to leave little room for a Turki renascence on a national scale. Togan and the other Eastern Turki patriots who have taken refuge in the West are probably not less prone than other émigrés to wishful thinking. All that can be said is that great national movements have in the past originated in countries, like Palestine, in which ideas and civilizations overlap.

"Central Asia, like India," says Sir Olaf, "is a region of this kind, from which we may expect new forces to be set in motion in this age. There is good reason of recent showing for the belief that the older inspirations of the Central Asian peoples have not yet failed; there are also grounds for supposing that the impact of the new has not been wholly destructive, but by a process of catalysis may even bring about some renewal of life. . . . From this meeting of new and old some offspring will surely be born. It is for the free world to forecast the delivery and nurse it when it comes."

Sir Olaf himself is inclined to think wishfully on this all-important subject. He compares the "Eurasian empire" of the Soviets with that of the Mongols in the thirteenth century, "dependent on the life of one man and on singleness of aim within a small and jealous palace circle," and thinks that the former may one day prove as ephemeral as its medieval prototype. He fails to take into account the fact that modern communications can make an empire even of that size viable; whereas in Mongol times a message by express courier would have taken four months to reach Odessa from Shanghai, now, granted fuelling facilities, a Comet would cover the distance (5,000 miles by Great Circle route) in about twelve hours. Moreover, the Mongols were nomads and their rule rested on armed force alone; that of the Kremlin is based on settled agriculture and industry on a continental scale.

It is easy, but dangerous in the long view, to underestimate the possibilities of industrial and agricultural expansion in Soviet Central Asia. The author of the book under review (pp. 207-8) is sceptical about the startlingly grandiose "Davidov plan" to divert the waters of the northward-flowing Siberian rivers Ob and Yenisei by means of a barrage at the junction of the Ob and the Irtish and a canal leading southwards through the Turgay gap into the Aral basin. He rightly emphasizes the dangers of waterlogging and the administrative difficulties involved in bringing so vast an area of desert under irrigation. But the processes of Soviet expansion

resemble those of nature in their disregard of waste. As Mr. W. M. Pintner points out in his paper on the "Soviet Economic Development of Central Asia" in the July-October, 1953, issue of this Journal, the planners of the Kremlin are more fortunate than those of more democratic lands in that they can "use economic pressure unabashedly to eliminate the opposition and to channel labour into preferred industries." They have also a monopoly control of education, propaganda and communications. With the vast reservoir of manpower at their disposal it is by no means improbable that they may succeed one day in bringing from 300 to 350 cubic kilometres of fresh water annually to irrigate and provide waterways for the Turanian basin. The importance of such a scheme from the point of view of the future of Russia's Central Asian Empire cannot be overestimated.*

The bibliography appended to *Soviet Empire* is comprehensive and will be of great assistance to the student of Central Asian history. There are four useful maps, of which the first might perhaps have been less exclusively "Physical" and have shown the chief towns and political divisions, for which it is necessary to turn to the interesting and valuable "Linguistic" map at the end of the book. Like other workers in this field, Sir Olaf has come up against the impossibility of transliterating Eastern Turki and Western Turkish names in such a way as to please both the philologists and the large class of readers which is impatient of philological pedantry in books of history or travel. The system he adopts is a compromise between the Hunterian and the Western Turkish systems which is likely to appeal to the latter class much more than to the former. His criterion might well be used more generally by writers of books about Asia; what is needed, he says, is a system of transliteration "generally phonetic in intention and effect, yet conforming broadly with an educated approach to orientalia." The review of Eastern Turki literature ("Heritage of Chaghatai," chapter xiii) is one of the most interesting chapters in this valuable and thought-provoking book.

C. P. SKRINE.

The Muslim Architecture of Egypt. By K. A. C. Creswell. I. **Ikhshīds and Fāṭimids,** A.D. 939-1171. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1952. 17½″ × 13″. Pp. xxvi + 292 + pls. 125 (+173 text illns.). 15 guineas.

In an age given to official compilations, collaborative research, and the liberal employment of "ghosts," Professor Creswell stands almost alone among art-historians as the single-handed author of a definitive work on the grandest scale. Following upon the two volumes of his *Early Muslim Architecture*, which carried the story of the building art of Islam up to the opening of the tenth century A.D., the present book deals with Egypt alone for nearly three centuries more. Every known monument of the period is described in meticulous detail, provided with plans (and often elevations and sections) to uniform scales, and sumptuously illustrated by magnificent collotype plates, mostly from the author's own photographs. The date of each building is discussed in detail, together with all former references to its architectural history, and in each case there is a full bibliography chronologically arranged. Here is an exemplar of clarity and perfected method.

Slips of detail appear to be remarkably few in a book so thronged with facts and dates, though on two occasions there seems to be some error in a date (pp. 37, 38, the dates May 7, 1009, and January 16, 1266, are said to have fallen on Fridays, whereas

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* See Dr. T. E. Armstrong's paper on "Soviet Siberia" in *R.C.A.J.*, January, 1952, pp. 12-14. The name of the author of the Ob-Yenisei-Aral scheme is given as M. M. Davydov, not J. Davidov as in the book under review. Sir Olaf's figure on p. 207 of 24·5 milliard kilowatts for the hydroelectric capacity of the scheme is presumably a misprint for 24·5 million; Dr. Armstrong's figure is 12·9 million kilowatts. The scale of the works envisaged for the scheme is certainly staggering; the barrage on the Ob will be not less than 78 metres (260 ft.) high and 60 kilometres (37½ miles) long and the Great Turkmen Canal carrying the overflow of the Aral Sea to the Caspian will be 700 miles long.

each was a Saturday). The period of "about 1900" given (p. 23) for the filling of the old canal through Cairo is stated more precisely as 1897 by the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11-13th ed., IV, 954). There may still be room for discussion on some points less trivial, though most of the conclusions on controversial subjects are very fully buttressed with hard facts.

A round denial of Persian influence upon Fāṭimid architecture is an outstanding feature of the book. (This view has also been presented by Professor Creswell in a paper printed in *The Art Bulletin*, XXXV, March, 1953.) Much evidence is brought to show that the older view was founded on premisses completely falsified by the enormous expansion of knowledge of Persian art during the last generation. But Professor Creswell has been carried rather too far: it is illogical to attempt to refute the Shī'a influence of Persia upon the Shī'a dynasty of the Fāṭimids by means of a percentage sum (p. 51, note 1), when the relevant figures show that Persia was under Shi'a rule for the vital period, the *first* 69 years after the Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt. Nor can the architectural typologist accept the view that there is absolutely no relation between the early Persian and Egyptian versions of the stalactite pendentive, so nearly contemporary. The earliest Persian example, the Yazd pendentive (Fig. 144), is dated to 1037, just a year before the Sunni dynasty of Tughril Beg came to power in Persia. May it not be that some craftsman of Shī'a faith carried the rudiments of the device into exile in Cairo, and that it was there developed in distinct fashion? The early dating of 975-8 A.D. for the pendentives of the main dome of the Church of Abū-as-Sayfain at Old Cairo seems improbable in view of the recorded alterations of the building and the close resemblance of these pendentives (perhaps truncated by the fire of 1168?) to those of the chapel of St. George in the same church, which can be dated with some certainty between 1094 and 1121. On the other hand, if the date of 975 were established, one would have to believe that this Egyptian invention had been carried to Persia and there developed independently. The remarkable points of structural resemblance between the Egyptian and Persian fashions, even more striking than the differences in detail, will not allow of two independent inventions within so closely knit a civilization as the world of Islam.

The value of Professor Creswell's work will be immediately appreciated by Islamic archæologists, but it is only too likely that workers in other fields may overlook his far from negligible contributions to Byzantine, Romanesque and Gothic knowledge. The gates and walls of Cairo, built in 1087-92 to the designs of three Armenian architects from Urfa (Edessa), form a cardinal monument of the dawning transition from "Romanesque" to "Gothic." Here for the first time these amazing works are adequately published. The essential unity of mediæval art, both Christian and Muslim, on which Lethaby was wont to insist, is here demonstrated. A window grille in the Mosque al-Azhar, of *c.* 1130-49 A.D. (p. 256) contains patterns based on the angle of 45° and quatrefoils, strikingly foreshadowing such early Gothic tracery as that of the great south rose of Lausanne Cathedral. Finally, there is a most valuable discussion (pp. 240-1) of the decorative motive of a cusping consisting of alternate circular arcs and Vs, the essential feature of the split-cusped "Kentish" tracery of England, produced about 1300; whereas the Muslim examples are a century earlier and include a doorway in the mosque of Dunaysir (Turkey) of 1204 A.D. (Fig. 139) which might almost pass for an excentric English work of 100-150 years later.

In a short notice it is not possible to comment further upon detail. It is enough to say that Professor Creswell's book is itself an enduring monument which must retain its value so long as the study of man's past continues to exert its fascination over succeeding generations.

JOHN H. HARVEY.

Israel. By Norman Bentwich. Ernest Benn. 1952. Pp. 224. 21s.

This book replaces the author's earlier *Palestine*—a "geographical expression" which now seems to have passed from actuality into history. No book about Zionism by a Zionist has yet achieved, or seems likely to achieve, entire objectivity, except in the presentation of internal problems, for the creation or non-solution of which no blame can be attributed to outsiders. This tendency is exemplified even by

Mr. Bentwich, who of all such writers comes nearest to attaining that balance which the judicious reader is entitled to expect. Thus his chapters on The Land, The People, The Socialist Order, Immigration and Economy, The Democratic Government, Law and the Courts, The Jews in the World Today, Education, Archæology, and Literature, Jerusalem, Israel and the Religion of Israel, and The Jewish Dispersion—by far the greater part of the book—contain scarce a page or even a paragraph which would not be endorsed and applauded by the fair-minded seeker after truth.

And truly, given the thesis, the record of achievement is tremendous — even inspiring, and it must have been a filial as well as a racial pride for a son of one of the original *Khoveve Tsiyon*—those lovers of Zion who preceded the internationally organized Zionist—to give full vent to his just enthusiasm.

Mr. Bentwich has a gift of vivid phrase and illuminating exposition, abounding in such happy coinages as, "Israel: the pressure-cooker of the Jewish people"; and "a common idea that the Law of Israel is Mosaic . . . is a fallacy. It is rather a mosaic, made up of a number of legal pebbles of different ages."

The United Nations and Israel, and The Arab Refugees, the two more controversial chapters, may cause the already informed to stare now and again and maybe to muse. We read today with a wry smile of Sir Winston Churchill's 1922 White Paper "to set at rest the exaggerated apprehensions of the Arab people" which "did not placate the Arab leaders," who refused to participate in election for a Legislative Council. No blame is however implied for the Zionists, who indignantly rejected the Legislative Council likewise proposed in 1936. Again, after the 1929 White Paper "the Palestine Government ruled without the consent of either section of the people." That for twenty years they had been ruling under the Balfour Declaration against the consent of the Arab majority had, to the best of my knowledge, never constituted a Zionist grievance. It is cold comfort for the dispossessed to read now "the Arabs had left in their flight built-up quarters in the towns and villages which were, or could quickly be made, habitable"; and "It was a helpful condition that large areas of lands, which were before in Arab possession, were now available to Jews." Or again, "the incoming Jews have taken the places, the quarters and the villages, the fields and pastures of the outgoing Arabs." On the next page, "During the war the British Government devised a new policy in favour of uniting the Arab States in a League." My recollection, on the contrary, is that Mr. Eden welcomed and supported the Arab League well after it had been devised by the Arabs themselves. "The benevolent autocracy was turned into a police State"—which it had of course been for the Arabs from the moment they realized its inevitable implications. Against these relative crudities must be set one or two frank admissions, verging on apology. "The property rights of the resident Arabs have not received hitherto the same equitable treatment as their political rights." "Economic discrimination, denial of the rights of property and security measures which work hardship, take away the virtue of the political assurances."

And finally—two masterly understatements: "During the critical post-war years American Zionists and American non-Zionists, also, were the dynamic elements in marshalling world opinion, not always too scrupulously but none the less effectively for the Jewish cause against the Mandatory Power." And "the amazing triumph of Israel's bold diplomacy, in establishing the State against what seemed overwhelming odds, was due to . . . the skill and know-how of the Zionists' leaders in America." It was indeed. But there is no meiosis; rather, a legitimate hit in his "Operation Chaos": the ignobly gratuitous emergency exit of the British Mandatory, which will surely go down as one of the *gran rifiutos* of history.

Mr. Bentwich writes in an equable temperament and with an urbane manner, together with a refreshing absence of the rancorous anti-British calumny with which such histories are all too often disfigured. This admirably qualified apostle to the gentiles offers to the public a manual, replete with a mass of important, well-presented and generally interesting information and fortified by a scruple of corrective objectivity; the aspiring lecturer on Israel might face with confidence an audience of the Royal Central Asian Society itself.

R. S.

Caucasian Battlefields. By W. E. D. Allen and the late Paul Muratoff. Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. xxi+614. Illus. 70s.

This is a book mainly for the military historian and student, and military history must be followed with maps and is stiff reading. But there is material here to excite interest in many quarters. More than twenty years ago Mr. Allen wrote the only real history of Georgia in English, and during that writing and ever since has been amassing the material which made possible this later work. The result is a monumental, even a formidable, account of a century's dingdong struggle between Turk and Russian across the highlands of what was once Armenia and the Pontic Shore. How many know that between 1828 and 1918 four great wars, involving tens of thousands of troops on both sides, were fought out in Eastern Anatolia between the armies of the Tsar and the Sultan ? Here is the whole story, related in lucid and scholarly prose, complete with 39 maps, plates, an elaborate bibliography and index. And by no means dull.

Mr. Allen has a great gift of objectivity. In all his appreciations of the personal characteristics of commanders, whether in planning or in the field, of the strategy of higher commands, of the qualities of the fighting man, it is impossible to convict him of any predilections whatever. Criticism there is in plenty, and praise for skill or courage in victory or defeat, but he never comes down emotionally on one side or the other. "If Alaca-dağ," he writes, "remains a classic feat of Russian arms, Sarikamiş must live in history as the most heroic manifestation of the spirit of the Turkish fighting man." That sentence, comparing the 1877 campaign with that of 1915, is typical of the perspective of the book as a whole. (In parenthesis is not the use of the Turkish-Roman spelling a little tiresome in an English book? *E.g.*, Alaca would be better as Alaja, and Sarikamiş as Sarikamish. And would not feet be better than metres for describing mountain heights?)

The most interesting of the many commanders are Paskevich and Yudenich on the Russian side—in 1828-9 and 1915-17 respectively—and Enver Pasha on the Turkish side—in 1915-18. Mr. Allen does not spare Enver, whom he regards as cursed with a romantic dynamism unsupported by a solid grounding in the art of war. Yet, pan-Turanian dreamer as he was, it is hard not to admire the imagination which conceived the magnificent failure at Sarikamish in mid-winter, and it is fair to remember that, later in Turkistan, Enver was ready to die for his ideal.

Another impression is of the astonishing complexity of the geography of Eastern Anatolia. In parallel valleys are rivers running in opposite directions and bound for one of three different seas. Beside this the North-West Frontier is open country. It is to be noted too that, despite the book's title, these wars for the most part were not fought in the Caucasus, or even in the Trans-Caucasian plains, but in the highlands lying in the triangle Aleksandropol (now Leninakan)—Erzerum—Bayezid. Russian propaganda seeks to call this Armenia; in fact, so fiercely has the battle swayed to and fro over this terrain, and so often in history have the populations advanced and retreated with one or other contending army, that the land has become a confused amalgam of Turk, Circassian, Armenian, Georgian and Kurd. This thought should give pause to any who seek to follow President Wilson in believing that there exists here solid material on which to build a national State or States.

Mr. Allen wisely eschews political deduction, and the reader will find no concluding reflections. His task is military history, carefully disentangled. But any who follow the story to the end will be struck by the thought that, after a century of testing war against Imperial Russia, the Turks were left with much the same frontier as they started with. And that was before Ataturk. He figures only as Mustafa Kemal, a Corps Commander in the last of the four wars.

There are many relieving touches that make the country and the story come alive. His military text does not prevent Mr. Allen from referring to the Elysian shores and the early-flowering forests of the Pontic coastline, or to the icy blizzards on the bare ridges of the heights round Erzerum. There is mention more than once of "a victory without a morrow," a phrase to stick in the memory of the student of war.

The author freely acknowledges his debt to his Russian collaborator, Mr. Muratoff. Yet he himself has walked and ridden over all this tangled territory from both sides. Here we have a record, the outcome of a sustained adventure in a wild and difficult

country, undertaken during a period when many were disillusioned, to serve as a challenge to those who dare to follow on this pilgrimage. It is a book combining action with learning in a rare degree.

OLAF CAROE.

Arabian Jubilee. By H. StJ. B. Philby. Robert Hale. 1952. Pp. xiv + 280. 30s.

While your reviewer was writing these notes, news came that Ibn Sa'ud had died—I do not say "the sad news," for there can be no sadness in the quiet passing of a great man, old and honoured—leaving behind him a lifetime of achievement which it was Mr. Philby's purpose in writing *Arabian Jubilee* "to set forth in a series of tableaux illustrating characteristic phases of his career." The book stops at 1950; the king was seventy years old and the future of Sa'udi Arabia under his successors was already a subject of speculation. Now, so swift are the changes that follow the departure of a commanding personality, many a well or ill inspired conjecture will probably have received at least the beginning of an answer by the time this review appears in print. Mr. Philby himself, however, whose forecasts in matters relating to Ibn Sa'ud and his country have in the past proved substantially right, though their utterance has not always been unattended with controversy, was not concerned in this volume to predict the future of the Sa'udi Arabian State, but rather to include in his account of it some friendly and constructive suggestions which, if acted upon, could go far to ensure its continued prosperity and progress.

It is a safe guess that in his last days the thoughts of Ibn Sa'ud returned, as often before, to the scenes of his early manhood. "Those," he had said to his guests one evening not very long ago, "were the best days of my life . . . the years of struggle in the desert, with hunger and thirst ever present in company with danger . . . every day of it full of enjoyment and good companionship, never to be forgotten." Looking back across the half-century whose troubled tide had borne him somehow safely to his jubilee as conqueror and ruler, he became once more in memory the sheikhly exile fighting to recover the domains of his ancestors, proud above all—as perhaps he remained proud to the last—of being a man of the desert. Indeed, had he been other than this, his victories in desert Arabia would have been impossible: he had to be an Arab of the Arabs, but better. Personal ambition, tribal pride, religion, politics, love and war—here was the Arabian "mixture as before," but its ingredients were blended and made coherent by a sustained energy, a patient far-sightedness and a force of personality rare if not unknown in Arabia since Muhammad.

To Mr. Philby himself, sitting with the king among the assembled guests, it came as "something of a shock to realize that the period which he [the king] regards as the peak of his career left virtually no mark on contemporary history." From the point of view of the West, Ibn Sa'ud was just another aggressive and enterprising son of a sheikh, bent on righting family wrongs in a country to which Nature's barriers denied all but the most slender traffic with the outside world. But, seen from the inside, his recovery of Riyadh and the Qasim from Ibn Rashid and, still more, his discomfiture of the Turks who went to the latter's aid carried the rumour of the new warrior's stature far and wide in Arabia itself. In that country history must be seen from the inside, and Mr. Philby is the one Englishman who can do this.

Diligence and foresight marked the young sheikh's actions from the beginning. In the old tribal warfare of the desert, surprise and daring, aided by a little treachery and perhaps some impetuous blundering or mere negligence on the other side, could accomplish much: often it was no great matter to win a town or even a district. The difficulty, as Ibn Sa'ud was quick to realize, was to keep it; for the enemy could withdraw into the ample spaces which invited him, and would work and wait for his chance of a come-back. A wise commander, therefore, would use this interval to organize and strengthen his position in the newly won territory, while preparing to meet or anticipate the inevitable counter-attack. Such was the course pursued by Ibn Sa'ud in the years of ding-dong struggle which followed the conquest of Riyadh in 1902 and, soon after, of the Qasim, Washm and Sudair. Hayil itself, a Shammar town amid Shammar tribesmen, lay beyond his grasp, but already in less than three

years he had regained the whole of his grandfather's territory, and his immediate need was so to order tribal affairs as to retain what he had won.

To this end Ibn Sa'ud had to be not only a master of prompt if simple military action and the sternest of disciplinarians in the sternest of countries, but an artist in that diplomacy of the desert which alone could ride the stormy weather of tribal politics. At this time, among many measures of importance, he embarked, probably without reluctance, on a network of diplomatic marriages destined ultimately to cover (four at a time, of course) a large part of Arabia. Now, too, he began to reap the reward of what was perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of his conduct in the hour of victory—a clemency towards beaten foes, which must be ascribed as much to natural inclination as to policy.

But it was in 1906, Mr. Philby tells us, that he began to prepare that famous project which we must surely regard as the most revolutionary ever undertaken in the Arabian desert. Himself, like his ancestors, a devout Wahhabi, he knew that the fiery zeal of his warriors, invaluable as the mainspring of his military effort, afforded no recipe for stability—so long as the collective indiscipline inherent in nomadic tribalism remained. He decided, therefore, that the faith of his fathers should be nourished in fixed centres, each peopled by men not of one tribe but of many, bound to one another by loyalty to the Wahhabi creed and, of course, to himself. They would till the land and would receive a subsidy, and thus at any moment he would be able to lay hands on a sufficient number of trustworthy warriors to punish the erring or to undertake—who could foretell what further conquests? (Had not the Wahhabi army of an earlier 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud gained Mecca itself, to be followed shortly by Medina and even by Oman and the Yemen?) To tamper with the immemorial structure of desert society was a course which must have proved too hard and dangerous for a less able and resolute man, but at the end of six years Ibn Sa'ud was able to establish the first of no fewer than two hundred colonies of Ikhwan.

The crowning victory of this period came in 1913, when the 33-year-old sheikh surprised the Turks at Hufhuf, and ended by a short operation their tenure of the province of El Hasa. Little could they know what they were losing!

In the first World War, so soon to follow, Ibn Sa'ud made no addition to his domains, nor was he drawn into it in any very positive manner, for though he was our friend, geography made the Hashimites our allies. Perhaps, from the viewpoint of the West, the most fruitful incident of the war, as touching Ibn Sa'ud and his country, was that in 1917 it sent Mr. Philby into Arabia, inspiring him to begin the series of journeys and chronicles which have so enriched the world's knowledge of that country and earned for him so high a place in the long history of exploration and travel. Those of us especially who for long have travelled agreeably and with profit (by armchair) in his company here and there in the land to which he has devoted most of the last six-and-thirty years may welcome this supplementary volume not least by reason of the first-hand view which it affords us of the change from old to new.

Dammed by the Great War, the flood of Ibn Sa'ud's endeavour burst forth afresh with irresistible force in the ensuing years. Hayil—inland Asir—the Hejaz itself fell into his hands. Well might the world in general and the Muslim world in particular ask themselves with apprehension in what manner the Sultan of Nejd, by now called also King of the Hejaz, would discharge his guardianship of the heart and centre of Islam.

Mr. Philby traces through this critical period the policy of one "whose unquestionable zeal for the faith had always been tempered with the discretion of a born statesman." Determined to brook no outside interference with his rule of the Hejaz, he had to justify that determination in face of much unfriendliness, suspicion and criticism on the part of other Muslim countries. Security of the person and property he rigorously enforced, while seeking means to improve conditions for the pilgrims and relaxing certain of the severities of the Wahhabi code. Such of the Ikhwan as were not required to establish his authority in the remoter parts of the country were sent back to their centres in Nejd, where their reactions against this treatment and against what they regarded as an undue softening of their harsh creed (and an unfair curb upon their natural appetite for looting) were drastically punished. Soon

indeed the day of the Ikhwan as soldiers would be over, their tasks accomplished and their double purpose fulfilled, for the tribal basis of society in Sa'udi Arabia has been destroyed as surely as was the clan system in our own Highlands in the eighteenth century. It is impossible not to regret the passing of much that was fine and admirable in both. But in Arabia the *coup de grâce* was dealt wholly from within. Butcher Ibrahim's victories altered nothing; Arabia has seen no Culloden (though she has had, alas! many a Glencoe).

Meanwhile Ibn Sa'ud had to face the new and formidable problem of governing a country stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and from the borders of Iraq and the new State of Transjordan to the sands of the Empty Quarter—a country, moreover, whose political centre of gravity had shifted from Riyadh to the Hejaz. What changes should be made in the machinery of government? What men could be found to fill new and difficult posts? In the result, so unfavourable does the answer to the second question appear, on the whole, to have been, that it disposed of the first question also. True, a number of new appointments were made, but the reins of executive government, the final decision, even in small matters, remained where they had always been—in the strong hands of Ibn Sa'ud himself: an arrangement which, though it can scarcely have been uncongenial to one whose rule had always been (within the sanctions current in desert Arabia) absolute, imposed on him a burden far too heavy for any man to carry with more than partial success. Much of the business of government was carried on by the king in his daily Court, which, for all the enrichment of its physical apparatus, remained, in effect, the coffee-hearth of a great sheikh. Nothing in this book makes better or more interesting reading than the account it gives of the Court at Mecca, Taif and Riyadh.

In one respect at least Ibn Sa'ud soon found in the Hejaz some alleviation of troubles which had afflicted him sorely in earlier days, when the revenue at his disposal amounted, in all, to £100,000 a year. As soon as he had established sufficient confidence in his administration of the Hejaz and its Holy Cities, the flow of pilgrims, checked first by the Hejaz war and then by fear of its consequences, began again, soon to achieve a volume which brought into the ruler's hands an annual revenue such as he had never known, opening up a prospect of unlimited motor-cars, wireless stations and other modern necessities of a State such as his. But comparative riches, suddenly acquired, are apt to set as many problems as they solve, and for all the benefits that accrued to the government from its new source of income, it is not surprising that a general demand for luxuries also arose; so that when, after four years of overspending, the new State ran into the world slump of the 1930s, it was ill-prepared. Lean years followed, and it was under the compulsion of their stringency that Ibn Sa'ud was persuaded to sell to the Standard Oil Company of California a concession to search for petroleum. It is not difficult to understand his reluctance to take a step which, should the search be successful, must open the heart of Arabia to the western world. As is well known, what Mr. Philby calls "the Miracle" happened; and despite the five years' set-back to production caused by the second World War, the Hasa oilfields of the producing company (now "Aramco") yielded in 1952 300,000,000 barrels—perhaps sufficient to bring into the Sa'udi Arabian exchequer £40,000,000. Thus has accomplished fact outdone every old tale of hidden treasure that ever beguiled a bedawin camp-fire audience. And thus, too, within the space of a few years, has a second social revolution—induced by a peaceful invasion from the West—unforeseeably piled itself upon the first.

In Mr. Philby's final chapter, "Sunset," we find the ageing king still master in his own house, but somewhat aloof from a new world which he neither understood nor (how comprehensibly!) wished to understand. Yet, if for no other reason, a State possessed of a strategic asset as massive as the Hasa oilfield can maintain no longer a policy of benevolent aloofness, however amply justified that policy may have been in the days before she sold her virginity for the price of oil.

Is it too much to hope that Sa'udi Arabia will take her due place among the nations and play a leading part in the restoration of the Arabs' former greatness? Or will the Arab race, too susceptible to luxury and incurably fissile, fall once more by its own immemorial disunity? Future observers, peering back along the contemptuous perspective of history, may well find the dynastic rivalries of our day (and the almost equally heated antagonisms of their Western advocates) a little thing. But

if ever the Arab race grows great again, it will have owed much of this consummation to the magnificent qualities of one of whom Eldon Rutter, in his book *The Holy Cities of Arabia*, quoted by Mr. Philby, wrote in 1927: "His personal ambition is boundless, but is tempered by great discretion and caution. He is a relentless enemy while opposition lasts, but in the hour of victory is one of the most humane Arabs in history. . . ."

May he rest in peace. E. D.

A Continent Decides. By Lord Birdwood. Robert Hale. Pp. 315, including index, 2 maps, glossary, and frontispiece. 21s.

The creation of the two Dominions of India and Pakistan by way of partition which involved the partition of the Punjab and Bengal took place on August 15, 1947. It was subject to the determination of each country's Constitution by the Constituent Assemblies in Delhi and Karachi respectively. Constitution making in the new India was completed by an Act of the Assembly in November, 1949. On April 27, 1949, under an agreement reached in London at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, India remained a full member of the Commonwealth and although a Republic-designate accepted the King as "the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth." The formal proclamation of the Indian Republic took place at Delhi on January 26, 1950. Lord Mountbatten, who was Viceroy and Governor-General of undivided India until the transfer of power (he had assumed office in March, 1947), stayed on to be the first Governor-General of the Dominion of India (Mr. M. A. Jinnah with the title of Qaid-i-Azam filled the same office for Pakistan) and was succeeded by Mr. C. Rajagopalacharya in June, 1948. On the creation of the Republic and the consequent abolition of the Governor-Generalship, Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected President and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Vice-president of the Republic. The Pakistan Constituent Assembly has not yet completed its work, but it is now clear that, as Lord Birdwood foreshadows in this book, it, too, will become a sovereign republic within the Commonwealth, presumably under the same formula already approved for India, although, of course, the concurrence of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers will be required.

This is the constitutional background against which Lord Birdwood tells of his impressions gained during a tour of India and Pakistan some seven years after he had, as he thought, seen the last of the subcontinent on completion of twenty-five years in the Indian Army. The Birdwood family have a record of five generations of service to India, and it is therefore pleasant to note that, in keeping under control the inevitable nostalgia arising from such traditions, Lord Birdwood is able generally to preserve an optimistic balance of view as he marshals the facts discerned by him in an industrious search for truth. He frankly declares that now is not the time to attempt a historian's treatment of the happenings between 1944 and 1951, nor is it possible to permit the truth to dispense with the garment of considerateness for feelings which for some time to come will be highly sensitive. He does not disguise regret that the transfer of power, in fulfilment, as Mr. Attlee rightly put it, of British policy, had to be based on partition, and he gives reasons for the conviction that although speed was the essence of Lord Mountbatten's "contract" the pace was unduly hurried. As he unfolds the sad tale of the yet intractable differences of opinion which bedevil the relations between India and Pakistan, he indirectly poses certain questions to which the historian will eventually have to find the answer. In view of the nearness of the Cabinet Mission's approach to the solution by way of an undivided India in 1946, could not a little more perseverance have been shown with advantage, even at the cost of some delay? How was it that the Punjab district of Gurdaspur's importance to the settlement of Kashmir's destiny was apparently overlooked? When it was decided to transfer power on the basis of partition and the already violent clashes in the Punjab were from the beginning of 1947 onwards causing anxiety, how was it that the British Government could imagine that the small boundary force would be able to maintain order, once the effect of partition of the Punjab, to say nothing of the disorganization arising from the hurried division or break-up of the Indian Army, came to be appreciated?

This country can be proud of the sincerity with which its statesmen first introduced parliamentary traditions and then gradually democratic government into India. It can now realize that the creation of communalism was forced on its administrators by the very nature of the minority problem in India, even though "wisdom after the event" may affirm that the system of separate electorates should have been tempered by measures designed in the long run to render it unnecessary. To the extent that it was ultimately found impossible to honour pledges without partition, British policy failed. Moreover it is difficult to view with equanimity the fact that the triumphal culmination of Lord Mountbatten's mission was at once marred tragically by a complete breakdown of law and order in the Punjab, Baluchistan and in the capital itself to the tune of many thousands of lives.

It says much for the steadfastness of the men newly in charge at Delhi and Karachi that, despite these unhappy memories and the still irksome differences over Kashmir, refugee property and water rights, they have been able to maintain a democratic equilibrium and a striving for neighbourliness the one Government with the other. It is true that trains do not run through from Amritsar to Lahore—for passengers at all events. It is true that both India and Pakistan are spending far more money than they can afford on defence because of the Kashmir issue. Lord Birdwood does not turn a blind eye to these shadows on the scene. His appreciation of the complexities of the Kashmir problem, to which he devotes eight thoughtful chapters, is comprehensive and comprehending of the opinions on both sides. Yet that is only a part of the service rendered by his book. For example, the chapter headed "For the Soldier" throws pleasant light on the manner in which the two new armies are piously preserving the traditions of that great war-proved comradeship of their origin. He sympathetically deals with Mr. Nehru's position as an international statesman who has won both esteem and criticism as political leader of a new Government in Asia. No less sympathy is felt for Pakistan's statesmen as they grapple with their internal problems in welding two territories physically 1,000 miles apart and differing in language and culture, and at the same time seek to justify their membership of the Commonwealth by convincing themselves and their people of the essential friendliness of the United Kingdom and other members to their new country.

EDWIN HAWARD.

Cities and Men. Vol. II. By Sir Harry Luke. Geoffrey Bles. Pp. 262. Illustrated. 25s.

The first volume of Sir Harry Luke's autobiography covered the thirty years from 1884 to 1914, and this volume carries on the story to 1924. One tells of an age of stability and prosperity, which seems as remote as the glories of the Roman Empire; the other is an account of the years of confusion and uncertainty, a state of affairs now all too familiar.

Sir Harry was taken from his peaceful haven in Cyprus in July, 1914, and plunged into the vortex of the Mediterranean war. He had a number of interesting assignments, including the administration of Lemnos on behalf of Admiral Wemyss, one of three co-existent Governors, the other two being Greeks and the rightful rulers of the island. The author touches lightly on our strange methods of waging war in that zone, but chiefly confines himself to an amusing account of the various strange problems with which he had to deal and the many interesting people that he met. This period in his life was ended by his return to Cyprus, where he successively held the commissionerships of Paphos and Famagusta.

The contrast between the idyllic years of peace in these lovely surroundings and the years that followed is striking in the extreme. The author was appointed Political Adviser to Admiral Sir John De Robeck, British High Commissioner in Turkey, and though he does not tell much that is new concerning the distressing intrigues of those who were nominally allies, he is able to give an interesting account of life in Constantinople and to make some illuminating comments upon the situation as he saw it. Sir Harry is a staunch supporter of the old régime, but from the standpoint of the present day there seems no doubt that the rise of Kemal Ataturk and

the creation of a strong and virile Turkey, which were the direct outcome of the events which he describes, were in the end all for the best.

The largest section of the book deals with the brief visit to Batum, which the author made in 1919 as an observer, and the six months he spent in Tiflis as British Chief Commissioner in 1920. He describes at length his relations with the Governments of Georgia and Armenia and the remarkable events which preceded their collapse. He also gives us an account of the many races which inhabit Transcaucasia and a brief outline of their history. It must have been a very frustrating period in Sir Harry's lifetime, since although the Georgians are a most colourful people and their country is most beautiful, there was the continual background of Britain's inability, as far as one can gather, to decide upon a policy regarding the new republics, and later her impotence to help even her own people, as illustrated by the story of the prisoners in Baku. By vaccillation we lost the chance of succouring those who might have been our allies and who, in any case, looked to us for support.

The book ends with an account of four years in Jerusalem. Already the seeds of disaster had been sown and the administration was grievously handicapped by having to act on the one hand as guardian of the Jewish settlers and on the other as protector of the Arab inhabitants. The author, however, diverts our attention from this depressing subject by his description of the conflicts which raged between the Christian Churches and the age-old ceremonies which make Jerusalem so fascinating and unique a city.

This is a book of anecdotes and personal experiences. The author perhaps wisely avoids discussing the policies of the period and confines himself to entertaining the reader. The detail which he supplies serves to fill in background knowledge and assists in the assessment of the achievements of the period.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

An Introduction to the Science of Tradition. Edited by Professor J. Robson. Royal Asiatic Society (Oriental Translation Fund, N.S. vol. 39). Pp. 54 + 48. 1953. 35s.

It was natural that Muslims should take an interest in the sayings and doings of Muhammad, the so-called traditions, and equally natural that demand should create a supply. It was soon realized that not all which was told about Muhammad was true, so much so that the pious were said to be the worst offenders in inventing stories about him. Some test had to be devised to separate the true from the false. This book, presented here in Arabic text and English translation, describes five classes of tradition which all accepted as genuine, five which some rejected or hesitated to accept, and ten classes of men whose testimony invalidated a tradition. The criteria of authenticity were all external with one possible exception. Mahdi was fond of pigeon racing, so, to please him, a man quoted a tradition which allowed betting on such races. The caliph had his birds killed because they had made a man tell a lie about the prophet. The author insists that this scrutiny of a witness's qualifications is essential and has nothing in common with the scandalmongering condemned in the Koran. Indeed, one scholar showed his opinion of another by copying the traditions reported by him and using the copy to heat the bread oven. The Arabic text is reproduced from manuscript and the editor has supplied all the necessary information.

A. S. T.

Public Administration in Burma. By F. S. V. Donnison. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1953. Pp. vii + 119. 11s. 6d.

Mr. Donnison's book is a valuable contribution to the series of studies undertaken by Chatham House of the history of Public Administration in some of the countries of southern Asia. It provides a careful summary of the development of the system of government and of the public services, local as well as central, in Burma from the first days of the East India Company's rule in the 1820s to the declaration of independence in 1948, together with, in the early part of the book, a useful com-

parison with the traditional system of administration under the Burmese kings. It is shown that a lack of understanding of the indigenous system of administration led to the almost complete elimination of the traditional organisation and so to a disastrous loosening of the sense of social responsibility, though it seems clear that the preservation of the traditional system, with its many complexities such as the overlapping and sometimes conflicting spheres of the heads of occupational and territorial groups in pre-British days, would have been hard to reconcile with the needs of the modern State. Another notable feature indicated in the book is the growth of the secretariat: for many years it was possible for the central government of British Burma to be managed by a Chief Commissioner with one secretary and one assistant secretary, and the contrast with the vast secretariat of later days is striking evidence of the increased responsibilities which the administration had to undertake, even though the reader may have some suspicion that inflation of the central machine to so high a degree was perhaps not altogether essential. Be that as it may, the purpose of the book is to record the facts of such developments, and this it does with skill. The problems presented by the introduction of the first reforms in 1923 are well depicted, and when the facts of this period are considered, the conclusion comes almost irresistibly to mind that there is no satisfactory half-way house between direct rule on the one hand and the recognition of complete self-government on the other.

B. R. P.

The United States and India and Pakistan. By W. Norman Brown. Harvard University Press and Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. 308. 30s.

Many readers of this Journal know something of what India owes to American Protestant missionaries, of whom Mr. W. Norman Brown was one. He is also an Oriental scholar, and during the war served as an Asian expert in the O.S.S. He has given us an enthusiastic and valuable compendium of facts which, unlike many works which are useful for reference, is easy and interesting to read. Apart from such slips as the confusion of " commissioner " and " chief commissioner," and " E. M. Foster " for E. M. Forster, the author of *Passage to India*, this is a correct and reliable work, given the author's selection from the mass of material upon which he has drawn. There is a most adequate index, an adequate map of the sub-continent and an exhaustive bibliography which some may rate the most helpful part of the book.

What we should not expect from the citizen of a country of revolutionary and anti-imperial tradition is an apologia for the British Raj. We do not get it. According to Mr. Brown, whatever good came of Company and Imperial rule came incidentally. The splendid record of the Indian Armed Forces in two World Wars is not even summarized, but the mutiny in the Royal Indian Navy is not forgotten. It was the voluntarily recruited Indian Army to which India and Pakistan owe gratitude, not the so-called Indian National Army, which was composed of traitors and deserters to the Japanese. Some of these tortured and killed former comrades who had kept their allegiance and remained loyal to their oaths. If the armed forces of India and of the Commonwealth had not held the Japanese and their allies at bay, independence would have been long delayed, if not impossible. Nevertheless, it is the " Indian National Army " and not the splendid Indian Army which interests Mr. Brown. Disproportionate space is similarly given to the Jallianwala Bagh and other incidents during the Punjab disturbances of 1919, and no mention is made of the uninterrupted and not unsuccessful working of Provincial Autonomy by Unionist Ministers from 1937 to 1947. The closing stages of that period are of first importance to the history of Pakistan and should have received some notice.

For Mr. Brown, the Indian Independence Act is not the culmination of a mission but the ending of an epoch " as full of self-complacency as ever has been known." Again, wisdom after the event might have modified the verdict that the British " augmented the communal mistrust " in order to divide and to rule. The conclusion of Mr. Brown's story does not agree with the one-sided view which he gives to British rule. If it had been what he suggests, one would have expected the successor Governments to have done everything possible to remove the last traces of the British connection. Yet Mr. Brown has to report the continued partnership of Pakistan and the

Republic of India in the Commonwealth of Nations. If they had chosen, as Burma chose, to leave the Commonwealth, no one would have prevented them.

One of the obstacles to Anglo-American understanding is the view widely held in the United States that the British record in the Indian subcontinent, where the problems were so much vaster and more complex, was less respectable than the American record in dealing, for example, with the simpler problems of the Philippines. Both the Philippines and the former Indian Empire have now attained independence. This is to the credit of two Imperial Powers. If Hongkong and the Gambia are not yet independent, nor are Hawaii and Guam. Mr. Brown is, however, fair-minded and knowledgeable enough to realize that the nationalist movements in Asia are not the same or as simple as the American Revolution. Americans, he rightly says, can learn from Asia; American interest in India goes back, as he tells us in an interesting passage, to Colonial times. He faces the fact that the United States is no longer viewed in Asia as the great emancipator.

A better understanding between East and West, between the countries of the Commonwealth and the United States, is sorely needed. Mr. Brown epitomizes part of the problem when he thus portrays a topical American world view: "We see the world engaged in a gigantic ideological struggle and divided into two camps of Democracy versus Communism . . . of liberty versus slavery, of the U.S.A. and the other Western democracies versus the U.S.S.R. and its satellites (among whom we Americans, unlike Indians and Pakistanis, normally list China)." It is partly because Asia does not see the world like that that the Commonwealth has its appeal for Asians and not merely lingers on, as Mr. Brown seems to imagine, because the Indian or Pakistani thinks that the British lion is now toothless, harmless and senile.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

The Pattern of Communist Revolution. By Hugh Seton-Watson. Methuen and Co. Ltd. Pp. xv + 356 + bibliography and indexes of persons and subjects. 25s.

This book would be invaluable, if it had no other virtues, for the immense amount of information it gives that cannot be found elsewhere between two covers. The important communist movements naturally receive most attention—those in Russia and China for instance—but even the smallest, such as the Soviet Republic of Gilan, in Northern Persia, in 1921, receives a mention. The scholarship and industry behind this information are matched by the shrewdness and good sense of comments scattered throughout the book. How neat, as well as penetrating, is the description (p. 245) of the Soviet historians who explain to Kirgiz or Tartars how lucky they were to be conquered by the Tsars, as the Marxist-Leninist equivalent of Kipling. How sadly true is the reminder (p. 323) that nationalism often does the work of communism: "Arab and Persian nationalists are doing Moscow's job for it without needing an ounce of gold or a word of advice from Moscow. They are engaging the attention and the resources of the West when these are in short supply, and they are undermining the state machine and social framework of their own countries."

There is a timely appeal on p. 355: "Western intellectuals must stop being ashamed of their own civilization, and become aware of the difference in quality between it and totalitarianism." One knows the kind of book which traduces Britain by comparing the worst side of colonial government with Soviet theory. Professor Seton-Watson knows all about the Soviet colonies, as the Central Asian Republics can fairly be called, and he rightly (p. 165) shows the difference between the cotton policy dictated to Uzbekistan by Moscow and the British encouragement of cotton-growing in Egypt. Even Soviet theory is in fact drastic. The constitution ties the Central Asian and other "republics" to Moscow much more closely than any British dependency is tied to London. It is true that the Constitution provides for secession, but in fact anyone who asks for local liberty falling far short of secession finds himself accused of "bourgeois nationalism."

The book ends with a moving appeal that what is possible may be done at least

to diminish the social causes of communism: frustration of the intelligentsia and poverty of the masses. His plea for social justice is advanced not because it will weaken communism, though it should do that incidentally, but because that is the right and honourable policy to follow.

R. W. BULLARD.

The Sword from the Rock. By G. R. Levy. Faber and Faber. 1953. Pp. 236, pl. 4, 1 map. 30s.

The sub-title is an investigation into the origins of epic literature and the development of the hero. The matter of epic is taken from strife among the gods leading to the creation of the world, fertility rites which bring in the search for the lost god, and warfare in which the protagonist is ruined by self-confidence and both parties often destroyed. In the first is the Babylonian story of creation, the *Enuma Ellish*, in which the hero is a god and there is no development of character. The recitation of this story was part of the new year ceremony in Babylon, and was followed by fertility rites, including the search for and revival of the dead god. Here the part played by Semites was the uniting of several Sumerian stories into an organic whole. The authoress draws on Hittite religious sculpture and on stories preserved in Hittite texts for illustration. In the second is the story of Gilgamesh, and in it character plays a part. The king, who suffers from too much ego, is partly tamed by being given a companion with whom he fights monsters. The friend dies, and Gilgamesh, in his need for consolation, goes to seek the elixir of life. He finds it, but loses it again before he can use it. The Odyssey is the familiar example of this class; the original object of the search has been forgotten, yet the return of Ulysses is almost the revival of the dead god of vegetation. In the third class are the Iliad and the Mahabharata. The former deals with an episode in a long war and depicts "the moral fall of a surpassing hero through pride, and his redemption through loss and compassion, concentrated to such intensity that it is felt as all men's fall and redemption." The Mahabharata also ends with the victory of one side and the destruction of both. The behaviour of the gods is different in the two epics. Modern epics are mentioned only to show the likenesses to the earlier, similarities which are often astonishing. The book is full of interesting suggestions, but there are too many assumptions in the earlier part and the writing is careless.

A. S. T.

Seven Years in Tibet. By Heinrich Harrer. Rupert Hart-Davis. 1953. Pp. 288. Illustrated. 16s.

This is a delightful and illuminating book, in which the author has been well served by his translator. Much of it reads like a fairy story, since the evolution from a fugitive, begging his way to Lhasa, to the confidant of the Dalai Lama seems almost impossible without the assistance of a fairy godmother.

Harrer and others escaped from their internment camp in Dehra Dun at their third attempt in April, 1944, and at last, accompanied only by Peter Aufschnaiter, he reached Lhasa in January, 1946. The first half of the book tells of their flight across the frontier and their journey to Lhasa, while the second half is an account of life in that city and of how they became valued members of Tibetan Society.

The sufferings which they underwent and the subterfuges which they practised to avoid being returned to India, show both Harrer and Aufschnaiter to have been outstanding both physically and mentally. They were clearly helped by being mountain men themselves and by having a very obvious sympathy for the Tibetans. The most outstanding feature of their wanderings was their crossing of the Changthang in winter, as Harrer says, "days full of hardship and unceasing struggle against cold, hunger and danger." Penniless as they were, they suffered the continual risk of death at the hands of the bandits who infest that region. It is improbable that any European has travelled the route they took and none certainly in such circumstances.

However, all was forgotten at the sight of the golden pinnacles of the Patala and they bluffed their way into Lhasa, where they were made surprisingly welcome and treated with extreme generosity. When at length the Cabinet decided that they could remain, they had become one of the sights of Lhasa and in return were able to make themselves fully acquainted not only with customs and habits of the inhabitants but also with many of the great in the land. Once granted asylum, they were not slow to prove their usefulness and, while Aufschnaiter was commissioned to build an irrigation canal, Harrer designed a garden and fountain for his host, Tsarong, Master of the Mint. From this they progressed to being fully recognized as employees of the Tibetan Government and Harrer's tasks were varied and interesting, including the construction of a cinema for the personal use of the Dalai Lama.

Most interesting of all was the friendship they had with parents and brother of the Dalai Lama, from which arose the most unusual and delightful relationship between the Dalai Lama and Harrer. It was much more than that which would exist between pupil and teacher and, of course, gave Harrer an insight into things Tibetan probably unequalled by any other European. He did and saw things normally forbidden and held a privileged position, all the more remarkable in that he apparently did not arouse the jealousy of anyone. His picture of the young ruler is touching and striking. The Dalai Lama is clearly an outstanding young man with great ability and a charming personality.

The closing chapters deal with the sad period of the threat from Communist China and Tibet's final eclipse. Harrer naturally feels sore at the way in which the Tibetans' pathetic calls for help were ignored by U.N.O. Even if physical aid were impossible, surely sympathy and recognition of the tragic events which were taking place could have been shown and the naked aggression condemned in terms which left no doubt of world opinion.

The book has two shortcomings. One is the lack of a really good map, which is essential for tracing the wanderings from Dehra Dun to Lhasa. The sketch provided is not sufficient. The other is an index, which would add greatly to the value of this work.

Whether the reader is well acquainted with Tibet or not, I am sure that he will enjoy this book, since in addition to being an adventure story, it is also an account of an interesting and charming people from an unusual point of view. We should congratulate the author on his work and condole with him on the sad end to an enterprise which had possibilities far greater than anyone could realize. What a privilege it was to be offered the chance of educating a ruler in the ways of the West and of satisfying his craving for knowledge and assistance.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

The Coast of Incense. By Freya Stark. John Murray. 1953. Pp. 287. Illustrations. 25s.

This is the third volume of Miss Stark's autobiography and covers the years 1933 to 1939. It is chiefly concerned with journeys in South Arabia and the archæological expedition of 1937-38, described in *A Winter in Arabia*, but there are also interludes in Iraq, Greece and Syria. The stories of her travels have already been told, and it is not they which hold our interest so much in this book as the effect they had on Miss Stark. Regardless, or almost regardless, of physical discomforts which would appal many people, she had an eye not for dirt and flies but for beauty of form and sound. "What these people give one," she writes of the bedouins, "is the sense of beauty in *movement*; a boy with a cloth round his curls, and a loin cloth, catching his donkey yesterday as it rubbed against ours on the path, was a thing to make one catch one's breath, like a Greek statue come to life."

Like the second volume of her autobiography, *Beyond Euphrates*, this volume is also based on her letters and through them we gain an insight into Miss Stark's personality. She describes herself as having "detachment," and it is this ability to view surroundings as though from outside them that is most evident in her letters.

Throughout her story there is the constant recurrence of illness, and one cannot but admire the fortitude and patience shown in face of so much ill-health. She has, however, the gift of finding consolation in the "abstract world," which, she says, "is surely one of the essentials for living in the East: it gives an oasis always at hand wherever one may be."

The success of her books and the many friends that her fame as a traveller, explorer and author brought seem to have astonished as well as delighted her. There is a perpetual youthfulness about her which brings a zest to all she does, and a pleasant curiosity about everything, and an air of wonderment at the oddities of others, particularly the more conventionally minded others. She alternates her letters with present-day memories of the same period, and in many ways the present-day reflections are of even more interest than the letters. Her photographs, which are numerous, varied and delightful, give an excellent idea of the country and people of South Arabia. The particular charm of this book, however, is the light it throws upon Miss Stark herself.

D. I.

The Mountain World, 1953. Edited by Marcel Kurz. (Swiss Foundation for Alpine Research.) George Allen and Unwin Ltd. First published in 1953. Large 8vo. Pp. 220. 25s.

This is a fine book, and one which should appeal to any one who loves mountains.

The short preface to this book, of only two pages in all, states that the object of the book is to respect the achievements of others, and to display disinterestedness regarding the nationality of one's own achievements. In this age of intense nationalism, which so often masquerades under the guise of patriotism, this disclaimer is of value.

After a touching tribute to Gustav Hasler, who died in 1952, which gives a photograph of him as a young man, the book proper starts very naturally with an account of the Swiss expedition to Everest in 1952. This account is from p. 17 to p. 178, and as a preliminary the editor reviews the century of the History of Everest. It is by no means easy to describe the attempt on the mountain, but fortunately it is not necessary as the book itself gives an excellent summary of what the Swiss did. No one would venture to underestimate the good work that has been done, and which has unquestionably benefited later climbers. One cannot help wondering if the expedition of 1952 was not too elaborate and the same may be said of all subsequent mountaineering ascents.

We are even told on p. 107 what the climbers ate, and they certainly had very good appetites. Perhaps it was wise to start with a full stomach. It is not to be wondered at that the Sherpas liked European food. The truth is that some men can climb and some cannot, and it is no use taking any one on an expedition who cannot stand the climate. Again, it may be agreed that it is folly not to take advantage of modern aids to climbing, but do such aids always help the climber? The human element is a curious one, and there is such a thing as over-elaboration.

The account of acclimatization by Dr. Ed. Wyss-Dunant is very interesting and very masterly. It is interesting, too, to learn that Mlle. Maillart had a Brahmin cook (p. 140). By the way, it is a great mistake to take rice. Apart from being bulky and having other drawbacks, the stomach of the European can never take enough, and it is a deplorable form of food.

The climbs in the Bolivian Andes are told on pp. 149 *et seq.* and the Illimani area is one of great interest. For some reason, South America, with its wonderful mountains, seems to have been neglected by climbers. The description of the country is excellent, and although after the heights of the Himalaya and of Everest in particular, one is apt to regard a mere 20,000 feet as hardly high enough, these Bolivian mountains demand all the skill and thoroughness of the most expert mountaineer. It would be interesting to know the causes of the disaster referred to on p. 157. The whole account of the climbing in Bolivia is very stimulating indeed, and the description of Hancouma, on p. 160, is well worth reading.

That well-known climber Piero Ghiglione gives a fine account of the Southern Peruvian Andes. His opening remark on p. 171, when he sees the vast vista of peaks, all over 20,000 feet, awaiting the foot of man, encourages one to go to South America. After all, who, on gazing at the Peaks of the World, would choose any country rather than another? The book ends with 35 pages on mountain exploration in North-east Greenland. It is a novel and an interesting experience to read about this terrain, hitherto little considered from a mountaineering point of view. The mountains rise from 2,900 feet in the east to 8,200 in the west. It is hard to deny that height does mean a great deal, and that the climber in these lower regions is not the same as one who rises to a height far greater. One cannot help thinking that these pages devote too much to geology and not quite enough to climate. The discomfort is very great: there is no gainsaying that, but there cannot be quite the same appeal in Greenland as there is in the Himalayas or the Andes.

This book will be a joy to every climber. One must make mention of the photographs which are so admirably reproduced, and the panorama at the end, Taweche to Nuptse, is wonderful. It is everything that a photograph should be, and cannot be too highly praised.

The Story of Everest. By W. H. Murray. London: J. M. Dent and Son. Pp. 193, 14 maps and diagrams, 24 pp. of photographs. 15s.

Honourable mention of W. H. Murray's latest book, now in its third edition, is long overdue, because the first edition was published just as the British Expedition of 1953 was setting out. So it could not have been better timed. It served then and still serves a most useful purpose in that it epitomizes the history of the world's highest mountain from the day on which the computers of the Survey of India ascertained that it was pre-eminent down to the gallant Swiss assaults a hundred years later. The author gives full recognition to those first pioneers who, in 1921, carried out the reconnaissance which was the basis of the five subsequent expeditions from the north. As Mallory remarked, "It would be necessary in the first place to find the mountain." The description of how it was done, of the high hopes, of the repeated frustrations and of the indomitable perseverance with which the famous 'North Col' was located lacks nothing in the retelling. In relating the events of those expeditions Mr. Murray has, deliberately it seems, relieved in places the tenseness of tragedy and of near disaster by inserting passages in lighter vein. We hope that the rum cask presented by Hugh Ruttledge to the Head Lama of Rongbuk and adapted by him as a prayer wheel is still in use as such. The author has, rather briefly, summarized the manner in which the approach through Nepal came about, together with the hope of access by the Khombu glacier. He has given a useful picture of the West Cwm and a vivid description of the pre-Swiss ascent of the great ice-fall. Writing as he did, hard on the heels of the Swiss attempts of 1952, the material could not be available for him to adequately pay tribute to their pluck and their great achievements. Nevertheless sufficient is said to show that our own planners and climbers profited greatly from their lessons, and seemingly our party was blessed with a greater measure of good fortune.

Fine photographs, maps and diagrams illustrate this excellent contribution to mountaineering literature, in which Mr. Murray fully maintains his usual high standard.

H. W. T.

Captive in Korea. By Philip Deane. Hamish Hamilton. 1953. Pp. 224.

Philip Deane is a trained journalist and his tale of the horrors of captivity are the judgments of an expert, supported as they are by the testimony of his fellow sufferers. He tells the story without rancour or self-pity, with the same objectivity as his reports for the *Observer* on French North Africa in October, 1953.

There have been many "escape" stories since 1945. Readers have become accustomed to horrors, death and torture, but this record is different from the others. For one thing it is better documented. The preservation of his detailed Greek notes

for July 23, 1950, to April 10, 1953, in extremes of heat and cold, searchings and rough treatment, was an amazing feat. Most prisoners found that mere survival taxed all their efforts. Earlier victims of the North Koreans had the hardest time. It required exceptional force of character to survive such episodes as the " Tiger's " Death March. Deane's impersonal record of these events reads like the reporting of a Cup Tie. There is little to choose between Japanese and Koreans as jailers, except that with the first ill-treatment was more deliberate, while the Koreans were nearer to savages, to whom such treatment was much how they treated each other. Things changed for the better when the Chinese took over.

This account is quite watertight. No counsel for defence could hope to throw doubts on any of the incidents. Nuremberg trials are not practicable against uncivilized opponents, even if victory had made possible the necessary enquiries. All diplomatic and Red Cross conventions were ignored. Bishops and Ministers fared little better than G.I.s.

Deane was captured in the far South after a mere thirteen terrible days: 5,000 men trying to stem fifteen North Korean Divisions, with tanks and guns in proportion, and a system of " infiltration " which found the Americans unprepared.

The actual captivity, covering 166 pages, would be easier to follow if split into chapters such as " The Journey North," " On the Yalu," etc. Also, from the notes available it might have been possible to distinguish more clearly the experiences of the various parties—diplomats, prelates, G.I.s; later captures; and other parties. Perhaps the author may deal with these matters in a subsequent study. He owes it to history as the possessor of evidence much of which is not likely to become otherwise available.

G. M. ROUTH.

Punjab Prelude. By L. F. Loveday Prior. John Murray. 1952. Pp. 218. Illustrated. 18s.

In her foreword Miss Prior explains that she comes of a family who for generations have dedicated themselves to the service of India and that India is her native land as England can never be. This is the clue to her book, since she knows India and its ways of thought almost by instinct, even though on her return there she had much to learn and many gaps to fill. She has taken the Punjab to her heart and to be a Punjabi, whether Muslim, Sikh or Hindu, is almost to excuse everything.

Miss Prior took up an appointment at the Aitchison College, Lahore, in 1945. Her book is based upon her experiences while she was a teacher there. Its avowed object is to put the Muslim case in its true perspective and to enable her readers to judge between Pakistan and Hindustan. She has clearly gone into the matter with great care and has made a point of having friends of all types and creeds. She made special efforts to understand the boys she taught and to discover the way in which their minds worked. She discussed all manner of subjects with them from religion and morals to village customs and habits. The boys found in her a confidante and source of good advice and clearly appreciated her desire to learn about their difficulties and problems and to help them where she could. The result is most interesting, more especially because it deals with the younger generation who will be the builders of the two new Dominions.

Her bias in favour of the Muslim in general and the Punjabi is very strong, though she reserves her chief invective for the money-lender and the temple-priest. She is fully capable of seeing the good in the solid Hindu peasant, though here again her sympathies lie with the Northerner. Her wide acquaintanceship has prevented her from narrow-mindedness and she rarely spoils her case by overstatement. Her account of the religions of the Punjab shows clearly her deep interest in the subject, and, while she naturally has a prejudice in favour of the monotheistic faiths, she has made every endeavour to understand Hinduism and to ascertain what part it plays in the lives of her Hindu friends. Not least interesting is her account of family life, its problems and the position of women, whether Muslim or Hindu. She sees the curse that seclusion of the womenfolk has become and is a staunch supporter of the campaign for their emancipation.

Her book ends with the period after the transfer of power to the new Dominions of Pakistan and Hindustan, and she gives her own impressions of the events which followed and of the prospects of Pakistan and the problems which face it, giving a sympathetic and fair account of the position. This is a light, friendly book, which anyone who knows the Punjab will enjoy, even if he does not find much in it that is new, and which offers to anyone who does not know that part of the world a pleasant introduction to it. Its chief virtue is its sincerity, and the author is to be congratulated on her courage in stating what she believes to be the truth.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Lebanon Paradise. By Edward Atiyah. Peter Davis. 1953. Pp. 256. 12s. 6d.

Any work of Mr. Edward Atiyah's is worth reading for two reasons: firstly the qualities of his pen are proven, and secondly his position is surely unique, as an enthusiastic Arab by birth and race yet wholly integrated into England, which is in every sense his home.

This novel traces the life of a modern rich Lebanese family and the reactions of members of the older and younger generations to the world around them. A Palestine refugee camp produces the central problem. The underlying problems of corruption, apathy and immorality are demonstrated through the characters of the people who sit around the fashionable terrace of the Lebanon Paradise Hotel. Against this hollow life—at best but idly trivial—the young Violette rebels. At the refugee camp she seeks and finds a link with reality which changes her life and, through her, the lives of several others.

Points such as this are clearly made, but there is no moralizing. The characters who represent the indulgent, scheming side of Levant life are fundamentally lovable people. The reader feels that they could perhaps change if a key could be found to penetrate their complacency and win their allegiance. If ever a tale exemplifies the principle that systems cannot change without people changing, this does.

There is a feeling in Mr. Atiyah's works that he identifies himself with the shortcomings of both the English and the Arabs, so when he spotlights the failings of either side, it does not give the tiresome effect of an outsider pointing the finger, but of one who understands and admits. That makes all the difference in a book of this type, containing as it does the Arab slant on the English. A novel it may be, and a good one too, but anyone really interested in the vast ideological trends in the Middle East today—heavy with possibilities for good or for evil—will find that this book stimulates more than fantasy.

The descriptions of types and settings are laughably life-like, to anyone familiar with that part of the world. The strange polylingual conversation is exact; though I waited in vain for one superb phrase—the vocative "Ya ma chère"—which can sometimes be heard on the beaches of Alexandria or in the hotels of the Lebanon.

Lebanon Paradise makes one look forward to Mr. Atiyah's next book. Or will it be a play? If he could portray, through either medium, a uniting ideological alternative to Communism, for the stirrings, questioning and convictions of the Arab world, and help the West to understand it, that might be a work which would make history.

MARY ROWLATT.

THE following books have been received :

Asia and Western Dominance, by K. M. Pannikar. Allen and Unwin. 1953. 30s.

Brief History of the Mongols, by Altan Tobci (Mongolian text). Harvard Univ. Press. 1952.

Ceylon, by Sir Ivor Jennings and H. W. Tambiah. (Development of its Laws and Constitution.) Stevens. 1952. £2 15s.

Chinese Painting, by Chiang Yee. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.

Eastern Science, by H. J. J. Winter. John Murray. 1952. 4s. 6d.

The Economic Impact of Under-Developed Societies, by H. Frankel. Blackwell. 1953. 15s.

The Faiyum, Sinai, Sudan, Kenya—Contributions to the Anthropology of, by Henry Field. Univ. of California Press, 1952; Cambridge Univ. Press.

The Founding of the Kashmir State, by K. M. Pannikar. Allen and Unwin. 1953. 15s.

Les Hommes ne veulent pas Mourir, by Pierre-Henri Simon. Editions du Seuil. 1953.

The New Warfare, by C. N. Barclay. William Clowes. 10s. 6d.

Price Control in Communist China, by Ronald Hsia. Institute of Pacific Relations. 1953. $1.50.

Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, by Ragnar Nurksem. Blackwell. 1953. 15s.

Sands of Karakorum, by J. R. Wilman. Collins. 1953. 10s. 6d.

Sargonic Texts from the Diyala Region, by I. J. Gelb. Univ. of Chicago Press and Cambridge Univ. Press. 1953. 22s. 6d.

Tibetan Tales, by A. Gordon. Luzac. 1953. 7s. 6d.

Pamphlets received :

The Rôle of the Military in Middle East Politics, by Majid Khadduri. *American Political Science Review*, vol. XLVII, June, 1953.

Bibliography of Painting in Islam, by K. A. C. Cresswell. Publications de l'Institute français d'archaeologie orientale du Caire, 1953.

Catalogue of Dictionaries, Grammars, etc., in Oriental Languages, 1953. Bailey Bros. and Swinfen.

Studia Orientalia, Vol. XVII. Helsinki, 1952.

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NOTICES

THE Annual Dinner of the Society will be held this year on Thursday, July 8, at Claridge's Hotel, London, W.1. The cost of tickets will be 35s. a head, exclusive of wine but including waiters' tips. Members coming home on leave from abroad who may wish to attend are asked to get into touch with the office for further particulars.

The Annual General Meeting of the Society will take place on Thursday, June 17th, 1954, at 4.0 p.m., at the hall of the Royal Society of Arts, 6, John Adam Street, London, W.C.2, by kind permission of the President and Council of the Royal Society of Arts.

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following:

Royal Central Asian Society's Journal for the years 1927-1947 (complete). Presented by W. G. Ives, Esq.

Agenda and Report (complete) on the Agricultural Credit Conference held in Beirut in October, 1953. From Colonel Goddard-Wilson, Kuwait.

Afghanistan, No. 4, 1953. Revue trimestrielle, published by La Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles.

Select Essays of Thomas de Quincey, Vol. 1. Presented by D. Carruthers, Esq.

Also the following:

Khotanese Texts, II. Edited by H. W. Bailey. Published by Cambridge University Press.

Kushṭa. A Monograph of a Principal Word in Mandæan Texts, by Waldemar Sundberg.

The Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 14. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1951.

The Policy of Tomorrow—Mirrit Boutros Ghali, translated from the Arabic by Isma'il R. el Faruqi. Published by the American Council of Learned Societies, 1953.

Among Arabic Manuscripts, by I. Y. Kratchkovsky, translated from the Russian by Tatiana Minorsky. E. J. Brill, 1953.

Literatures of the East, edited by Eric B. Ceadek. John Murray.

Simple Malay Reader, by Richard Winstedt, K.B.E., C.M.G., F.B.A., D.Litt.(Oxon). Routledge and Keegan Paul Ltd.

Central Asian Review, Nos. 1, 2, 3. A quarterly review of current developments in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Published by the Central Asian Research Centre, London, S.W.3.

Colloquium on Islamic Culture in its Relation to the Contemporary World, September, 1953. Princetown University. U.S.A.

Members and contributors alone are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

IN MEMORIAM

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEILL MALCOLM, K.C.B., D.S.O.

WHEN Neill Malcolm died four days before Christmas 1953 the world lost a citizen of rare character. In the language of the market-place, where he was always at home, "he had a way with him." Had he not spent the greater part of his active life as a soldier, he might have made a name for himself with his pen; and had he chosen a career in civilian public life, he would have made a mark peculiarly his own on the politics of the twentieth century. This Argyllshire Scot was born in 1869, went to Eton and thence to Sandhurst and was gazetted Second Lieutenant in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at the age of twenty. He served with the Second Battalion of the Regiment in the Tochi campaign of 1897; and in the following year crossed Asia on foot from Gilgit to Peking with his friend Wellby of the 18th Hussars. He served for two years thereafter in Uganda, where he won the Distinguished Service Order; and thence continued his active service in the South African War. At the battle of Paardeberg he held a junior staff appointment under Kitchener; and it was in performing a dangerous mission at Kitchener's orders that he was severely wounded in the knee. Later he did much of the spade work of the Esher Reforms at the War Office, when he won special notice from Mr. Haldane (later Viscount Haldane), then Secretary of State. When the first World War broke out, Haig appointed him to an important post on the Headquarters Staff, whence he moved on to become Chief Staff Officer to Sir Hubert Gough in the Fifth Army. In the Great Retreat of March, 1918, he was again wounded in the leg, so severely indeed that he could serve no longer.

He was then nearly fifty years old and retired from active service at the end of the war. Other men would have felt that they had performed their public duty to the full. Not so Neill Malcolm; for, in some ways, his most distinguished service was yet to come. He was the backbone of the British Military Mission in Berlin, whence he passed on to become G.O.C. Malaya. Recognition of his quality led to his appointment as President of the North Borneo Company. Members of the Royal Central Asian Society do not need to be reminded of his service to them as Chairman of Council.

Neill Malcolm was a founder member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, being elected Chairman of the Institute in 1926, a post which he held for nine years. On his retirement in 1935, the Governing Body of Chatham House named one of the principal rooms after him, and gave him a banquet at which Lord Cecil said that the secret of his unique success in the chair was that he made everyone, high and low, love him. "By his work for the House," said Lord Cecil, "he set an intellectual and moral standard for all of us." This was no more than the simple

truth; but the tribute which Neill Malcom would have treasured most of all, if he had lived to hear it, was given by one of the young women on the staff, who said, " He made you very fond of him."

A. F. W.

MAJOR C. S. JARVIS, C.M.G., D.S.O.

MAJOR C. S. JARVIS, C.M.G., D.S.O., died on December 9, 1953, at Ringwood, Hants. *The Times* of December 10 gives notice of his career, of his well-known articles in *Country Life,* his autobiography, *Half a Life,* and other books—*Yesterday and Today in Sinai*; *Three Deserts*; *Desert and Delta*; *The Back Garden of Allah*; *Arab Command*; *The Biography of Lt.-Colonel F. W. Peake Pasha, C.M.G., C.B.E.*; *Scattered Shots*; *Innocent Pursuits*. There are others.

He joined the Society in 1931 and for some time was a member of Council. In 1938 he was awarded the Lawrence medal. Having served as a trooper in the Imperial Yeomanry in the South African war, then in Special Reserve Dorsetshire Regiment, 1902, he served in France, Egypt and Palestine 1914-18, when he entered the Egyptian Government Frontier Administration, serving two years in the Western Desert; then two years as Governor of the Oases of the Libyan Desert with headquarters at Kharga; and in 1922 was appointed Governor of Sinai until he retired in 1936.

He thus had wide experience of Arabs and Beduin customs and law West and East of Egypt; he also studied the flora, fauna, history and practical development of the Western and Eastern deserts.

He was a great asset to the Society. One could always write to him and get a quick and very bright reply on almost any question connected with those areas. He was an extremely welcome guest at Moascar, where I was stationed 1925 to '28, on his way between El Arish and Cairo, adding greatly to the gaiety of life by discussing or relating details of the Beduin, the Araishi notables, schemes to irrigate or develop various areas of Sinai, roads from El Arish to Akaba and other parts, his novel theories of the Israelites' forty years' wanderings, supported by local knowledge. Whether or not his theories prove to be true, they certainly helped to expunge some very wild ideas hitherto accepted as facts. He had an interesting life, and a very helpful one, too, to his friends the Beduin whom he administered in Sinai. The Society will miss him and his wide experience and humour.

S. N.

RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH ASIA

The following is the report of a recent talk given by
SIR ALVARY D. F. GASCOIGNE, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.

I WANT, first, for background purposes, to give a lightning sketch of Russia's activities in Asia since the beginning up to today; then to attempt to define the Communist tendencies which may flow from the Communization of China; and finally to make some suggestions for blocking Communist advance.

You will recall that it was in the middle of the last century that the Czar began seriously to turn his attention to Eastern Siberia, when in the 1840s and '50s Muraviev initiated the great Russian drive eastwards, as far as the sea of Okhotsh, and then started to go southwards. This easterly drive was carried out with a view to filling up the then empty spaces of Asiatic Siberia; and until the Czar's armies turned southwards the drive did not encounter international complications. But of course immediately the Russians started to go south into Manchuria they came up against not only China but also Great Britain and Japan. During the last part of the nineteenth century, and the first years of the present century, up to February 8, 1904, when the Japanese attacked the Russians at Port Arthur and Chemulpo, the Russians were engaged in taking over the whole of the north-eastern corner of Asia, which included of course the Amur and Maritime Provinces, and the Czar had made himself the master of an area southwards of Vladivostock reaching as far as the borders of Korea—making Korea itself a Russian sphere of influence. During this same period Russia had also been busy in penetrating into Central Asia. Taschkent was taken in 1864, Kokand in 1876, and in the 1880s Bokhara and Khiva, two hitherto independent principalities, were annexed. By the early years of the present century Russia had extended her influence right up to the Pamir and the borders of Afghanistan.

After the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, when Russia was ousted from Manchuria, the Russians were forced to confine their attentions mainly to their own Far Eastern territories, and to those districts of Central Asia to which I have already referred. After their defeat in the first World War, which was followed by the internal strife and chaos produced by civil war during the Russian revolutionary period, the new Communist masters of Russia naturally suffered from great weakness both in Europe and in the Far East. During the last years of the first World War Japanese forces had occupied much of the Russian Far Eastern territory. They had infiltrated into the Maritime and Amur Provinces, they had occupied Vladivostock, and they were to be found in possession of territories as far as and even further west than Tchita. By international agreement the Japanese withdrew from these territories in the early 1920s, but what was known as the Far Eastern Peoples Republic, a puppet State of Moscow, continued to operate until 1922, when the whole of the

Russian Far East came back once more into the Russian sphere. The new Russian Communist Government of Moscow were also especially active in the early '20s in Central Asia. Bochara disappeared altogether from the map as a separate entity, and outer Mongolia with its capital at Urga became a Russian satellite State. Meanwhile Russia was doing all it could to make its bed with China. A settlement was arrived at on Russia's rights in Manchuria, and the Chinese Eastern Railway was placed under Russo-Chinese control. In the 1920s Moscow's envoys in China were hard at work in their attempts to persuade the Chinese Government actively to oppose "imperialist oppression," and Russia's "unequal" treaties with China were abolished. Despite the tempting overtures which were made by Russia to the Chinese Government, and the many concessions that were in fact granted by Moscow to Peking at this time, the going was not easy for Russia. This was chiefly for the reason that, while in economic spheres Moscow was, in fact, making some concessions to China, in territorial questions the new Russian Government was as anxious as its forebears to retain, and even enlarge, its estates. There was also of course the attempt which was being made in the early '20s at Canton and later at Shanghai to implant Communism in China, and you will not forget the name of Borodin, the Soviet adviser to the Canton Revolutionary Party (Kuo Min Tang), who, despite all his efforts to convert the Southern Chinese Government of Sun Yat Sen to Communism, was obliged in the end to leave China about 1926 after having failed to unite the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communists.

Let us now look at Communist Russia's relations with some of the principal Asiatic countries.

First, Japan. After the Washington Conference in the early '20s, the withdrawal of Japan from the main land of Asia and also from the northern part of the island of Sakhalin (which she had occupied after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905-6), there followed, with some backing and filling, a period of relative calm in Soviet Japanese relations which lasted through the years up to 1945. In 1925 an agreement was signed between Russia and Japan pledging, *inter alia,* that each party would refrain from interference in the affairs of the other. This resumption of relations between the two countries was particularly significant as it coincided with an increase of tension in Russo-American and Russo-British relations. Meanwhile Manchuria remained, of course, the most important of the issues between Tokyo and Moscow. Russian influence was predominant in North Manchuria, while Japan was stoking up in the Kantung peninsula at Dairen and Port Arthur, and with her South Manchuria Railway was omnipotent in South Manchuria. When at last the Japanese military took the bit between their teeth and unleashed the so-called "Kuantung" army first into South Manchuria and then into the Russian preserve of North Manchuria in 1931-2, and then finally set up the satellite State of Manchukuo, comprising the whole of Manchuria (with the unfortunate Puyi as Tokyo's puppet), the Soviet Union's reaction was greatly to strengthen their Far Eastern army. But they accepted the situation, which of course involved the withdrawal of their influence from North Manchuria. The situation between the two countries continued to

remain outwardly quiet, excepting for many border incidents, until, on August 8, 1945, Stalin began his six days' war against Japan—with the immediate results that we know of. During the allied occupation of Japan under General Douglas MacArthur, Russian representation in Tokyo, consisting of a Mission accredited to a body known as the Allied Council for Japan, endeavoured by all its means to infiltrate its propaganda into that country. But without result. Many of the 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in Russian hands were indoctrinated, and sent back to Japan to do their work. But the results of their Communist indoctrination produced little fruit in Japan; and the Japanese Communist Party remains today small numerically and politically unimportant. What the political future holds in store for Japan depends of course largely upon the attitude towards her of the United States of America, and her future relationship with China, with whom she is bound increasingly to trade. But the Japanese do not, I suggest, take kindly to Communism, and it would only come, I believe, to Japan if she were to fall into a deep trough of economic depression, and then to be abandoned to "stew in her own juice" by the United States. One prominent Japanese said to me: "You Americans seem to believe that we Japanese would sooner starve than turn to Communism. Of course, we would prefer to live and work out our own democratic way of life. But if that is not to be—if we shall have to choose between democracy and death as against Communism and life—we will choose the latter." "Even the gods cannot strive against necessity." Opportunity to insure livelihood to these people on their crowded islands is the horse which will draw their political cart either to the right or to the left; and the decision as to the direction the horse will take lies in a great measure with *Washington* and *London*.

Now let me return for a moment to Russo-Chinese relations. As I have already said Russia, after the revolution of 1917, was bent on doing all in her power to bring the 400 million Chinese population into the Communist fold. But Borodin, Karakhan (with all his subtle Armenian intrigue and personal charm), Joffe and other Russian envoys were unable to convert Sun Yat Sen's Kuo Min Tang Government to Communism, and the Chinese Communist Party of the '20s and '30s and even the early '40s played as we know a secondary rôle, although they had by 1924-5 indoctrinated certain areas in the north. At the end of the second World War in 1945 the Russo-Chinese picture was, broadly speaking, as follows. Chiang Kai Shek and his Kuo Min Tang Government was nominally in charge of most of China; but the civil war between Chiang's forces and the Communist forces, which had subsided during the World War, flared up again in 1946 after the U.S. General Marshall's failure to bring Chiang and Mao together. Russia, who had recognized the Kuo Min Tang Government in 1924, continued to recognize that Government right up to 1949, while at the same time she was doing all in her power to assist the Communist cause by giving the Communist forces supplies and advisers. Indeed, in 1946, after the second World War, the Americans were faced with a difficult decision. Should they keep their forces in China to assist Chiang Kai Shek to regain the mastery over his own house and finally, and permanently, to defeat the Communist forces?

Should they limit their help to the supply of arms, munitions and advisers to Chiang? Or should they pull out of China altogether? As we all know, Washington chose the second alternative, with the tragic result that the millions of dollars' worth of arms and munitions which they pumped into China, for Chiang to use against the Communists, were finally taken over by the victorious Communist forces, who by the end of 1949 had managed to gain control of the whole of continental China. It is interesting to note here that Stalin hesitated for a long time to back the Communists outright, even though, after 1947, their final success seemed to be fairly well assured. And at one moment in 1946 after the armistice with Japan, Stalin actually advised Mao Tse Tung to delay his advance southwards from Manchuria upon the forces of Chiang, and to consolidate his position in the north. Only when the Communist victory was assured beyond any possible doubt did Stalin openly enter the arena and back the Chinese Communists to the full.

The make-up of the so-called Chinese "agrarian revolution" is also particularly noteworthy, in that while, according to the Marxian doctrine, a proletarian revolution must be preceded by a bourgeois revolution against feudalism, Mao, remembering that the two classes which really counted in China were the peasants and the intellectuals (while the bourgeoisie were and always had been politically impotent), based his revolution on the agrarian workers. Mao's revolution was only successful because of the peasant support and the increasing support of the intelligentsia. Mao won through to victory, although he acted against the advice of Stalin, who had told him that he considered that, rather than rely on the support of the peasants, he should work upon the Kuo Min Tang Government itself and capture that from the inside.

Since 1949, and Mao's great victory, the democratic world has felt the effects of Chinese Communism both internally, in China herself (by the total loss of their investments in that country), and externally in Korea, Tibet, Indo-China and South-east Asia generally. The Korean war was started in June, 1950, at the connivance of Russia and China. It was, I believe, estimated in Moscow and Peking that South Korea could very easily and rapidly be overrun by the North Korean Communists (as indeed it nearly was) and that active intervention by China herself would not be necessary. Indeed, it was not until General MacArthur's troops reached the Yalu river after his brilliant stroke at Inchon, that the so-called "volunteers" from China began to appear on the Korean front. Russian aims in Korea are of course to bring about a united Korea under Communist domination. Her continued interest in Korea, Manchuria, Japan, and the Far East generally, is shown by the fact that she has persuaded China to accept Russian troops at Dairen and Port Arthur. But it will be interesting in the future to see how her relations with China will work out when these, and other delicate questions, become riper and call for a final solution.

Internally the Chinese revolution has created large armed forces, industrial reorganization and social discipline. The Russians are of course assisting the Chinese with their schemes for industrializing the country. And, indeed, it is only from Russia that China can at present obtain the

capital goods which are necessary to complete the grandiose schemes which she has inaugurated in her first five-year plan. The Chinese revolution must of course continue for many years to go through "teething" troubles, and we can only speculate as to whether, in the long run, the Communist system will become permanently consolidated. It is also interesting to speculate as to whether a Communist China may not, in future decades, become a greater menace to the West than Russia. There are many today who believe that China, with its regimented millions and its vast industrial potential, may, in due course, take the lead of the Communist block in the place of Russia—that Mao may become the future Stalin. This is certainly an interesting and I think a legitimate speculation; but although it would be idle to belittle the potential power of the Communist China of tomorrow, Peking still has a *long* way to go. Agrarian collectivization has not yet been generally started, and there must be much discontent over the abolition, under the Communist régime, of many of the most sacred Chinese customs and ways of life, to mention only one—the family system. As regards the peasants, we all know how much the ownership of his land means to a Chinaman. I cannot help feeling that a mass liquidation of the present Chinese landowners may have to be resorted to (as it was in Russia, where no less than 10,000,000 were slaughtered) before collectivization can be enforced and become the order of the day.

Now let us turn to South-east Asia and consider Indo-China, where that tragic and unnecessary war between Ho-Chi-Min, the Viet Minh Communist leader, and the French Viet Nam is taking place. I say "unnecessary" because I, personally, believe that if only the French Colonial authorities had, years ago, taken a leaf out of our own Colonial administration the war need never have come to pass. I have had an opportunity of watching French Colonial administration in Indo-China, where I spent some time on two separate occasions between the wars. There was no elasticity in their methods and any dispute or attempts to resist the hard-and-fast administrative machine were put down by force. It is too early to make any prediction upon the issue of this struggle, which has been of such enormous cost to France and the French armed forces. But, now that France has given way somewhat to the desires of the people, and has agreed to the establishment of the three autonomous States, and now that French Viet Nam forces are being strengthened with much material assistance by the United States of America, the situation seems a little brighter. The fact that Ho-Chi-Min has been mentioning the word "armistice" may be a good sign, although for the moment it is doubtless only a "try on." I should here like to stress the great dangers inherent in a Communist victory in Indo-China. One has only to look at the map to see that if the Communists gain the upper hand there they are bound, in time, to be in a first-class position to spill over into Siam and Burma. And it is well to remember that Siam marches with Malaya.

Finally, as regards Indo-China, the Chinese Communists have not, as far as we know, sent Chinese "bodies" to fight with Ho-Chi-Min. But they have, since 1949, or before, supplied Ho with arms and munitions;

and we know that selected officers and N.C.O.s of the Viet Minh forces are sent over into Chinese territory in the Canton area, to receive military training and instruction in up-to-date weapons. There are some in this country who think that Mao, now that a Korean armistice has been arrived at, will in due course decide to send his "volunteers" to stiffen Ho's armies. Personally I do not share this opinion. In the first place Mao must have taken note of the "writing on the wall" in the shape of the various declarations which have been made by public men in America to the effect that if Mao starts in Indo-China the same game that he started in Korea in 1950-51, after the battle of the Yalu, and infiltrates his "volunteers" into Indo-China, the U.S.A. will not limit the war to Indo-China but will go full blast, with both orthodox and unorthodox weapons, for continental China herself. In the second place, I do not think that the present policy of the Moscow-Peking axis is to indulge actively in any more military adventures for the moment. Korea has been a lesson to Peking and also, in a smaller way, to Moscow.

Now let us go to the remaining countries of South-east Asia.

First Siam. Siam has a very large Chinese population, about one-third of its total. The Siamese are volatile and will go with the stream. The likelihood of Siam successfully resisting Communist infiltration in the event of a Communist victory in Indo-China is in my opinion very slight.

As I said before, Siam and Malaya have a common frontier, and I need not stress the danger to us of a Communized Siam. In Malaya the great efforts which we have made to defeat the Communists are now bearing fruit, thanks to the fine leadership of General Templer and High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald. If the clouds over Indo-China disappear, and that problem can be settled satisfactorily, I believe that our own problem in Malaya will be happily overcome in, say, two years, but a great deal must depend on what finally happens in Indo-China.

Burma has of course its Communists, and although the Burmese Government has achieved marvels since the partition period of 1947 to consolidate its hold over the country, Burma cannot be looked upon as being stable and reliable. Pressure by Communism coming from the outside would be a great danger for Burma. Furthermore the Karens, the hill tribe from which the Burmese Government have suffered so much in the past, have recently been "playing" with the Communists, and this is not a good sign.

I want now to say a word about *India* and Nehru's policy towards Communism. When I was serving in Tokyo and Moscow I had a good opportunity of experiencing this through the behaviour of my Indian colleagues. Nehru seems to suffer from a deep conviction that he has a call to act as arbiter between the two worlds. This attitude, although admittedly it may be useful to us at times (and has indeed been useful in Korea), could be dangerous if it went too far. I believe that the time may come when Nehru, who is by no means a Communist sympathizer himself, will *have* to take a more definite line. We all remember the results of the last Indian elections, where the Communists gained considerable successes in the south, and Nehru and his Government must be disturbed by the recent Communization of Tibet. He must know well

that his rôle of umpire may be untenable in the long run. If we look at the map it is obvious that India's position might become a most unenviable one if the worst were to happen and South-east Asia were to go Communist together with the countries of the Middle East. I do not wish to appear to be a pessimist, however, and I only mention this in a purely hypothetical way. At any rate, at the moment Nehru is at all times, and in all places, declaiming his neutrality in the East-West cold war; and his representatives abroad have the strictest orders not in any way to appear to be siding more with the democratic West than with the East. Thus, both in Tokyo and Moscow my Indian colleagues were careful to refrain from being seen in company with me in public; they did everything in their power to brand themselves as being outside our fold. This of course could go too far; it has caused me considerable inconvenience and anxiety in the past.

Pakistan, which flanks India on the north-west and north-east, is perhaps more solid politically than India. And Pakistan is, for the present at any rate, a *fully fledged* member of the British Commonwealth, which India is not. But Pakistan is weak militarily, and is now being offered American military aid. Although Pakistan public men have declared time and again that Pakistan will not enter into alliance with the West, India seems to take exception to Pakistan accepting this because of the supposed danger that she will use this against India to secure satisfaction over Kashmir—which of course unfortunately is still causing so much tension between the two countries.

North and west of Pakistan we have Afghanistan and Persia. Both of these countries march with the Soviet Union. Both of them are, or might be, extremely susceptible to Communist infiltration.

Persia, as we know, is more or less morally and materially bankrupt, thanks to Mossadek's oil policy.

Afghanistan is a tougher customer, but who knows what might happen there if Russia began seriously to try to Communize her? The Afghan Government is extremely sensitive to, and frightened of, every move which Russia makes. She has, for instance, recently agreed to abandon some large-scale oil drilling near her frontier with Russia, because this specialist work was to be carried out by Americans, and the Russians were not slow to take umbrage at the presence of an American "base" so close to the Amu Dariya.

To end my tour of Asia I want to mention *Sinkiang,* although the situation is far from clear. As I have said earlier, the Russians, who up to 1941 had occupied extensive parts of Sinkiang, withdrew in the early part of their war with Germany. They had to take their forces away, and even to withdraw a lot of their colonists, because in the early days of the German advance these were wanted in the West to assist in the struggle against Hitler. But this Russian exodus was merely temporary, and by 1944 we found Russia returning to Sinkiang and occupying many ill-defined parts of that vast area. The United Kingdom used to maintain consulates in Sinkiang at Kashgar and Tiwa-Fu, but these were closed in the '40s owing to the confused conditions which existed in the country, and it is therefore difficult to get reliable or precise information

of the exact political divisions of Sinkiang today. Roughly speaking, according to my information, the Russians now occupy large areas in the north and west, while the Chinese are in possession of the east and south. In any case the Russians seem to have, from the economic point of view, taken the best parts of Sinkiang, for the south consists mostly of desert. But the Chinese hold the largest acreage.

Now, it must be obvious of course that, with a Communist Government at Peking, Sinkiang with its present political divisions will obviously be a delicate spot as regards Russo-Chinese relationship in the future; it will act as one of the mirrors of their future relationship.

In Russian Central Asia, which my wife visited last July, there is great economic activity.

It is fascinating to ponder a little upon the difficulties which the Russians must have encountered in the communization of this Moslem population. I think one of the things that struck my wife most, on visiting Central Asia, was the complete upheaval in the life of the country that must have taken place to have made it possible to impose on these centuries old communities a new way of life. Not only was the economic life changed, but there seems to have been a complete elimination of the religion of what was one of the most fanatical and certainly one of the oldest Islamic communities in the world. This can only have been done by the adoption of measures more ruthless than any former conquerors have ever used. For not only were thousands destroyed by violence and famine (as might have happened in olden days), but the weapon of mass transportation of populations was used, until a void had been created which was easy to fill by a new way of life—a far easier way than it would have been to try to superimpose and graft it on to this ancient community.

It is difficult to reconcile the sight of these nomadic peoples, still living in yuarts and riding their donkeys through the desert steppes, with the Kolkhoz farms and factories springing up throughout the country. It is difficult to reconcile them going through life with no call to prayer and their mosques empty. And yet there is another picture—that of young workers apparently happy on the farms and in the factories, and there is no doubt that, provided they conform to the *plan*, a wider horizon is opening for these peoples.

The development of Russian Turkistan is going ahead fast economically, and the five-year plans which are applied to it are being worked out with the greatest zeal and energy.

I should like now, finally, to sum up and offer suggestions about the Asian situation as a whole. It may well in the future become dangerous, for, as I have suggested, the Communist road toward world domination leads through it.

Firstly, I should like to say that in my opinion the men at Moscow are putting the accent on Asia at present rather than on Europe—where the going is harder for them owing to the defensive arrangements which we have fortunately been able to make during the past five years for the protection of Western civilization. It is clear, if we glance at the map, that, now that the two colossi, Moscow and Peking, have joined hands

(for we must, I think, assume that Moscow and Peking will continue to work together, although there may be *scènes de famille*), we may well witness a combined Russo-Chinese drive southwards to India and eastwards to Japan. It is no use, I think, to deny the fact that Russia will wish to extend her influence southwards, just as she tried to do so under the Czar, and that China and Russia will certainly make a bid to include Japan within the "Communist block." Russia's final aim, from which she will *not* be deflected as long as a Communist Government sits in the Kremlin, is world revolution—that is, a world-wide federation of Communist States under the leadership of Moscow. In Asia she and her Chinese partner may well consider that they have, in the long run, not too difficult a task; and Russia in the years to come will undoubtedly make efforts to communize Persia, Afghanistan, and finally to infiltrate her poison into India itself. China, for her part, will do her best to infiltrate South-east Asia to the south and Japan to the west. That roughly must, I am sure, be the general line of thinking of the Communist statesmen of today. The crux of the matter seems to lie in whether or not Moscow and Peking will, in fact, continue to act in unison, and this of course depends a great deal as to whether Chinese Communism will become fundamentally and permanently implanted in China in the same way as Communism has taken root in Russia.

What can we do to counter, and finally to stay, the tentacles of the Communist octopus in Asia? Clearly, the most important weapon which we have against the infection of Communism is the building up of the backward countries which are exposed to it; we must do all in our power to help to raise the standard of living of their populations, so that Communism cannot take hold in winning the battle of minds. In Malaya, at any rate, we are doing our full share of this, and we are also preparing the Malayans for independence in due season. But there are other backward countries in Asia which must receive, and indeed are receiving, assistance. It is to be hoped that in this way we shall, finally, be able to stop the inflow of Communism into Southern and Western Asia. As for Japan, she, as I have already said, is for all intents and purposes, in the hands of the United States. And although the Japanese are prone to mob-psychology, and can be volatile in their politics, they will not, I sincerely believe, turn to Communism unless they suffer some grave economic disaster which would provide the fertile soil for that ideology.

What of the immediate future? In my attempt to expose to you my own opinions about the future of Communism in Asia I have been reckoning in decades—for it will obviously take a long time for Russia and China to effect the large-scale drives such as I believe them to be aiming at. As regards the immediate future, I believe that the aim of Soviet foreign policy, today, is to persuade the Western Powers to stop fighting and not to restart fighting. Meanwhile the Kremlin will rely upon the National Liberation Movements in the various Asiatic countries to bring about favourable situations without the risk of major Western intervention—such as of course resulted from the Soviet miscalculation in the Korean adventure. Generally speaking, the Communist aim is for the moment, I think, to consolidate Communist gains and to expand and

strengthen the Communist camp, while doing nothing to provoke a general conflict between the two groups of Communist and Capitalist Powers.

Meanwhile there remains, as I have tried to explain when discussing Russia and Asia, a serious vacuum in the Middle East, in Southern Asia, and possibly in Japan too, if the United States were to abandon her in the future.

You will perhaps wonder why I have not referred during my talk to the complexion of the new Soviet Government of Malenkov. I should like to finish this talk by stating that, in my opinion, the Government of Malenkov may well prove to be more subtly dangerous than that of Stalin. On the surface, Malenkov and his men are more pleasant to deal with, and more ready to get round a table. But fundamentally "world revolution" remains their ultimate goal. Although they have to date made some slight changes of tactics, these may prove to be even more difficult to counter than the clumsier methods of Stalin (which, after all, gave us the necessary arguments to persuade our populations of the necessity of rearming for defensive purposes). Our slogan, therefore, in my opinion remains, and will remain for a long time, "Unity with Strength." Although this will mean sacrifice, there is no getting away from it that we shall have to continue, with our Western Allies and with the United States, to maintain our rearmament, to concert with our allies as regards any changes in our policies which may become necessary from time to time, and, lastly, to watch for any opportunity which might present itself in the future for arriving at a *modus vivendi* with the Communists on contemporary world problems. There is no reason, that I can see, for extreme pessimism or for great optimism. Our way to stable world peace will be long and arduous, but at least since the creation of our various defensive organisations we are on that road, and we must remain on it.

February, 1954.

IMPRESSIONS OF A RECENT JOURNEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.

Luncheon lecture given on January 27, 1954, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said: Strange things very often happen in the Mother of Parliaments, but behind it all there is a wealth of knowledge and experience which is always available. There are those who have spent their lives in industry or commerce, and that remarkable category who make it their business to really understand foreign countries and the people of those countries not only by one visit but by frequent and prolonged visits. The lecturer whom we welcome today is a very distinguished member of that last category, Mr. Philips Price. He is a Member of Parliament for West Gloucestershire, which was formerly the Forest of Dean. He has, indeed, a very remarkable record. He was the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, staying in Russia from 1914 to 1918. From 1919 to 1923 he was the correspondent of the *Daily Herald* in Berlin. He has travelled in Siberia, Central Asia, the Middle East with its category of countries, and Turkey. Lately he has been visiting the Middle East again and remained some time in Persia, from which country he sent a series of articles to the *Manchester Guardian*. We think ourselves more than fortunate in having him to address us today. We welcome him and look forward with great eagerness to what he has to tell us.

Mr. Philips Price then delivered his lecture as follows:

MR. PRESIDENT,—It is always a very great pleasure for me to address the members of the Royal Central Asian Society, firstly because I have been a member of the Society for many years, and secondly because I always feel that the members of this Society know something about Asia; indeed, nearly every one is an expert in some aspects of Asiatic problems. That makes an address to the members very much nicer and easier and, moreover, one feels it is profitable.

In view of the importance of the Middle East at the present time from the point of view of strategy, politics and economics, I thought it desirable that I should spend a part of the autumn Parliamentary recess in that part of Asia to see a little for myself. I do crave the indulgence of this audience, however, because I covered a fairly big area and there are a great many subjects about each of which I should like to say a little, though I fear in so doing I may possibly tax your patience. If I do, I am sure our President will give me a hint, and that I must obey.

The first country I visited in the Middle East in 1953 was the Republic of Turkey. I have visited Turkey three times since the end of the last war, and I had been there twice in the old days of the Ottoman Empire before the first World War, when I met such people at Talaat Pasha and Enver Pasha. I was last in Turkey in 1950, and when I returned there in 1953 I was greatly impressed by the changes which had taken place in those three years. Politically Turkey has come right into the Western camp and can, indeed, be called a full parliamentary democracy. A point

of interest is that if you say to a Turk "What a fine stable country yours is—the most stable country in the Middle East," you will rather offend him. He will reply: "We are not Middle East; we are Europeans." And, judging by the way the modern Turks think, that is true, but unfortunately, geographically speaking, Turkey is still part of the Middle East. Revolutions may come and go but they do not alter the facts of geography.

It would be true to say that over the last five years since I was in Turkey in 1947 after the second World War, the political situation has become increasingly stable. On the other hand, the economic problem, as I thought I saw it, was not so stable; it was certainly difficult. Not that there have not been tremendous developments in Turkey economically. When I was in Turkey in 1946 and 1947 Turkey was importing wheat because of a bad harvest. This last season she had 2,000,000 tons of wheat for export and is somewhat in difficulties in finding a market. That has happened thanks to the great improvement in methods of cultivation in Central Anatolia. The reason for the surplus is that there has been increased mechanization of agriculture, improved qualities of seeds, the combating of pests through advisory services, and finally, though not perhaps quite so healthy, the price of the wheat has been 30 per cent. above world market prices. It is not now above world prices, but it has been. The result of this encouragement of agriculture has been that the cereal acreage of Central Anatolia has gone up 30 per cent. and the crop has increased by 70 per cent. A somewhat similar development has taken place in the case of cotton, though not quite to such an extent. Through various improvements the cotton crop has increased, so that Turkey is now a cotton exporter.

The problem that is now facing Turkey is that of finding an export market for those surplus products. Unfortunately, not only has the price which she has asked for her products been above the world market price, because the Turkish peasant is paid by the Turkish Government at that price, but also, as far as wheat has been concerned, it has been insufficiently graded and cleaned and hence not particularly desired on the world market. Consequently, in 1952 Turkey had 500,000 tons of wheat for export, but it remained unsold. In 1953 the surplus is likely to be greater. In the meantime Turkey has been importing quantities of capital goods of all kinds—agricultural machinery, hydro-electric plant for the development of her various industries—and all this has thrown her balance of payments completely into disarray, so much so that last summer the Turkish Government put an embargo on all foreign exchange for Turkish importers which practically stopped the foreign trade of the country and has hit our export trade and also the export trade of Germany and other countries. That is serious, because our export of tractors to Turkey had gone up since 1951 by 70 per cent.; our textile machinery exports had risen by 160 per cent.; combustion engines and pumps were up 100 per cent. In 1953 there was a heavy fall in imports from all countries, but I believe the situation is now improving in that regard.

The trouble with regard to Turkey's balance of payments is that she has been trying to finance this large capital import programme by exports

alone. That of course is impossible. It is true that Turkey has taken steps to make it easier to sell her products by bringing the price of her cereals down to the world market price, and she is in process of establishing in various parts of Anatolia cleaning and grading machinery, and silos are now being erected. Even so, I do not believe that Turkey will be able to finance her big development programme without loans and credits. But the Turks do not like foreign loans, and I do not wonder at that. They still have long memories, and they remember tyrannical Sultans and Grand Viziers in the old days before the revolution who sold the country down the river, so that the Turks have been very chary of taking up foreign loans or allowing foreign capital to operate in Turkey. They have a system of laws which make repatriation of capital invested in Turkey very difficult, and dividends and the amount of profit which can be repatriated are severely limited. This is not attractive to foreign capital; hence it has fought shy of investment in Turkey. I understand that there is a Bill before the Mejlis modifying the conditions under which foreign capital can operate, and it will certainly be very interesting if it comes about.

Turkey has great prospects of advancing her economy and national wealth, for she is the most stable country politically of all in that part of the world. But, like all undeveloped countries in the Middle East, Turkey has been through a wave of nationalism—the most moderate of nationalisms—while in process of emancipation from foreign influences. But the Turkish revolution has been such a success that the period of extreme anti-foreign policy has never really developed in Turkey as in Persia and other countries.

While I was in Turkey—and this is a matter which concerns us—I found the Turks were rather concerned about our negotiations with Egypt over the Suez Canal. They fear Egyptian refusal to regard an attack on Turkey as a reason for allowing Turkey's allies to use the Canal Zone. I found public opinion certainly nervous about this. Responsible Turkish statesmen and politicians are, perhaps, less worried. I believe they think the Canal Zone is of no use, anyway militarily, in the midst of a hostile Arab world, and they are more inclined to rely on other bases further north, which might help in the event of an emergency in which Turkey was involved.

I went to Iskender-un (Alexandretta) from Turkey, following that route into Syria, and so I was able to see something of the work done by us and the Americans to improve that port and to make a naval base for the use of NATO powers. One feels that Iskender-un, together with Cyprus and other naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean, might go some way towards mitigating the loss of the Canal Zone and so pacify Turkish public opinion.

That is all I propose to say about Turkey, but I will show a few slides, from the first few of which you will be able to see the type of cultivation carried on in Western Turkey. The western port of Izmir is the port of entry into the great cotton, sultana, fruit and fig-growing district; it is an up-to-date modern port. In the country round Smyrna there are small cotton fields cultivated by Turkish peasant proprietors. There is a

large trade carried on in figs as well as sultanas, the famous stoneless raisin which has been a feature of the countryside since classical times. You will note that the Turks now dress like Europeans; they no longer wear baggy trousers and the fez. The Fergusson tractor imported from Great Britain is used a great deal in Western Turkey, where the fields are small, for which the Fergusson tractor is particularly useful. One sees the new and the old methods of transport side by side: camels bringing in cotton from the countryside and the donkey still doing what he has done for hundreds and hundreds of years.

We leave Western Turkey and go into the interior, to Konya, the old capital of the Seljuk Turks before the Osmanli rose to power. In old Konya there is the famous mosque where the remains of Jelal-udin-Rumi, the famous Sufi mystic of Seljuk times, are buried. In modern Turkey, in the same city of Konya, there has been built during the last eighteen months a modern silo; it was built by the Germans, the wheat-cleaning and grading machinery having been supplied by Italy. So far as I could see there is, unfortunately, no British machinery there. We do not seem to be getting a foothold in Central Anatolia, where such tremendous agricultural developments are taking place. We are doing pretty well in the west but not in the centre. That modern silo will do much to improve the quality of Turkish wheat on the world market. In this picture one sees the delivery of the wheat brought in and sold by the peasants, all this wheat coming from the outskirts of Konya.

The Turkish Government arranged for me to visit a large State farm about one hundred miles to the west of Konya, a farm of 30,000 acres, where there is produced on a large scale by means of modern farm machinery seed wheat for sale to the peasants in order to improve the quality of the wheat grown. I went out one morning and saw caterpillar tractors and combine drills going across a tremendous area of land. The peasants were going out in the autumn season sowing, and by means of teams of these machines they can in one hour sow about 300 acres. I saw seven caterpillar tractors and combine drills all going out towards the horizon sowing the seed. One might be in the western prairies of the United States, such is the change that has taken place in Central Anatolia.

Coming back to old Turkey, we see that there are still flocks of Angora goats here and there, although the Angora goat has nothing like the value it formerly had; it is not now so much in demand. A typical scene in old Turkey for centuries has been a shepherd with his fat-tailed sheep, and that is also something that can still be seen all through Central Asia from the Bosphorus to Central China.

Returning to the new Turkey, I visited in the south-east the hot plains of Cilicia with vast cotton farms extending for hundreds of acres, and there one saw gangs of workers picking the cotton, much of which is now exported.

The peasants are really pretty well off in these days, because all they earn goes to them; they are, on the whole, the favoured people in Turkey now. The old village mosque still stands. In spite of the secular republic Islam is still functioning in Turkey. Scattered about at the edge of the villages there are largish farms. In the village tea-shop I saw peasants

dressed as Europeans and engaged in playing card games. And of course there is the village school.

I cannot, without taking up too much time, say much about the Kazaks, the Central Asian refugees who have run away from Communist influence in Central Asia and are given refuge in Turkey. Turkey once more, as so often in her past, has made herself the place of refuge for the minorities of Russia who no longer wish to live under Russian conditions. I am sure it would interest the members of the Society to hear more about these refugees, but I must now pass on.

The next countries to which I went during my visit to the Middle East were Syria, Jordan and Iraq, the Arab countries. A question I found much discussed everywhere was that of the Arab Federation. There was great enthusiasm for the idea, but beneath the surface I noticed quite a bit of rivalry and jealousy; rivalry between the Hashemite dynasty and the Saudi Arabian dynasty; also rivalry between Jordan and Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, although that seems to be dying down. The passing of old King Abdullah and the recent passing of King Ibn Saud are making that particular rivalry less than it used to be. There is suspicion of Egypt and the attempted leadership of the Arab world by Egypt. There is jealousy between those Arab States that have oil royalties to dispose of and those who have not. However, all are united on one thing: hatred of Israel and determination to wreck its fortunes, if possible. That is the one thing I found all were agreed about. They seem to think that they can bring Israel down by an economic boycott. For myself, I think they are wrong about that. I think Israel has sufficient international support and help, and is likely to continue to have, to make that impossible. I found strong feeling against Britain and the United States more or less in all Arab countries, but more so in some than in others. I found the feeling against Israel, and against us also for that matter, was worse than when I was in the Arab countries three years ago. I heard more bitter remarks made against the West in one week when I was in Damascus than I have heard in a whole year elsewhere. As far as Syria is concerned this bitterness is affecting our trade and commerce, to some extent, and possibly also contracts for public works. For instance, in regard to the port of Latakia, which the Syrians are developing on their coast, the contract has gone to Yugoslavia, not to Britain, America or Germany. There are constant pinpricks over the oil pipeline and attempts to blackmail the oil companies. All this is probably due to the feeling there is against the West. There is no hope of co-operation between Syria, at any rate, and us or the NATO powers over Middle East defence. I can see no chance of such co-operation. My impression is that if there were a war with Russia, Syria would be neutral, and possibly benevolently neutral, towards Russia.

The reason for this anti-British feeling is largely psychological. The Syrian army was badly beaten by the Jews, and the Syrians are now doing what all Arabs are prone to do—throw on other people the blame for their own shortcomings. It is an Arab characteristic to be so proud that he can never think he could make a mistake: if anything ever goes wrong it is the other fellow's fault. I feel the position, in Syria at least, has so

deteriorated that we must count Syria out for any co-operation, economic, political or military, as far as the near future is concerned. It is no use pandering to them in their present temper; better to leave them to stew in their own juice.

Matters were very different in Jordan, where Glubb Pasha's Arab Legion gave a good account of themselves in the Jewish War and gave the Jews something to get on with. I found that the Jordanians have much more self-confidence. They have a terrible refugee problem—the greatest of all in the Arab States. 400,000 Arab refugees are in Jordan and they are about one-third of the whole population of the country. They are nearer to the furnace, of course, and what is more, they have an impossible frontier to deal with.

Mr. President, in your speech to the Annual Dinner of the Society I remember you made a remark in which you pointed out that until this frontier is rectified there cannot be much peace in that part of the world. I can assure you I found those words to be absolutely correct. I agree that until the rectification of the Israel-Jordan frontier takes place there are always bound to be these raids from one into the other, because it is an impossible frontier which cuts right through villages and territories and keeps one village away from its old water supply and all that kind of thing. I talked with several important Jordanians and they seemed willing to consider negotiation on this matter, and I understand that there are those in Israel who would agree to do the same; but I imagine that there are extremists on both sides, and that makes it difficult for anything to be done. Feeling in Jordan against Israel is pretty bitter, though not so unreasoning as in Syria. Curiously enough, Syria is economically in a much stronger position than Jordan and is, in many ways, a progressive State. Jordan does, indeed, need agreement with Israel not only on the frontier question but over irrigation as a possible means of settling some of the refugees. But unfortunately, again, politics intervene. The Jordanians do not like to appear disloyal to the Arab League by negotiating with Israel on irrigation matters, because that mere fact would involve recognition of Israel. So the matter goes by default. On the other hand, while I was in Amman I spoke with a number of experts who know all about Jordan irrigation, and I believe it is possible for Israel and Jordan to develop Jordan water schemes without an agreement with each other—that is, each irrigating their own areas without affecting each other. That would involve a much smaller type of scheme than the big American all-Palestine scheme, which seems to me entirely impracticable owing to the political feeling between Israel and the Arab States. So far as Jordan is concerned the smaller scheme would involve diversion of the Yarmut, the big tributary of the Jordan; it would also involve the creation of a diversion weir at Adasize, and I was told that the scheme would enable in all about 150,000 refugees to be settled in the eastern part of Jordan; that is, 100,000 settled on the land and 50,000 in addition as persons engaged in secondary industries but part of the total number. The scheme would, of course, necessitate Israel having the right to make diversion of the upper waters of the Jordan at Lake Huleh. Both those things could be done without either country interfering with the other, and something

on these lines may have to be done. Unfortunately, the whole idea may be wrecked by the desire, not so strong in Jordan but everywhere, more or less, in the Arab world, to exploit the refugees politically, which is very reprehensible. Personally, I have always sympathized with the Arabs and think that the creation of the State of Israel was a disaster for the Middle East. But no Britisher can approve of the cynical exploitation of refugees for reasons of high politics, as some of the Arab Governments are doing. Moreover, in my opinion the Israel State is there now, created by international decision, and it is only wise to recognize facts. That is very hard for the Arabs, but they will have to do that sooner or later.

I come now to Iraq. Iraq is further away from Israel. Its army also fought well against the Jews. So, in spite of determination—as strong as in other Arab lands—not to treat with Israel, feeling against Great Britain and the United States of America is not as bitter in Iraq as in Syria and Egypt and is more like the feeling of Jordan. We are doing 45 per cent. of the import trade of Iraq in capital goods and machinery of all kinds. We are having to meet very heavy competition from the Germans, but so far we are holding our own.

I was glad to see that reforms are taking place in Iraq. A new Government of younger men has come into power bent on raising the standard of living of the people, bent on establishing a scheme of social insurance and housing schemes in some of the big towns which badly need houses, and bent on creating co-operative land settlement schemes on the newly irrigated lands. It is said that the Regent of Iraq is largely responsible for having brought about this change. I spent quite a little time while in Baghdad in visiting parts of Southern Iraq and seeing land settlement schemes where landless peasants are being settled in co-operative colonies.

There is, however, one serious problem in this part of Lower Iraq lying between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. Much of the land already irrigated, or some of it, is deteriorating through salting conditions because the Tigris and the Euphrates bring down every year hundreds of thousands of tons of débris of every kind. This necessitates drainage and leaching the land as well as irrigating it, and so doubles the cost. Therefore, it seems to me, as far as Lower Iraq is concerned, that it is not going to be so easy to re-establish the "Garden of Eden," in spite of oil royalties. It also makes one wonder whether the decline of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires in times past may not have had something to do with failure to solve the irrigation and drainage problems of those earlier times.

On matters of defence I found Iraq much more inclined to talk than Syria was, but not much interested in the military alliance of all the Arab States under Egyptian leadership. Iraq in fact, according to what I could gather, wants an alliance of Arab States, but in a smaller League comprising Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Moreover, responsible people in Iraq seem to be well alive to the Russian danger. They are further away from Israel; they do not feel so bitter about that, but they are much nearer Russia and they seem to be ready in every way for our military assistance In fact, one very prominent person in the Government said to me: "We want more assistance from you, military assistance,

than we are getting now." Moreover, they are not as yet pressing us to abandon our air bases in Iraq, Habaniyeh and the other in Basra. What will happen in the future, when the situation in the Suez Canal is changed, we must wait and see. For the present they are letting sleeping dogs lie. So far as the people now in power in Iraq are concerned, I feel if there were an emergency with Russia, Iraq would come in with the West. Alternately, of course, she might try to form a neutral bloc with Persia. The attitude of Pakistan would be all-important. The Shah of Persia and some Iraqi politicians are believed to favour a neutral bloc of Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That, too, would suit India. But it might not suit Pakistan, who fears Russia on the Persian Gulf more, apparently, than Nehru does. So also feel most people in Iraq. Generally, I have the feeling that if the Jemali Government in Iraq remains in power we can expect a benevolent attitude of Iraq towards us in the event of an emergency. But one must always bear in mind that Iraqi Governments can be very unstable and, as happened to the Portsmouth Treaty, be upset overnight by a bazaar riot in Baghdad. That might always happen again.

If I have not taxed your patience too much I should now like to say a word about Persia. On December 13, 1950, I had the honour of lecturing to this Society on my visit to Persia that autumn. I then said: "If the Razmara Government fails and if there should be an assassination of some important person, that is just the situation that Russia wants to stage another Korea."

I was, unfortunately, right about the assassination of an important person, because two months after my lecture Razmara was assassinated and Mossadeq came soon after into power. But I was, fortunately, wrong about Russia being able to stage another Korea in the event of an assassination and upset of the Razmara Government. But she very nearly did. Russia failed because she could not get complete control of the Persian Nationalist movement.

During 1951 and 1952 we saw an orgy of Nationalism in Persia. It was an acute form of what has been and is going on throughout the whole of the Middle East. In the Arab countries it is influenced by the vendetta against Israel. In Turkey it has had its period; it has successfully founded the republic and has moderated, and Turkey has become part of the European system. In Persia, on the other hand, an extreme form of nationalism has led that country to the brink of disaster. All these countries, of course, have realized their own social and economic backwardness and they recognize that without help from the West they cannot progress or become modern States; and yet they fear the economic domination of the West. That is at the bottom of it. That is the dilemma in which the countries of the Middle East are placed; they wobble from one side to the other.

When I was in Persia in 1950 the trouble with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was just blowing up. In 1947 the Persians had cancelled the Russian oil concession in the north. After all, it was only natural—it has always been the Persian habit to play us off against Russia—considering the strong Nationalist feeling running at the time, that they should next turn on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in order not to appear to be just

simply anti-Russian. I had the feeling when I was in Persia in 1947 that possibly our turn was coming next. And it did. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was the natural target. Its immense financial strength, indeed its very size, was a challenge to any Persian Government and therefore a most tactful policy was called for by the company. I do not think the policy-makers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company fully realized the sensitivity of the Persians and the strength of the new Persian Nationalist movement. All the new professional classes, the people who have risen out of the new industries which have come into Persia since Reza Shah made the big changes, some journalists, some business people and so on, are all part of this movement. It is easier to influence them by frank and sympathetic treatment, to which they respond more easily than the old school of politicians and statesmen.

The events of 1951-52 are still fresh in our memories. When Mossadeq fell in August, 1953, I decided to try to get into Persia and see what were the chances of re-establishing relations between us and them. On my arrival at Baghdad I applied for a visa and in six days I got it. Then I had to decide how to get into Persia. An American plane goes once a week; it costs £30 to go in and £30 to come out. I had not that amount of money to spend in that way. I wanted to travel cheap. Moreover, I wanted to travel so as to see and hear something of the views of the people and to see what the country was like. I went down to the Baghdad bazaar. One of the people from the British Embassy was very helpful to me, and I found that a bus was travelling into Teheran to take pilgrims to Kerbela, it being at that time the feast of Muharram. I decided to travel rough overland through Kermanshah and Hamadan. It meant sleeping in caravanserais, on floors, with camels and donkeys in the courtyard outside. It was hard travelling but most interesting. The moment I got into a Persian village I found a friendly and helpful attitude, because people got on to the bus and travelled short distances, found out who I was, gave me smiles and told me things, so that I got on very well with them and they helped me at each stage. Fortunately, of course, that part of Persia is bilingual. I do not speak any Persian, but I do speak some Turkish, and all that northern part of Persia speaks Turkish as well as Persian. One can always find some form of Turkish spoken in every group of people in that part of Persia. I think I must have been the first Englishman to travel by that route since the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and certainly the travelling was hard. It was getting cold; snow was beginning to come down over the mountain passes between Kermanshah and Hamadan. But the friendliness of the people made things easy. The roads are patrolled by Persian gendarmes who examined our passports, being on the look-out for Communists. They seemed to have the situation well in hand.

At last I reached Teheran and got into a small hotel. For the next ten days I spent a most interesting time, meeting people I had previously known in Persia: members of the Mejlis, journalists, university professors, the Prime Minister, General Zahedi, Mullah Kashani and finally, no less a person that H.M. the Shah, with whom I had an audience lasting for two hours.

I am satisfied from what I heard, putting two-and-two together all through this time, that Prime Minister Mussadiq in the earlier part of his régime had 95 per cent. of the people of Persia behind him. Everyone wanted the oil nationalized, but all sensible Persians realized that without an agreement with the oil companies the oil could not be refined or sold or transported. Mussadeq's mistake was that he failed to realize this, or could not do so. I met a member of the Mejlis Oil Commission, Dr. Alavi, a well-known eye specialist, member at that time for Bushire. He has now retired. He told me that he had said to Mussadeq in the autumn: "I am with you on nationalization, but you must come to an agreement with regard to the handling of the oil and you must pay compensation to the oil companies for the Abadan refinery." Mussadeq became violent, banged the table and said he would rather pour the oil into the Persian Gulf than come to agreement with the oil companies. All sensible Persians began to drop away from Mussadeq, and he had to depend more and more on the extreme Nationalists who were Republicans and the Communist Tudeh Party. Finally, all these people forced Mussadeq to turn against the Shah. Then the army, which was loyal to the Shah, struck and the people supported the army. That is what happened in August, 1953. The Shah is particularly popular and Mussadeq's allies grew fewer and fewer and more and more Republican, and he had to strike out. Then the crisis came. He finally allowed the Shah's statues to be pulled down, issued an order to the various units of the army that they were to leave out the Shah's name in the evening salute to the flag. The army disobeyed. That was the beginning of the landslide. I had the impression that the newly formed Government was not quite sure of itself, was not quite sure what kind of opposition there was, what was the power of the opposition and supporters of Mussadeq, but the Prime Minister said to me: "We can do what we like; we have the force to do it; but we want to carry public opinion with us." I think that was the reason for the long hesitation in asking us to re-establish diplomatic relations.

In order to get an idea of the strength of the opposition to the Government I managed to arrange to get an interview with no less a person than Mullah Kashani, the anti-British Mullah. There is little to report of what I heard from him: half-an-hour's anti-British tirade and nothing else. I had the impression that he is completely barren of ideas. I think his influence is declining. In saying that I am more or less borne out by the fact that since I left he attempted to get up a bazaar riot against the Government when the latter decided to ask for diplomatic relations to reopen, and that bazaar riot was quickly suppressed. We have heard no more about the Mullah or his supporters.

The problem now is to get Persian oil going again so as to provide some revenue for the bankrupt Persian treasury. That will not be easy, for no one wants Persian oil now. However, I am glad to say that there seems to be every prospect of close Anglo-American co-operation in the Middle East, particularly over Persian oil, and I had a long talk with Mr. Loy Henderson the American Ambassador in Teheran, of whom I had a very good impression. It does look as if there are prospects of a Con-

sortium of oil companies; that British and American companies will take a percentage of Persian oil and try to sell it on the world markets. Abadan used to produce 30,000,000 tons of oil a year before the débâcle, but the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is now building a refinery at Aden, and the Arabian oilfields are well-developed, so it will be impossible again to find room on the world markets for 30,000,000 tons of Persian oil. Yet we must find a place for some Persian oil in order to enable that country to escape economic collapse. The situation today is that if it were not for the generosity of the American taxpayers, the Persian army and Civil Service could not be paid. They are living on an American subsidy of 5 million dollars a month.

Meanwhile the country is fortunate in having a progressive young man to be Shah and ruler. In the audience I had with the Shah he told me that he thought the way to fight Communism was by preventing discontent at home, and he showed me what he is doing. He got out maps of Persia to show me his properties and the extent of his estates; the big schemes he is trying to work out for distributing land to the Persian peasants and to found co-operative colonies. It is the first time any man in that position has done that kind of thing in Persia. Incidentally, Mussadeq stopped the Shah carrying out his plans. Now Mussadeq has gone the Shah can carry on.

So Persia has been saved from going behind the Iron Curtain and the Persian people have at the eleventh hour saved themselves. I have often noticed how in Persian history the Persian people have wriggled out of what seemed to be an absolutely impossible position. They have done it again.

Forty years ago, when I first went to Persia, the talk was—and it seemed to be the case—that Persia was finished and would soon be partitioned between Great Britain and Russia. But Persia is still there. The Shah's writ runs now, as it did not then, from Mount Ararat to the Afghan frontier.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, it was not a question of me giving the lecturer a hint to stop. I was so sorry when he finished. I was hoping he would have gone on, but the time has gone and we must close.

KOREA

By SIR ARTHUR N. RUCKER, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.B.E.
Chief of the European Regional Office, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

Luncheon lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 16, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—You will agree with me that it is very kind of Sir Arthur Rucker to have come here to talk to us on the reconstruction of Korea. Sir Arthur's record is far too well known to need any introduction from me; he has a long period of very distinguished service as a civil servant in the British Civil Service; now he is in the service of the United Nations. In that capacity he has been working in Korea and is still working in connection with that country,—Sir Arthur Rucker.

WHAT I hope to do today is to give you, perhaps, some travellers' tales of what Korea is like, to discuss with you some of its problems—and certainly there are many problems in that country—and to consider a little what the United Nations, what all the nations of the world together, may be able to do to relieve those problems.

The Korean Scene

What sort of country is Korea? It is, I think, the most beautiful country I have ever been in. It is a country a little, perhaps, like Italy; that is to say, like Italy it is a peninsula with a long coastline, but unlike Italy it has a great many islands lying off its coastline and making the most beautiful little inland seas where the islands occur. Like Italy, Korea has mountains running down the centre—it is indeed largely mountainous and, as in Italy, the mountains were covered with forests. Unfortunately, many of them have now been cut for fuel and the hills are rapidly being denuded. The valleys between the mountains are for the most part full of paddy fields in which the brilliant emerald of the rice paints the countryside in spring. The climate is temperate. True, in winter it is cold in the north and in the middle of the summer hot everywhere. Yet, in general, the climate and scenery of Korea are, in my experience, unequalled.

History

Korea has a long, complicated history, of which it may truly be said *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.* All that is going on there today is what has gone on all down the ages, the country always having been menaced by attack, sometimes from the north and sometimes from the east. How similar is the picture today.

Somewhere in 200 B.C. there came probably the first big movement into Korea from China, from the valley of the Yellow River. Then for a long time Korea was divided into three kingdoms. In the tenth century the three kingdoms were superseded by a single kingdom, the Koryo kingdom, which again in the fifteenth century gave place to the Yi

dynasty, which lasted until our own times, when the Japanese moved in, took over the country, occupied it and ruled it from 1910 until the end of the second World War.

Even during all these centuries there were constant invasions. There was a devastating Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, the bitterness of which still remains. There was a Japanese invasion in the sixteenth century. At that time there was a famous naval victory in which the Koreans destroyed the Japanese fleet.

The Korean People

They are largely an agricultural people, living in small villages and small towns. There are few big towns. Seoul is a modern and beautiful city, rivalling the great capitals of the world; battered to bits at the moment but beautifully set among its hills. Pusan is not so attractive; it is mainly built of small shacks and wooden houses, though there are a certain number of stone and brick buildings in the centre of the town. The village life is the real life of Korea, and it is a family life, a life in which the thought of every person is primarily and mainly towards his family. The status of women has been what many who know the East will be accustomed to. In the past woman has been the *femme de ménage;* she has not been accustomed to go out with her husband, but has remained at home and cooked the food. At parties, as in Japan, it was and still is the custom to have Kissang girls, the equivalent of Geisha girls, to entertain the men guests. But all that is changing.

There is one charming point in regard to Korean clothes which gives me particular pleasure. In Korea when a man reaches an age of dignity, certainly when he becomes 60, he is entitled to put on a striking black hat with a brim, rather like a top-hat, made of horse-hair. In Korea 60 is 59, because you are one year old when born, and next year I am going to have a black hat. The ladies wear the most graceful garments, long flowing skirts with a little cape at the top coming down to the waistline. That, with the great flowing skirt below, gives a beautiful and graceful appearance. It is not considered polite for a lady in Korea to show her shoulders, so that even in the evening the women wear the little capes over their shoulders.

As to food, rice of course is the staple diet of Korea, with a little fish and meat when it is obtainable (today there is little meat in Korea), aided by a kind of pickle called kimchi, to which, in all truth, the Westerner finds it difficult to become accustomed; it has a powerful smell which the Westerner does not like until he becomes accustomed to it. After two years I was just beginning to enjoy *kimchi*. As against that, the Koreans say that the cheese and milk which we eat and drink also produce a horrible odour, which is just as nauseating to the Koreans as *kimchi* is to the incoming Westerner.

Agriculture is the primary industry; upon it everything turns and depends. At this moment, with a population of something like 23,000,000 in the small area below Seoul, there are too many people trying to farm too little land, but if unification takes place there will be great opportunities. Korea grows probably the finest rice in the world. It has also

splendid fishing grounds, but its chief economic hope lies in its minerals. Korea has large deposits of coal; true, it is a hard anthracite coal which to be used needs to be made into briquettes, but there is a large amount of it and there are also valuable deposits of graphite, tungsten and gold, as well as some copper and some silver; probably a good deal more than anybody realizes or knows of. There lies one of the main hopes. Korea has also some industry; it is quite erroneous to suppose that the country was never industrialized. In the Japanese period quite a lot of light industry started, some of it in the North.

The social services at this moment are pathetic. There is no money available for them. The hospitals of Korea are terrible to visit; they cannot pay properly the doctors or nurses. The army has been helping the hospitals, and at one point we were in the position that the rich could go into hospitals and could afford to pay for their food and pay the doctor, but they could not get any drugs for treatment because the drugs were being brought in by the army and given as relief to the poor in the community. The poor could go into the hospitals and get drugs, but they had no money for food and doctor. The social services of Korea inevitably are starved.

In the Korean schools, the teachers could not be paid enough to live on but the Koreans have a passionate desire for education and somehow or other the parents make up the wages of the school teachers. The culture of Korea is old and deep, akin to the Chinese from which it derived originally. Unlike most other eastern countries, Korea has a true alphabet. They use Chinese and Japanese characters, but there is a Korean alphabet which can be used to spell out words.

There are those who say that Korea is today without religion. That I believe to be profoundly untrue. On the other hand, I do not think there are a large number of Koreans who belong to an established orthodoxy. The percentage of Christians, for instance, is somewhere between 2 and 5 per cent., and there is a small percentage of Buddhists. Most Koreans are influenced by a veneration for their ancestors and their families, but I believe it is profoundly untrue to say they are without a sense of religion even if they do not believe in any organized Church. I do not understand how any people could have such profound patriotism if they were not inspired by a spiritual force.

The Needs of Korea

What are the needs of Korea today? It is difficult to paint in ordinary language a picture of the extent of the war damage. You must remember that during the last three years the country has been fought over three times, and from Taegu northwards practically all the towns and villages were destroyed. The damage done to agriculture and industry has been appalling. Fortunately, it is very difficult indeed to destroy a rice paddy; but irrigation channels were destroyed and cattle died. At least 10 per cent. of the fishing fleets were completely destroyed and great damage was done to the rest. Most of the mines were destroyed or damaged and put out of action; so too the industries. Forests are being cut down three times faster than they are being replanted. And that is not the whole

story. It is not merely that the trees are lost, but that when the trees go the hills are denuded.

Housing conditions are tragic. Close to Pusan station there is a little strip of land between the road and the railway. On that there are built a series of little shacks, constructed out of flattened petrol and beer tins, old bits of packing-cases, cardboard and straw, and in those hovels there are living innumerable families; no water, no heat; just cooking their meals in a primitive way. Those are the conditions under which many of the people are living, and, of course, all the overcrowding and suffering were made far worse by the fact that there came out of the North, pouring down into the South, some 3,000,000 refugees. Finally, in the hills there has never been a complete cessation of guerrilla fighting and banditry. It is not, I think, a very serious matter at the moment, but it does all pile up the problems and difficulties.

What has the effect of all this been? What has happened to the economy of the country? The Government of Korea is doing its best to get together enough money to keep its services going and to feed the people. On top of that there is a vast army from overseas for which labour and services have to be provided. For a long time the local currency put up for this labour was not repaid. Now it is repaid in dollars, but no one can eat dollars, and until those dollars begin to bring in consumer goods on a large scale the only possible effect is steadily rising inflation. That is up to this moment what has happened. In August, 1953, compared with June, 1950, wholesale prices in those two and a half years had risen by 1,650 per cent., and retail prices had gone up 2,337 per cent. Wheat flour today costs roughly 3s. a lb. at the official rate of exchange; beef 14s. lb.; cotton and cotton shirting 6s. 8d. a yard. The trouble is Korea's disbalance of trade. During July 1953, Korea had to import, to live, goods worth 2,780,000,000 Hwan. Her exports were worth only 290,000,000 Hwan. There in a nutshell is the problem. Until we can begin to put the economy of Korea back again where the country earns its own living, these terrible conditions must prevail.

UNKRA and its Task

What is being done about it? The Government of Korea is doing everything possible. They are taxing heavily; they are struggling hard; they are exporting all the tungsten they can, and so on. In addition, two big sources of outside aid are going in to help them. First the United States of America is giving a great deal of direct aid. At this moment for the current period, perhaps six months, it is putting in $200,000,000. That money is being spent through the Civil Assistance Command of the army, mainly on relief. In addition, UNKRA, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, the organization to which I belong, is putting in something like $100,000,000 per year, provided we can get it. That money is being spent primarily on reconstruction—getting industries going again, rebuilding irrigation dams, restarting the mines, and so on. The actual work of reconstruction is, of course, being done by the Koreans themselves, but we are trying to help them with money, with imported materials and machinery and with some technical assistance.

UNKRA has now three programmes: a $71,000,000 programme for 1952-53 which is in full operation, a larger programme of $85,000,000 for 1953-54 which is just being prepared, and a bigger programme still in preparation for 1954-55 of $110,000,000, making a total expenditure of $266,000,000. These three programmes are being planned to fit in with the reconstruction schemes which the Koreans are able to finance for themselves and with the schemes financed by the direct aid of the United States. There is thus a single overall programme of relief and reconstruction for Korea, an important part of which is assigned to UNKRA.

So far, thirty-three countries have given financial support to UNKRA. Of these, twenty-five are members of the United Nations, five are not. Much the largest contributor is the U.S.A., who, in addition to all the direct aid she is giving to Korea, pays some 65 per cent. of UNKRA's costs. I am glad to say that this country has promised £10,000,000 to the total programme, and other Commonwealth countries and European countries—particularly the Scandinavian countries—have contributed generously. But nothing like enough money has yet been put up. It is my special task to explain this and to beg for more.

Let me try now to give a few concrete examples of what the UNKRA programmes actually mean. What is it that we and the Koreans are doing with all this money? I will quote from the 1952-53 programme now in operation. First of all, we imported $20,000,000 worth of grain and fertilizer. More fertilizer was imported by the United States, and as a result of all this fertilizer, the black market began to disappear and prices fell. For the first time, farmers had enough fertilizer and there was a bumper rice crop. We are also importing cement for irrigation works; that will mean that this next year there will be another 63,000 acres under rice. We are importing farm tools. We have a big inoculation campaign against animal diseases—generally the Koreans lose 58 per cent. of their swine; in 1952-53 there was no such loss. We have a reforestation campaign and have purchased 43,000,000 seedlings to try to restart the forests.

Large sums of money are being spent on ropes, nets, and boats, and on lumber to make boats, for the fishing industry. We bought nearly £1,000,000 worth of textile machinery from a Manchester firm to re-equip Korean textile factories. We sent from this country £500,000 worth of trucks. We are putting in briquetting plant, and we hope to start a fertilizer plant.

Power is one of the main problems. Most of the power came from the North, where the best water supplies are, but there are water supplies down in the South too—in Hwachon, just south of the border, for example—and there is great opportunity for hydraulic electric development. The Civil Affairs Command are doing that for us and UNKRA is putting up the money, but it is a Korean Government scheme. What could be a better system of co-operation?

We are helping the Koreans to drill for gold. There are some sands in Korea which seem to have a really high gold content. There may be a great future there. We are also reconstructing some of the coal mines.

I said earlier that the future of Korea depends largely on its minerals. Believe it or not, at present there is no means of getting a sample of

mineral ore assayed in Korea. It has to be sent over to Japan. Therefore we are building an assay laboratory at Taejon, and we hope it will be in operation in January, 1954. We are importing from South Africa machinery for making blocks with which to build houses. The Korean house is built normally on a timber frame with a hot floor; that is to say, the flue of the kitchen is carried under the floor of the living room, so that all through the cold Korean winter you are kept warm.

Our plans for education include the building of classrooms and the provision of books and laboratory supplies. On the health and welfare side, Taegu Hospital is being rebuilt, with its medical school, which is one of the three big medical schools in Korea. We hope to get the teaching of medicine there restarted very soon. We are also helping to rebuild and equip a large rehabilitation centre at Tongnae, close to Pusan.

Probably this brief picture suggests a somewhat haphazard method of working. Yet I can say truthfully that that is not so. What we are doing is part of an overall plan for Korea, in which we and the Koreans and the Civil Assistance Command are all playing our assigned parts.

For all this work we have a staff of about 200 people, mainly in Korea. We have a small office in Geneva trying to collect money and a larger office in New York.

The Future of Korea

I will spend my last few minutes in asking myself a question which I find very much more difficult to answer. It is fairly easy to tell you what the history of Korea has been, what its geography is, and what has happened. It is much more difficult to tell you what the future is, or whether all this tremendous effort is worth while. Is there going to be peace in Korea? Will there be a political conference in Korea? Is there going to be any unification of Korea? I do not know. I do not believe anybody knows. I have no crystal ball, but what I do want to put forward is this: if the nations of the world do not put this money into Korea, do not start to get Korea right again, it does not matter what happens, because Korea will certainly be destroyed and ruined and lost. If we do not start now and help to reconstruct Korea there will not be any Korea. It will be finished, and all we have fought for will be lost. So I do not believe, from the point of view of what our duty is, that it matters what the answer is to my question; our duty is clear. We must go to the help of Korea, and go to her help now.

If we do that, can we make the economy of Korea viable? Is it ever possible? Can Korea be made self-supporting? It will be enormously easier if there is unification. To maintain 23,000,000 people and their descendants in South Korea alone, will be difficult, but not impossible. I think that with all the big agricultural and mineral possibilities the economy of South Korea can be made viable. But certainly unification is urgently desired, even if for the moment it would make things more difficult, because there must be even more damage to restore in North Korea than in the South. For the rest, we have to face it honestly that in the long run Korea has got to find an outlet for its trade and must

develop trade either with China or Japan, or both. One tremendous asset the Korean Government have in making their economy viable is that they have a very remarkable people, people of immense fortitude and great industry, and a people with amazing patriotism. I have been in hospitals and have seen Koreans in the operating theatre without proper anæsthetics, and just whimpering. I do not know how people are so brave. I do not believe that that amount of bravery can be lost. I think a country which has people with that kind of bravery must come through. Of course Korea is not perfect any more than any other country is perfect. There are individualists in Korea, people who consider their own private profit instead of the country's good. Of course there are. Is there no glass in our house that we can afford to throw stones? Often the trouble is due to inadequate pay. How can one expect the ordinary salaried official who is not paid enough to feed himself, let alone his family, to maintain a perfectly high degree of integrity such as we would demand of our Civil Service? How can one expect that in a country where nobody is ever paid anything like enough on which to live? Most of them, to their honour, somehow do another job; do paid work on farms and somehow make do, but of course there are evils sometimes. That is inevitable. And the only answer is to pay the people properly, and that depends on a restoration of the economy.

Lastly, let me voice one other criticism which is always being made. I approach this with a great sense of delicacy, but it is asked by all sorts of people in the West: If we put up this money to help Korea, can we be sure their President and their Government will play with us, will understand what we are doing? Will the Koreans do their part in this combined bargain? There are one or two things we should remember. The Korean Government and President have been criticized quite a deal in this country. Let me put a little analogy to you which you might bear in mind when you feel critical of some of the things that have happened during the last few years. Supposing—I will not name any particular country—supposing a country at war with us, a bitter enemy of ours, was occupying the northern parts of these islands from the east across to Bristol, and around London there were congregated most of the armies of the rest of the world, what do you think a Prime Minister of England would have said and done? It seems to me that we ought to have some understanding of the attitude towards the situation in which he has found himself of a President who is a profound patriot and who has been imprisoned for his patriotism and exiled for it over many years. It may be that things have been done by the Korean Government which were criticized in the West: It may be that in the troubles of last May there were things that happened of which the United Nations were justifiably critical. With all that, consider the situation as it is, consider the history of these people, consider what they have been doing in trying to fight for their country. Are they not bound to seek at all costs to hold it together? Those are political questions into which I have, perhaps, no business to go, but I feel that sometimes in this country there has not been sufficient understanding of what the President and his Government have been up against.

Conclusion

All I want to say in conclusion is that we cannot go to Korea and tell the Koreans how to run their country. We would not like it if anybody came and told us how to run ours. But we did go to help to fight a war there in the hope of preventing a third World War. We are hopeful that we have succeeded; and in the process the country has been destroyed and ruined and the result has been the death of thousands of Koreans. Surely the rest of the nations of the world owe it to Korea to redress that terrible suffering? That is what we in our humble little way are trying to do. It is an appalling task. At first it was terribly frustrating. Now I see some hope, but it can only be a task successfully carried out if the Governments of the rest of the world are prepared to go on putting up money in these very large sums and if, when they do that, they have the support of public opinion. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is you.

The Chairman: Sir Arthur Rucker has kindly offered to answer questions. I ask the first. I am not clear from what you have said, Sir Arthur, whether in this reconstruction of Korea you have managed to cover the whole of Korea, North and South, or only part?

Sir Arthur Rucker: Across the centre of Korea just north of Seoul, running diagonally north-east, there is still a Front Line, and we cannot set foot north of it. All I have been speaking about so far is the reconstruction of South Korea, but of course we all hope and pray that a political answer will be found and that we can treat the country as a whole. That is the only satisfactory way in which to restore the economy. The figures I gave were for South Korea only. We have no knowledge of North Korea except that the Russians have said they will put in 100,000,000 roubles.

Mr. C. G. Hancock: Would the lecturer comment on what would happen if United Nations troops were withdrawn from Korea? Would Communism then get the upper hand? If so, would they use it as a stepping-stone to Japan?

Sir Arthur Rucker: I would have thought that if United Nations Forces were withdrawn from Korea and Chinese troops not withdrawn, then Communism would certainly get the upper hand. I do not see how you could expect South Korea to stand up against China alone. I would have thought that to hold South Korea was an important part of the holding of the Western Line.

Lt.-Col. Dimmock asked if there were any ethnological or linguistic distinctions between North and South Koreans or were they the same people.

Sir Arthur Rucker replied: I would be grateful if some of my Korean friends would answer that. I believe I am right in saying that there are the same kind of distinctions as between Scottish and English; it is substantially the same, but I am told a South Korean can tell a North Korean accent. We certainly could not. It is, however, just the same difference as there is between northerner and southerner of the same race and type.

Mr. C. J. Edmonds: The lecturer told us that deforestation was going

on apace. Is that because the troops require fuel or because of the destruction of houses, or any other particular reason arising out of the war?

Sir ARTHUR RUCKER: It is because the ordinary people in the countryside require fuel; mainly it is the villagers. The Korean winter is very cold, and the normal method of getting fuel over the last few years, and unfortunately still is, to go on the hillside and cut down wood. There has been a bad habit of taking even the grass and leaves off the hillside, which makes denudation proceed faster. It is a problem of getting cheaper fuel to the villagers.

Mrs. A. ST. JOHN COOK: Is there not plenty of nice fruit growing in Southern Korea?

Sir ARTHUR RUCKER: Yes; the Taegu apple is famous all over the East, and the persimmon is a lovely thing to see on the trees. There are some grapes grown also, but I have never heard of any grape wine being made. The most famous fruit is the apple.

Mr. C. W. LARGE: I have been reading a number of articles on Korea. Many refer to Korea as Chosen, which I believe means "The Land of the Morning Calm." Is that poetical or is it an actuality?

Sir ARTHUR RUCKER: I can only quote Mr. Osgood. According to him the Land of Morning Calm was Chosen, so named originally by the Chinese, who saw the Sun rising in the East over Korea. Hence the name. Whether that is true or not, I do not know. That is Mr. Osgood's account of it.

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: I believe that is perfectly true. I have been in Korea, though not for a long time, and it is unusual to have any stirring in the air in the morning. There is an extraordinarily still beautiful air. The name is very well chosen.

Sir ARTHUR RUCKER: It is a very suitable name. I did not mean to deny that. Korea is the most lovely country I have ever been in.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no more questions, I feel sure you would wish me to thank Sir Arthur Rucker for the wonderful description that he has given us of the country of Korea, the people and the problems. In his task of trying to raise money for Korea he has made a very fine case for it, which was really summed up almost in his last sentence in which he pointed out that we went into Korea to stop aggression, hoping thereby to stop a third World War. It is quite certain that if we had not gone into Korea to stop aggression, there would have been further aggression elsewhere, and very quickly. We do, therefore, owe a very great debt to Korea and to the Koreans, over whose country this battle has taken place.

IRAN TODAY

By THE RT. REV. W. J. THOMPSON, C.B.E.
(*Anglican Bishop in Iran*)

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 24, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Bishop Thompson, who has kindly come to speak to us on Iran, first went to that country before the 1914-18 War, during which he served as a Sapper. After that war he took Holy Orders and went out to Iran again in 1921, and there he has been since, having been made Bishop in 1935.

I GREATLY appreciate the invitation you have again given me to address you. I have no qualification of erudition or learning to justify inflicting my views upon such an informed group as this on all matters relating to the Middle East, beyond this—that I have spent most of my life in Iran and that I have a great love for the country and the people of Iran, amongst whom I count many of my closest friends.

One thing I should make quite plain at the outset, which is that I shall not talk "politics"; and if I shall mention matters which are commonly considered political (and what can really be excluded from this category?), at least I do not approach them from a political angle nor with any political inside information. I shall speak from my own personal observations (for what they are worth), and they will be from the point of view of one who has a great affection for the people of Iran; and I think I can claim to speak from the point of view of the Irani, so far as a foreigner can do this.

Much water has passed under the bridge since I last spoke to this Society, but on referring to what I said then I see that I did stress the great changes which were taking place in the country and the signs that people were not all in full sympathy with existing conditions. But it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have predicted the extent of the changes which have since taken place or their effects. It has become a hurricane which has swept all before it, tearing up old landmarks and destroying many familiar features and old popular ideas and leaving people dazed and uncertain. In order to see the situation in its true perspective I think one must relate it to a wider scene, which has been shaping itself gradually, but with gathering force and speed, throughout Asia and Africa as well as the Middle East. Perhaps Iran got caught up in this storm more suddenly and violently than some others because of the previous comparative isolation of the country. I refer, of course, to the clash of cultures and ideas which has been coming to a crisis lately between East and West. We must try and get some picture of this in our minds if we are to be able to understand and appreciate the sudden violent rise of nationalism in Iran (and elsewhere). We must try and see the problem from the point of view of the country and people whose culture and way of life is being threatened, otherwise we shall not be able to sympathize with it or understand what it is.

Here was a country, Iran, which for many years had been largely bypassed by the world—or rather by the West—tucked away behind its great rampart of mountains, living a life of its own and enjoying her ancient culture and civilization. Then two things happened concurrently which changed the whole course of her life.

The people of Iran were suddenly woken up out of their comfortable apathy and ancient ways by the appearance of that dynamic personality Reza Khan, later to become Reza Shah Pahlavi. He gave to the country internal peace and security, creating a sense of unity and purpose which had been conspicuous by its absence for a long time. He forced the pace of changes and reforms—social, educational, industrial and political—which otherwise might have been indefinitely delayed or instituted much more slowly. He brought order out of chaos, he tied up the loose ends of government and strengthened the central government in Teheran; he freed the women from their age-long seclusion and gave them a new sense of importance and value; he introduced modern education and many Western ideas and technical improvements; he built roads and railways, and at the same time created a new interest in and revival of Persian literature and culture. He made the people feel alive, united and expectant. Anyone who lived through those years out in Iran could not but be struck by the new spirit which Reza Shah inspired throughout the country.

While all this was happening internally, the discovery of oil under her soil and the fortunes of war brought Iran suddenly, and to an unusual degree, into the centre of attraction for the rest of the world and specially the West. Money poured into the country and foreigners by the thousand invaded her boundaries and imposed a kind of industrial revolution for which she was quite unprepared and which was unrelated to the rest of her social development. One has to remember that our own industrial revolution was one of our own making and grew out of our own development. This fact tempered its baleful effects, although even for us it was a major social revolution the effects of which we are still feeling today. How much greater must the impact of this new industrial development due to the discovery of oil have been to a country like Iran. *We* tend to emphasize the great material benefits which this great development brought in its train to Iran—and there is no denying the truth of this—and at first Persians also were dazzled by the superficial advantages and material comforts which Western technology and industry were introducing into their midst. But gradually they became conscious of a greater fact—that this interference and intrusion was undermining and endangering the whole structure of their life and culture. Their way of life was breaking up and they were in danger of being left stranded and unprotected against the inroads of the West. Something foreign was being forced upon them, and that not for their own good but purely for the advantage of the foreigner. Arnold Toynbee, the historian, expresses all this very well in his book *The World and the West* in the chapter entitled "The Psychology of Encounter," from which I would like to quote the following:

> "The reception of a foreign culture is a painful as well as a hazardous undertaking; and the victim's instinctive repugnance to

> innovation that threatens to upset his traditional way of life makes the experience all the worse for him. . . . He gives grudging admission to the most trivial, and therefore least upsetting, of these poisonous splinters of a foreign way of life, in the hope of being able to get off with no further concessions than just that; and then, as one thing inevitably leads to another, he finds himself compelled to admit the rest of the intruding culture piecemeal. No wonder that the victim's normal attitude towards an intrusive alien culture is a self-defeating attitude of opposition and hostility."

That is well said, and we cannot rightly understand the upsurge of Nationalism if we fail to see it as an attempt to stem the tide of foreign influence and intrusion. It is the expression of deep-seated instincts of self-preservation—a fear bred of the sudden half-conscious sense of insecurity, and old sanctions failing to satisfy and appeal. And the greater and richer the old culture and way of life had been the greater will be the shock when that begins to be questioned and to break up. It was inevitable, it seems to me, that this "encounter," this clash of cultures, should happen, for we are all being thrown together as never before in the history of the world, but I think that the shock might have been eased and the bitterness have been averted if the West had had more vision and been less selfish and self-centred, less self-seeking and greedy to make the maximum "profits," and had shown more sympathy and understanding for their "victims," to use Toynbee's word.

In what I have said so far I have been anxious only to emphasize the nature and the reasonableness of the national movement which has been finding such free expression of late in Iran. Our Foreign Secretary said in a broadcast lately the growing force of Nationalism "is one of the most stubborn problems we have to face in the world today." Naturally the East is taking advantage of the difficulties in which the West finds itself at present; these have given the opportunity for the underlying discontents, fears and resentments to find expression. They were there all the time, but it was previously more dangerous and unwise to express them too openly.

Looking back over the last few years in Iran, some things stand out as of special interest: The power of propaganda in a country suddenly exposed to its full force – undiluted, so to speak. It is the first time we have seen this thing happen in Iran. One has to remember that the radio, or rather broadcasting system, is under the complete control of the government, and so only what the government wants to get across is put out. The majority of the people, I suppose, are still illiterate and so do not possess the means for sifting out the chaff from the substance and finding out the truth. It was the first time propaganda had been used in this way in Iran, and so it came with all the added interest and attraction of something new. Wherever loud-speakers were put up there you would find crowds listening. Apart from this anyone who had an idea wanted to put it on paper and rush into print, and I think the influence of the crude cartoon has been very great amongst the less educated. Even if he cannot read a man can usually understand the picture, which is generally lurid, crude and inciting. One realizes how easy it is to alter the mass mind of a people still largely

illiterate. An Irani friend of mine said to me: "There is no such thing as public opinion in Iran, there is only public sentiment." There is a lot of truth in this, though it is an exaggeration, and sentiment can be much more easily and rapidly changed. A thought-out opinion goes deeper and is not so easily rooted out.

Another very noticeable thing in Iran is the great change in the foreign community. The predominantly British character of the foreign community has changed and it is overwhelmingly American today. Irani friends of mine used laughingly to say to me: "We have got rid of you Britishers, but we have now fallen into the hands of the Americans." This probably is the most striking change which a person who had not been in Iran for some time would notice. It was sad to see all the British institutions go one by one. Many of them were old-established and had served the country well. Their disappearance may have been inevitable from the point of view of the nationalist, but it brought great loss to the country, and their disappearance created a great feeling of instability and many were thrown out of work, and owing to their association with the foreigner they could not readily find re-employment elsewhere. The purpose behind all this was, of course, to make a break with the past and all that that stood for and to open the way for a new beginning. It is understandable—all revolutions seem to follow much the same pattern—and we should be able to sympathize even if we may be more conscious of the loss than of the advantages gained. But today the Americans, and specially the Point 4 organization, have more than filled the gap left by the disappearance of the British. Where one Britisher was before there must be half a dozen Americans today. That is the irony of the situation and of a movement designed to rid the country of the foreigner. American Consulates have come into being wherever British Consulates used to be and in many other places as well; and Point 4 have enormous offices in Teheran and their activities are to be seen all over the land. However much we may be inclined to criticize the way Americans are doing the job in Iran, at least we should acknowledge the high purpose and idealism which lie behind it all and the fact that this help, both financial and practical, has been a big factor in keeping the country going through these difficult and troublous times and enabling it to pay its way. It is hardly surprising that in the present critical and suspicious attitude of mind of the people their efforts are not always appreciated. In fact they seem often to have come in for more hostility than even the British. I think the traditional goodwill and friendliness between our two countries and peoples have stood us in good stead through these difficult days, so that in spite of the intensive anti-propaganda the latent good feelings have been able to persist. Speaking personally, and I think for all our British missionaries, we never received anything but the greatest courtesy and consideration. Of course many dared not too openly associate themselves with us, but that is a different matter.

It would not be easy to talk about any country today without some mention of Communism, for that is a world-wide fact of great importance. I think it is true that Communism and Islam do not readily mix (after all, Communism may from one point of view be considered as the embodiment of the materialistic spirit of this age and as such will not mix with any

religion); it is also inimical to the present popular brand of nationalism which is bounded by narrow racial and national limits. But Communism makes a twofold appeal in Iran as in other countries. It claims to be able to get rid of the extreme inequality between the rich minority and poverty-stricken majority. It thus draws into its net all the seething discontent and natural selfish instincts of human nature. It appeals both to the highest and to the lowest in human nature. But it also claims to be the bulwark against the West—Western imperialism and interference. I think the majority of those who are attracted to Communism in these lands (even the student class and the intellectuals) are very little concerned with—and in fact know very little about—its ideology; if they did, perhaps it would not have the same appeal. I believe also that Communism trades on the complete disillusionment as to the benefits of Western civilization. It is a useful stick with which to beat the West. In any country such as Iran the only effective reply to the Communist is an enthusiastic and satisfactory policy of economic relief to the under-privileged. It is the lack of any such effective and practical solution to this—one of the basic problems—which is the most disappointing element in the successive governments which come into power. Of course all of them pay lip service to these ideals, but very few go beyond this. It is easier and more spectacular to increase military expenditure or to hasten on with an ambitious educational policy. But this is really dangerous, for as has been well said: "Poverty and ignorance can abide together for centuries, but poverty and education is an explosive mixture." So few governments seem to see the truth of this. The fact is that there is a sad lack of the necessary moral incentive or urge to make the necessary sacrifices involved in a really just distribution of the available material resources. Those who have are not prepared to share with those who have not. The Shah is giving a fine lead to his people in distributing his crown estates and encouraging social reform.

There have been some important engineering developments in Iran during the past few years. Among these is the fine new water supply which has been completed in Shiraz and which was lately opened by the Shah himself. Shiraz also has perhaps the most efficient medical service of any town in Iran (except the capital), under the very enthusiastic and efficient direction of its Director of Medical Services. In Isfahan two important improvements have lately been completed—viz., the Turbine power scheme, which gives Isfahan one of the finest and largest power plants in the Middle East, and the Kuh Rang water scheme, whereby some of the water of the Karun river has been diverted by means of a tunnel and a dam into the Isfahan river, and so it is hoped that the agricultural needs of the Isfahan plain will be better met. The Shah also opened this a short time ago. Thus a dream of Shah Abbas the Great is at last realized—he nearly completed a similar project 300 years ago. Teheran is at the present time in the process of getting a fine new water supply, which when it is complete will greatly increase the amenities of the town. But it is likely to be some time before this is completed. It is a tremendous undertaking.

Another very noticeable and welcome change of the last few years is the great improvement in transport facilities in Iran. There is, of course, for those who like it, the aeroplane, though this is not yet very reliable in

winter owing to difficult weather conditions. But Iran is a very large country and rapid, easy, cheap transport is one of the great essentials. When one compares the present facilities with the old unreliable, uncomfortable and infrequent buses and other so-called motor transport which was all that the unfortunate traveller had to rely on (if he did not possess his own transport) only a very few years ago, one must give unstinted praise for the enterprise of the present bus companies which ply buses between the various towns. They seldom let one down and they offer much improved accommodation and more consideration for the passengers. They start up to time, which is a very great change from the old interminable delays. They are also cheap—very cheap when compared with our British Railways here in England. There is really nothing to complain about them except that the old excitements and interesting unrehearsed incidents which made travelling in Iran in former years so full of interest are so seldom met with today. The remembrance of those old days perhaps has given a more romantic colour to them as they recede into the past!

There are only two complaints I think one could justly make: Many of the roads should be kept under better repair. This would not only increase the comfort of the traveller but would also greatly lengthen the life of the vehicles which use the roads. One often wonders as one skims over the interminable corrugations how any motor ever keeps together. The other thing is that the hotel accommodation usually provided for the traveller at the end of his journey, or at the various stops, has very little to commend itself. The available accommodation is usually not worthy of the country and must give a bad impression to those who visit it for the first time. There is another complaint which as a foreigner I would register, and that is that we have lately not been able to make use of the transport as we should like, because of the restrictions in the movements of foreigners about the country. Red cards have to be obtained, and these are not easy to procure and are often refused. I trust this restriction may soon be removed and we be allowed as before to travel freely about the country.

The people of Iran are fast becoming a literate community, with the emphasis which is being put upon education. It is not merely that the government encourages education, but that there is an urge for it; schools are crowded and also the University in Teheran. People have a great belief in the inherent value and worth of knowledge and that this is the road to success and progress. I think there is too much emphasis on the quantity rather than the quality of the education given. There is a crying need for better teachers who appreciate the fact that schools are not merely for imparting knowledge but rather for the formation of character. Efficient normal schools are perhaps the greatest need today.

One very interesting point—or at least it is of great interest to me—is the fact that practically the only British institution which survived the political storm which is just abating was the Missionary Society, and the churches which have grown up as a result of its work. Of course it did not survive unscathed, because missionaries who happened to be out of the country could not get visas to return, as was the case with all other British people. But the Christian hospitals and the blind welfare work as well as the churches are still carrying on, and we hope that those at present outside

will be granted permits to return to their work. I do hope this fact of our survival means that the government and people do recognize the fact that we have no political axe to grind and are in no way connected with any political activities whatever. Actually one of the regulations of the Society is that its members should not take part in any such activities. We hope that by now this fact is generally understood.

I hope I have managed to give a fair glimpse of Iran as it is or has been during the past few years. It is only too easy for anyone at close quarters to miss important trends and get false impressions. However, the points I have mentioned are among those which appear to me worth noting.

May I make one observation before closing? I do not think the West—and that in effect means Britain and America—has yet given to Iran of its best nor what Iran is really looking for. We have, of course, brought to her much of our technical knowledge and appliances, but we have not given her that sympathy and understanding—that friendship, which she looks for as she faces the dangerous times ahead. We have not attempted adequately to interpret to her the more fundamental bases of the best that our civilization stands for, the rich heritage of Christian faith and thought and character to which we owe so much and which we take for granted and are in danger of losing in consequence. Iran, and the East in general, is looking for the solution not only of the economic problems which trouble her but of the deeper questions which are clamouring for an answer. Those questions which Nationalism and Communism are attempting to answer and failing to do so effectively and satisfactorily. If we have the answer we should be sharing it. The future would seem to depend on the answer to these fundamental questions.

Mr. LANGE: The lecturer mentioned improvement in the water system and in transport. Has there been any improvement made in the meantime in the medical service? When in Teheran shortly before World War II I fell ill with measles. I made enquiries in the very comfortable Palace Hotel where I stayed and I was told that there were only two hospitals in Teheran, a Persian hospital and another quite modern one, a propaganda hospital, which was the Soviet hospital. Between the two I chose the Soviet hospital, and applied to the chief physician, a Soviet Armenian doctor, who treated me most efficiently and well in the Palace Hotel, visiting me there almost every day. I had every courtesy shown me and the very finest attention from Dr. B.

Bishop THOMPSON: I think there has been considerable improvement in the medical service, though in my view Iranian doctors are better physicians than surgeons. There are no really adequate facilities for getting practice in surgery, outside the capital itself; there one can get pretty well served today. The criticism one hears is that the practitioners will squeeze the very last penny from the patient's pocket and that, of course, makes things very difficult for most people. Also the American Point 4 are doing a great deal to help improve the situation. Their doctors and nurses are trying to provide help, instruction and advice in regard to the development of medical services all over the country. At present it seems to be the ideal of almost every young Persian to become a doctor. The medical courses in

the University are crowded out. How many of those young men will eventually prove to be good doctors is a question which still remains to be answered.

Mr. LANGE: I should have mentioned that there is a very good medical institution in Teheran which is French, the Pasteur Institute, but I gathered when there that the Institute only produced serum, particularly that used in the treatment of typhoid, which is endemic in Persia. I understood from the Director of the Institute that the whole French army is inoculated with serum made at the Institute, this being the finest typhoid and paratyphoid serum in existence.

Dr. NANCY LAMPTON: May I point out that the Pasteur Institute in Teheran is Persian, not French.

Mr. DAVID SCOTT: Could the lecturer give us some idea of the present influence of the Bahai community?

Bishop THOMPSON: It is difficult to say anything very definite in that regard. All I can say is that they are maintaining their position, though probably not increasing to the extent they were a few years ago. My impression is that they have become stabilized.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: Could the lecturer give some idea of the religious feeling generally at the present time? Is there more fanaticism now than in the time of Reza Shah? What has been the tendency in that regard during the last few years? In the course of the work of the Church Missionary Society the nationalist factor must sometimes enter into the question. Would the lecturer say that the mullahs are a greater menace to the Society's work than they were a few years ago?

Bishop THOMPSON: That is a very wide subject. The national movement has its religious side and it has given an impetus to Islam on its political side. I do not believe that it is much of a spiritual movement, but Islam has three strands: the religious, the political and the social. The political aspect is certainly today in the ascendant. Any Muslim wishing to become a Christian has to face today, besides the old difficulty, the fact that he is considered to be unpatriotic, and it is not pleasant for anybody loving his country to be termed unpatriotic. That is a big obstacle to anyone wishing to become a Christian. I should say that, on the whole, Islam has gained some advantages as a result of the national movement in Iran, but that amongst those who have been educated in the West Islam does not probably appeal very greatly on the religious side.

Mr. A. M. HAMILTON: It would seem that after World War I when the Assyrians came from the north and reached Baghdad they suffered dreadfully from religious persecution. Would that be likely to happen again or is there quite so much feeling towards other religions as there was in that earlier period? The Mar Shimun, when he last spoke to this Society, was pleased that he and his bishops were given more liberty of action in Persia than in the past; more so than in regard to Iraq, I gathered, where there are still some difficulties for him.

Bishop THOMPSON: Religious intolerance appears to be pretty near the surface all over the world and not only in Iran. At the moment there appears to be wonderful religious tolerance in Iran. Of course it might easily be turned the other way, though normally the Irani is an extremely

peace-loving person and to my mind very tolerant. During the first war there was the terrible experience of the movement of the Assyrians down through Persia to Baghdad. That was war, and one of the terrible effects of war. I do not think the Iranians are worse or better than others in such respects.

Mrs. Fox Holmes: Does the lecturer believe that the best way to oppose Communism in other countries is by a real living faith in the Lord Jesus Christ? If so, and the Communists are not tolerant, how only through faith in Christian principles can the Communist be opposed?

Bishop Thompson: I said in my closing remarks that I felt we had not given Iran of our best, that is the basis of our Western life and culture. We have been content very largely just to give and share with them some of our technical knowledge. I believe the whole matter is beginning to come on to a quite different level. All over the world it is not so much technical knowledge that people are wanting today. They have already got that. They want to know what is the meaning of life. If we can help them in that way we shall have done something very much greater than we have done so far.

Mrs. Chambers: Could the lecturer add something in regard to art in Persia, the wonderful Persian rugs and materials? I am interested because when I was in Istanboul last year everything of beauty seemed to have come from Persia.

Bishop Thompson: Iran is the home of some of the most beautiful arts, and I suggest the best source from which to get information on the subject would be from the Survey arranged by Professor Upham Pope. That Survey runs into seven large volumes containing a number of fine illustrations. In Iran carpet-weaving is still as important as ever, though the cost of producing the carpets has risen so greatly that I am told by the carpet weavers it is becoming more and more difficult to sell their carpets in foreign markets. The majority of the carpets produced in Iran today probably go to the United States of America.

A Member: Some years ago I heard that there was a large exodus of Armenians from Isfahan to the Soviet Union. How far did that go?

Bishop Thompson: For two or three years there was a movement to return to their country, a desire fostered by the Soviet Union. Many Armenians did go, not so much from Isfahan but rather from the villages around. Others got as far as Teheran. They had sold all their belongings and goods at very poor prices, and then they were held up in Teheran and never got any further. They are in a very sorry plight. There is a large community in Teheran at present of displaced persons living in very poor conditions.

Sir Hugh Dow: The lecturer said we have not given Persia of our best. I should rather like to hear that elaborated and to hear a little more as to what we should have done and what we have not done. We have to the best of our ability already given the Persians our religion, and, within the limits possible, we have done what we can for education and for the promotion of health. With regard to those two last matters, we have had to work within a very limited sphere. It must be remembered that although Persia has had considerable revenues from the United Kingdom we have

not been consulted as to how those revenues should be spent. We could only show an example in the area in which we were in control, that is, in the oil area, and that I think we did.

This difficulty runs through most countries. At present all through the East and in Africa there is a great demand for increased expenditure on education and on health, and the people of the various countries also want their industries developed. At the same time, they are very jealous of those industries being developed through the only way in which they can be developed, and that is by trained Europeans or Americans. The people tend to say: "Let's get rid of these people and develop our industries ourselves for our own benefit," and then they find themselves immediately up against the problem that they have not themselves the knowledge to enable them to develop their industries, and thus development ceases. Also they say, "Let's first get educated," failing to realize that in order to expand education and health measures vast sums of money are needed and that these can only come from the development which they insist on holding up. I believe that to be true as regards a great part of the world.

Does the lecturer think it is equally true of Persia?

Bishop THOMPSON: I think that there is something besides education as such. I do not know that the people are conscious of that or that they quite know what they want. I believe they are convinced that education will provide the answer to most of their problems—until they are educated, and then they realize that it will not; they realize that education has given them another handle, shall we say, but what they do with it when they have it is the great problem. We see the same here in the United Kingdom. It is a world problem, and it is something altogether deeper than merely education or medical knowledge. So much can become a travesty when translated to people who have not the background which we have with our heritage. Education can be merely thought of as knowledge and not character-building; and medical knowledge can be merely regarded as a means whereby one can get rich quick rather than as a means of rendering service to one's country and the people in it. Those are the dangers evident all over the country. Many young people who become doctors are not thinking of the service they can render to others, but of the amount of money they can make. That is a danger which we have to face as we try to give these people something on which to build a firmer basis of life and which will encourage them to want to serve others and help them to understand the meaning and the value of character rather than to strive merely for the acquisition of knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we leave I know you would all like me to thank Bishop Thompson very much indeed for his most interesting discourse, so extraordinarily broad and tolerant. I am sure we all agree with what has been said. I always feel that what is required, not only in all these new countries but in our own country, is a proper sense of values, which only true education—which is the balance of the development of character and training—can give. We thank you very much indeed, Bishop Thompson, for a most interesting lecture.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

By SYED WARIS AMEER ALI, C.I.E., I.C.S. Ret'd.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 10, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The Chairman: Syed Waris Ameer Ali, who has kindly come to lecture to us this afternoon is, as most of you know, a member of a very distinguished Muslim family and is, in fact, himself descended from the Prophet Muhammad. His father, incidentally, was the first non-European to become a member of the Privy Council, which is a very high distinction to be conferred upon anybody. Syed Ameer Ali was educated at Wellington and Balliol and then had a most distinguished career in the judicial branch of the Indian Civil Service.

Among his many accomplishments Syed Ameer Ali is a very good shot and was a member of the Indian rifle team at Bisley from 1930 to 1938.

WE hear much now of Islamic brotherhoods, not only in Egypt, but the Fedaian ul Islam in Persia and the Dar ul Islam in Indonesia. The inspiration of all appears to be devotion to the older traditions of Islam, along with an intense xenophobia, aroused as much by the impact of Western ideas as by Western territorial expansion. The Persian Mullah Kashani of the Fedaian ul Islam has in fact lamented that we are not living in the eighth century, when a Moslem army invaded Gaul. No apology is needed for speaking to you in this connection about religion, for religion and politics are even now inextricably mingled in the East. Nay more, the present extreme of irreligion in the Communist world, fundamentally Tartar as it is, is in itself a demonology, a vicious religion of atheism. I hope to sketch for you in the next half-hour the ancient religious background of these modern Islamic brotherhoods.

For many years past Moslems have been exhorted to modernize their way of life, and it is not surprising that some of them, brought into contact with modern luxury and material civilization, should exploit the pleasures they afford to the full, thereby undermining the very basis of the old Islamic tradition that material possessions conferred upon their possessors the duty alike to care for those less fortunate than themselves, and for posterity. That the reactions against materialism have not yet taken the form of Western envy politics or extreme atheist Marxism, but of a return to the more rigid traditions of the past, is surely a tribute to those traditions and to the teaching that inspired them.

Islam as taught by its founder had no ordained clergy, nor has it now, nor did it in the beginning have any religious brotherhoods. It laid down the glorious principle that there was *no* intervenor between man and his Maker. The ideal was that all Moslems formed a brotherhood and that communal prayers were led by the most pious and worthy man of the congregation.

The Christian hierarchy of the time was well known to the Prophet, who in his youth made journeys into Syria, and spent much time with the

Christian monks of the Hauran, who recognized his piety and acclaimed him as a possible evangelist of his people. He preached the utmost toleration of Christianity and of its priesthood. In the expansionist days of Islam this brought to it numbers of new votaries in the Near East and North Africa, even Spain. Meanwhile, with the rescension of the Koran and the Hadis or authorized traditions the faith became crystallized, and those learned in them assumed almost the position of ordained clergy as doctors of the law and interpreters of religion. The many Christians amongst the new converts from old and highly civilized communities for their part felt, we may be sure, the lack of a true clergy and found this assumption of authority a natural development.

Furthermore, the simple monotheism of the desert coming in contact with more subtle minds was strongly affected by the neo-Platonist philosophy taught at Alexandria and so much scorned, with some injustice, by Gibbon.

This led to a spread of mysticism and to an idea, new to Islam, that there was an esoteric or hidden meaning in the words of the Koran: and moreover that by certain ascetic practices the human soul could in this life attain union with the Universal Soul, the Absolute. This idea was even then no new thing in the East. There had been an Indian Buddhist mission at Alexandria for four centuries. The Essenes, possibly inspired by this source, had formed an ascetic community at about the commencement of the Christian era: whilst there had long been men like St. John the Baptist who had abandoned the world, had a flock of devotees, and valued life so little that they feared not publicly to upbraid their temporal rulers. Oriental and indeed many other polities in those times consisted in despotism tempered by the fear of assassination, of religious sanctions, and of revolt. The voice of the people rarely found expression save through the mouths of such bold ascetics. St. John the Baptist's example was followed by many a dervish after him, clad like him in a lion's skin and living in the wilderness.

There were two curious nineteenth-century survivals of this religious independence. The reforming Sultan of Turkey, Mahmoud, was upbraided by a dervish in the streets of Constantinople for his modernizing tendencies, the dervish was hanged at once for saying the Sultan was mad, whereupon the people set lights upon his tomb. Again, the Akali shock troops of Ranjit Singh, an ultra-religious group in a nation, the Sikhs, themselves based upon a religious community, made a practice of abusing their sovereign when marching past him at reviews, and of showering musket balls at his feet.

To return to early Islam, many men turned to mysticism. Some of the more emotional, with minds sharpened by self-inflicted pains of the flesh, would from time to time cry aloud in public "An-al-Haq" ("I am the Truth") to claim that they had become one with God, had attained Unity with the Absolute. This was considered by the Islamic governments of the time to be blasphemy and they were often dealt with as blasphemers. One of these men, Fazlullah of Asterabad, was executed by Tamerlane and found distinction as the originator of Hurufi divination by means of

the Arabic alphabet, some letters of which have numerical values. Considered to be extinct, this practice was found to be flourishing in nineteenth-century Turkey. A distinguished member of our society, Sir Richard Winstedt, found it in Malaya; and following his description one may without offence style it as a sort of religious crossword puzzle. Perhaps someone in the audience will tell me if they have found it anywhere else. Mysticism, however, had long been preached and practised by men of non-extreme views, whose literary and religious influence endured to our day. The mystics were from early times styled Sufis allegedly from their wearing wool for simplicity, possibly a pun also on the Greek word Σοφος, although the first Sufi I saw, at Moradabad forty years ago, wore the yellow muslin of the Indian ascetic. He had a face of singular happiness and tranquillity.

From the time of the Crusades Islamic mysticism may be said to have taken a highly organised and influential form. Fraternities of a religious nature had for long existed in the East. Mithras worship and the lodges of its votaries in the Imperial Roman army left traces as far as the Northumbrian wall. Ismailias and Druzes had their lodges in Egypt and the Near East well before the Crusades, and influenced the practices of the Templars as well as other organizations that still survive. There is a curious sidelight on this in the statement of a French witness against the Templars in proceedings taken against them about A.D. 1300 that resulted in their extinction. This simpleton had been invited to a ceremony of the Templars and was scared out of his wits by the unveiling of "Un Bafumeth"—*i.e.* a terrifying thing he supposed was an image of Muhammad, believed by the ignorant Franks to be worshipped both by the Templars and the Moslems—probably a Hittite or Assyrian stele brought back from the East.

The idea of mystic Islam was that the Koran and the Sacred Law were only the first gateway to esoteric knowledge. The cursus was: Shariat (the Koran and the Law), Tariqat (the "Way"), Mar'afat (Enlightenment), Haqiqat (the Truth or Divinity).

Mysticism found a large number of votaries amongst those devoted to the memory of Ali and his descendants, still almost a nationalist cult in Persia, and Ali was styled by the mystics "The gate of knowledge."

The most dangerous of these Islamic brotherhoods was that founded shortly before the first Crusade by Hassan-al-Saba, a Persian and a devoted adherent of the house of Ali. This soon turned into the Assassins, so styled by the Crusaders because they drugged their novices with hemp (Hashishīn means Hemp-men).

Now, all these religious leaders demanded implicit obedience from their votaries, and the successors of Hassan Saba drugged their initiates and promised them the Paradise they saw in their visions, before sending them to murder those incurring their political displeasure. As they were at odds with Orthodox Islam, relations between their Syrian settlements and the Crusaders were not too bad, the Franks treating them with a healthy respect. Richard Cœur-de-Lion was alleged rightly or wrongly by his enemies to have suborned the Assassins to murder Conrad of Monferrat during the third Crusade.

Their headquarters were at the remote castle of Alamut (Eagles' Nest) in North Persia. When they murdered Viziers of the Mongol Khan Hulagu, the grandson of Chengiz, they literally caught a Tartar, for he destroyed Alamut and its defenders. The sect survived in South Persia, and by a turn of fate has developed as the modern Ismailias—wealthy, progressive, and upholders of law and order. Their present head is H.H. the Aga Khan, whose position may be taken as the extreme example wherein the Sheikh, Pir, or other head of the sect, is the channel whereby the "Baraka" or divine afflatus descends to his devotees. There is, as I have said, nothing of this in early Islam, and it is reaction against such practices that brought about the Wahabi Puritanism of Saudi-Arabia, the devotees of which nevertheless style themselves "Ikhwān," brethren, the collective term for King Saud's soldiery. The Wahabis particularly dislike the idea of the superior efficacy of prayer at the tomb of a holy personage.

These tomb cults flourish perhaps more than anywhere in North Africa, and one suspects a continuing pre-Islamic tradition amongst the Berbers. Their countrymen, the early Christian Tertullian, styled their many pagan godlings "Decuriones dei" ("town councillor gods").

The normal growth of one of these brotherhoods is that a pious man gains a reputation for sanctity by the constant practice of a "way" (Tariqa), devotions that may be his own, or adopted from a famous saint of yore. This means constant repetitions of a set number of glorifications of the Almighty, quotations or what not, designed to bring him into the "Hal" (condition) which is the state of mystic ecstasy, that brings him into the enlightenment "Ma'arafat" and into final absorption into the Absolute. The holy man then becomes the particular saint of the locality, acquiring followers, some of whom may take up a similar religious life with him, and transmitting his "Baraka" or blessing to his successors and devotees. This leads to the foundation of a "Cœnobium," one may say a sort of monastery, known variously as a Dargah, Khankhah, Qubba, Tekke, Rabat, or what not. That becomes the parent shrine of the saint, who may be a married man with hereditary successors: or he may be a celibate in the ancient tradition of the East—Moslem, Buddhist, Christian or Hindu. The mark of the celibate is usually a single or a pair of horn earrings. Some Dervishes wear this, to commemorate Hussein's charger, in the shape of a horseshoe, others the plain ring.

I have seen outsizes, alleged to be of rhinoceros horn with magic properties, in the ears of a Nepalese Jogin and other Hindus of similar profession in the mountains of Kumaon.

As the sect spreads, subsidiary foundations arise in different parts to which the saint's disciples wander. His devotees often wear patches of a particular colour to signify their adherence, in imitation of the Prophet, who used to patch his worn clothes along with other acts of self-abnegation, so as to give more to the poor. The classic examples of colour are the black patches and hats worn by those who follow the Qadiriya Tariqa, the "way" of the followers of the famous Sheikh Abdul Qadir Al Jilani, the twelfth century saint buried outside Baghdad, virtually the patron saint of the Kurds. The famous Mahdi of the Sudan followed this "way,"

hence the black-patched Jibbahs that confronted British soldiers in the 1880s. Qadiriya devotees are found all through North Africa, India, and down into Indonesia. The enthusiastic followers of the Mahdi proclaimed him as their religious "guide" in revolt against Egyptian misrule, and turned upon or turned out other Sudanese practising a different "way" and refusing to accept his Mahdiship. The Mahdi's state is a very recent example of a brotherhood rallying round their religious leader against the Government, setting him up as their ruler, and accepting his son in due course as his "Khalifa" or representative. His grandson is now at Balliol. The Mahdi's spears and Remingtons were after all only crude substitutes for the ballot box that might be used again by those who care not for voting papers. Since my notes were compiled, they *have* been used with tragic effect.

An offshoot of the Qadiriya are the Rifais, signified by black or blue patches, who cry aloud to attain their state of ecstasy and are known as the "howling dervishes." I understand that most of the snake charmers of Egypt adhere to this "Tariqa." The followers of El Bedawi, the crouching saint of Tanta, so called from his attitude when in meditation, wear a red patch. The rustics of the Delta swarming to his defence routed and captured St. Louis and his knights in his Crusade of 1252. One guesses that one of El Bedawis' principal adherents came to negotiate the king's ransom, for he is described by a noble French prisoner as a "petit bonhomme esclopié marchant avec des béquilles." A modern order founded in the western desert about A.D. 1787 is the Senussi, whose Sheikh after many vicissitudes is now King of Cyrenaica. Another religious leader who is also a temporal ruler is the Imam of the Yemen.

The whirling dervishes, so well known in old Turkey, dance to the music of the fife and drum to attain their state of ecstasy. They follow the famous Maulana Jallaluddin Rumi, whose tomb we saw the other day in a picture taken by Mr. Philips Price, who described him as a Persian. He certainly wrote 26,000 couplets, the greatest mystical poem of the world in that language. He claimed descent as I do from the eighth Imam Ali al Raza, who is buried at Meshed, and he was therefore Persian in culture if Arab by descent. The first couplet of his poem describes the anguish of the human soul seeking absorption into the Universal Intelligence, in an allegory of the wail of the flute lamenting its separation from the parent bed of reeds.

"Bīshīnō ain nai chun shikayat mi kund
Az judahia hiqayat mi kund."

A crude paraphraze may be "Listen to the flute, How he cries for his root." Rumi flourished under the thirteenth century Seljuq Sultanate, hence his nom-de-plume of "Rome"—*i.e.*, Asia Minor; and he appeals more perhaps to the educated and the townsfolk of the East than to the people. There used to be study circles in Turkey and even in India to philosophize over his poem. Another great order is the Naqshabandiya that spread from Turkestan to Turkey and India. It is unlikely ever to function again under "dialectic materialism."

Of course there is another side to these orders, namely that they may

become formalistic, not to say foci of superstition, and sometimes of subversion. The dogma " to the pure all things are pure " can lead to extraordinary results if pursued to its logical conclusion. A patriotic Turk said at the time of the Crimean war that his country would never progress until all the dervishes and their foundations had been swept away, an opinion evidently shared rightly or wrongly by Ataturk and accomplished when he dissolved the orders.

A few years after the Crimea the famous Sir Richard Burton was H.B.M.'s Consul at Damascus, where he was initiated into a small community of Shazli dervishes. Their order, founded by a Spanish Moslem, substituted for ceremony and self-mortification the deepest introspection. Lady Burton soon wrote home with pride that he had gone through all the stages and become a pure Sufi, but the dervishes did not convert the Consul. Far from it, every one of the forty Shazlis of Damascus followed Sir Richard and was baptized as a Christian. The Governor, an old-style Turk, was deeply shocked at this breach of protocol, diplomatic protests ensued, and H.B.M.'s Sufi Consul was hastily transferred to a more secular appointment.

These orders attained to very great influence during the heyday of the old Turkish empire. The original Islamized Turks drifted west through Persia, where many of them stayed, into Asia Minor. In their progress they absorbed many of the ideas of Persian Islam, including devotion to the House of Ali. These semi-nomad Turks were accompanied by mendicant dervishes, originally termed Kalandars, who caused trouble at various times even to the mid-sixteenth century, and the present Turkish Foreign Minister, Professor Fuad Kuprulu, has accomplished considerable research into their activities, including a big rising in the mid-thirteenth century known as the revolt of the Kalandars, in the very same area where Paulicius the Dualist raised his flag in Byzantine times.

The nomad Turks were styled Turkmen, the forerunners of the modern Turkish State were called Osmanlis after the first of their Sultans. Ibn Batuta the famous fourteenth-century traveller from Tangier, said of his successor, " Orkhan Beg is by far the most powerful of the Begs of these parts (west Asia Minor) and where else will you find associations of young men so prompt at entertaining the weary traveller, and so ready to go out and kill an unpopular police officer?" In other words, he is speaking of associations in all probability connected with the dervish orders that practiced the charitable and hospitable tenets of the Koran, and yet resorted to the immemorial Eastern tradition of using violence to right a real or supposed wrong. Ibn Batuta further speaks of staying at the Tekke of Baba Saltuq, whom he styles " an ecstatic mystic, though stories are told of actions by him which are condemned by the law ": that is the sacred law of orthodox Islam.

Amongst the dervishes that followed the Turkmen westward was a certain Haji Bektash, who settled and died at a site in Anatolia but recently identified as an ancient Hittite shrine. The new Tekke became famous as the headquarters of one of the most influential orders in Turkey. Haji Bektash came from central Asia and was evidently not of the same

religious or social standing as his contemporary Rumi. He was not even a true Haji, and was alleged by his followers to have made the pilgrimage by a miracle. He seems to have been much more a man of the people, appealing to the rustic veneration for Ali expressed in the Alavis, Qizilbashes, and so forth, who persisted in popular associations up to Ataturk's day.

Another example of the continuity of religious appurtenances in the East is that up to the very end some Turkish dervishes still used to carry the double-headed axe, the ancient symbol of Cybele and of an even older Cretan cult. It is also possible that the form of plum-pudding used in some ceremonial meals is a survival of Mithraism.

The Bektashi order soon acquired a secret, unorthodox and complicated ritual of lodges, liquor, ritual meals, and social association in their lodges between unrelated members of opposite sexes. They early became associated with the military organization of the expanding Turkish empire. When Orkhan's grandson Murad crossed into Europe in 1363, he was advised to take a Royal Fifth of his prisoners and enlist them into an Imperial guard of the traditional slave soldiery that founded dynasties elsewhere in the East. The Sultan secured the blessing of Haji Bektash's successor, of whom the Baba (father) Saltuq visited by Ibn Batuta was one, and the new guards were named Yenisheri (New Soldiers), the famous Janissaries. Dervishes and missionaries of the order followed the troops far into Europe, and their unorthodox ritual, and trinity of Allah, Muhammad and Ali, seem to have played a great part in winning over the Balkan soldiery and peoples to the Empire to Islam.

No office was too high to be attained by these slaves of the Sultan, and indeed a former Yugo-Slav diplomat spoke to me only the other day of "our" Grand Vizier, the Croatian Muhammad Sokolli, who attained that office about 1570. Every Janissary on enrolment became a Bektashi, and in the early centuries a celibate at that, kept not only in strict military but in quasi-monastic discipline. Even their rations savoured in early days of the ascetic. Busbecq, the ambassador of the Emperor Charles V to the Porte, was in the field with the Sultan and remarked on the scanty issue of mutton for sacrifice at the feast of Bairam. Another time he saw a Janissary eating his dinner off a wooden platter with gusto, and observed that it consisted of herbs with oil and vinegar—in other words a salad, naught else. Small wonder that these guardsmen demanded donations at the accession of a new Sultan, were avid to go to war: but in later times waxed fat, married, and made and unmade Sultans and Grand Viziers. As they became corrupted and inefficient the Ottoman power declined, and from being the first disciplined regular troops in Europe since the Romans, whose successors indeed they were in the Eastern Empire, they objected to reforming Sultans raising new troops on the modern European model. Therefore they suborned the murder of Sultan Selim III at the end of the eighteenth century, who at his accession had exhorted them to be loyal as "little ones of Haji Bektash."

The complete identification of the corps with the order will be understood from these extracts from a discharge certificate of a Janissary dated A.D. 1822:

"COMPANY No. 45.

"We are believers from old. We have confessed the Unity of Reality. . . . We are the moths in the Divine fire. . . . We cannot be counted on the fingers, we cannot be finished by defeat. No one outside of us knows our state. . . . The 12 Imams, the 12 Ways, we have affirmed them all, the 3, the 7, and the 40, the light of the Prophet, the beneficence of Ali, our Pir Haji Bektash Vali," and so on.

Sealed, "I have trusted in God," Hussein, Teacher or Captain.

"Barrack Master Muhammad."

The document is quoted *in extenso* by the American Dr. Birge in his scholarly work on the Bektashis.

The language would be familiar to all Islamic mystics. The 3, 7, and 40 are the higher ranks of the mystic hierarchy, of whom there is one principal in each generation known as the Kutb, the Pole Star.

Four years after this man was discharged the Janissaries rose in their last revolt in the capital, and the reforming Sultan Mahmud wiped them out with his new troops and sailors. The corps of Janissaries was dissolved, and with them the order, which as we should now say went underground. It still functioned, and it is said that one of the Imperial ladies brought about the raising of the ban against it some eighty years ago.

The Bektashis were always popular in Albania. Their foundations endured there until the late war, when some gave shelter to British officers: doubtless they are all now liquidated under Communist rule. Byron's host, the famous Ali Pasha, the lion of Janina, wore the Alifi Taj, the conical felt hat worn both by dervishes and Janissaries, and copied from them as the Grenadier cap of Europe that was worn by the Prussian Guard until 1914.

Eclectic as is the Albanian, Ali Tepelenden went as far as most, for his biographer described him as a "Pantheist with the Bektashis, but when dining in company with Christians he drinks repeated bumpers to the health of the Blessëd Virgin Mary." This Pantheism is characteristic of many dervish orders and probably finds its most extreme expression amongst the Bektashis with their virtual identification of God and man, the Macrocosm reflected in the Microcosm: a doctrine inconsistent with orthodox Islam.

Much of this Pantheism derives from the works of the famous twelfth-century Spanish and Moorish mystic Muhi-ud-din El Arbi, described by the French authorities MM. Depont and Coppolani as the quintessence of Sufi mysticism. El Arbi had, it is said, considerable influence on the thought of some medieval Christian schoolmen, down to the Catalan Saint Raymond Lull. The following quotation, which I give with some hesitation, shows how extreme and involved was El Arbi's Pantheism: "Whoso hath seen God in the form of a woman, hath seen Him in his fairest Form."

Remembering the *motif* all through the Koran, "He begetteth not nor is He begotten," and the horror at attributing partners to the Almighty, it will be understood that any who promulgated similar ideas were wise to do so in private and even in secret.

Be that as it may, El Arbi's view was different to that of the early Christian St. Chrysostom, who pronounced woman to be "a necessary evil, a natural temptation, a desirable calamity, a domestic peril, a deadly fascination, a painted ill."

I have tried to sketch for you as briefly as possible the ancient lineage of these brotherhoods, their great influence, and how from being purely religious movements of men in search of philosophical truth, and others who followed them for consolation in a troubled world, they might well become forces utilized sometimes in all honesty for the redress of grievances, in others the tools of ambitious men used for equivocal ends. Their influence persists, as we see, to this day.

As to their background of belief I cannot do better than quote with his permission the words engraved by the Bektashis of the Tekke near Cairo on the pistol of Major Julian Amery, now the Member of Parliament for Preston, before he was parachuted into their beloved Albanian mountains in the late war: "The Ways are many but death is one: wherefore be thou afraid!"

Mr. M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.: I have listened with much interest to our learned lecturer's account of Islamic religious societies. He was kind enough to refer to a remark I made in my lecture to the Society on January 27 last. I should like to rectify any misunderstanding of what I may have said on that occasion.

I had not then very much time to expand when speaking of what I had seen in Konya; I had so much else to talk about. I was, however, trying to indicate that when I visited the shrine and tomb of Maulana Jallaluddin Rumi, the famous founder of the Dervish sect, I was impressed by the fact that this man, who founded this sect in the days of the Seljuq Turks, actually had Persian inspiration; if I described him as a Persian that was not quite right. Arab by origin, agreed. But I think Persia again, as so often in her history, had given new ideas to the religion of the world at this time. The Persians are great thinkers, so I think the ideas of this sect did originate in Persia, although the races of people concerned may have been very different in origin.

What has always impressed me in regard to Jallaluddin Rumi is that in him we seem to have somebody who epitomizes the ideas that seemed to run through Islam throughout that particular period; there were the Arabs who gave the new idea of Islam to the world; there was Persian speculation which would not accept anything from the Arabs, whom they rather despised; and then there was the tolerance first of the Seljuq Sultans and then of the Ottoman Sultans, who through their patronage rendered the idea possible. Those three together, in my view, founded this wonderful sect in Konya and its relics continue there today. I discovered when there that the last Chelebi Effendi died only a few years ago, having accepted the new régime in Turkey and having become a much respected member of the Majlis.

While in Konya I was privileged to be invited one evening to the Governor's residence, where I met members of the Turkish Parliament for Konya province. They had come together to discuss certain public

affairs, but after this the main discussion during that evening was as to why the Ottoman Sultanate declined after the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. The discussion continued for an hour or more and the members finally came to the conclusion that the Sultanate declined after Suleiman's death because there was a lack of tolerance of new ideas in Islam. That may or may not be true, but I do feel that the Seljuq Sultans showed a tolerance which made new ideas possible. Among the Ottoman Sultans there were great and little men: there was Mehemet the Conqueror who, I believe, was tolerant; Selim, the Grim, was anything but tolerant; he was grossly fanatic. Then there was his son Suleiman, who showed great tolerance so that new ideas flourished. After that there came the régime of the "Anderun" and the corruption through the "palace system" in Constantinople, and finally a decline.

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: I was not cavilling at anything Mr. Philips Price said in his lecture in January, but merely pointing out that Maulana Jallaluddin Rumi was a collateral of my own. That was all. He certainly was Persian by culture, and that is what I tried to bring out.

Col. KEIGHLEY BELL: Is there a Sufi or mystical side to the present-day Muslim Brotherhood? If there is, can it be dissolved as President Neguib has dissolved it? It seems to me that if there is a mystical side it cannot be dissolved by writ or proclamation or anything of that nature.

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: I have no inside knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. I do not think anybody is in a position to know that except those who are now locked up. I see no reason why there should not be a mystical side, because the movement is a reaction against spendthrift tendencies and indulgence in luxury in Egypt. If it is a Sufi brotherhood in reality they would probably go underground and develop in another form. I imagine a number of the members have these ideas. It is not like a Roman Catholic Christian order. In Islam a man can practise one kind of "Tariqa" and yet go somewhere else and pursue another, so that it is easy to change adherence to an order and also easy to dissimulate. I understand that the leaders of the movement in Egypt are still under detention, though they may have been freed by now, because things there change from week to week.

A MEMBER: When in Palestine some years ago I was travelling through Nazareth and came to a little village in the hills to the west of that city where the people were celebrating remembrance of the death of Hussain and Hassan. A number of men were walking through the streets hitting their heads with their swords; several others were lying with swords stuck in their heads, and outside on the *maidan* there was a tremendous battle raging between men wearing red cloaks and calling themselves Witnesses of Allah. They were going for each other for all they were worth and having a most glorious fight; in fact, there were a number of catastrophes. Are such ceremonies and fights still maintained by the Muslims? I am not sure whether the people concerned in this particular instance were Shiahs or Sunnis?

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: That particular ceremony continues and it used to be responsible for many broken heads in India. Still more curious is it when you see Hindus taking part in it, as they frequently did. There

are a number of different sects in Palestine and Syria, as you know better than I do. There are the ordinary Shiahs; there are Ismailias, descendants of the Assassins; Druses and the Nusairiyahs, who are alleged by some to be descendants of converted Gnostics. It is not surprising that any one particular village should enact a ceremony of this nature and enjoy the scrap which resulted.

Sir C. SKRINE: Dr. Ann Lambton, the newly appointed Professor of Persian at London University, in her inaugural lecture yesterday made the point that the recrudescence of anarchical secret societies in Persia may be one of the results of the breaking-up by the late Shah of the traditional structure of society. From Sassanian times Persian society had been organized in village communities, trade guilds and the like; the policy of the late Shah was to suppress any form of local association and concentrate on centralizing the government. As a result the people in the provinces did not know where they stood; Tehran was all-powerful and a long way off; locally there was nothing. This lack of organization, Professor Lambton thought, might have been one of the causes of the wave of assassination and of the formation of dangerous secret societies. Does the lecturer think that a corresponding break-up of traditional society in Egypt may have had something to do with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: You have probably more information than I on that point, Sir Clarmont. I believe the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was more a protest against too much money all of a sudden and the flouting of Koranic conventions by some at the top. What you have said in regard to Persia is most interesting and a natural sequence. After all, in a country that has been accustomed to a great deal of local life, when a dictator of a modern type suddenly comes in and tries to modernize things and so on, without the technical apparatus with which to do it, there is bound to be trouble. You know the old Persian motto for use in troubled times: "Takayya"—dissimulation. There are relics of that.

General Sir MOSLEY MAYNE: Towards the end of his lecture Syed Waris Ameer Ali said that Pantheism is a doctrine inconsistent with orthodox Islam. In my regiment we had about 50 per cent. Shiahs, 50 per cent. Sunnis. Each claimed they were orthodox and the others were wholly unorthodox. We had also a sprinkling of Qizilbashes who said they were the only orthodox group and that I must not pay heed to what the others said. Which did the lecturer mean?

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: I meant the original and early teaching of the Prophet and the Koran.

General Sir MOSLEY MAYNE: When was the first split?

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: At the first election of the Khalifs.

General Sir MOSLEY MAYNE: As soon as that?

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: Yes. Sectarianism is not confined to Islam.

Mr. C. J. EDMONDS: The lecturer described the various mystical Dervish orders. Can he explain why the organized orders seem to have flourished in the Ottoman Empire, where the State religion was Sunni, and not in Persia, where the State religion is Ja'fari-Shi'a. I am, of course, not referring to the modern gangs of fanatical xenophobe roughs which

call themselves Muslim Brotherhoods, but to the long-established orders like the Qadiri, Maulavi, and Naqshbandi.

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: I think Mr. Philips Price has given as good a reason for that as possible. He said the Turk was essentially a tolerant being.

A LADY MEMBER: I take it that the Bahais do not come into the Moslem Brotherhood.

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: They started as a Brotherhood. The Prophet is reported in a tradition to have said: "I am the city of knowledge and 'Ali is its gate." The original founder of the Babis took it up and claimed or was claimed to be "The gate (Bāb) of knowledge," and he is one of the mystics who got himself into trouble. They started as a Muslim Brotherhood even though they may have become something quite different now.

Lord BIRDWOOD: Could the lecturer add a word or two about the Druzes of southern Syria? They are a mystical brotherhood in the religious sense, are they not? Have they by any chance any connection or liaison with the modern political branches of the Syrian Mountain Brotherhood?

Syed WARIS AMEER ALI: The Druzes started as devotees of a Fatimide Khalif Hakim B'Amrullah about 996. The Fatimides were descendants of the Prophet in a direct line, the contemporary Khalifs of Baghdad. He had a number of followers who settled in that corner of Syria, and they have been Druzes ever since with the same lodges and the same ritual. They are truculent folk and inclined to be "agin" any government of the day.

EXPEDITION TO THE API MOUNTAIN

By W. H. MURRAY

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on February 10, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, K.C.B., C.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Murray has kindly come today to describe to us his expedition to the Api mountains in 1953. He is an author as well as a climber and has published a number of books mostly concerned with his great recreation, which he describes as "exploratory mountaineering." He was a member of the 1951 Everest Expedition, and his publications include *The Story of Everest, Scottish Himalayan Expedition, Mountaineering in Scotland*, and others.

Mr. Murray served during the late war with the 5th Indian Division from 1941 to 1942. He was taken prisoner at El Fuka and was in German prisoner-of-war camps for three years.

I now ask him to give his talk on his exploration of the Api area—an area to which no other European party has hitherto been granted access.

THE tale I tell you this afternoon is one of exploratory mountain travel, with only a little mountaineering thrown in, in the extreme north-west corner of Nepal, about 400 miles to the west of Everest. There we find a great range of mountains, the Api range, to which the Government of Nepal had consistently refused entry in the past.

My own attention was first drawn to that range in 1950 when I was climbing in Kumaon. From a camp at 19,000 ft. on Panch Chhuli we looked south and east to a great host of very high and spiky mountains receding in ranges one behind the other into the blue skies of Tibet and Nepal. Not one had been climbed and few had been investigated at close quarters. In all that great array there was one mountain outstanding, which we discovered to be Api, 23,400 ft.

It was distinguished not only by height but also by the fact that it was the only peak that really did look climbable, and running eastwards from it was a great range which looked most enticing. I resolved to go there at the first opportunity, but there was no opportunity then. Access would not be granted from Nepal, and it was not until 1953 that I found to my delight that at last we could get in, and my friend John Tyson was free and able to go with me.

Illustrating his lecture with slides, Mr. MURRAY continued:

Application for a pass was delayed at Kathmandu for a month, and so we lost a month of good pre-monsoon weather. Bentley Beetham, who was over 60, proposed to go with us only for the march in, not for the climb, with the idea of returning whenever he felt unable to go on.

We went to the foothills at Tanakpur and from there travelled by bus for 100 miles to the little town of Pithoragarh, where we arrived at the middle of May. Here we were joined by three Sherpas from Darjeeling. It was difficult to get Sherpas last year, as you can imagine.

We climbed a small hill in order to get a view of Api. Our problem was how to get to it at all. I should explain that our plans were most

uncertain. The range of Api is divided into two parts by the Seti river, and it is the left-hand part on the map which I am calling the Api range.

The obvious way to approach Api is to go up the Kali river by the trade route on the Indian side and then cross into Nepal to reach the north side of Api. Unfortunately, the Indian Government will not now allow foreigners to travel within thirty miles of Tibet by the Kali route, so we had to approach it on the Nepalese side.

No route was known there. We were told there was no possibility of getting a route along the Nepalese side of the gorge. However, assuming we did get there, we would try to climb from the north-west side and then to get a pass over the range to get south. We could not come back by the way we went in. The ravines would be flooded by the monsoon rains.

Longstaff and Gansser and others said they did not think there was a pass. A great deal was thus left to chance. The truth is that a trip like this one must start out with a very great trust in Providence. Without that trust one must stay at home.

On May 23 we set out from Pithoragarh, striking north-east along the hill ridges for two days. On the tracks was an incongruous combination of pine trees and cacti in bloom. We were travelling now not only with the three Sherpas but also with eighteen Dhotials, for we had 1,200 lb. of baggage.

Then we descended 2,000 ft. to the Kali river. The heat was so great in the latter part of May—the altitude was only 2,000 ft.—that the Dhotials actually ran from one patch of shade to another because the soles of their feet were getting burnt on the stones.

At the village of Darchula we had to cross the river into Nepal. It is necessary to cross at dawn, for the Kali is a glacier river which swells immediately after sunrise. The bridge is frequently swept away. The men of Darchula told us we should not find a route up the east side of the Kali and laughed derisively when they heard of our plan. They said that our route was for goats, not men.

At first the tracks in Nepal were as bad as we had been promised. We could average only about six miles a day. Our habit was to rise at four a.m. in order to get the day's march finished by noon, after which we were immobilized by heat. We were very fortunate with our porters. The Dhotials especially were outstandingly good men.

After seven days of travel we came to the village of Dumling, where we saw a man threshing barley. It was the first time I had seen a hillman working while women looked on. The Dhotials were scandalized.

At this village Beetham was not at all well. He had been unable to digest the native food and now had to return. Tyson and I continued alone.

From this point the track ceased and we had very difficult ground ahead of us, across cliffs and ridges dropping 15,000 ft. from the summit of Api into the Kali gorge. Our men would not carry more than 40-lb. loads and so we had to engage more men from the village. We averaged about two miles a day. We found goat tracks and ledges which we followed without once having to spend a day reconnoitring the route ahead. We could

hardly say from one day to the next whether we were going to get through, but never did we have difficult rock climbing. We had short stretches, of 40 or 50 ft., when we had to use our hands as well as our feet, but apart from that all went well.

Every day we had to climb many thousands of feet up and down over the butt-ends of the spurs and ridges falling from Api into the gorge, until, after fourteen days' travel, we at last broke through to the north-west side of Api. We then climbed south-eastwards into the heart of the Api valley in order to reach the foot of our mountain. We camped at 12,000 ft. All around us were alpine flowers—the purple primula, yellow anemones and potentillas. At this point we sent back fifteen of our eighteen Dhotials and kept only three of the best.

I like these Dhotials even better than the Sherpas. (They are better rock climbers but not nearly so good on snow and ice.) The Sherpas, in my opinion, are becoming spoilt by the big expeditions and are anything but the thrifty and honest men they once were. I am speaking of the Darjeeling men, and grant that there are exceptions.

Directly above us rose a great step in the valley, which we climbed in order to get to a long and flat terrace above, where we pitched our base camp. Tyson at this point was not at all well, so I went myself up the glacier, following the moraine for three miles till I came to the upper basin.

The wall of Api rises from here to a greater height and is more heavily iced than the flank of Everest from the West Cwm. Our only possibility was to get up the ice-fall by which the ice-cap discharges into the basin. The ice-fall, which I reckon to be about 4,000 ft., lies at a very high angle.

I approached more closely to the end of the moraine and thought that possibly if there was no route up the ice-fall we could climb the rock ridge to the left of it. I went to the foot of the ice-fall and looked up, but came to the conclusion there was no hope of a route. The angle was far too high for laden porters. While I was considering this point a great chunk of the ice-cap broke off. One half went to the right and the other swept over the rock ridge to the left. That put any idea of an ascent by the rocks to the left out of my mind. I cannot show photographs of that incident: I was running for my life.

We went back to our original base camp. Tyson also went up to the basin and agreed there was no route there. Back in camp Tyson spent a lot of time collecting alpine plants and flowers. We had contracted with the British Museum to collect alpine flowers and insects, including butterflies, because no collecting had been done here before.

We now leave the Api valley and go into the parallel Nampa valley, in hope of making a fresh attempt to climb Api. The Tibetan frontier is just about 7 miles to the north. Our height now is 11,000 ft. On the pastures we met many Tibetan shepherds. The monsoon broke over the main range on June 13. We had a week of very bad weather. (We reckoned that after the first onslaught the monsoon would withdraw behind the Api range, which would act as a gigantic dam, and that proved to be so.) Meantime we climbed very high on to the north side of the valley, and from there could reconnoitre Api to our south.

Our hope was to be able to climb up a glacier and find a way on to

Api's east ridge. As we moved along the hillside we saw how hopeless that was. Between the glacier basin and the ridge stood a sheer ice-wall of 2,000 ft.

Looking directly up the Nampa valley to the eastern range the peaks looked very spiky. What alarmed us was that there was no evidence anywhere of a pass, by which we could return southwards. We could not go to India, nor to Tibet, nor down the Kali, and we were determined not to stay where we were until the end of the monsoon. So we decided to go straight back to the Tinkar valley on the north side of Api and explore the rest of the range with all speed.

The Tinkar valley runs eastwards to the Tibetan frontier. The people of the valley assured us that there was no pass across the range. We must, they said, turn the range by climbing up the Tinkar valley to a pass on the Tibetan frontier, then travel south-east to a pass at 20,000 ft., which would allow us to break south again into Nepal.

The local policeman assured us that, although there were Chinese troops across the frontier, we would be travelling three days in the no man's land along the frontier, and we had his blessing. He advised us to keep very clear of any Chinese troops we might encounter.

We stopped for a couple of days at Tinkar village while we considered the position. We decided that rather than head for the Tibetan frontier we should first of all explore another valley—the Yokanadi—running into the heart of the range. A shepherd told us he thought there might be a pass at the head of that valley. We moved off and travelled two days up the Yokanadi.

Great though the merits of the valley were, they did not include a pass. However, one morning at dawn we looked up a side ravine and saw what looked like a promising pass above it. Straight away we climbed up and pitched a camp at 16,000 ft.

At this point I was confined to my tent with a high temperature, but Tyson went ahead into the upper glacier-basin with one Sherpa and enjoyed some good climbing. The trouble was that the monsoon was now on, the climate warmer, and the snow accordingly very avalanchy. He failed to find a pass, for the promising col was excessively dangerous and steep. To the right of the col is a peak of some 20,000 ft. and this he was able to climb by its north ridge.

Never had we seen such discouraging mountains as we saw round Api. It is important to remember that Mt. Everest is only one great peak among many thousands, few of which have been climbed and many of which are in fact unclimbable.

I was now much better and we withdrew to the Tinkar valley and there we came to terms with the Tinkar men. They agreed to carry our loads along the Tibetan frontier. They knew the route. There was no track, of course. They could give us only five men, so with our six permanent staff we had eleven. But we needed seventeen.

We split the party. We sent the head Sherpa with half the baggage and several Tibetan porters into India. (He was free to go there if no white men accompanied him.) He had orders to travel down the Kali, cross into Nepal south of the main range, and rejoin us in three weeks at a

village named Chaubisho. The rest of us set off for the Tibetan frontier pass.

We arrived on the pass on July 6. The Tinkar men decided that, while we had every right to be where we were, it would be better not to have a meeting with the Chinese, and that we should move by night for two nights, which is what we did. We reckoned we should have to travel for three days along the frontier in order to turn the range. The Tinkar men on this journey lived entirely on tea and barley flour.

When the sun set and the last light flamed across the tops, we packed up and began travelling south-eastwards. We went three miles and bivouacked. All next day we lay up in a hollow at 16,000 ft., then again moved at sunset.

Although we journeyed by night and there was no moon, we had no difficulty in covering the very rough ground. The Milky Way streamed across the sky like a sunlit cumulus cloud, and stars hung with three-dimensional solidity, like lamps, so we had plenty of light.

After a couple of nights we were free to move by day and for three days travelled up a great glacier valley to the Urai Lagna pass at 19,500 ft. Thence we dropped 11,000 ft. into the basin of the Seti river. As soon as we started going south we ran into the monsoon. We had torrential rain throughout our thirty-two-mile journey to the first village, called Dhuli, at 9,000 ft. It was very hard going.

When we arrived in this village, the first outpost of civilization, we were the first white men ever to enter the district. The womenfolk took one startled look, then dropped everything and bolted indoors. The men, however, were more friendly and eventually the women came out, too. These people did not know the use of money. All their trade is by barter. They sold us food, but only to oblige us. They took rupees, but explained they were not of any practical value to them.

We stayed for four days waiting for a clearance in the weather. The rain was incessant. But far away to the south we could see occasional patches of blue sky and we decided to go south at once. We engaged Dhuli men who came reluctantly, fearing the heat of the lower valleys. The tracks were very bad and could not be used even by ponies; only goats could be used as pack-animals. As we descended the tracks greatly improved but also it became excessively warm. We could not get the men to go more than five miles a day, although the tracks were now better.

At last we came to Chainpur, the metropolis of West Nepal. The Dhotials had spoken with awe of this town where everything a white sahib could want would be found and where there were merchants who wore spectacles on their noses and kept accounts on paper. We approached Chainpur through paddy-fields and at last the great town came into sight. It turned out to be a village of quite modest size.

When we got into the heart of it we were surrounded by small boys speaking English. We were introduced to His Highness the Rajah of Bajang, on whose ground we had been moving since crossing the Urai Lagna. He was in his summer residence. He had started up the first school in north-west Nepal with 300 boys and eight masters, and English figured in the curriculum. Within the last year he had also started the

first postal service and the first dispensary with a doctor from Kathmandu, and the first troop of Boy Scouts. In appearance he reminded us of Stalin in one of his "Uncle Joe" moods. After lunch he introduced us to the scouts. The boys were intelligent and we were very much impressed by them all.

We headed westwards and two days later met our head Sherpa with half our baggage. We now continued west to India. None of the rivers had bridges and none of the tracks were mapped, so we had no idea where we were from day to day save that we were going westwards and were bound to hit India sooner or later.

It is interesting to see the means by which one crosses the grass-ropes over the rivers. The penalty for falling off is heavy—you can hardly expect to get away with your life. Big boulders trundle along in the river bed. The Nepalese cross upside down, feet curled over the rope, and pull themselves across hand-over-fist. Tyson and I decided that moral courage should be declared superior to physical courage, so we classified ourselves as baggage and were pulled across on a rope sling.

After ten days we came in sight of India with the Kali gorge in the forefront. As we approached the frontier we found shops selling Lux soap and Seven O'Clock razor blades. Two days later we were back in Pithoragarh.

In conclusion I should like to say that this and my other expeditions leave no shadow of doubt in my mind that the Himalayas give their highest rewards in enjoyment not to the big, heavily organized expeditions, but to small ones, with small funds, carrying the minimum of gear and equipment, and which are not tied down by obligations, financial or otherwise, to any of the great societies, and which are therefore free to roam where they will. The important point is that the party as a whole and the members as individuals should feel themselves to be free.

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REVIEWS

The Men who Ruled India (The Founders). By Philip Woodruff. London: Jonathan Cape. (8½″ × 5½″). Pp. 402, including bibliographical notes, index and 5 illustrations. 30s.

A distinguished retired officer of the Indian Civil Service, who, on return to his own Scotland, found pleasure in further public work, was once heard to admit that, having experienced the shortcomings of his own countrymen in minor offices and perhaps major ones too, he felt he owed an apology to his former subordinates in the India he had loved and left because of the rigorous standards of probity and efficiency he had demanded of them in the fond belief that defects apparent to him in India were not to be met with " at Home." Writing of the period between the disappearance of the " nabobs " from the East India Company's administration and the arrival of the first " competition-wallahs," Mr. Woodruff sums up the outlook in India of the Company's young men from its own Haileybury College thus: " . . . at a time when the wealthy were inclined to regard the misfortunes of the poor with some complacency, there are no signs of an outlook bounded by turtle soup. Most of them were found to be on the side of the tiller of the soil, surprisingly few believed in supporting an enlightened aristocracy who were supposed to look after the peasant and whose interests would coincide with those of the Government."

Later Mr. Woodruff continues his theme: " There were men among them who were industrious, men who were idle, men devout and indifferent, bent scholars in Sanskrit and cheerful sunburnt men with good livers whose leisure was spent shooting tigers and spearing hogs. But there was a stamp on them all, a combination of two qualities usually antagonistic . . . a consciousness that they have a great task and that they belong to a service in which varying degrees of belief in an official doctrine did not smother independence of outlook, a readiness to criticize and to state an opinion, however unfavourable to the administration." These attributes might be said to have been inherited from the great exemplars, Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, John Malcolm and Charles Metcalfe, and to have been the inspiration of the " competition-wallahs " who came afterwards and whose general principle of conduct may be said to have anticipated the Blatchfordian " Defence of the Bottom Dog." Both Great Britain and India were fortunate that to India's service went young men fresh from the sheltered life of universities to uphold standards untainted by the cynicism too often inevitable in those with riper experience of the world as it is. They were perhaps always fortified by the knowledge that, as Mr. Woodruff shows, in frankly exposing the unsavoury but comparatively short-lived régime of the " nabobs," the undoubtedly remarkable achievements of the best of their predecessors had been marred by misdeeds which, however excusable in the light of the age, made recompense worth while.

In this book, biographical sketches, brilliantly interwoven with historical commentary and lucid analysis of administrative problems, cover the East India Company's saga up to its end in 1858 when, spurred by the tragedy of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, the Crown formally assumed the sovereignty which had in fact been recognized half a century earlier. It will be followed this year by one which concludes the story of British rule in India when the transfer of power on August 15, 1947, created out of the former Empire the two self-governing sovereign members of the Commonwealth, India and Pakistan. The quality of this volume, in its fine literary craftsmanship, integrity of judgment and superbly vigilant fairmindedness, whets expectation of its successor.

The author claims modestly that his is not a work of original research or a reference book or meant only for those who know India. He seeks to show to anyone who wants it what sort of men they were who, having secured the mastery of India through a chain of events, beginning with Queen Elizabeth's charter of 1600 and ending with the breakdown of the Mogul Empire, received in 1765 the Dewani of Bengal and so an empire " at which they [the Company's Directors] looked with

the incredulous elation, shot with sharp twinges of doubt, of a village grocer who has inherited a chain of department stores and is not quite sure whether they will pay him a profit beyond his dreams or drag him down to ruin." He discharges this task not only with the judicial probity already noted, but also with an astringent humour and a vividness of description to adorn which he, ever and anon, leaves his armchair and seasons his narrative with his own rich recollections of the scenes wherein his heroes and those who fell short of their measure moved.

In the gallery Warren Hastings stands by himself—without a peer—and what modern journalism would call a brilliant "profile" ends with the conviction that, when at the age of 81 Hastings received from the House of Commons that bare-headed, upstanding, silent tribute of respect as he passed through its doors, it was "not because Hastings had made the Company the paramount power in India . . . not because he had treated the people of India with consideration and endeavoured to make all the servants of the Company do the same. It was, I think, because the House recognized the fervour of his spirit, the flame of his purpose that shines in everything he wrote or said, the glow of his indefinable greatness."

The temptation to quote other felicitous appreciations of the men who did their duty to the Company and, what the best of them felt was more important, to the people of India, has to be resisted. It is sufficient to say that light and shade are used with the skill of a confident painter who finds pride in the subject of his art. India, in the old meaning of the name, has taken and still, in changed conditions, will continue to draw some of the best of our youth for service—again in a new guise—but too often Great Britain's past achievements there are treated as if they were irrelevant to modern problems in the Commonwealth or, indeed, required apology. Mr. Woodruff's book might be recommended as an antidote. Though it explodes certain cherished notions of the unrelieved selfishness of British doings in India, that is a risk to be expected of an author who confesses to believing that "man must be judged not by his worst so much as by his best, and in the end not even by his best but by what he aimed at." As he fearlessly sets down the worst to make a fair test, his vindication of pride in a great adventure and in what may well go down to history as the finest service in the world is heartening indeed for all except flagellants. Indian and Pakistani Civilians still remain to uphold its traditions with success in their two countries' new-found sovereignty. British merchants too are resuming the rôles of their forbears in an earlier Elizabethan age—their manners and methods suitably attuned to the democratic modernity of which John Company's servants sowed the seed. Mr. Woodruff's primary object is to prove that very fulfilment of policy and to picture those who bore the burden and heat of the day, especially the district officers of whom memories surely will remain for a long time to come with the people they served. His is a classic contribution to our knowledge of a fine comradeship.

EDWIN HAWARD.

'Iraq, 1900 to 1950. By Brigadier S. H. Longrigg. Oxford University Press. Pp. 400. 35s.

Brigadier Longrigg's new book, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs—an indication of its merit—is a worthy successor to his scholarly and very well written *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, published in 1925.

These same qualities are to be found in the new volume, which relates with accuracy and ease the fascinating story of a period of very eventful transition and development in an ancient and historic land.

The fifty years under review have been compressed very skilfully within 400 pages, and no event of any real consequence appears to have been overlooked.

The work is described by its gifted author as a political, social and economic history—and this it very truly is. It is an objective narrative, embracing a wealth of faces, facts and figures, but it is written with great understanding and with first-hand knowledge of the country, its people and its problems. A great amount of diligent quest and careful sifting has been demanded, and one has only to glance at

the bibliography (Appendix C) to appreciate the immensity of the task which Brigadier Longrigg has performed—and performed with conspicuous success.

The narrative opens with a pen picture of 'Iraq (at that time Mesopotamia), backward, poverty-stricken and wretched. It then flows pleasantly through the years of the first World War, across the succeeding span of British occupation and administration, coursing onward, with an interest that never flags, to the Mandate, the new kingdom and full independence.

Happenings of the second World War are faithfully recorded, and the "Thirty-Day War" of 1941 is vividly described.

In the last chapter—by far the longest—which ends this masterly review, is an admirable summary of the situation, political, social and economic, in 1950. This provides a remarkable contrast to that at the beginning of the century, and reveals 'Iraq "at the threshold of an era of abundant wealth," but the author adds, very wisely, that "this must, besides its blessings, bring accompanying responsibilities, stresses and dangers, both moral and economic."

Chapter VII is entitled "Al Istiqlal Al Tamm." I fear that this, untranslated, may puzzle some readers, though the context should make its meaning clear.

Brigadier Longrigg has given much thought to transliteration from Arabic, and no one can, I think, dispute his accuracy, though some who have already grown accustomed to another form in common use may not give whole-hearted approval, for example, to Faysal, 'Abd al-Ilah, Hijaz, Yaman and Shaykh, and some may possibly fail at first sight to recognize an old friend in the guise of Sasun Hasqayl. However, this is a minor matter which in no way detracts from the value of an excellent and much-needed work, which fills a long-felt want.

A very useful sketch map showing international frontiers and provincial boundaries has been thoughtfully included, and in Appendix B will be found helpful information concerning the area and population of each *liwā* and *qaḍā*.

The book will be welcomed not only by the specialist and the future historian, but also by the general reader who is interested in Middle-Eastern affairs.

To those who have had the good fortune to serve in 'Iraq it will be nostalgic, and to those who are resident there at the present time, or who will be in the future, it is an essential volume. To many—'Iraqi as well as foreigner—it will become a cherished vade-mecum. I heartily recommend it.

Brigadier Longrigg deserves gratitude no less than congratulation on this very valuable contribution to the history and literature of the Middle East.

H. C. S.

Landlord and Peasant in Persia. By Dr. A. K. S. Lambton. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1953. $8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$. Pp. 459; map. 44s.

Dr. Lambton has given us a masterly and admirably documented survey of the past history and present condition of Persia's agricultural economy. Her theme is confused and complicated to a degree by the political vicissitudes of thirteen centuries, by the theorizing of a host of Arab and Persian jurists, philosophers, statesmen and historians and by the diversity of races, climates and soils found in a sparsely populated country of great distances and bad communications. But the author's erudition matches the complexity of her subject. In the first part of her book, after a brief account of the feudal systems of the Achæmenian, Parthian, and Sasanian empires, she traces the growth and decay of various systems of land tenure, taxation, and rural organization from the Arab conquest in the seventh century to the "Constitutional" revolution of 1906. The tale is a grim one of a human stock engaged in a struggle for existence through the ages in a hostile world of drought and locust, earthquake and epidemic, civil war and foreign conquest, a struggle against selfish and arrogant landlords, rapacious tax-farmers, corrupt law courts and the emissaries of Sultans and Shahs who claimed a "divine right to govern wrong." Dr. Lambton traces in much detail the evolution of Islamic theory in the Arab period (seventh to tenth centuries) according to which all conquered and ownerless land belonged to the Muslim community and could only be alienated by the Imam in the interests of the

community. The Seljuk (Turkish) and Mongol conquerors in the four centuries which followed applied the "theory of the steppe" that all land belonged to the Khan as representative of the tribe, a doctrine improved upon by the Safavid Shahs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who claimed absolute, almost divine, ownership of the soil. The result was that the peasants, who through their village headmen up till then had some say in their own affairs, were gradually depressed to the status of serfs tied to the land. Dr. Lambton describes vividly from contemporary sources the evil of the *tuyūl* (land-revenue assignment) system which culminated in the cruelties and oppressions of the Qajar Shahs, a race whose ruthless despotism influenced every grade of official, landlord and *tuyūldar* in the country. The abolition of *tuyūls* and the other reforms which resulted from the "Constitutional" revolution of 1906-7, and still more the administrative, social and economic changes forced upon a bewildered Persia by Reza Shah Pahlevi, greatly improved the lot of the peasantry. It is true that the rapacity of underpaid officials of the new Shah's Government to some extent offset the curbing of the greed of the landlords; that the Civil Code (which Dr. Lambton summarizes in Chapter IX) did little for the peasants; and that the scales of justice in the provinces were still weighted heavily in favour of the landlord. But compared with the period of the earlier Qajars, at any rate, the reign of the first Shah of the Pahlevi dynasty was a golden age.

In the second part of her book Dr. Lambton gives a very full and elaborately documented account of Persia's land tenure system and rural organization at the present day. Chapters X-XXII are too full of statistics, Persian terms and quotations to make easy reading, but they throw new light on subjects of great interest to the student of modern Persian history, such as the ill-advised efforts of Reza Shah to abolish nomadism and settle the tribes of Fars and Azerbaijan on the land, and the sad story of the Central Government's attempts to distribute the Crown Lands of Zabul (Sistan) among the peasants. In the chapter on "The Large Landed Proprietors," one of the best in the book, Dr. Lambton describes the wide gulf which divides landlord from peasant in Persia even today. The former, with a few notable exceptions, seldom considers the welfare of his tenants and labourers, whom he regards as merely a source of gain in money, political power and social prestige; the peasant on his side, by his obstinate conservatism, plays into the hands of his oppressors. Faction strife is another obstacle to progress; in the author's words, "struggle between conflicting groups and interests is the keynote of Persian society."

In her concluding chapter on "The Future" Dr. Lambton lists the chief technical problems which must be tackled in order to increase production and so relieve the grinding poverty of the peasantry—improved roads and cheaper transport, better marketing arrangements and credit facilities, more up-to-date agricultural methods, improved and developed irrigation, water conservation and animal husbandry. She might have mentioned the insufficiently appreciated efforts of the British Middle East Office to help Persia in these spheres. On the administrative side she calls for reforms in the land-tenure system giving more security to the cultivator, and for measures such as the substitution of fixed rents for crop-sharing, the abolition of labour service (*bigar*), and the limitation of the size of estates. But the evils of the present situation in regard to land tenure and rural organization are inherent in the whole social system. "Nothing short of a fundamental change in the conception of society and the relation of the individual to society," says the writer, "is likely to bring about a reform of conditions." Those who know Persia best are usually least hopeful of such changes, but in this case it is permissible to welcome as a very hopeful portent the Shah's magnanimous decision to distribute the Crown lands among the peasants. His example, according to *The Times* report of March 22, is being followed by that most public-spirited of great landowners, Amir Assadullah Alam, son and heir of the late Amir Ibrahim Khan Alam, C.I.E., better known to his many British and Indian friends by his Qajar title of Shaukat ul Mulk.

The book as a whole would have been better if the process of digestion had been carried a stage further. Some of the copious translations from laws and regulations, most of which, as the author herself says, were dead letters from the start, might have been relegated to appendices. The same applies to much of the wealth of facts and figures in the chapters on irrigation, lands held in trust (*ouqāf*), crown lands, crop-sharing, rents, *bigar* and other personal dues, payments to local officials, flocks

and pastures, agricultural methods and debts. The author jumps from region to region, village to village at opposite ends of Persia in a fashion which leaves no clear picture in the mind. From the geographical point of view, too, the map is scarcely adequate; apart from a small inset roughly showing the relief of the country, no physical features are shown, nor is there any indication of provincial boundaries. On the other hand, nothing could be more scholarly than the documentation of the book throughout. The breadth and scale of Dr. Lambton's researches may be judged from the bibliography, which includes 21 major Persian and Arabic manuscripts and documents, 109 printed or lithographed works in the same languages, and a most comprehensive list of Western books, treatises, and articles published in five different European languages between 1664 and the present day. *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* is likely to remain the last word on its complex and little-known subject for a long time to come.

C. P. SKRINE.

Rural Reconstruction in Action. By Dr. H. B. Allen. Cornell University Press and Oxford University Press. Pp. xviii + 204, illus. 1953. $3.50.

This is a book which cannot fail to be of interest to anyone who cares for the welfare of the people, and especially of those who inhabit the rural areas, of the Near and Middle East. Dr. Allen has been for many years Director of Education for the Near East Foundation, an American Association formed shortly after the first World War, to promote the social, physical and educational betterment of the countries situated in the south-east of Europe and the Fertile Crescent of western Asia. During his long residence in Athens, where the working headquarters of the Foundation were set up, he visited all the countries in which the Foundation was interested, and later, since his transfer to New York, he has had several opportunities of seeing again at first hand the results of his associates' efforts. After the second World War, Dr. Allen was a member of a joint Anglo-American commission to enquire into and report on rural conditions in their varying aspects of certain countries of the Middle East, and his own contribution, *Rural Education and Welfare in the Middle East*, was published by H.M. Stationery Office, and most favourably reviewed in these pages.*

Those who have served in that part of the world know only too well under what privations the population, especially in the rural areas, have lived and are still living in many parts, lacking modern systems of hygiene and sanitation, educational facilities, decent living conditions, and means of agricultural development. All these matters have been the close concern of the Near East Foundation, and the improvements that have been made in many directions are largely due to the leadership and inspiration of Dr. Allen. The work has always been based on the principle that if money is provided and a few experts appointed by the Foundation, the native can be trained in a comparatively short time to take over, and the responsibility transferred to the Government concerned. The Foundation has never been a "charitable" institution: it has always regarded its funds from America as those of a trust, only to be applied in return for close co-operation by the rural population themselves as well as by the local administration.

This book describes in detail the work of the Foundation in the rural areas of Persia, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Eritrea, Cyprus, Greece and Albania. It is a record of slow but steady progress. Of the countries mentioned, none seems to have shown, in Dr. Allen's view, greater success at the time than what was then Palestine, where the experiment of "Making the Rural School Rural" (as the author heads this chapter) made such notable advancement in the years between the wars and even up to 1947. The present reviewer was fortunate enough to profit from the co-operation offered by the Foundation in the late 1920s, when their pioneers drew up a scheme with the Department of Education to remodel the village schools of the country by making them "rural-minded." The results of this experiment, which extended over a long period of years, ending only with the disastrous Arab-Israeli war, were remarkable in many ways; and Dr. Allen was able to visit the country himself for the last time in 1947, when he found to his satisfaction that the experiment, begun

* R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, 1947, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. I, Pp. 96-8.

by the Foundation in 1930 as a five-year project, had exceeded his most earnest hopes.

But Palestine was not the only country to show success. In Syria, Greece and Cyprus especially there was excellent response from the people and the local authorities: in fact, there was none in which failure could be said to have occurred, though obviously lasting progress was more marked in some than in others.

In his final chapter, "Make Haste Slowly," Dr. Allen offers some wise observations which should be of value to those engaged in similar work of rural development. "Every demonstration in rural improvement should be a co-operative undertaking." "It is unwise to begin with a full team of experts." "When selecting a field staff, remember that a knowledge of rural life, sympathy with rural people, and willingness to serve in out-of-the-way places take precedence over formal education as essential qualifications." Here is advice which might well be followed not only in the Near and Middle East but even nearer home.

HUMPHREY BOWMAN.

A Window on China. By Raja Hutheesingh. Verschoyle. Pp. 191. 12s. 6d.

I have no hesitation in recommending this as the most important book on China to appear in recent years. At the head of the first chapter stands the well-known quotation from Laotze:

> Those who speak, know nothing;
> Those who know, are silent—

which aptly sums up the present situation in regard to China: those who know what is happening there are, for the most part, silent (either for fear of injuring their friends still in the country, or because they are sick at heart and despair of convincing public opinion abroad), but of books and articles giving a favourable picture of affairs in China there is no end.

The importance of this book to which I have referred lies in the fact that it is written by a man—an Indian, a brother-in-law of Nehru, who had taken his full share in the struggle for the independence of India—who went to China as an ardent supporter of another Asian country struggling to free itself from "domination by Imperialist countries" and fully expecting to see the early promises of the new régime in process of being carried out.

He paid two visits. The first was the usual personally conducted tour as a member of a Goodwill Mission in October, 1951, and even in the restricted scope of that mission he saw enough to make him feel that all was not well. Hoping to have another opportunity to visit the country, he confined his observations to a personal note to the Prime Minister which was "by mistake" circulated to the whole Cabinet and nearly caused him to be disqualified for the second Mission; however, he was sent as special correspondent of the Press Trust of India and, in spite of the efforts of the Indian Ambassador to prevent him, paid a longer visit, when, knowing what to look for and persistently asking the same question in different ways, he was able to probe right through and expose the fraud. Thus he noticed that on each occasion the party was taken to see a typical new model village; but—of all the hundreds of thousands of villages in China—it was on both occasions the village of Kao Kang near Mukden. He was also taken to the Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition at Mukden, where there was a wonderful display of machinery and industrial products of all kinds, also some working models, and everywhere young boys and girls who "reeled off explanations of the exhibits, though they hardly understood what they said." But while such an exhibition may be effective propaganda (and it certainly seems to have impressed many who saw it on this occasion or who had seen similar displays of alleged Chinese production in India or East Germany), it had the opposite effect on the author, who observed that when he went the second time and insisted on seeing the factories in which the machinery was supposed to be manufactured he was constantly put off with substitutes, and any factories he saw were mere empty shells from which all except the simplest machinery had been removed and such work as was being done was of the most primitive sort and mostly by manual labour. There were "no experts or technicians on the staff." When expert advice or guidance was wanted they referred to the various bureaux at Mukden, manned by the

Russians. When a worker was elected as a " model worker " he became classified as a " technician " with all the higher wages and privileges of a " technician " but nothing else.

His experiences in connection with the much-advertised Huai River Conservancy scheme were similar. This is an age-old problem caused by the fact that this river, into which flow some 200 tributaries, has no outlet to the sea but empties itself into the Hungtseh lake; and it has been further aggravated by the fact that in the course of the war with Japan the dykes of the Yellow River were breached near Kaifeng and its waters spread out over the Honan plain and finally came into the Huai system. Here was a problem which might have challenged the most efficient and highly organized administration in the world; and the Communists had proudly announced that in a few short months with the skill of their engineers and the devoted work of two million volunteers they had harnessed the river and solved the problem. The Indian Mission were naturally much interested to see this work, and while some of them may have been impressed by the propaganda that all the trouble was due to the incompetence of the Kuomintang, some, including the author, knew that it is on record that since the fourteenth century there have been 935 floods and droughts in this area, one of the most thickly populated in China. On paper it certainly was a wonderful achievement, but the figures (of 16,000 technicians and 40,000 administrative cadres, for instance) made him wonder where all these men came from and how China could spare such numbers on a single work, however important. But when the Mission, after a long and tedious journey 100 miles up the river, reached Junghochi, the centre of the work, they found—precisely nothing! There were no enthusiastic millions of rural workers and no evidence that they could have been housed there even for a short time; there was no dam but a simple " anicut " in three sections, the third of which had not been finished; the floods had been diverted into the lower-lying fields which, it was claimed, would eventually benefit from the silt, and the lower sections were already more fertile. Then came the usual Communist subterfuge: of course if the Mission really wanted to see the administration at work they should (or should have arranged to) go on some indeterminate distance upstream to Futzeling, where they would see everything.

But the most important question in China, where 90 per cent. of the population are peasants, is, of course, the land, and to land questions he has devoted a great part of the book. He accepts as axiomatic the usual Communist premises that maldistribution of land is the cause of all China's troubles, but by persistent questioning and following out his questions he arrives—almost in spite of himself—at the conclusion that the scheme is already well on the way to failure. He found that the country was still far from self-sufficient in food, so that if large quantities of grain have been exported to India and Ceylon, as alleged, it must have been from the proceeds of taxation in kind and at the expense of the native population. There is, of course, a " land question " in China—the usual Malthusian problem of a race between food supply and the growth of population—but the usual Communist bugbears of landlordism (as in Russia) or moneylenders (as in India) simply did not exist (a " big " landowner usually held not more than 100 *mou* or 16 acres, and loans to farmers to carry them over the harvest were usually supplied by their own families or clans); and so, as was only to be expected, the whole policy of redistribution, being based on a fallacy, is already showing signs of failure. The author notes that the Government are faced with the dilemma that if they continue with their policy of dividing up the land (and especially of giving it, not to experienced and industrious farmers, but to " good party men ") it will end in disaster, as the lots are uneconomical to work; and if, on the other hand, they persuade or compel the individuals to come together into co-operative or collectivized units, they will lose the support of the peasants on which they rose to power.

But, proceeding further, he found that another and even more serious dilemma has arisen. To exist as an independent country—let alone take her place as a great World Power—China must be not only self-sufficient in food but producing an exportable surplus, if she is to industrialize herself. Moreover, in order to realize this latter ambition, she needs a great many other things of which he saw no signs: raw materials, capital, light industries producing consumer goods, technical and managerial staffs, and above all peace at home and abroad. He notices that in the produc-

tion of coal, the one raw material that is generally thought to be plentiful, supplies have fallen very low owing to faulty methods of production and transport failures. Most other materials are either lacking or inaccessible; and there is little that China can offer in exchange for imported materials, as most of her exports are mortgaged to Russia or her satellites. (He would no doubt have been interested to hear that in 1947 China was still sending most of her tin, bristles and certain other exports to Russia in payment for the aeroplanes supplied for a short time at the beginning of the war with Japan.) The short-sighted policy followed by the Peking Government in the last few years has destroyed or frightened away most of the little capital there was and no one is encouraged to try to save or produce any more. Such technicians or managers as survived the revolution go in constant fear of being charged with one or other of the unforgivable sins; and no workers, whether in the fields, factories or offices, can give their whole time to their work owing to the incessant calls to attend meetings and criticize themselves and their colleagues. Students are inadequately trained, due to lack of qualified instructors and textbooks, and half their time being taken up by political meetings. Skilled men of every sort are so badly needed that they are drafted out before they have assimilated such teaching as is available. China had not progressed very far on the way to industrialization before the revolution, but such progress as she had made has been largely lost by the Russian looting of the Manchurian factories, the disappearance of foreign managerial staffs and most of the technicians, and shortages of raw materials—even, for instance, cotton—so that factories are idle for a great part of their time and the workers are being pauperized and in danger of losing their chief virtue, a capacity for hard and sustained work.

Finally, there is the question of peace. It has been said that the prospect of a redistribution of land was one of the chief inducements to the people to support the Communists: this may have been true in the case of many of the peasants, and as these constitute 80 or 90 per cent. of the population it was no doubt a considerable factor. But not all the peasants welcomed interference with their land-holdings, and to the town-dwellers (who, while numerically inferior, are politically and economically a more important force) it was meaningless. But to all Chinese, of whatever class or calling, the great inducement (apart from the fact that no alternative government existed) to support the "liberation" was the prospect of peace and a cessation of the interminable civil and foreign wars that had wracked the country for forty years; and—after a brief honeymoon period, during which they consolidated their hold on the country—the new régime have given them a worse deal than any of their predecessors. Of the terrible drain on manpower and resources in Korea—in return for which China gets nothing but empty glory—there is little in this book (though space is devoted to an exposure of the "germ warfare campaign"), but he emphasizes the even greater effect of the denial of internal peace, which is the price China has to pay for her "liberation"—"brain-washing," indoctrination, internment camps and the travesty of justice in "popular courts." Even when he says (p. 184) that he found a new spirit and enthusiasm owing to land reform and the emancipation of women, he adds that all they wanted was "to be left alone and grow rich" (echoing the cry of an anonymous ancestor of 4,000 years ago—"From break of day to sunset glow I toil. . . . What care I who rules the land if I am left in peace?" p. 83). "But the Communist cadres could not leave them alone. The peasantry must be made to give up their individualistic approach and learn to conform to doctrine."

He finishes, as he started, with a quotation, this time from Mao himself:

Behold, both sides of the Great Wall
There is only a vast desolation left;

and adds: "China offers little hope for the future. Mao was a prophet of his own success. Will he also foretell the doom of his failure?"

A. G. N. O.

Report on Indo-China. By Bernard Newman. Robert Hale. 1953. Pp. 239. 18s.

This well-written, well-balanced and informative report on a highly complex situation is both timely and excellent reading. The author, a most prolific writer

(seventy-five books), undertook his survey of an explosive area with the background of an observer trained in many parts of the world, an analytical and dispassionate mind, and an understanding of the causes of discontent—the conflicting emotions and disillusions that lead to revolution and counter-revolution. This equipment he has used effectively.

What may evolve from the struggle in Indo-China is sure to have far-reaching impacts on the shape of things to come not only in Asia but throughout the Western world. Mr. Newman appreciates "the hollowness of the Viet Minh façade of Nationalism." He warns that "a Viet Minh victory would almost inevitably involve the complete transference of South-east Asia to the Communist bloc." This reviewer inclines to omit the word "almost." The repercussions, furthermore, would surely not be confined to South-east Asia.

The author gives due credit to the French, which many critics have failed to do, for the beneficial—if not always altruistic—features of their administration of Indo-China during the past seventy years, notably their accomplishments in improving the economic, social, medical and general conditions of life in the area. He also believes, as does this reviewer, that the French definitely intend full independence for the three Associated States and have gone a long way to prove the sincerity of their intentions, from which there seems no reason now to assume they will retract. If the French may have dragged their feet a bit in according complete sovereignty to the three States, one may ask, as does the author, what would occur if the French should grant immediate full military command to the three States and withdraw the French combatant forces? Complete disaster in a week. The three Associated States (or their higher governmental officials) know this, and the author has clearly sensed not only the implications of such a move but the horrified reactions of the Associated States to the turning over of full sovereignty in any such manner.

As to the military situation, the end is not in sight. While military victory can conceivably be denied the Viet Minh, and is being denied, early complete military success of the anti-Communist forces does not necessarily follow, so long as the Chinese continue to equip the Viets. It would appear that considerably more Russian and satellite military equipment has been captured from the Viet Minh than the two motor lorries and some medical stores mentioned by the author (p. 123). This reviewer cannot agree with the author's contention: "It could be claimed with confidence that, could both armies be ranged on the field in traditional style" (an impossible contingency, as Mr. Newman surely recognizes), "not merely the battle but *the war would be over in about half an hour*" (italics the reviewer's).

A further comment on the military angle. That the French have been deficient in aircraft, and also in aircraft maintenance crews, is unquestionably true. This deficiency, in part at least, is being overcome by American aid. Yet it should be noted that, as there is so far no air opposition by the Viet Minh, the types of aircraft employed—in some cases obsolescent as modern standards go—are adequate for their tasks; and the effectiveness of aircraft against a slithery enemy infiltrating by night under cover of the jungle is restricted. The French aviation in Indo-China is putting up, with its still limited resources and against ferocious climatic conditions as well as formidable handicaps of terrain, a magnificent effort that has in all probability kept stalemate from defeat.

Mr. Newman mentions that morale was very high at Na Sam, adding: "It usually is among troops nearest to the enemy: defection flourishes most in distant bases." With this the reviewer fully agrees. It might well be pointed out that the most distant base is Paris. And while many of the best informed French political leaders are clear-cut in their refusal to envisage negotiation with Ho Chih Minh before a decisive military superiority over the Communist forces has been achieved, others—notably M. Mendès-France—advocate withdrawal from the struggle at any cost, which flatly means to permit the Associated States to be engulfed in the avid maw of Communism.

The author has grasped the complexities of the political situation—or rather situations—in Indo-China very clearly, and expressed these with such clarity as their highly fluid nature permits. Political consciousness amongst the peasant masses has hardly been created, and at best is confused and racked with conflict. Mr. Newman's references to His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Viet Nam, are sympathetic and

this reviewer concurs with them on the whole. But Bao Dai has the present aspect of a prince and potential leader who has put on his spurs but not yet mounted his horse. A Vietnamese friend both of Bao Dai and of the reviewer maintains that His Majesty (sometimes called the Emperor from his hereditary title as Emperor of Annam, a State which no longer exists save as Central Vietnam) must adopt a mystic symbol to inculcate in the Vietnamese people a real desire to express themselves as a nation. This charming oriental thought has in it the elements of sound advice.

King Sisavang Vong of Laos, whom Mr. Newman also met, though briefly because of the King's age and illness (gout and liver trouble), has twice in the past twelve months refused to leave his capital. Luang Prabang, under heavy Viet Minh attack; on both occasions the enemy abandoned the attack and withdrew. The King maintained that the Prabang, a golden Buddha representing the guardian spirit of Luang Prabang, would protect his town. And the Prabang did this, or so it would seem, in the face of these two vicious threats. The people of Luang Prabang believe it firmly.

The King's son, Crown Prince Sivang, a cultured, travelled and personable man in his early forties, can be counted on to resist the encroachment of Communism on Laos to the best of his ability, which implies a stout resistance. It took the Crown Prince of Laos to inform this reviewer, an American whose taste runs to cigarettes of black tobacco, that cigarettes of this type could be found in the United States—Picayunes, made in New Orleans.

Report on Indo-China, as well as being informative and very good reading, is richly descriptive. Among many other observations, the author mentions the dignity and erect carriage of Vietnamese women. But he omits to remark on the amazing grace with which they ride side-saddle on the backs of bicycles and motor-cycles, their long silk robes tucked between their slim ankles.

The book is well printed, the type easily legible; and the numerous photographs and two maps enhance its interest.

MELVIN HALL.

Le vieux Tibet face á la Chine nouvelle. By Alexandra David-Neel. Pp. 245. Paris: Plon. 1953. Fr. 540.

This is a disappointing book, because in nearly 250 pages one expects to learn more about what the impact of Chinese Communism on Tibet is likely to be. One learns relatively little from this book and, after reading it, one is left with the uncomfortable impression that the author put the book together hastily in order to get it on the market as rapidly as possible.

This is not to say that the book does not make entertaining reading. In style it is much like her earlier travel books. Here is probably where its major weakness lies—it is written like a travel account. But there is no "itinerary"—no definite plan; there is no high point and no central theme, and there are really no conclusions. It is difficult to deal with social and political problems in the same way one describes a varied and exciting journey.

The book consists of an initial chapter on the general situation of Tibet in the world in modern times, and five chapters devoted to separate consideration of the principal Tibetan social classes: the rural aristocracy, the peasants, the secular nobility, the merchants and the priests. A final chapter is made up of observations on the natives of the frontier regions.

Each of the major chapters follows much the same pattern: a general impressionistic description of the traditional way of life of the group is followed by reminiscences of the author chosen to illustrate the habits of thought and action of the class under discussion. These reminiscences are invariably delightful and often pertinent, as are some of the references to folk tales and Tibetan epic poetry. But in development of the main theme of the book they are not an adequate substitute for recent information—or, if asking for that be too much, intelligent speculation—about post-1950 developments and trends within the various classes.

The essence of what Mme. David-Neel has to say about the peasants and the priests, the merchants and the aristocracy, in this book does not differ much from

what she and many others have already written in many previous books. It is true that the conquest of Tibet by the forces of Mao Tse-Tung, to the best of our knowledge, has brought no radical changes to the country yet. It may take several years for that to happen. There can be no doubt, however, that the Chinese Communists are already laying the groundwork for the destruction of the old Tibet. The old Tibet, though until recently sheltered from outside influences to a remarkable degree, never had a completely stable society. The present book points to some areas of tension and potential conflict in Tibetan life, but far too little attention is paid to this aspect of the situation.

It is in the nature of Communism to exploit all existing social and political frictions and cleavages as a means to consolidating its power. Not only do Communists take advantage of the tensions they find on taking over a country; they also intentionally develop new strains and stresses among the population in order to facilitate eventual destruction of all continuity with past tradition, with the exception of such tradition as can be subverted to serve domestic or international Communist aims. In Tibet, as everywhere else where Communism has captured power, the ultimate aim of the Communists can be none other than the establishment of a new subservient and malleable totalitarian society, unhampered by past loyalties to former social, cultural and religious traditions. It would be unfair to expect Mme. David-Neel to predict the future for us, but from a person so intimately acquainted with Tibetan society and the workings of the Tibetan mind it is discouraging to receive so little information on what the main alternatives for the future are likely to be and such scanty guidance on how to evaluate the information we still occasionally receive from Chinese and Indian sources.

Mme. David-Neel's conclusions seem to be more or less to the effect that since Tibet has survived periods of Chinese domination in the past, it is unlikely to be too disastrously affected by Chinese Communism now. In fact, she maintains, many Tibetans would rather be governed by Chinese officials than by less just Tibetan ones; the peasantry will in many cases welcome introduction of a system that will relieve it of the hopeless burden of debt it now bears; the monasteries will eventually be restricted in their activities, but this will be good for them, since they are nests of ignorance and corruption anyway; the merchants will go on trading because there has to be trade. For the time being, the author is probably correct, and, as far as the future is concerned, her implied conclusions are at least comforting. They are not, however, entirely convincing. Communists have never been in power anywhere in the world for even a relatively short period of time without effecting great social and economic changes. Though in many cases these changes have initially been welcomed and have done some good, they have inevitably led to total enslavement of the people to the power interests of the Communist state and have wrought incalculable damage on the national cultures affected. Tibet is certainly one of the most difficult assignments World Communism has yet faced, but it is hard to believe that in the long run it will be an exception. Mme. David-Neel's book is to be recommended in so far as it is entertaining and in some respects informative, but a realistic and thorough appraisal of what Old Tibet has to expect from New Communist China remains to be written.

PAUL B. HENZE.

What Price Israel ? By Alfred M. Lilienthal. Pp. 275. Published by Henry Regnery and Co., U.S.A. $3.95.

The title of the book is unfortunate. It suggests a cheap journalistic attack on the State of Israel. There is indeed too much sensational journalism in the writing. But yet the book has a more serious content than its title suggests. It is an examination by a serious and earnest American writer of the political, religious and moral problems provoked by the creation of the State of Israel, which is based on the theory of the Jewish nation. The writer is a religious Jew, and belongs to that Council of Judaism in America which is hostile to the State of Israel, and fears that the establishment of a State will involve all American Jews in the charge of dual loyalties. His premises are strange to most of the Jewish people. Judaism for him is purely a

universal religious faith without any national element or without attachment to the Holy Land. "The ancient prayer, 'next year in Jerusalem,' resounding down the centuries, made Judaism indestructible. It held forth a perpetual goal not to be achieved through human intervention." Not one Jew in a thousand of all the Jewish generations would have accepted that conception. And it is strange that a people's prayer should reject the idea of human activity to fulfil it.

Given the premises of the writer, however, part of his analysis of the way in which the State of Israel came into being, and of the way in which American Government policy shifted under pressure of the Jewish vote, or what was believed to be—in the author's view, erroneously—the Jewish vote, is worth recording and studying. The power of the lobby and the power of the press on American policy are alarming; and no less when they are concerned with the Middle East than with China. It is also a service that the author provokes clear thinking about the words Jew and Israel. He remarks truly that "Jew" is now used to denote a universal faith and a particular nationality; "and the corresponding allegiances to religion and to State have become confused."

The book is unfortunate not only in its title but in its manifold errors of fact. The writer revels in inaccuracy. When he speaks of the Anglo-American commission, which in 1946 examined the Palestine problem, he suggests that it took all its evidence about Palestine in Egypt, while in fact its principal sessions were in Palestine. He refers to "the mob hanging" of the two British sergeants by terrorists in 1947, when in fact that act was done without any participation of the people. He refers to Ernest Bevin as "that Welsh miner," obviously confusing him with Aneurin Bevan. He states that the late Justice Brandeis was attached to Palestine because of the Hebrew University, while in fact that leader of American Zionism was essentially concerned with agricultural settlement and economic development. He says: "Throughout the entire Christian era the bulk of Palestine's population continued to be Arab," as though he were ignorant that the Arab conquest of the land occurred in the seventh century. These examples, which could be multiplied, are symptomatic of a recklessness of statement in order to build up his case.

It is unfortunate also that the author has a habit of making unwarranted innuendoes, based either on his imagination or on flimsy evidence. He admires Dr. Judah Magnes, the first President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. But, commenting on his death in America "in virtual exile," he suggests that his family kept him away from Palestine to save him from a Zionist terrorist bullet. All the friends of Magnes know that he went to America in the last year of his life in order to plead with the American authorities for preserving the peace of Jerusalem. Again, he suggests that the Yemenite immigrants to Israel are victims of scorn and discrimination when they come to the land to realize their Messianic hopes. They are charged, he says, as "childish, imbeciles, shiftless, dirty." It may be that a few irresponsible journalists used such epithets about the Oriental Jews in general; but all who have lived in Irsael in the last years know how great is the respect for the Yemenites, and how happy, for the most part, are the Yemenites in their lot. The main theme of the book, that the creation of the State of Israel involved not only a partition of Palestine but a partition of American Jewry, merited more careful and more responsible statement.

N. B.

Electoral Reform in Israel. Beth Hillel Publications. Society for Social Research in Israel, Tel Aviv. Pp. 32. 1953.

The thesis of the compilers of this pamphlet, the origin of which was published in Hebrew, is that the present electoral system of proportional representation in Israel has proved a failure and is a potential danger to the stability of the State. It is alleged that the system has tended to encourage the less desirable features of Israeli society, which are discussed quite freely. While the merits of a bold change-over to constituency elections is recognized, it is advocated that an interim solution should be adopted providing an electoral law which would obviate the pitfalls of the two alternative electoral systems.

Useful information in a concise form on the governments, elections and political

parties in Israel since the inauguration of the State is included in this short work. Special mention is made of the relationship between Mapai, the largest political party in Israel, and the Histadruth, which, though nominally a trade union federation, controls in actual fact the greater part of the economic and cultural life of the country.

Exception might be taken to the unnecessary allegations made against the Mandatory Government in the Introduction and on pp. 21-22.

G. H. S.

Sair-i Farhang, The March of Education. By Dr. Issa Ṣadīq, Professor of Education in the University of Tehran. Tehran University Press. Tehran, 1332/1953. Pp. 716. Maps, Ill.

Dr. Ṣadīq, at one time Persian assistant to Professor E. G. Browne at Cambridge, a graduate of Columbia University and now a member of the Persian Senate, calls his work "A short history of Education in Iran and the West, from the time of the earliest records to the present day." Like the term "civilization," education is something which requires to be defined anew with practically every age and country, and lettered Persians, like their counterparts elsewhere, have nearly all set down their conceptions of what constitutes a proper upbringing for children—more especially other people's. One need only read the *Gulistān* of Sa'dī to realize what is meant, but in a valuable chapter Dr. Ṣadīq provides copious illustrations from nearly all the well-known Persian classics about the ways in which the child's mind, morals, and behaviour should be trained; for professed moralists like Ghazālī and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī were not alone in expressing themselves on these matters. Here we have extracts from Firdausī, Nāṣir-i Khusrau, Niẓāmī, Sa'dī and Jāmī, as well as from authors who dealt with the training of novices who were setting out on the Ṣūfi Path.

For those who are concerned with the affairs of Iran today, there is an informative section on the whole system of education existing there, actually or ideally. It deals with every rung of the educational ladder from elementary school to university, with a portion describing how the Ministry of Education is organized both at the centre and in the provinces.

The plan of the work was obviously inspired by American models, for it ranges over every period and clime and is illustrated with numerous pictures of people, places, and institutions. Much of it concerns the professed educationalist, but the part dealing with Iran is instructive in the extreme to those whose business is with that country or the Islamic world in general. As might be expected in consequence, there is an imposing bibliography of works consulted, both of Eastern and Western origin, and, in addition, a useful vocabulary is provided giving Persian equivalents for technical terms used in education both in Europe and America. Unfortunately there is no index, and running down a name may involve a careful search through a lengthy text. However, there is a good table of the contents, which are calculated to hold the interest of the student of Persian and of the history and sociology of Iran.

R. Levy.

Buddhism (volume II—*Mahayana*). By C. H. S. Ward. Edited by Eric Waterhouse, M.A. Epworth Press. 1952. Pp. 222. 15s.

This is one of the "Great Religions of the East" series, and intended primarily as a textbook for students of Comparative Religion. The editor explains in his foreword that Mr. Ward wrote the first volume, on Hinayana Buddhism, from his experience in Ceylon, and largely from the classical Pali texts, and that this is the necessary complementary to that study, taking in the historical development of Buddhism with the evolution of the Mahayana School, and of the doctrine of Buddhology.

The historical periods under consideration are roughly from 600 B.C. to A.D. 1250, and in addition Mr. Ward gives a résumé of the doctrines of the great Mahayana teachers and also a comparison of Hinayana and Mahayana philosophical ideas.

From the hotch-potch of philosophic and metaphysical ideas emerging from the

quotations and textual references there is a compelling interest in the Tantric doctrine which in Left-hand Saktism is the only extant practising Buddhist sect in India today.

The Tantras developed the Sakti cult, the conception of the female energy as the necessary component of the godhead, and this secret doctrine was originally esoteric rather than erotic, and intended for the yogin as a method of attainment of spiritual perfection and absorption in Dharmakaya, which is the Void, the Atman, Brahma. Tantrism largely influenced the decay of Buddhism in India, not because of the degeneration of the cult, but because it united the essentials of Buddhism and Hinduism with the Immanence as well as the Transcendence of the Absolute.

Left-hand Saktism, which is still widely practised in India, is an adaptation of Saivism and Saktism, but has degenerated into an orgy rather than an exercise, with an erotic conception of the divine (in Hinduism every god has his consort, and in Tantrism the Buddha has a fourth body vajrasattva with which the eternal Buddha eternally embraces his Sakti or Bhagavati), from which it follows that in order to realize his divine nature the ascetic must perform the rites of union. The liturgy of the modern cult consists in the repetition of *mantras* and charms, and the ritual in partaking of the five *tattvas* (elements)—wine, meat, fish, parched grain, and sexual intercourse.

This Tantric Buddhism in Tibet united with the terrible native cults, and later became a powerful influence in China and Japan, where the Shin-gon sect is based on Tantric texts.

In its degeneration it is not surprising that Tantrism is condemned, and Left-hand Saktism practised only secretly, but a bright light shines on the idea in a quotation from B. Bhattacharya's Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism.

"The Tantric culture," he says, "is the greatest of all cultures, because it aims at the spiritual perfection and psychic development of man, and as such no one can deny that the Tantric culture is the greatest contribution made by India toward the world's civilization."

Mr. Ward remarks that surface views of Buddhism are misleading and should be carefully investigated, and this Tantric spotlight suddenly lights up the Jewel in the Lotus, Om Mani Padme Hum, the secret of Buddhahood, the Enlightenment.

Tantrayana or Vajrayana is a way of final liberation; Vajra, the weapon of Indra, designates the divine energy. The supreme being, the Atman, the eternal energy and essence; Adibuddha is the universal vajrasattva. "Vajra," with the variant "mani," is the mystic phrase for "linga," the male organ, and "padme," "lotus," is the classical rendering of "yoni," the female organ. It is clear that Tantrism is more than a pagan system of rites and sorcery, and the inspiration of the Gautama Buddha for man's spiritual and psychic development, in and not out of the world, Immanent and Transcendental, and the negation of negation.

It is disappointing that the Buddhist development in Japan is not more fully dealt with by Mr. Ward. Zen Buddhism is not mentioned, and Zen, the teaching that is beyond the word, might surely link up somewhere for us in the Void.

> In enlightenment no sorrows are found, no burning desires;
> 'Tis enjoyed by all men who are wise.
> All sentient creatures from the turbulent waters of the triple world
> I'll release, and to eternal peace them I'll lead.

E. S.

The Shi'a of India. By J. N. Hollister. Luzac's Oriental Religions Series, Vol. VIII. Pp. 440. Pl. 2. £3 3s.

The author seems to have used only translations and secondary sources and certainly knows no Arabic. He set out to describe the Shi'a in India and was led on to tell its history from the inception. It began in politics with the idea that 'Ali, son-in-law of the prophet, ought to be caliph, but soon a belief that he had a peculiar value was added. The story of the beginning as told here might have been written a hundred years ago; that of the eleven imams after 'Ali reproduces Shi'a tradition and its value as history is doubtful, though no hint of this is given. The introduction of the Shi'a faith into India is the occasion for twenty-five pages on some States in

the Deccan, a dull record of alliances and wars. In this century a young man said of his co-religionists, " We hate Yazid "; it is doubtful if Dr. Hollister conveys to his readers the bitter feelings which still exist. The section on the Isma'ilis is useful because it has collected facts from many scattered sources, does not try to hide uncertainties, reports conflicting views and refuses to be dogmatic. Much of what is told by orthodox historians about this and similar sects has been proved to be calumny. Neo-Platonism provided the Isma'ilis with a philosophy. The supreme deity is so completely transcendent that the imam, usually identified with the first intelligence, is the effective deity and lower ranks in the hierarchy are equated with the succeeding emanations, details varying with the sects. It is odd that sects which derive from the Shi'a with its reverence for 'Ali, end by relegating him to a back seat. Dr. Hollister did not know the work of Prof. Minorsky on the 'Ali-ilahis. The section on India in modern times is the most valuable part of the book; it is full of information which will be new to any but specialists and is fully documented. The author describes the evil effects of *taqiya*, the duty of concealing one's religion to avoid danger; he might have quoted, "*taqiya* is as important as prayer."

A. S. T.

The Sikhs. By Khushwant Singh. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 215. 1953. 16s.

An unhappy feature of the partition of the Indian sub-continent was its effect on a great community, the Sikhs, who in their dispersion were left scattered haphazardly across the northern plains with many of their holy places of pilgrimage and nearly half their population on Pakistan soil. Hitherto we have had to depend largely on the well-known history of the Sikhs written by Captain J. D. Cunningham, a work which covers the period of the two Sikh wars with great attention to detail and with much sympathy for the Sikh nation in their defeat. The time was ripe for the story to be brought up to date and placed in perspective with reference to the events of August, 1947. We are fortunate that the task has been undertaken by a loyal Sikh who is yet able to write in an objective, balanced manner on the fate of his community.

Khushwant Singh records dispassionately that it would be in the nature of things if one day his people merge again into the wider Hindu system. Regretfully we must agree that this is probably the happiest solution of a problem which could retard all progress and development in the Punjab.

There are some noticeable omissions. We would have welcomed a fuller assessment of Master Tara Singh, his rugged strength and his petty bigotry. More attention could perhaps have been given to that period after World War I when the Akalis were busy marching on the Gurdwaras; and a soldier, General Sir William Birdwood, was appointed by the Viceroy to attempt a political settlement. Nevertheless, we are grateful for a very valuable and balanced contribution to the history of the sub-continent in a work which surveys Sikh politics, economics, history, religion, and culture.

BIRDWOOD.

Urban Life in Syria Under the Early Mamluks. By Nicola A. Ziadeh. Beirut: The American Press. Pp. 299. 1953.

The author, professor of Arabic studies at the American University of Beirut, has surveyed the political, social and economic aspects of Syrian cities under the Bahri Mamlūks in this publication, which is derived, with all too few alterations, from his doctoral dissertation. Based on a profound study of the original sources for the period, the book would be of great value to students of Arabic history in providing a much-needed study in depth in a particular period were it not for the broken style, over-segmented organization, inconsistencies in transliteration and capitalization, and grammatical as well as typographical errors. In short, it is not readable in its present form. It is to be sincerely hoped that after a complete revision in form the contents will be reissued, for its value is inherent.

Certain portions of Professor Ziadeh's book merit special attention. In Chapter II,

through an exhaustive compilation of material from Arab geographers and Western travellers, he has been able to present tables showing which urban centres in Syria maintained their prosperity during the early Mamlūk period, which ones declined, and the reasons for such action. There is perhaps too much emphasis on the attenuation of an urban centre through warfare. It was often the case that destruction of a town was merely the final *coup de grâce*; the real reason may better be attributed to the economic deterioration of its market area.

The section entitled " Economic Problems " amasses the conflicting information in the Arabic sources for the values of weights and measures, and presents the interrelation of the various monetary units used at the time. That the conflicting standards were " problems for the city " (p. 144) is fully understandable. Following this, Professor Ziadeh presents details regarding prices and the fluctuations in the standard of living. Although there is insufficient information available to render such a tabulation scientific, the conclusions are both interesting and inherently sound in that they deal with such basic commodities as wheat, rice and oil.

In view of its general importance in Islamic social history, the guild system should receive more attention than it has been given, and its relationship to the *futuwwa* should be mentioned, at the very least. Material on this latter point is available.

It would be tedious to enter into the errors in transliteration and grammar, but the use of " Taymūr " for " Tīmūr " throughout is too glaring to be ignored; the first sentence of section 7 and section 8 of Chapter IV are completely repetitious, and the use of " Turkmen and Akrād " for either " Turkomans and Kurds " or " Turkmān and Akrād," also throughout, is improper. These are merely some of the most obvious errors and inconsistencies which seriously detract from the intrinsic merit of the research.

HERBERT L. BODMAN, JR.

The Ring of the Dove. By Ibn Hazm, translated by A. J. Arberry. Luzac. 1953. Pp. 288. 25s.

Ibn Hazm, said Nicholson, was the most original genius of Moslem Spain. Famous in later life as a writer on theology and law, in *The Ring of the Dove* he set himself, at the request of a friend, to compose an essay on the art and practice of love, a subject which he excuses with the quotation, " Recreate your souls with a little vanity, that it may the better aid them to hold fast to the truth." There is more than a little " vanity," and worse, but he is no sensualist, rather—strange combination!—a moralist and a romantic, and the book is well worth reading for the vivid picture that emerges of its author, for his shrewd observation of men and women, for the sidelights on the brilliant and turbulent life of the last distressful years of the Spanish Caliphate, for the queries it must raise in the reader's mind on the place of the culture of al-Andalus in European history.

It is unfortunate that Ibn Hazm's good opinion of himself extended to his verse, which he here quotes freely in illustration of his points—and sometimes off the point. Once at least in recalling the slave girl Nu'm, the lost love of his youth, real feeling, matched to plain words, make a memorable poem. In satiric verse he has vigour and wit—and one can well believe that it was his treatment of his opponents in theological controversy as much as his political loyalty to the Umayyads that made one city after another too hot to hold him.

There is plenty of anecdote and much observation of the subtleties of human intercourse. Had the genre been invented in his day he would certainly have written a psychological novel—with its main characters women. " My only care and mental exercise," he says, " since first I began to understand anything, even from the days of earliest childhood, has been to study the affairs of females, to investigate their histories, and to acquire all the knowledge I could about them." Certainly his women, slave girls and great ladies alike, live and reveal themselves in a quick phrase; the men are too often described by a string of epithets, and remain mere types.

The publisher describes this book as a " complete theory of courtly love " and assumes the profound influence of Muslim Spain on the troubadours of medieval

Europe. With the word "courtly" one may well quarrel, for the background of life is here a half-oriental urban life, not so much the Court as the private house, the mosque, the shop of Isma'il b. Yunus, the Jewish physician, the street. But that this lively and sophisticated world, this interest in the minutiæ and romance of love, should have had no influence on the culture, poetry and ideas of the Courts across the Pyrenees, it is hard to believe, and much to be regretted that Professor Arberry himself, in an otherwise excellent preface, should have refused to enter on "the perilous arena of comparative literature." He contents himself with referring to two books on the subject by Nyke, one published in Paris and one in Baltimore, and so not easily accessible to the general public to whom this translation is addressed, and who might well have welcomed a summary of a part of what is known—or disputed—in a fascinating question of origins.

M. H.

The Sacred Oasis. By Irene Vongehr Vincent. Faber and Faber. Pp. 114. Ill. 30s.

The Sacred Oasis, which Mrs. Vincent visited in 1948, is Ch'ien Fo Tung, the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas, twelve miles south of the oasis city of Tun Huang. Her object was to study at first hand the frescoes and sculptures in the rock-cut temples which are among the most precious relics of Chinese Buddhist art ranging from the fifth to the tenth century A.D. This involved a journey along the North-West Highway (the modern and more prosaic name given to the ancient Silk Route), which the Russians had used in the late war when transporting supplies through Sinkiang and Kansu to Lanchow for shipment to Chungking and other centres. Passing beyond the Great Wall she notes the derelict aspect of Kansu and the poverty of the people, who have never recovered from the wars fought over this area.

She gives an interesting and lucid account of the temples, of their rise to importance and splendour in the Wei and T'ang periods, and their gradual decline after the Yüan period until their rediscovery and revaluation at the beginning of this century by Chinese and European archæologists. Particularly interesting are her remarks on the techniques used by the painters and the present condition of the paintings; and within the limits of the book she tries to trace their stylistic development. She pays tribute to the work of conservation and restoration carried out by the Tun Huang Institute founded under the Kuo Min Tang Government in 1943, and it is reassuring to learn that it continues its work with the blessing of the present Government.

Readers will be especially grateful for the photographs in this volume, which include forty-one of the frescoes and sculptures, and in several cases supplement Pelliot's great work. The frontispiece in colour of a Wei period Buddha and painted alcove gives a tantalizing glimpse of the lovely colour effects obtained by the artist: and one looks forward to the publication in this country of a selection of these in the near future.

R. H. PINDER-WILSON.

Horned Moon. By Ian Stephens. Chatto and Windus. Pp. 195. Illustrated in colour. 21s.

This is in every way a remarkable book, unbiased, and yet a sympathetic account of a revisit to Pakistan in 1952. The author's illustrations, plain or coloured, are truly magnificent. Mr. Ian Stephens is now a Fellow of his old college, King's, at Cambridge. He was first employed in public relations by the Government of India in the early 1930s. Thence he proceeded to the editorship of the *Statesman*, the well-known British daily of Calcutta. There he remained until long after the transference of power, in spite of incurring the personally expressed displeasure of Lord Mountbatten and, by implication, of his new Indian Ministers. There is a factual account of this episode in Chapter 10 of *Horned Moon*, the trouble having risen out of a leading article in the *Statesman* on the Indian action in regard to Kashmir in October, 1947. Mr. Stephens states: "Glancing at it since, I have found little that I would alter"; and he appears to have acted on this, as on all other occasions,

according to the highest traditions of British journalism. Our author, believing that a British-owned newspaper might be impartially helpful to both the new dominions, even when they were virtually at war with one another as one result of the very equivocal Indian action about Kashmir, remained at his post for a further three and a half years. He apparently found that his effort to uphold an inter-dominion policy rather than to support one side was misunderstood in India and so he returned to England. He appreciates the tragedy of former comrades of 1939-45, ex-British-Indian officers and men slaughtering each other in Kashmir. He further realizes that officers, whether Hindu or Moslem, who had been educated in British military institutions approximate more to British officers and gentlemen in their outlook than to some of their educated civilian fellow countrymen. He hints that had affairs been left to the military of each dominion to settle there might have been a happier outcome.

He furthermore states that the principal weakness of many politicians of "Delkaria," a horrible new name he has coined for the old Indian sub-continent, is vanity. This of course is not confined to Asia. The only other criticism is that the author suffers from his intellectual background, Winchester, King's, and a self-confessed early tendency to left-wing politics. He cannot refrain from tilting at the older generation of Anglo-Indian officials—their occasional pompousness and social aloofness, even to avoidance of Asiatic food. Men of the present generation who have never exercised executive functions cannot well realize that officials of former days, isolated amongst virile if primitive communities, often had to rely upon their own personality to maintain order. The author mentions the proximity of sudden death in India, and from his own experience of tropical disease may realize that before the most modern remedies came into use extreme care was needed in the dietary.

He speaks with the affection often felt by Britons abroad of his own personal retainers, as of his Asian friends; and with understanding but not entirely uncritical sympathy of Pakistan since 1947. He received the unusual permission to cross the cease-fire line in Kashmir to the Indian side. There he came upon a horrible incident that spoiled the lunch of a neutral United Nations observer. An old father and son had been shot and bayoneted presumably for crossing the line in search of their beasts or some other pastoral motive. As he says, "Novel frontiers are not easy for the poor to remember." He had the further privilege of going on patrol with the Scouts, the local corps maintaining order along the Afghan border of Pakistan. There he found no diminution of efficiency, but a strangely peaceful atmosphere compared to the "old" days. The tribesmen have indeed comported themselves very well up to now with their new Moslem rulers and co-religionists, unlike some other neighbours. The inspiration of a Monotheistic Faith has led to the creation of a new State and has moved mountains. Any reader will not only derive a fund of knowledge from this book but also, it may be, a certain spiritual comfort in these godless and evil days. How the faithful of Pakistan will confront the many and formidable perils that are ahead depends under Providence on themselves and on their continued devotion and selflessness.

W. A. A.

Into Hidden Burma. By M. Collis. Faber. Pp. 268. 18s.

This book combines charming stories of folklore in Burma with accounts of the ups and downs of the author's contacts with his official superiors.

It seems a pity that two such differing subjects should not have been kept to separate volumes, as in his books *Siamese White* and *Trials in Burma*.

Fairy Tigers, a Flying City, a Scented Hill, and Ghostly Watchers are likely to have a wider appeal than the lack of sympathy, real or imaginary, of one's seniors in government service. As regards the latter, was not the author a little too introspective or even thin-skinned?

His description of a "Good or Perfect Official" is hardly typical; had this been so, how comes it that they were normally and sincerely addressed as "Protector of the Poor"? And also, that one of his immediate predecessors in high office was held in esteem as the reincarnation of a Burmese famed for his pious acts?

Commerce is not only the life-blood of Britain but of Burma also, and had the necessary qualities been available locally, development would hardly have been mainly in the hands of aliens. Recent experience in other parts of the world has shown the folly of entrusting management to the inexperienced.

The strictures on the European community in Rangoon probably had justification, but it must be remembered that in the period after the first World War bad manners and lack of consideration for others were noticeable in other places besides Burma.

As regards admission to holy places, the footwear complication is of recent date. The possibility of leprosy and elephantiasis should be remembered. The difficulty has been resolved satisfactorily in many other countries.

Criticism of the British Administration should be viewed in the light of the admirable extracts of old-time instructions contained in *The Times*, November 30, 1953.

This book is recommended to those who know Burma, or are interested in folk-lore.

C. L. DAY.

Round about India. By John Seymour. Eyre and Spottiswoode. Pp. 255. $5\frac{1}{2}'' \times 8\frac{3}{4}''$. 1953. 18s. net.

John Seymour is the ideal traveller; nearly all his contacts seem at once to become friendly; and in most cases really intimate. Certain anti-social persons are described with disapproval, but never intolerance. He is as much at home with uneducated coolies as with leaders of thought, and with both he engages in serious and often controversial argument. Such a journey in Anglo-India could never have been so uninhibited.

Not only did John Seymour meet the Indian with another approach. His directions of travel were quite different from those of even the most enquiring Briton of other days. Usually short of cash, he mixed with Indians as one of them, mostly as an honoured guest.

He reached Pamban by sailing ferry from Ceylon and wandered happily to sacred Madura, thence to Madras, where he made many friends. Thence to Travancore and the Malabar coast, finding not a few Britons more or less content with the new India, also pockets of Jews and Christians at least as ancient as any in the West. Recrossing to the eastern Coramandel coast, the River Godaveri so took his fancy that he joined some pilgrims in a launch chugging up to sacred Bhadrachalam. His next friends were Australian missionaries, who helped to balance his widening perspective. Then a coal-mine in Hyderabad. The Mahatma's " Ashram " at Sevagram seems to have made some impression. After a stay in Delhi the author was for a month a guest in a Jat village. And so by Comet to Europe.

Such records are a sign of the times, a ray of light in a sombre age. England could have no better ambassador, no happier contact with many who might not in the abstract regard themselves as friendly to our race. The British Council aim at just such results and might well consider what means they can *pour encourager les autres*.

Not the least valuable are Seymour's versions of today's problems in India, and how to face them. His attitude shows knowledge and judgment which must impress not only the reviewer, who knows his India, but present a very readable picture to the ordinary reader.

G. M. ROWTH.

Early Chinese Pottery and Porcelain. By Basil Gray. Faber and Faber. 1953. Pp. xvi + 48; 4 coloured and 96 monochrome plates. £1 10s.

As the works of Hobson and other pre-war writers had been conveniently summed up in W. B. Honey's *Ceramic Art of China and Other Countries of the Far East* (1945), Mr. Gray has wisely given his book the character of a progress report on evidence and theories that have emerged since that date. The handsome illustrations are mainly of pieces hitherto unpublished.

The evidence to be drawn from archæology, inscribed pieces and early Chinese

literature is often suspect and far too slender to invite conformity of opinion about most of the wares discussed. In the limited space at his disposal Mr. Gray has very skilfully indicated the widely conflicting views of other scholars, and he deserves sympathy if at times he hesitates to make his own position clear. But in his brief discussion of pre-Han wares he states firmly that the mysterious white pottery of An-yang is stoneware, fired at about 1,000° C., and not made of kaolin; and perhaps deliberately he omits all mention of the recently discovered black miniature vases and figures of Hui Hsien.

The undesirable term "proto-porcelain" has been extended to cover many different classes of early glazed stoneware; some experts would put them in the third century B.C., others in the third century A.D. A similar range of dates has been proposed for the finer olive-glazed early Yüeh wares, which may also continue till the sixth century A.D. Mr. Gray here shares our despair. On different pages he suggests three different dates for a monstrously ugly vase in quite un-Chinese, apparently Sasanian style: one could wish it and its companions at Kansas City and The Hague out of the canon, though they seem to be genuine.

The Sasanian period in Persia (A.D. 224-642) barely overlaps the T'ang (618-906), and it is a mystery why so much T'ang pottery and stoneware should show the influence of Sasanian and even Hellenistic metal work in shape and relief decoration. Can it be that Sasanian smiths fled eastward from the Arabs and worked in China or its borderlands, though none of their work survives? Mr. Gray hints at the possible existence of Indian silver work which has also disappeared, but may have helped introduce the lotus and other Buddhist motives into China. He would derive the shape of the Chinese pottery and stoneware ewers, with a tall, narrow neck surmounted by an eagle's head, from a class of early Islamic bronze ewers made in Persia. But this is hard to follow, for on the Persian ewers it is a spout emerging from the body, and not the neck, that takes the form of a bird.

Mr. Gray considers that the important Yüeh celadons range in date from the T'ang period until the early eleventh century; but there are good reasons for thinking they continued later. A vase like Plate 18 in the David Foundation is dated 1080, and the ware influenced the Corean celadons, besides remaining in great demand for export to the Near East. Mr. Gray's Plate 19 shows a vase of developed Sung form which, if not actually "Northern celadon" as it appears, surely dates from the twelfth century. The third important class of celadon was made at Lung Ch'üan in the same southern province of Chekiang as the Yüeh ware, but in a very different style. Mr. Gray suggests a hiatus in time to explain this. Was it not rather a decisive change in Court taste, favouring thick, unctuous glazes with little or no carved decoration? This change set in about 1107 when the experimental Ju-yao was first made in the north (not a stoneware, *pace* Mr. Gray, but a soft earthenware). The Court fled southwards from the Chin Tartars in 1127, and from this time begin the thickly glazed Kuan wares of Hangchow and the celadons of Lung Ch'üan, continuing the movement started at Ju-Chou and Chün Chou in the north. Mr. Gray rightly regards as later intruders the fragments of Lung Ch'üan celadon found at Samarra, a site in Mesopotamia whose importance was confined to the ninth century.

In describing the other Sung wares he strikes a nice balance between firmness and tact. The finely carved and incised white Ting wares were made in the northern province of Chihli before 1127; but some of the potters fled south at the same time as the Court, and resumed work in the Chi Chou district of Kiangsi. Can the northern and southern products be distinguished? Key pieces are two bowls, one in the David Foundation, the other (unpublished) in China, which exceptionally bear dated inscriptions naming Yung-ho near Chi Chou as their place of manufacture. Chinese authorities, followed by Mr. Honey, have inclined to a southern origin for unmarked pieces that resemble these two in material and style, thus leaving "Northern Ting" as an uncertain category. But now Dr. Koyama's exploration of kiln-sites at Chien Tz'ŭ-ts'ŭn in Chihli has confirmed the northern origin of the best incised Ting wares; and "Southern Ting" becomes the uncertain quantity, if the two inscribed pieces are accepted. Mr. Gray is cautious here. He might, however, have said more about the many Ting-type pieces with a greyish body, whose southern origin is probable; and the covered bowl in Plate 49 must have been made, not in

the south, but in the north, for its inscribed date 1162 is in a Chin Tartar system of chronology.

In describing the Tz'ŭ-chou wares, Mr. Gray misunderstands their technique; the designs are carved through a white slip, not a black or brown one; it is the clay body appearing through the glaze that gives the dark background. His proposed category of Northern "Black" Wares would perhaps be better "Brown," and their manufacture certainly continues into the Ming period. He is cautious about the conjectural identification of Tung ware, which has now hardened into print in other quarters. Altogether the book is a valuable contribution to study, not least because it will revive discussion of much that has been prematurely accepted as basic doctrine.

ARTHUR LANE.

Scheherezade. Tales from 1,000 Nights. Translated by A. J. Arberry. London: Allen and Unwin. 1953. Pp. 222. 15s.

Professor Arberry explains his purpose in a 15-page introduction which raises several points of interest. His main purpose is to present his own translation of the "Nights" in a less stilted form than the renderings of Lane, Burton, Payne and Mathers. He deprecates the Neo-Gothic jargon of John Payne (p. 10), and also the less artificial if more scholarly rendering of Doctor E. W. Lane 120 years ago. For these and other reasons, also the biased work of Sir Richard Burton, sniping at Lane and gloating in his own Latin, and at times Greek, pornographic notes, he believes the time has now come for a "Revised" version, more in keeping with the times.

The author points out that the collection is a varied compilation covering several periods and many lands, all however with the Moslem slant. There have been obvious efforts through the ages at revision and editing by various Arab scholars to improve the style and layout of the stories, which Lane believes (p. 674 of his "Review" in the 1950 edition) were collected during the tenth century A.D. Obviously the Persian background of many tales points to the "Hazár Afsán" as the kernal of the Arabian Nights (*cf.* p. 459, Nicholson's *Literary History of the Arabs*). Professor Arberry, pointing to certain satirical passages and criticisms, suggests that some may have been produced at a much later period, when criticism of the Mameluke régime in Egypt might have proved unhealthy, and the circumstances narrated were therefore attributed to an earlier age. Whatever the facts, they cannot mar the value of this first real Moslem novel, which has probably inspired most of the existing fairy stories of the West, Hans Andersen and others.

One aspect which strikes those studying the original Arabic is the great emphasis on sex. The Arabs treat this subject in its correct proportion to their own lives, not, as the Victorians essayed, as elemental wickedness, to be hidden from view. Many stories in the original are surprisingly short, and narrate factual biology quite unambiguously, like the clinical reports of an operating surgeon. Though no Western censor would approve, it may well be that these simple pictures of Arab life are far less prurient than many modern novels accepted without question, and are perhaps in their own way less suggestive than Kinsey's disclosures of human behaviour. That this was distressing to Burton is apparent from his salacious notes, which gave an outlet to his particular type of mind, but did not improve his reputation.

Another angle which strikes the reader of today is the way the child of this Elizabethan age differs from Victorian predecessors. The modern child desires more plausible connection between cause and effect. There is a limit to acceptance of the Djinn's powers. Much of the Djinn's thunder has been stolen by planes instead of magic carpets, radar, atom bombs, prefabricated structures and mechanical toys. Children are now more sophisticated and harder to please. It is questionable whether the "Nights" would have been as popular if discovered in 1950 as they were in 1850, when translations became more generally available.

It is agreed that Professor Arberry is undertaking a public service of real value. These four tales, "Aladdin," "Judar," "Aboukire and Abousir" and "The Amorous Goldsmith," are the first of a series which will, it is hoped, cover all the printable stories, and eventually no doubt, in Penguin form, will not only help mothers to put their children to sleep, but lead to a wider understanding of problems in the Near East.

G. M. ROUTH.

The Ultimate Mountains. By Thomas Weir. London: Cassell and Co., Ltd. Pp. 98. 8½″ × 5½″. 21s.

This is the story, retold, of the Scottish Himalayan Expedition of 1950, which was undertaken by four members of the Scottish Mountaineering Club under the leadership of W. H. Murray, the well-known writer on mountaineering. It is written with the freshness and the joy of new adventure so typical of Murray's own works. The climbers were not bent on anything more spectacular than "twenty thousanders" and their outstanding success was the ascent of Uja Tirche, 20,550 feet. Their failures on Bethartou Himal (their initial objective), on the South Lampak peak, and on Panui Chuli are accepted stoically if not cheerfully. Weir's description of the strenuous passage of the Girthi Gorges, over the Ralam Pass, and into the Darma Gangh Valley are vivid and the fascinating encounters are well portrayed. The party's main intention, to gain Himalayan experience, was successful, and the book, which is amply illustrated with fine photos and four adequate maps, is good to read.

H. W. T.

The Hidden Land. By Ursula Graham Bower. John Murray. London, 1953. Pp. 244. 18s.

Miss Graham Bower's first book was an enthralling account of her work among the Nagas of the Assam Hills, during which she and the Nagas were caught up in the Japanese war. One result of this military preoccupation was her meeting with her future husband, Colonel Betts, and this second book is concerned with Colonel Betts's assignment after their marriage as Political Officer for the district in the terrain of the Subansiri Nagas.

The Subansiri area is the remote and, until this, entirely unpublished district to the north-east of Assam and bordering on Tibet, though further to Mr. J. P. Mills's frontier delineation tour, vindicating the MacMahon line, Dr. Christoph Haimendorf, the distinguished anthropologist, undertook an official exploration of this region in 1944 and has issued his report, *Ethnographic Notes on the Tribes of the Subansiri Region*, published by the Assam Government Press, Shillong, 1948; the only authoritative material available on the Subansiri tribes.

The author of this book also undertook ethnological research among the Nagas, and that is how she became a resident in these remote border areas, but from a student she became an accepted neighbour of the tribes, and this is not the book of a student or traveller, but of an admirer and a friend. It is reminiscent in its charm, and its lucid familiarity, with the thought processes and habits of a primitive culture and people, of Sir Horace Grimble's account of the Gilbert islanders in "Patterns of Islands," but the Apa Tanis and Daflas are more remote in the medieval seclusion of their legendary valley than any Pacific islanders. The illustrations are excellent, but after the description of the medieval splendour of the Apa Tanis' full dress, ceremonial cloaks, bamboo helmets and armour, and the intriguing picture lof an individual field worker with scarlet tail, one wishes there could have been coloured photographs.

Colonel Bett's job was not just to represent the British Raj but to put Pax Britannica on the map of the Subansiri area, and it was one of the pathetic by-products of Indian liberation that the freedom from raids and tribal warfare with ensuing blood feuds that this outpost accomplished should be abandoned. The author and her husband had accomplished much in a short time, because in their case they were representatives of an administration not remote from the remote people among whom they worked. The author is describing their final trek before their departure on the cancellation of Colonel Betts's appointment.

"When we climbed the Valley for the last time I did not look back. The forest closed in behind us, shutting the Valley in, shutting us out, and we walked forward through the centuries, in a thin, unkind rain, towards the alien and bitter present and the strangers who were our own kind."

E. S.

Prehistoric India to 1000 B.C. By Stuart Piggott, Professor of Prehistoric Archæology, Edinburgh. Penguin Series. Reprinted 1952. Pp. 289. $4\frac{1}{4}'' \times 7\frac{1}{8}''$. 3s.

While the general reader has been busy with two wars and the increased tempo of modern life, the archæologists have got down to it. In 1914 we used to talk of the cradle of the human race in Central Asia, and thence an Aryan invasion of India.

Researches of less and less by more and more, gradually co-ordinating discoveries in the Near East and the Indus Valley, have changed all that. Professor Piggott presents reasoned and convincing evidence that communal village life was in being in Baluchistan in the middle of the third millennium B.C., followed by a form of rigid and ordered civilization based on Mohenjodaro, 150 miles from the mouth of the Indus, and Herappa, on the Rawi, 350 miles to the north-east. There seems to have been traffic with Sumerian cities in Iraq, Syria and Persia.

Invasion from the north-west, possibly South Russia and Armenia, seems to have gradually overwhelmed the Zob colonies, and eventually, after nearly a thousand years of centralized empire, the great cities of the Indus Valley—round about 2000 B.C.

The author paints his picture with skill: the various pottery relics, and how they compared with similar finds in the Near East, so establishing connection. He starts with the more general outline of human existence for 400,000 years, harried by ice ages. Progress, as shown by tools, was very slow, and never got really going till about the fifth millennium B.C. It seems established to the lay reader that nothing much happened till the hunting man found wild grasses he could cultivate and animals he could tame, the same change from nomadic life to villages we see emerging in Arabia today. Again, the habitat of these grasses, round about Iraq, seems to indicate this area as the cradle of human progress rather than the Gobi Desert. As so often in history, the wild mountaineers from the north wiped out completely Sumerian and Indian cultures far superior to their own. But in India at least sufficient was absorbed to become a prototype of the Mauryan Empire so well described by Alexander's envoy, Megasthenes.

The chapter on the Aryans and the Rigveda presents the evidence from another angle, the linguistic and documentary, all confirming the assumed picture and fitting Sanskrit records into place as the record of these events.

Again one sees the recurring deterioration of settled peoples as victims of the anopheles mosquito and their own forest denudation, finally annihilated by a new method of war, in this case the horse chariot.

G. M. ROUTH.

A Tagore Testament. Translated by Indu Dutt. Meridian Books, 1953. Pp. 117. 10s. 6d. net.

This is an autobiographical selection from Tagore's poems, essays, letters and articles. It succeeds in expressing Tagore's philosophy, on which his life was based almost too well, for there is no great profundity in the "self-expression . . . that . . . pays the debt to intrinsic truth" and there is a good deal of reiteration in this anthology. It has been said that in reporting omission is more dangerous than misrepresentation, but in this "testament" there might have been more omission, and a selective sequence of thought that could have followed more closely the development of the poet and the man.

The author was closely associated with Tagore, and in his preface explains that it is his love for Tagore's work that is his reason for translation. The translation itself is excellent, but in an admiration that has allowed indiscriminate collection rather than a selection of Tagore's work the author has done less than justice to the master.

Actually the Preface itself is a well-balanced summary of Tagore's work and ideas, and if the juxtaposition of the prolific Bengali's poetry and prose and somewhat pseudo-philosophical ramblings makes rather nonsense of his autobiographical soul-searching, nevertheless it is lovely poetry, and it is the light of truth that illumines the prisms of poetic self-consciousness.

Perhaps Tagore suffered from too much appreciation in his lifetime to either become or be acknowledged now as a major poet. As a leader of Indian culture, in

the emergence of Indian nationalism, he was an acknowledged poet philosopher, the Bengali Ruskin. I remember going on what was almost a pilgrimage to Tagore's Ashram in Santineketan with a visiting English writer, and climbing up steps to the top of a tower, where the Sage sat waiting us, patriarchal, gazing over the red fields of Bihar, tilled by his own husbandry, in studied and impressive majesty. It would take a great poet and a greater philosopher to live up to that tower.

E. S.

The Holy Koran; an Introduction with Selections. By A. J. Arberry. (Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West No. 9.) George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 141. 1953. 8s. 6d.

The translation is very effective and can be praised almost without reserve, but the English reader should be warned that much of the Koran is not up to the standard of these selections. There are signs of haste; a verse is omitted in the version of chapter 56. In the introduction are some grotesque statements such as "the Greek and Roman civilizations were plainly dead and Judaism and Christianity appeared to be defeated faiths." It invites contradiction. It says, "truth cannot be dimmed by being frequently stated," but it can create boredom; it was a Muslim who said when reading the Koran, "I should scratch that out, he has said it before." Another assertion is that when the Koran tells of Abraham, Moses, and Joseph it was not telling new but reminding its hearers of familiar tales. If this is true, why did the audience not correct the mistakes? How is the identification of the Hebrew Miriam with the Jewess Mary to be explained? The Koran may have been inspired, as Professor Arberry says, but its ideas are few and are not new. It is an exaggeration to say that the rhapsodes' memories were infallible and that every good Muslim has learnt the whole Koran in his childhood. The idea that the rhythm of the Koran resembles that of drums is suggestive but has very little foundation, for it is admitted that we know little of the sound of Arabic as spoken in those days.

A. S. T.

Central Asian Review. Published quarterly. 30s. per year, single copy 7s. 6d.

Central Asian Review is published quarterly and is edited jointly by the Director of the Central Asian Research Centre and Mr. D. J. Footman, Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford. It aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of current political, social and material developments in the five Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as they are reflected in Soviet publications.

The selection of material is designed to represent positive achievements and shortcomings in the same proportion and with the same degree of emphasis as they are represented in the Soviet press and official publications. Explanation and background material are added where these seem to be necessary.

The Review is normally divided into six sections, one for each Republic and one containing articles of a more general scope. Each of the five sections dealing with the Republics contains material arranged under one or more of the following headings: Agriculture, Industry, Communications, Public Works and Services, and Political and Cultural Affairs. Subjects are only treated when a sufficient amount of significant material is available.

ERRATA

In the review of Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., in the January number of the Journal, it is regretted that the following errors appeared; p. 63, for Hauri read Hami; p. 64, line 2, for Colonel Youoff read Yonoff.

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CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

By LT.-COLONEL G. E. WHEELER, C.I.E., C.B.E., F.R.G.S.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 7, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Wheeler is no stranger to many of us. He has served for over thirty years in the Army and the Indian Political Service in India and the Middle East. Among other appointments, he was Military Attaché in Meshed, Director of the Publications Division of the Government of India and Oriental Counsellor in the British Embassy in Tehran. He has now retired and is at present Director of the Central Asian Research Centre. I will ask him now to give his lecture.

SOVIET Central Asia is not only adjacent to Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Chinese province of Sinkiang, but has important cultural affinities with those countries. Cultural developments in Soviet Central Asia have therefore a considerable significance for anyone interested in the future of the Middle East and South Asia.

Since the word "cultural" has a very wide application, I should explain at the outset that I intend to confine my lecture to the subjects of language, education, literature and the drama, the writing and teaching of history, and religion. In the short time at my disposal I shall deal with current trends in these matters, and shall refer only briefly to the past culture of the people of Central Asia.

Almost all my information is derived from Soviet sources, and this needs a word of explanation. Soviet publications—I am referring to those directed to the people of the U.S.S.R. and not to external propaganda directed to foreign countries—constitute a very important source of comprehensive information on the subject of my lecture. Other sources, such as the reports of occasional travellers and of refugees, are limited in scope and are usually biased. Soviet sources also are biased in the sense that they often conceal or attempt to conceal relevant facts, but since their policy of concealment varies according to circumstances, it is possible by careful and cumulative study of Soviet publications over a period to construct something like a coherent picture of the real situation. Unlike travellers and refugees, the Soviet authorities do have access to the facts; and it seems to me that a source which has access to the facts is potentially more useful than one which has not. As I hope to show during the course of my lecture, Soviet reporting on current developments in culture is by no means confined to favourable circumstances. In fact, it includes a great deal of information about the difficulties with which the authorities are confronted in their cultural policy, and particularly about the opposition which they are still encountering.

The Country and the People

According to the Soviet conception, the term Soviet Central Asia includes only the four republics Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenistan. I am including the adjacent republic of Kazakhstan in my lecture, partly because its culture is largely similar to that of the other four republics, and partly because the Soviet authorities themselves usually include it in their consideration of cultural matters. The area under review, then, stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to the frontiers of China in the east, and to Afghanistan and Persia in the south. To the north it reaches the frontiers of the R.S.F.S.R. The indigenous population amounts to about 11 million people, all of Turkic stock, except for about 1,000,000 Tadzhiks in Tadzhikistan who are of Iranian stock. Apart from the indigenous population, there are about 5 million settlers from other parts of the Soviet Union, mostly Russians and Ukrainians. There are also about 30,000 Koreans settled mostly in Uzbekistan. Up to the time of the Soviet Revolution, and for a good while after it, almost the entire population was engaged in agricultural pursuits, and a considerable part of it were nomads. Apart from the larger towns, and particularly Samarkand and Bukhara, which were centres of Muslim learning during the Samanid dynasty, the standard of life and culture was primitive. The percentage of literacy was very low, probably not more than 5 per cent., and most of the schools which existed were attached to the mosques. The nominal religion of the majority of the people was Islam, but there were and still are many shamanistic survivals, particularly among the Kazakhs and Kirgiz. There was only a minimum of written literature in the local languages, but there was a considerable oral literature handed down by word of mouth by akyns and bakhshis, or bards.

The Imperial Russian Government is often accused both of neglecting the welfare of the people and of pursuing an active policy of russification. The first charge is probably true, but there is no evidence to support the second; in fact the Tsarist authorities appear to have interfered very little in the traditional way of life of the peoples of Central Asia. The Soviet régime, on the other hand, has greatly improved material conditions; but it has interfered and is still interfering most actively in the cultural life of the people and makes no concealment of its policy of russification.

Language

There are five main languages used in the five republics with which we are dealing: Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh (with Kara-Kalpak), Kirgiz and Tadzhik. Of these, the first four are Turkic languages, which, although they have a basic similarity, are as much separate languages as those of European groups like the Romance and Slavonic. Tadzhik, on the other hand, is a form of Persian, and quite distinct from the other four: but a great deal of Uzbek is spoken in the Republic of Tadzhikistan. Of the four Turkic languages, only two can be said to have been written to any appreciable extent before the Revolution, namely Uzbek and Turkmen. A very small amount of writing was done in Kazakh, and all these three languages used the Arabic character. After the Revolution, or more pro-

perly after the end of the Civil War, an attempt was made to develop the languages themselves, and also education and literature, on the basis of the Arabic script, in which various modifications were made. Later, in about 1928, the Arabic script was replaced by a special Latin alphabet. Between 1939 and 1941 this was in turn replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet. The Cyrillic alphabet adopted for the Turkic languages was not a standard one, for each language was given a certain number of letters peculiar to itself, ostensibly to cater for phonetic requirements, but also apparently to make the languages mutually unintelligible to the peoples of the various republics in their written form. Since Stalin's famous pronouncement on the subject of languages made in 1950, there has been an increased drive to promote the introduction of more and more Russian loanwords. At first it was agreed that loanwords taken into the languages before the Revolution could be spelt in conformity with the phonetic requirements of the language which borrowed them. Thus, for instance, until recently the Russian word "krovat," commonly used for "bedstead" in the Kirgiz language, was always spelt and pronounced "kerevet"; but in a ukase on the subject of Kirgiz orthography published on June 6 last year, it was clearly laid down that this practice would cease and that in future all words borrowed from Russian, either before or after the Revolution, would be spelt exactly as in Russian.

Since 1941, when the Cyrillic alphabet was finally adopted for all the Central Asian languages, the "Elder Brother" theme, to which I shall presently return, has formed an implicit part of Soviet linguistic policy. But it is only comparatively recently, and particularly since 1950, that the rôle of the Russian language as the "Elder Brother" of Central Asian languages has been openly insisted upon. On the one hand, the Soviet authorities aim at preserving the elements and mechanics of existing languages, and on the other, at "enriching" and "developing" them—that is, overlaying them with, or rather infusing into them, as many elements of the Russian language as seems to them to be practicable. They evidently hope to achieve by russification an effect similar to that produced by the "Arabization" of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. But it was the *result* of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, just as Tsarist Russia and Britain insisted on the use of Russian and English, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages. The Soviet government is attempting to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: it is insisting on the russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loanwords; and it even envisages the modification of grammar and phonetics.

It is difficult to estimate the degree of success which Soviet linguistic policy is likely to achieve or even the extent of the opposition to it. As a means of writing Turkic or even Iranian languages, the Cyrillic script is far more suitable than the Arabic and not less suitable than the Latin. Left to

their own devices, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia might either have retained the Arabic script or have adopted a Latin script following the example of Turkey. The Tadzhiks, whose language closely resembles the Persian of Persia and Afghanistan, might have preferred the Perso-Arabic script used in those countries. As things are the Cyrillic script has probably come to stay. The increase in introduction of Russian loanwords and insistence on their spelling as in Russian are almost certainly resented by the older generation, but resentment might disappear if the policy is consistently pursued in primary education. The success of the Soviet plan to make people pronounce these words as in Russian seems less certain.

Education

At different times the Soviet authorities have claimed 100 per cent. literacy for various parts of the Soviet Union. This claim is now seldom advanced for Central Asia, though it was made last year for the unlikely region of Gorno-Badakhshan in Tadzhikistan. Both here and elsewhere in Central Asia it would be difficult to sustain this claim unless by literacy is merely meant an ability to recognize and write individual letters of the alphabet. Nevertheless primary and middle-school education has probably advanced further in Central Asia than in any area of the Middle East and South Asia with the exception of Syria, the Lebanon and Israel.

In theory, the same system of primary, seven-year and ten-year schools, universities and technical colleges exists as in the rest of the Soviet Union. In theory also, seven-year education is compulsory in the urban areas. There are, however, numerous reports of incomplete registers, low attendance particularly among girls, truancy—again particularly among girls—lack of teachers, buildings, books and other instructional equipment. Some of these shortcomings exist in other countries, England not excluded, but the extent to which they are reported from Central Asia is difficult to reconcile with claims of 100 per cent. literacy. But even if the percentage were not over 50, and I think myself that this is probable, it would still be more than twice as high as the percentage in most of the countries of the Middle East and South Asia. The same can be said for elementary technical education, to which great importance is attached and which has been organized on a far wider scale than in adjacent countries. Of the standard of higher academic and scientific education it is difficult to speak with any degree of precision. There are a number of universities and academies of sciences each with ambitious programmes of study; but there are constant complaints of inefficient teaching, unsound political theory, feudal survivals, and inadequate knowledge of Russian in the native students.

The extent to which Russian is used as the medium of instruction in middle and higher education is by no means clear. In middle schools its use as a medium is probably confined to instruction in the Russian language and in Russian history and literature. In the universities and academies of science, lectures are apparently given both in Russian and the local languages, but it is noteworthy that the great majority of the articles in university and academy bulletins are in Russian, and in some instances the use of local language is confined to the title and table of contents. The need for better instruction and more intensive study of the Russian lan-

guage is constantly emphasized and there are frequent complaints of the inadequate knowledge of Russian possessed by students passing on from middle schools to technical colleges and universities. It seems probable that no Central Asian native would get yery far in his profession unless he had a really good knowledge of Russian.

A word must be said on political education, which holds a high place in the Soviet conception of culture. It is difficult to assess the amount of time devoted to political instruction in the primary and middle schools. It may not be very great and such vernacular textbooks as I have seen are surprisingly free from political matter. But in the technical schools, universities and academies, what in the West would be regarded as a disproportionate amount of time is devoted to political matters. Indeed, the notion that professional and technical ability must be accompanied by sound political thinking and education still persists, although the difficulties which it involves are generally recognized. There is frequent mention in the press of seminars and courses in Marxist theory and other political subjects organized for professional men, whose apparent reluctance to profit by such facilities is as frequently deplored.

Literature

Whatever the real state of literacy there is no doubt that the number of books, magazines and newspapers produced in Central Asia both in Russian and in local languages is formidable. In Turkmenistan, whose population is little over a million, there are reported to be seventy newspapers and magazines, and this number may well be exceeded in the more thickly populated and more advanced republics. The most widely circulated books are probably those on political subjects, and the vernacular translations of the works of Lenin and Stalin are reported to run into hundreds of thousands. There are also many novels, short stories, historical romances and poems, as well as transcribed versions of traditional epics and songs which have been handed down by word of mouth. Many of these are strongly criticized in the official press, usually because they hark back to feudal times or because they present traditional characters in a light which does not correspond with the current party line. A notable case in point is that of the novel *Abai* by Mukhtar Auezov, who for a long time held the chair of "Abai studies" at the Kazakh University of Alma-Ata, and was also one of the editors of the first volume of the now discredited history of Kazakh literature. Although Auezov has been repeatedly called upon to revise his novel, he appears to have confined himself to minor alterations, and according to an article in the bulletin of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences of 1953, No. 4, he still persists in claiming that Abai was a protagonist of Sufism and pan-Islam. He even insists that the leaders of reactionary nationalist movements in the nineteenth century were disciples of Abai. Auezov has been guilty of other literary misdemeanours, but he still seems to hold a university post; and his books are evidently still extant and popular. Not all writers are so stubborn : the veteran Tadzhik writer Sadriddin Aini has conformed to the party line with almost complete consistency, and when he has deviated from it, perhaps inadvertently, he has been quick to repair his errors by revising his work. It is worth

mentioning that in Kirgizia a somewhat more indulgent attitude seems to have been adopted by the press towards writers who have in the past failed to give sufficient prominence to Kirgiz-Russian friendship and have tended to prefer traditional and imaginative themes to descriptions of Soviet life. In May, 1953, articles appeared in the Kirgiz press accusing the critics themselves of magnifying the trivial errors of such poets as Tokombaev. These articles also ridiculed the priggishness of some critics: a description of a prize at a horse-race won by some doughty cavalier would be ascribed to a predilection on the part of the writer for the glories of the past; and any indication of admiration for female beauty would be stigmatized as revealing a retrograde mentality. It is possible that this may be part of a new policy of literary broadmindedness designed to keep pace with the recent economic reorientation.

There has lately been a tendency to introduce a humorous, or rather a satirical, element in literature published in Central Asia. In the newspapers this takes the form of *feuilletons* which are intended to pillory current abuses or misapplications of official directives and are often well and amusingly written. So far only one comic magazine in a vernacular language has been seen, namely *Khorpushtak* (The Hedgehog), an illustrated monthly in the Tadzhik language. This too deals in satire and pungent criticism of officialdom and current abuses. It is said to have a circulation of 10,000 copies.

The only other branch of the arts on which I shall have time to touch is the drama. The theatre played no part in the traditional culture of Central Asia, but it has been given great encouragement under the Soviet régime. Many large towns have theatres, and although most of the plays shown are translated either from Russian classical or modern plays, original works by native authors are also acted. The latter have been frequently criticized on various grounds, and at the plenum of Union writers held in Moscow last October, the whole Soviet drama came under fire. Several well-known Central Asian writers attended this plenum and expressed views which were in accord with the general trend of criticism. This was to the effect that modern plays were too materialistic and lacking in the portrayal of human problems to attract audiences. People were tired of the constant reappearance of stereotyped characters such as party officials and kolkhoz managers with their petty problems of administration and ideology. Various speakers, including those from the Central Asian republics, strongly condemned the persistence of the "non-conflict theory"—the theory that in a classless society the clash of ideas and emotions is no longer possible. Furthermore, official and party control was found to be too rigid and often informed by ignorance of the æsthetic requirements of the people.

All this has the appearance of heralding a much more liberal attitude towards the drama and the literary arts in general. It remains to be seen how far it will be translated into fact.

The Writing and Teaching of History

The rewriting of history, that is to say the introduction of new historical theories, and sometimes the reintroduction of old ones, has always

been a prominent feature of Soviet cultural policy. In the matter of Central Asian history, Soviet historians feel themselves, not without justification, to be in a commanding position. They alone have full access to the historical facts of the Soviet period, at any rate since 1922 which marked the end of the Civil War. Again, only they have access to the Imperial archives dealing with the pre-revolutionary period, and particularly with such important events as the revolt of 1916. Finally, it is only they who have since the Revolution been able to carry out archæological research which might confirm or disprove existing historical knowledge. There is therefore no entirely reliable yardstick of impartial research against which new Soviet archæological discoveries can be measured. This is not to say that all Soviet historical research and archæological discoveries are falsified; but it is remarkable how they all seem to fit in with Soviet political requirements at a given moment.

During the past few years one historical theme has dominated all others: this is what is known as the "elder brother" theme. This theme, as it is developed in Soviet Central Asian policy, may be described as follows: From their earliest association with the people of Central Asia, the Russian people, by reason of their superior culture and technical and economic ability, have filled the rôle of mentor or elder brother towards the more backward peoples of the Central Asian republics. This relationship, the value of which has from the beginning been appreciated by the toiling masses, was made possible by the Tsarist conquest of Central Asia. The policy of extending Russian influence over Central Asia was sound. The means by which the conquest was carried out—and maintained in collaboration with the previous aggressors, the feudal and religious hierarchy—were bad. But the results of the conquest were good, since they brought the peoples of Central Asia into contact with the people of Russia.

The use of this theme seems only to have become extensive since the war, but it can be said to have had its origin in 1930, when doubts were first raised about the validity of the historical theory propounded by Pokrovski. Pokrovski had described the incorporation in the Tsarist empire of such adjacent non-Russian peoples as the Georgians, Armenians and Central Asians as "an absolute evil" (*absolyutnoye zlo*). In 1937, after Pokrovski and his school had been discredited, a decree was issued by the Government Commission assembled to consider the teaching of history in Middle School third and fourth classes. This decree laid down, among other things, that the term "absolute evil" was inappropriate in view of the collateral benefits conferred on the incorporated peoples by their association with the superior culture of the Russian people. It was necessary to abandon the conception of "absolute evil" and to use instead the formula of "the lesser evil," with the inference that the lot of these peoples would have been very much worse if they had not been incorporated in the Tsarist empire. It seems to have been in 1951 that the suggestion was first put forward that even the term "lesser evil" was too strong. This notion was developed by Professor Nyechkina in a letter published in *Voprosy Istorii* of April, 1951. The conclusion which she reached was that the word "evil" was inappropriate since, on balance, the results of the incorporation were "good."

One of the most specific and frequent complaints which have been levelled against Central Asian historians is that while they have dealt only perfunctorily with the part played by the Russian people in liberating the peoples of Central Asia from their Tsarist and feudal overlords, they have described in great detail the various revolts which have taken place in Central Asia, and have even tended to speak admiringly of the exploits of some of the rebel leaders. Accordingly, Soviet writers have been at pains to retell the story of these revolts in such a way as to throw discredit on the Tsarist administration, the feudal aristocracy and the religious leaders, and also on the agents of foreign powers, all of whom are alleged to have tried to exploit the revolts in their own interest.

Since the Revolution, and even during the past few years, Soviet treatment of the general theme of Russia's relations with the people of Central Asia has displayed a good deal of variation. At first the tendency was to allow the peoples of the various Central Asian republics to develop their history along something approaching normal lines—that is to say, they were allowed to revel in the exploits of their traditional heroes, who were held up as worthy forbears of the present generation thriving under the tutelage of the Soviet régime. Many of the histories of this kind written in 1943, and even later, have now, however, been completely or partially discredited on a number of grounds: the angle from which they have been written is found to be wrong; the national figures previously held up as heroes are now found to be reactionary reprobates. For instance, in the history of the Kazakh people published in 1943, a long chapter was devoted to the revolt led by Kenesary Kasymov, which lasted from 1837 to 1847. This chapter concluded with a specific mention of " the progressive rôle and significance of the struggle for freedom led by Kenesary Kasymov," who is described as " a hero of the Kazakh people." But a few years after the publication of this history it was decided that the movement of Kenesary Kasymov, so far from being progressive and a struggle for freedom, was " reactionary and feudal-monarchist," while Kenesary himself was an "obnoxious character"; and orders were issued for the rewriting of the history.

The unremitting vigour with which the Soviet authorities continue to preach the themes of the " elder brother " and the long-standing friendship between the Russian and Central Asian peoples suggests that opposition to them has by no means disappeared.

Religion

I propose to deal only briefly with the subject of religion, for although it is of great importance, the facts are not easy to determine. As I said earlier, Islam is the nominal religion of the great majority of the native population, but it would be a mistake to regard the people of Central Asia, or even of each nationality, as part of a corporate Muslim society. Indeed, a part of the previously nomad Kazakhs and Kirgiz can hardly be said to practise or ever to have practised Islam at all. Nor, except in some of the larger towns, is the traditional culture of the people essentially Muslim, many of the still prevailing customs and much of the folklore being pre-Islamic. Nevertheless, in so far as there exists any social and even political

bond of union among the peoples of Central Asia other than those of race, traditional culture and language it is probably Islam. That the Soviet authorities are aware of this bond of union and of the resentment felt by the people at being cut off from the rest of the Muslim world is shown by their constant denunciation of such international movements as Pan-Islam and Pan-Turanianism, and of the sect of Sufism.

Broadly speaking, the attitude of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government towards Islam is the same as their attitude towards other religions—they do not actively suppress it, but strongly discourage and still to some extent ridicule it. A nominal but officially appointed religious hierarchy is allowed to exist, but it has no power and every effort is made to restrict its influence by the counter-attraction of secular education and materialism.

It is often asserted that Islam is still a living force among the people of Central Asia, that it sustains them in their enforced subjection to the Soviet régime and that in certain circumstances it would unite them in achieving real independence. I do not myself know how far this is true today, but it might be unwise to take it for granted that Islam is any more ingrained in the hearts and minds of the people of Central Asia than it is in other parts of the Muslim world where the practice of Islam is not discouraged, but where it has failed to withstand the advance of westernization and where so-called religious movements are often disclosed as being political movements in disguise.

It may not be too fanciful to suppose that the sustained Soviet attacks on Pan-Islam and Pan-Turanianism, of which the significance is hardly evident to the West, means that the Russians regard Islam less as the ideological opponent of the Communist creed than as an obstacle to the establishment of Russian cultural and political influence. They may also fear Sufism not as a spiritual force but as a possible vehicle of secret communication among anti-Soviet elements of whose final liquidation they are by no means certain.

On the basis of information derived from Soviet sources the cultural situation in Soviet Central Asia can be summarized as follows: Soviet cultural policy is applied at the expense of traditional custom and culture. Although considerable play is still made with marxist and socialist cultural principles, more and more emphasis is being laid on the need for remodelling Central Asian culture on Russian lines. Thus, in dealing with language, the use of elaborate marxist theorization does not obscure the theme that Russian is the best language and that the peoples of Central Asia cannot do better than make their languages as much like Russian as possible. Similarly, Russian literature is the best literature, Russian science the best science and so on. Finally, the Russian people are the best people to guide the people of Central Asia along the road to prosperity.

Considerable progress has attended Soviet policy in matters of primary, middle school and technical education, in the elaboration of Central Asian languages, and in publishing. The response to attempts to rewrite history, to destroy traditional customs and to remodel literature and the other arts is not yet considered satisfactory. Opposition to these attempts

is freely admitted and efforts to break it down by various means are continuing.

Any spiritual hold which Islam may still have on the minds of the people is nowadays seldom referred to, but the chronic evils of so-called "cosmopolitan" movements and sects are constantly enlarged upon as being instruments of "Anglo-American imperialism."

The foregoing is the situation as it appears from a study of Soviet publications. Other appreciations of the situation, either more positive or more negative, are often to be found in books and articles published in the West. Many of them are based more on wishful thinking or ingenious speculation than on any other source of information which can be regarded as less biased than or as comprehensive as Soviet sources. But this is not to say that they may not be more correct. For reasons of their own, Soviet writers are often inclined not only to magnify Soviet achievements but to indulge in what seems to be exaggerated criticism of Soviet shortcomings and failures.

That opposition to Soviet cultural policy exists there is no doubt. Whether sovietization or russification is the more resented, whether the Soviet authorities will succeed in liquidating this opposition, whether they will resort to more intensive measures or adopt a more liberal policy, are questions which I myself am unable to answer.

The attractions of modernity and materialism are strong; but so is the influence of tradition and nationality. The rapid growth of literacy in circumstances where all forms of reading matter are subject to rigid control seems to favour the realization of Soviet cultural policy; but the spread of education however illiberal must eventually encourage people to think for themselves and thus develop a critical faculty.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: May I ask whether there is a greater measure of liberalism in Russian dealings with Outer Mongolia than is the case in other provinces? Are they presented with a more generous share of self-government than the other States?

Col. WHEELER: I cannot claim to speak with any authority, but I think so. I suppose we could say that although under control Outer Mongolia is freer than the people of the Soviet Union themselves.

Miss KELLY: Will the occupation by Chinese forces of areas adjacent to Central Asia bring about eventually a certain amount of Chinese influence among Central Asian populations?

Col. WHEELER: I think it is very likely. But in Soviet publications there is very seldom any reference to China except formal accounts.

Miss KELLY: May I ask how the standard of living in Central Asia compares with Persia and Afghanistan?

Col. WHEELER: I should say that material progress has been much greater in Central Asia. My impression is that the standard of living has been raised.

Col. ROUTH: In the matter of archæology referred to by the lecturer, it seems to me that this is an important area, quite possibly the cradle of civilization, dating back from before Sumerian times, and as regards both migration and philology. I understand that the conduct of inquiries into

those ancient times is entirely in Russian hands, not co-ordinated according to Western methods, and it seems to me that this might quite possibly mean the blotting out of records of the past, and that we shall lose a very important means of finding out how civilization started. I expect the lecturer has spent a lot of time on this subject, and I should like to hear his views.

Col. WHEELER: I am not an archæologist, but I have seen quite a lot of Soviet writings on archæology. In the excavations in the Khorezm Oasis, as far as I am able to judge, the Russians gave a fairly objective account. Of course, if they found anything which disproved their own theories they would probably obscure it. I quite agree that any form of science which is in the hands of one people with fixed ideas may have most awkward consequences because they can do what they like. Archæology should, of course, be internationalized.

It is surprising how often slavery is mentioned in Soviet archæological surveys and we do not often hear of despotic monarchs doing any good at all. The Soviet point of view is one-sided, but I do not think it is without real scholarship. Some of the work is of a high standard.

Sir CLARMONT SKRINE: May I ask the reason for the non-inclusion of Kazakhistan in the term Central Asia?

Col. WHEELER: I do not think it was ever included, but I cannot give you the exact reason why it is regarded as a separate area. It was at one time simply part of the hinterland of Siberia, and the northern parts were occupied by Imperial Russia long before the Russians began to extend southwards to the Persian and Afghan frontiers. That may have something to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is now up, and on your behalf I should very much like to thank Col. Wheeler for a most interesting lecture, obviously the result of very careful and skilful study. I very much agree with the last remark in his lecture that the spread of education however illiberal must eventually encourage people to think for themselves and so develop a critical faculty.

A RECENT VISIT TO BURMA AND INDONESIA

By SIR HAROLD ROPER, C.B.E., M.C., M.P.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 12, 1954, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, we are very fortunate this afternoon in having Sir Harold Roper to speak to us about his visit to Burma and Indonesia. He is one of those lucky individuals who have made such a good job of life that anything he has touched seems to be successful. I am sure he has deserved it, because going from Blundell's to Cambridge University he rowed in the 'Varsity boat; then, joining the Army for what I always call "our war," he was a captain in the Devons and won that coveted prize, The Military Cross. Later he turned his attention to business and was the general manager of the Burmah Oil Company from 1936 to 1945. In his record there is the modest sentence "Despatches 1942," which really means that he took a distinguished part in Burma in those troublous times. Sir Harold has now become one of our legislators and has been Member of Parliament for North Devon since 1950. He was a member of the Parliamentary Delegation that went to Burma in the early months of this year.

Sir HAROLD ROPER: I was very pleased to be invited to come here to give a talk on my recent experiences in Burma and Indonesia. I am very conscious of the limitations of my qualifications for lecturing on a quick 3-weeks' tour covering two large countries; therefore, I prefer that this should be a talk in which I give my impressions of the tour.

THE events in Indo-China and the discussions which are now going on at Geneva make it all the more important that there should be a correct understanding of the position in South-east Asia. It is not unnatural that there should be in South-east Asia a tendency for those smaller nations, which since the war have been established as fully independent nations, to look towards India, as towards a big brother, and particularly to Mr. Nehru as the dominating figure there. The recent Conference of Prime Ministers at Colombo shows how a conflict of local interest, such as about Kashmir or the Indian problem in Ceylon, by undermining confidence, can retard the development of a common policy and still more of a common plan to achieve it. I trust, and believe, that this will prove to be a passing phase, and that as the years go by initial difficulties will be overcome, mutual differences will be resolved and confidence will develop.

As to our own position in South-east Asia, during the years before full self-government was achieved in the countries associated with us, a bitterness against the British developed and spread widely amongst politically minded sections of the people. It was perhaps a natural result of a frustrated nationalism. With the last trace of control thrown over, the signs are that that spirit of bitterness is now rapidly disappearing and, although gratitude is a thing uncommon in international affairs, I am happy to believe that much good that we have done is still remembered in those coun-

tries, and that the reputation for straight and honest dealing which we have built up for ourselves, and which has surely been consummated in the final concession of full self-government, will serve us in good stead in the years to come, and will enable us in the closest friendship with them to continue to make a useful contribution towards their peaceful advancement.

It was with such hopes and aspirations that I accepted the invitation to take my place as a member of a parliamentary delegation, which visited Burma and Indonesia in January, stopping for three days at Karachi on the way home. Pakistan and Burma have been well known to me over many years. I was in Burma before the first World War, but Indonesia was new to me.

Organized under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, invited by the countries we visited, we had no axe to grind; our function was merely to exchange views and friendly feelings with others who, like us, believe that through the instrument of parliamentary democracy lies the ultimate solution of many world problems.

Burma

On arrival in Burma we were at once struck by the cordial atmosphere; indeed, the warmth of the welcome we received. wherever we went, will remain with me as one of the happiest memories of our tour. That in eight short days in Burma we were able to visit Mandalay, Chauk, Pagan, Taunggyi and Moulmein, as well as to spend several days in Rangoon, testifies to the excellence of the arrangements made as well as to the advantages of air transport.

The country has by no means recovered from the consequences of the war. Law and order have not yet been restored. Government hold the towns, but there are areas where the various brands of rebels still hold sway, and whether one travels by road or river, an armed escort is a normal accompaniment. For instance, when we visited Taunggyi, although that part of the Shan States is not a rebel area, not only were we given an armed escort, but in addition the twenty miles of road from the aerodrome was closely picketed by troops. Moreover, although the railways are in operation, hold-ups by armed robbers are still a frequent, one might say weekly, occurrence.

The Burmese have maintained that the continued presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in far North-east Burma has been largely responsible for the insecurity elsewhere. For a considerable force has been employed in dealing with them, and too few have been left to tackle effectively the various rebel bodies still at bay in different parts of the country. It is to be hoped that, now that the bulk of the Chinese Nationalist troops have been evacuated, as reported in *The Times* a few days ago, a rapid improvement will be seen.

Some of the rebels are Communist in name, and a few individuals have experience of Communism. But apart from possible remote liaison with Communist China there appears to be little connection between them, still less with Russia. Militarily there appears to be nothing to prevent the Chinese Communists from walking in, but the independence of religion of the Burmese people makes it unlikely that they would ever turn Com-

munists. Another factor is that they are self-supporting in food supplies and will never go hungry. When I enquired as to the standard of living in the villages we could not visit because of the insecurity, I was told that the people in the villages say: "Previously we could feed and clothe ourselves and still wear gold; today when we have bought our food and our clothes there is nothing left with which to buy gold."

Another section of the rebels is the Karens. It never included more than a part of the Karen community and it was claimed that their number was steadily declining. The Karens are not normally inclined to Communism; it is unsuited both to their temperament and to their religion. But in the Irrawaddy Delta they have at times co-operated with the Communist rebels in their opposition to the Government. At the very same time in Eastern Burma other Karens have been in association with the anti-Communist troops in Kengtung, trading with them arms for food supplies.

In this country many who have known the Karens feel distress at the apparent failure of our own Government to champion the cause of the rebel Karens. They feel that we have let down our friends. For myself, I believe the Government of Burma have done their best to give the Karens a square deal, and that the dissentient Karens were at fault not to accept the offer which was made to them, at least as a basis for discussion. I share the regret at what has happened, for I myself have had many friends amongst the Karens. But one must not let one's heart get the better of one's sense of justice.

It is greatly to be hoped that the Government of Burma will by their actions soon succeed in winning over the confidence of the dissentient Karens.

In Burma, as also in Indonesia, the insecurity of the countryside has driven folk to the towns, and Rangoon and Djakarta have doubled and trebled in size, setting a housing and a servicing problem such as would strain the resources of a local authority even in normal times.

In the face of so many and great difficulties we were impressed with the practical manner with which the Government were tackling the job. Terribly short of experienced staff, and handicapped by the insecurity, nevertheless we felt that they had their feet on the ground. One of the Commissioners in Burma told me, with pride, that he had visited every township in his division. What interested me was not that he had visited every township but that he had regarded it as an achievement. I was impressed by the Rehabilitation Centre outside Rangoon, a large camp into which deserters from the rebels are taken. There is an endeavour to turn them into good and useful citizens by teaching them carpentry, smithy work, weaving and so on. The Burmans assured us that that was having valuable results. To the extent that it is possible to get to the villages the Government are paying considerable attention to trying to improve the conditions of those living in the villages by improving water supply, education, etc. They are going ahead with a welfare scheme. The Burmans are naturally jealous of their new independence, nevertheless they have not been above accepting advice from us. Americans also spoke to me of the good sense and excellent co-operation which they are ex-

periencing in the course of making their own most generous contribution towards the rebuilding of the country's economy.

I have felt that this mark of their confidence in us is a tribute to our conduct of their affairs during the years that we were in control. Some have criticized that in the past we have been too slow in the rate of advancing of our overseas territories towards self-government. It was only on January 1, 1886, that the British finally took over Upper Burma. In 1937, fifty-one years later, I myself found myself one of only two European members of the Burma Senate. The Premier was a Burman. The Finance Minister was a Burman, responsible for deciding the rate of income tax which Europeans would pay. The Commerce Minister was a Burman, responsible for the terms of forest and mining leases to be granted to British firms. So much achieved in fifty-one years! And fifty-one years is surely not a long time in the life of a nation. And not only was it a firm grounding in parliamentary government which we have left behind, but much else besides, including a judicial system based on the principles of British justice, free from all political influence, and I was happy to learn that those principles are still being maintained by the present Government.

Burma has always been firstly an agricultural country, with rice her main crop. Her overseas trade development has been almost entirely in the hands of Indians, British and a few others, and in the past the Burmese people have never taken much interest in it. Moreover they are not given to saving, and so have little capital of their own to invest in new enterprise. Nevertheless the policy of the Government, and particularly of the Prime Minister U Nu, who impressed us very favourably, is ultimately to divert trade and industry into the hands of Burmese nationals, and, as a stepping-stone to that end, while private capital is building up, for the State itself to take its part in industry. Whether it will finally work out in that way, time will show. In the meantime a number of industries have been nationalized, including forestry, water, transport and electricity, and also the marketing of rice. The results appear to have been various; inland water transport is running smoothly and is showing a profit. On the other hand, their venture in the marketing of rice has been less successful. They have started just outside Rangoon a textile mill, an agricultural bank, a cotton seed farm and a dairy farm in an endeavour to improve the strain of cattle. A paper pulp factory and two sugar factories have been planned. A new method of Government participation in industry takes the form of the joint venture. The first experiment of this kind, the big mining concern, the Burma Corporation, appears to be working well. While I was in Burma the Government signed an agreement with the oil companies for a joint venture whereby the Government will take one-third share of the oil industry of Burma. Perhaps in the extension of the principle one may find a pattern of industry which will satisfy those national aspirations which have been the cause of so much heartburning in the past.

In concluding my remarks about Burma, I must again speak of the great warmth of the welcome we everywhere received. In a strongly Buddhist country I was particularly impressed at the hospitality extended to us in taking us into the most holy places in their pagodas. In the great Shwe-Dagon in Rangoon, for instance, we were taken not merely to the

main platform so well known to visitors, but to a still higher platform, to what we were told was the most holy shrine of all. The bars were unlocked, and as we were invited inside one by one to affix our personal tribute of gold leaf on the sacred image, our Burmese host of the moment, a trustee of the pagoda, made the significant comment: "In sixty years I have not been allowed that privilege." I could not help feeling that that was more than ordinary hospitality. It was something specially granted to us, and it would be a mistake to overlook it. The warmth of our welcome was a most important result of our visit. Although Burma decided to leave the Commonwealth, it demonstrated that at least we have retained a real friendship. And perhaps I may illustrate that by recounting an incident of a more personal nature. When our aeroplane touched down at Mandalay one of the first people I recognized in the crowd to meet us was U Kyaw, once a colleague of mine in the Burma Senate. He welcomed me most warmly. He was just on 80 years of age and he said that he would have met me in any case as a trustee of the pagoda later on, but that he felt he had to come to the aeroplane to meet us. And that is only part of the story. Later he was accompanying us to the old Fort of Mandalay. When we were looking at the site of the old Royal Palace, the last of which disappeared during the war, old U Kyaw pointed and said: "I was born over there." I replied: "Eighty years ago, when King Mindau was on the throne." He was the last but one of the Burmese kings. "Yes," replied my friend, "I can remember so clearly the British arriving." That old man could remember the British arriving to dethrone his king, and yet at the age of 80 he could come to the aerodrome to meet our delegation. I hope that is illustrative of the feeling towards the British in the country as a whole.

Indonesia

In Indonesia most of our time was spent in Java, where the generous use of the aeroplane enabled us from our headquarters in Djakarta to visit Djogjakarta, Semarang and Surabaya in addition to seeing something of the countryside by road. We also spent an exceedingly happy two days in Bali, where we were able to see something of the ancient culture of that beautiful island. Again the hospitality we received from our Asian friends was almost overwhelming. The country spreads over a vast area of sea and land, but is sparsely populated except in Java, where the density of population is even greater than that of our own crowded island, being nearly 1,000 to the square mile. Its total population is about the same. Fortunately the island is highly fertile and the people industrious—as indeed they have to be, if they are to handle the three crops a year which the land produces. They possess also a high degree of skill, as is shown by the high standard of their handicraft, their wood-carving and silver-work, and by the artistry of their Batik textile designs.

In certain sections of their public services, including roads, railways and public health, they have inherited from the Dutch a standard above the average for the countries of South-east Asia. In education, however, the standard is low, and there is a general shortage of experienced staff to fill the higher administrative posts. I was glad to be informed by the head

of a British firm there that the proportion of literates is now rapidly increasing, but in spite of a great expansion of university facilites, it would appear to be inevitable that for some years to come there must be something of a hiatus at the level of higher education. In young countries there is sometimes a tendency to reduce standards of education in order to give a larger number of students a degree of some kind. There appeared grave danger of this happening in Indonesia. We visited in Djogjakarta a new university founded only five years ago. In five years it had risen to 7,300 students. They are in temporary buildings. In spite of a generally low standard of education the lecturers and professors are 85 to 90 per cent. Indonesian. One shudders to think of the sort of education which is being given there, but a British Council representative at work there appeared to be confident that the shortcomings would soon be rectified.

On the political stage the outstanding personality is Dr. Sukarno, the President, a striking figure whose sole determination is to see his country firmly established. There is a nominated parliament. There has not yet been an election, but we were assured that one would be held either at the end of this year or next. That in five years there have been five successive Cabinets suggests a fluidity of political opinion. Perhaps it would be a more correct interpretation to say that it indicates the strength of Sukarno's personal position, for throughout he has dominated the scene. That is not to say that he has the united support of the country; he has powerful opponents in the electoral field, and the insurrections in Celebes, in West Java and in North Sumatra show how limited is the present governmental control.

The fact that the Communists are supporting the present Government has given rise to some concern. There is no doubt that the Communists are working hard to extend their influence, and they are already well established in the trade union movement. On the other hand, the strength of the Islamic faith and a generally prosperous countryside are countervailing factors. Dr. Sukarno himself has always been firm in his handling of the Communists, and a probable explanation of his present attitude is that he is using the Communists to support him against other powerful elements. The danger of Communism, though serious, is not, I think, immediately imminent.

In these difficult circumstances progress in my view is handicapped in two main respects, by the nationalism of its citizens and by the irresponsibility of its labour. Indonesia today is in the grip of a dangerous inflation. It is not the only country in South-east Asia in which there is a tendency to use to excess an imposed machinery for labour negotiation. The best place to settle a labour dispute is on the factory floor, and an almost automatic reference to an industrial court bedevils true labour relations. Samuel Gompers, the great pioneer of trade unionism in America, once said that "Labour and management are like man and wife; they've got to get on together somehow." It is as true for Indonesia as it is for the U.S.A. that for the solving of such human problems a court, of whatever kind, is a poor substitute for personal endeavour. A higher scale of reward for services rendered is greatly to be desired in many countries, but if an inflation, harmful to the workers as well as to others, is to be avoided there

must be a self-discipline in labour affairs which will set a limit to exaggerated claims. That is my first point.

With regard to nationalism, President Sukarno, in a speech made in 1945, when the Republic of Indonesia was in its embryo stage, referred to the bridge, the golden bridge of freedom, and how on the far side of it a new society would be built up. Today it might be added that the crossing of that bridge was a highly emotional experience, but that in the great constructive work which lies ahead emotion should have no place. It must be based on realism. In the present state of world opinion there can be no question of the Indonesians being forced back across the bridge, and emotion may well therefore be laid aside. Realists in Indonesia recognize that, if progress is to be made, the primary need is for a sound economy. Independence must be meaningless without it. A potentially rich country, the organized development of its wealth has been largely in the hands of others, and particularly of the Dutch, who have provided the experience, the "know-how" and the financial backing. Official opinion recognizes the continued need of capital from overseas, but in deference to the fashionable and perhaps natural dislike of all things foreign, the policy designed to encourage it is so hedged about with conditions that it is in grave danger of failure to achieve its object. It is greatly to be hoped that those who realize the peril will have the political power to force appropriate action before it is too late. But in Indonesia the prospect is most uncertain.

I return to the theme on which I started. In South and South-east Asia we have a group of nations newly advanced to self-government, jealous of their position and striving to establish themselves on a sound and firm basis, economically and politically. There is a growing realization that in this modern world even the larger nations cannot live in isolation. As President Sukarno said in the speech to which I have already referred, "Our homeland, Indonesia, is only a small part of the world. Remember that."

Not unnaturally there is a tendency for the nations of South-east Asia to look to one another for support. It is well that they should do so in the face of the common danger which confronts all free nations. But I returned from my tour encouraged by what I had seen and experienced. Both in Burma and in Indonesia I found great goodwill towards us, and I am filled with hope that, just as India, Pakistan and Ceylon, as members with us of the British Commonwealth, so also Burma and Indonesia, which are outside it, will go forward in close association with us in a joint endeavour for the common good.

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Harold has kindly said that if any member wishes to ask questions or to comment on what he has said, he is here to help.

The Hon. Mrs. PHILIP MELDON: Just two questions. Firstly, I did not quite understand what "joint venture" meant in Burma. Secondly, both in England and elsewhere over the world I have worked in welfare. The lecturer's explanation of the danger of inflation so far as workers are concerned is the clearest I have ever heard. When an ordinary individual like myself tries to explain the dangers to the workers it is difficult always

to give a clear explanation. It seems that not only in Burma but also in England Members of Parliament and business men should explain such matters to the ordinary people.

Sir HAROLD ROPER: Years ago I became convinced that both in India and Burma labour negotiating machinery was being used to excess. During our tour in Burma I was pleased to have a number of interesting talks with Mr. M. A. Raschid. During the period of acute labour disturbance before the war I had known Mr. Raschid as the able advocate of the workers against the company which I represented. He is now Minister of Labour in the Burma Government. I was interested to be able to express to him the opinion, which I had formed, that at that time our company's labour organisation had been overdone, and that the result had been a lowering of the sense of responsibility not merely of the labour force but also of our own departmental employees. There was too great a tendency to say: "That is not a matter for us to settle. Pass it to the Labour Bureau." It hindered the development of a proper labour relationship.

As to the "Joint Venture," it is an arrangement reached by agreement between the Government of Burma and the oil companies operating in Burma, of which the Burmah Oil Company is the greatest. In effect, the Burma Government as a Government is taking a one-third share in the oil interests within the country in much the same way as the British Government has a large holding in the shares of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

I mentioned the Burma Corporation, a very large concern, which also is now organized as a joint venture. The directors are 50/50 Burmese and British, on terms of absolute equality to the extent that the British Chairman has no casting vote. Both sides therefore have to shoulder full responsibility for action taken, and I was informed that the arrangement was working extremely well.

Miss KELLY: With reference to the unsettled state of the country, I gather from the lecture that those responsible for it are called Communists; at the same time the lecturer said they had no connection with China or Russia. Is there any legitimate reason why the people concerned should be called Communists?

Sir HAROLD ROPER: The Burmese say that there are a very few individuals who have been to Moscow; they were insistent that only a few leaders are real Communists; they denied that it was a case of mere dacoity. Burma always was a country of armed robbers and there is still a lot of dacoity, but the Burmese denied that these rebel bodies were nothing more than that. In Burma in the old days one used to say that politics was a matter of individuals, of personalities, rather than policies. I came away with the impression that that still applies: that the rebel bodies are very largely personalities who have worked up a following. I asked one of my Burmese friends, "What makes the followers follow?" and his interesting reply was "Fear." Whether that is right or wrong, I do not know. I do not think one must pay too much attention to the name "Communist." It would be handy in the event of an invasion by Communist China for the Communists to feel they had a following in the country, but I do not think there is anything at the back of it. It is

rather like the old politics: individuals seeking power, and that search for power is greatly assisted by the aftermath of war conditions when there were a great many Japanese weapons left around the countryside, so that the armed robberies were not a matter of going in with a few pitchforks and so on, but they started off with mortar-fire on the villages. That is what is being dealt with in Burma and Indonesia as regards dacoity.

Wazir AMEER ALI: There is a rider I would like to add, without casting any aspersion on our guest lecturer. He stated that in the past there was bitterness against the British, which has now vanished. He wisely qualified that by saying that the bitterness developed amongst the politically minded sections of the people. We hear that said everywhere. Even my esteemed contemporary, Professor Arnold Toynbee, got a great fund of goodwill because the Indians were more friendly to him than to anyone else. Actually there was so much goodwill that there were 2,000,000 volunteers in the old British Indian Army from 1939 onwards. I think Sir Harold can confirm that practically none of the men in the old Burma Rifles who survived to march out joined the Japanese and that 99 per cent. of the Burmese tribesmen, Chins, Kachins, Karens and so on, were actively loyal to the Allied cause, especially the British cause, and 60 per cent. of the rest of the population in Burma were willing supporters. So far from very general bitterness against the old Imperial rule, my information is that there is, for the most part, general regret for its having gone, very widespread regret, apart from the politicians.

I submit that possibly that is the reason why the lecturer and his fellow delegates met with such a warm and cordial reception.

Sir HAROLD ROPER: I am glad to hear that, and I believe it to be true. It is true that I qualified my remark by saying the "politically minded." May I quote, in support of your comment, sir, an incident that I once quoted in Parliament? It was in the days of exile from Burma, when the Japanese were in Burma and the Government of that country had its headquarters in Simla. They had a series of reconstruction committees. There was one such committee on education on which I was the only non-official member. The late U Tin Tut, then Chancellor of the Rangoon University, was a member of it. A Burmese Minister was the Chairman. U Tin Tut, who was a distinguished member of the Burma Civil Service, was strongly nationalist, if not of the bitter kind, and kept backing his arguments with references to "public opinion." "Burmese opinion will not have this, or will not have that." One day another Burmese member of the Committee came out with what I thought was a very courageous little speech, courageous because it was a speech against his own Chancellor of his own University. This is what he said: "I cannot sit here any longer and listen to what U Tin Tut has to say about Burmese opinion. Every year in the course of my duties I interview many hundreds of parents and students and potential students, and I am convinced that what U Tin Tut calls 'public opinion' is not public opinion but the opinion of a handful of politically minded people with the backing of the Burmese Press." I think that answers the point.

Colonel GARSIA: Would the lecturer say a word or two about the

White Flag and Black Flag parties. I had an idea that they were both aspects of Communism. About eight years ago there were certainly two such parties, but we do not hear much about them in these days.

Sir HAROLD ROPER: I do not think the name White Flag or Black Flag party is particularly important, no more important than "Communist." It might be Mr. Jones or Mr. Brown—just a tag without very much meaning. Some are a little further Left than others, but they are all much of a muchness in their aim to win power. I am sorry I cannot answer the question with greater certainty.

The CHAIRMAN: I think Sir Harold has met many in our country wondering really what has been happening in Burma and Indonesia. We have been very fortunate this afternoon in hearing the conclusions to which you, sir, have arrived after your tour. It has been most instructive and deeply interesting to hear what you have had to tell. And the most encouraging thing of all is that after your experience in these countries you have been able to conclude on a note of hope. We thank you most sincerely and gratefully.

EGYPT TODAY

By HENRY F. AYRES, C.B.E., M.Inst.C.E.

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on June 30, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Ayres has very kindly come to talk to us today about Egypt. Some people may possibly be thinking, as Egypt is not in Asia, why are we having a lecture on Egypt? That is quite true, but as it is only just over the border and what goes on in Egypt very much affects Asia Minor we felt we were justified in asking Mr. Ayres to come to give us this talk. Mr. Ayres, as many of you know, is very experienced. He has had a long experience of both Egypt and the Sudan—about forty years—and is an engineer by profession. He has served in the Government's services and also in private enterprise. He was elected the president of the Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, but left shortly afterwards.

THE subject matter of this talk is not quite what I was invited to discuss by your secretary, nor does the title printed on the notice now apply. The explanation of this is that after I had accepted the invitation and suggested a title, I discovered that the Royal Institute of International Affairs had just published two excellent articles by Mr. Tom Little, in *The World Today*, which covered almost exactly what I had intended to say. As it was too late to alter the title of this talk, as printed, I am now asking you to accept a new title, "Egypt Today," in its place.

For those who may not have seen Mr. Little's articles, they are in the April and May issues of *The World Today*.

I have found since my return from Egypt that few people in England have any knowledge of the Egyptian background except that provided by the press and private letters home from soldiers serving in the Canal Zone. Now, opinions based on newspapers necessarily depend on the paper usually read and it must be remembered that letters home from service men living under difficult conditions and in a deadly dull part of Egypt are bound to be full of grumbles and grouses against everything concerning Egypt and the Egyptians. On the Egyptian side, opinions are also based on the press, which is not as free as our own and which is quick to report and often exaggerate minor occurrences considered to be evidence that Britain is against Egyptian interests.

My object is therefore to try to explain more fully the position and some of the difficulties. The Egyptians are not "Wogs," nor are our British soldiers "Dogs"—but are human beings, who have been good friends and can be friends again.

Now I shall begin by stating some of the fundamental facts lying behind many of the present-day troubles.

Firstly, Egypt is overpopulated; the population density being over 1,700 to the square mile and rapidly increasing. About 70 per cent. of

this population depends on agriculture, and there is not enough land nor any hope of such increase as to meet the needs of the growing population.

Secondly, although Egypt has had contacts with what we now call the West certainly since Alexandria was founded in 331 B.C., these have been almost entirely at her northern end, which, I think, may be the reason why there are still so few enlightened and well-educated people and so many who, in spite of the rudiments of education, remain primitive in their outlook and experience. To my mind this is of greater importance than the usual comparison between rich and poor, because an increase in wealth does not immediately lead to advancement in education and outlook—this takes time.

The importance of this condition of the people becomes at once apparent when we begin to discuss constitutional government and free elections.

Thirdly, Egypt's existence as an inhabited country depends on the water supply from the Nile. This must always be remembered when considering Egyptian affairs with the Sudan and southwards.

Fourthly, Egypt is situated in such a geographical position that, whether she likes it or not, she is forced to be concerned in international affairs of the Great Powers. Egypt must trade with the highly industrialized countries both to dispose of her cotton and to obtain her own requirements. She cannot stand aloof and neutral.

There is no time to delve deeply into the past, but I can say that, according to Western ideas, the Egyptians have, in one form or another, been misgoverned for centuries. The intervention of the British in the 1880s led to rapid development and great increase in prosperity. None can deny this evident truth, although the younger generation in Egypt are not all aware of it; some have not heard of it or read of it. The withdrawal of our control, which in world conditions of today cannot be re-imposed, led to a revival of the old misgovernment in other forms and with the ever-increasing economic problems was rapidly leading the country once more to disaster. Many Egyptians realized this, but no group or individual was able to oppose the evil, with any chance of success, until General Neguib and certain army officers took action in July 1952.

It is difficult to describe the state of affairs just before the riots of January 26, 1952, but it is certain that the political party in power, the Wafdists, under Mustapha Nahas, endeavoured to cover their other misdeeds by encouraging to the full the latent anti-British feeling.

Apart from inciting violent action against the British in the Canal Zone, they encouraged any action against British civilians resident in Egypt. All but four British officials in the service of the Egyptian Government were summarily dismissed, many of them receiving their notices on dirty scraps of paper.

Social clubs were encouraged to turn out all British members, regardless of the fact that some of them had been started by the British. So it went on until the final flare-up on January 26, 1952. It is important to note here that in these riots it was not only British lives and property that

were attacked, but property belonging to people of different nationalities, even Egyptian property.

Now, I have not brought this up to reawaken old feelings and enmities, but to point out what sort of legacy any subsequent government inherited from the Wafdists. As you are aware, the King had to dismiss the Wafdist Cabinet after the rioting. Between then and July 22, 1952, Aly Maher, Neguib el Hilaly and, for a very short time, Hussein Sirry each held office. Whether the King felt more powerful now that the Wafd had been discredited and dismissed or not, I do not know, but I do know that he interfered more and more in both public and private affairs. The army, which in spite of strong feeling had remained loyal even after the arms scandal in the Palestine war, could stand it no longer and forced Farouk to abdicate on July 26, 1952.

It was most remarkable that the country took this so quietly. On July 23 I was informed by telephone at 7.30 a.m. that the army had taken over in Cairo. It so happened that auctioneers' men were coming to arrange a sale of furniture in my house that morning—they came punctually, did their work and the sale was duly held on July 25 with a large public attendance—in fact as usual!

It was not known at the time that this action of the army was to be the prelude to the overthrow of the Mohammed Aly dynasty, but I believe that had this happened at once there would have been little reaction against it. Egyptians like a monarchy and, if Farouk had been other than what he is, the idea of the constitutional monarchy would have worked. It must, however, be remembered that the dynasty only came into being in the nineteenth century and the succession was only granted to the family of Mohammed Aly in 1841. In the century, except for the great popularity at first accorded to the young Prince Farouk, from whom so much was expected, the reigning house meant very little to the bulk of the population.

Before the *coup d'état* the Egyptian Government was a constitutional monarchy modelled on the Belgian Constitution. It was promulgated on April 19, 1923. The Parliament consisted of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was elected partly by the King and partly by popular suffrage; the deputies by direct universal suffrage on the basis of one deputy for every 180,000 of the population. With this system and a largely illiterate electorate it is easy to see that a political party having the best and widest organization throughout the country could always get a majority in any General Election. This explains why an appeal to the country appeared to give Nahas the authority to declare that the Wafd was the people and the people were the Wafd.

From the above it followed that power soon got into the hands of certain small groups of politicians, most of whom put their own interests above those of their country.

It is said that revolutions follow certain patterns, so if anybody wants to try to foretell the future from this one I can say that the aristocracy and the rich were certainly not behind it, no political party nor the great masses of the people.

It started with the army and is strongly supported by the middle classes,

and if it succeeds it will have the mass of the people behind it later. Its bitterest opponents will be the worst of the old stage politicians and the once privileged few.

General Neguib's first pronouncement was that the object was to "purge the army and the country of traitors and corrupt people and to restore constitutional life." This was followed by expressing a desire to establish the monarchy on a sound constitutional basis and that the people should participate in directing the affairs of their country.

While no one in this country will deny the virtue in all this, the question arises, but how?

In fact, the ruling groups were still powerful and not prepared to co-operate with the new régime, nor would they purge themselves to help what they hoped would be a temporary authority. This attitude led to the confiscation of all party funds and the dissolution of all political parties. To take the place of the parties and to get some kind of popular support without elections the Liberation Rally was organized as a popular movement early in 1953. It soon became apparent to the new government that things were not going to be as easy as they thought, and, ever since the discovery that the old political parties were not going to help, they have looked for support elsewhere. They want recognition and help from outside as well as inside the country, certainly until such time as they can reorganize the Constitution.

As things are in Egypt it is impossible to appeal to the country by a General Election, so the government, through Colonel Nasser, has proposed a Constituent National Assembly made up from all sections of the community to meet on July 23. This meeting, if held as proposed, should give a good indication of the way things are going. It is not intended to take the place of a parliament but to function during the transition period until January 1956, when a parliamentary government is promised.

Now, all that has been done so far does surely indicate that the government has the honest intention of restoring constitutional government and that those officers in the present régime who wish to continue in politics will resign from the army and become civilians. I cannot detect any sign of a wish to continue with a military junta any longer than necessary. What the future holds no one can say, but if a new Constitution is evolved, and if it results in any government which puts the needs of the country before personal interests, a real miracle will have been performed.

Let us consider what has been achieved since July 1952, firstly in purely internal affairs. To meet the urgent need to provide for the great and growing population, two kinds of works are required: firstly, those to increase the productivity of the country, both agricultural and industrial; secondly, those to improve the living conditions of the people.

Now, in my opinion, the former should take priority; the improvement of the living conditions is urgent, but the wherewithal to live seems more so. Over recent years much has been done in the supply of filtered water in the provinces, in welfare in its many forms, but far too little in major works of development.

The National Production Council under the present government has declared the following to be provided for in its programme:

Aswan hydro-electric scheme.
Land reclamation and development.
Improvement of irrigation and drainage.
A higher dam project at Aswan.
Extension and improvement of roads.
Improvements in inland navigation.
Electric power station (South Cairo).
Iron and steel works at Helwan.
Chemical fertilizers at Aswan.
Paper factory.
Oil pipeline from Suez to Cairo.
Development of sugar beet, etc.

The cost of these projects cannot be met out of the ordinary resources of the country, so, if they are to be carried out, foreign capital must be encouraged. The first step must surely be to re-establish confidence. How far this has been upset in recent years is well illustrated by recalling that the first dam at Aswan was built from funds provided by Sir Ernest Cassel and that for some fifty years the great British civil engineering contracting firms were active in Egypt and the Sudan. Later on I shall make reference to the fact that not one of them is at present anxious to take on any work in Egypt. It is unlikely that any considerable increase in confidence will be felt until the Canal Zone question is settled, but in the interim period the Minister of Finance has taken what action he could to improve matters. He imposed restrictions on imports and encouraged exports; he increased taxes, customs and excise duties; but perhaps of greater importance to foreign interests are the alterations to the Company Law of 1947 and to the Mines and Quarries law of 1948. The latter has already given an impetus to prospecting for oil, which has been held up for some years past, and the news of the agreement on the price question between the Egyptian Government and the oil companies operating in Egypt should further stimulate activities. Of course, if oil is discovered in considerable quantity in Egyptian territory the whole economic situation will be changed.

British trade has been going through a most difficult time, but it is encouraging to note that over the first three months of this year we are back in our old position of biggest supplier, even if by only a small margin. I shall refer to this later. Meanwhile the Egyptian Government has widened its scope by making trade agreements with some Eastern European countries, including Russia.

Apart from the possible discovery of oil, there are three other internal matters that may have a far-reaching effect on the country's future. The first is the agrarian reform, for which the present régime is entirely responsible; the second is the growing influence of labour; and the third is the emancipation of women.

I am not going to attempt to analyse any of these three, but with regard to the first I can refer to the last annual report of the President

of the National Bank of Egypt, in which it is stated that the Committee set up to deal with agrarian reform had shown care in paying attention to local conditions so as to ensure continuity of production. The report adds, however, that the reform has led to a reduction in rents but also to a reduction in agricultural wages.

My own comment on this is that agricultural wages were considered to be far too low before the revolution.

As regards labour, which is one of the most disturbing features of Egypt today: Laws governing the employment of labour in industry and commerce were very much needed and have been brought into being, but at present they are operating so much in favour of the employee that the employer can be seriously embarrassed.

Labour syndicates have been formed and these sometimes take action against firms, which have complied with the requirements of the laws governing dismissal. It might be thought that in such case the firm would be protected by the law, but it has been found that the defence is a long and costly business. This threat from labour is a serious menace to industrial development in Egypt.

The third matter I referred to was the emancipation of women. This applies to the upper and middle classes, as the peasant women have been more or less free. The spread of education and freedom amongst these classes has been remarkably rapid in the last twenty-five years; as here in England, the youth of today can do things that would not have been tolerated in the youth of their grandparents. Women have not yet won the right to vote in parliamentary elections, but with their ever-increasing interest and activities in public affairs, especially welfare, the time cannot be far off when they will achieve this.

Turning now to the Sudan, I am not sure whether this should be treated as an internal or an external matter. I prefer to regard it as external, in view of the fact that the Sudan is at present going through an interim period in its political development. As I said earlier, one must always remember that Egypt's existence depends on the water of the Nile and that this comes via the Sudan. The Egyptian desire to obtain some measure of control in the Sudan arises from this fact and not from any blood relationship or particular friendship with the Sudanese. Although the coming of air travel has made the Sudan, especially the northern parts, more familiar to the Egyptians, not one of them, unless with some Sudanese blood in him, could honestly admit he liked the Sudan and felt naturally drawn to its people. This feeling is mutual; the majority of the Sudanese dislike the Egyptians. They remember the misrule which led to the revolt of the Mahdi, and latterly they have noted the misrule in Egypt itself. Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan was claimed unilaterally in 1951, and while this lasted, no agreement was possible between Great Britain and Egypt on the Sudan. It was the repudiation of this claim by General Neguib's government, which opened the door to the negotiations and the settlement of the Sudan question in February 1953.

The agreement provided for a commission of five to aid the Governor-General during an interim period in which the Sudanese could prepare for elections, etc. This Commission consisted of one British, one Egyptian,

two Sudanese and one Pakistani, the last-named to be the Chairman. An Electoral Commission of seven was also convened to organize elections throughout the country. You are probably all aware of the result of these elections and will remember that the National Unionist Party was returned. As this party had declared its desire to co-operate with Egypt, the result was taken by some to be a severe blow to the British and an expression of ingratitude for all Great Britain had done for the Sudanese. This was not really so. The difficulty is the rivalry between the two great " tarikas " or lines of thought. The followers of the head of the Khatmia, namely Sir Sayed Aly el Mirghani, remembering the bad old days of the Mahdi's successor, fear the return to power of the Mahdi faction, now represented by the followers of Sir Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi. They therefore oppose this group and there can be no real unity in the Sudan until the old fears can be shown to be groundless. The Egyptians are still interfering in Sudan affairs and, in my opinion, will continue to do so even at the risk of losing what influence they have gained through the split I have just mentioned, until they have reached a satisfactory agreement with the Sudanese on the apportionment of the Nile water.

As the full control of the Nile water involves other governments than the Egyptian and Sudanese, it means that until these two can agree as to their respective requirements and justify them, the political side of the matter can only be dealt with in principle.

How all this works out is for the future, but we must remember the vital importance of water to both countries and at least give credit to Egypt's new government for removing the chief obstacle to the achievement of a political settlement in February 1953.

I must now refer to the Canal Zone, which still remains to be a problem of major importance. It is interesting to recall that in 1947 Mr. Ernest Bevin stated that of the questions in dispute between Great Britain and Egypt, by far the most difficult was the Sudan. That shows also how strange it is that although he thought at that time we were very near a settlement over the Canal, it is still not achieved, and the Sudan is. Certainly the Egyptians at first considered a settlement to be near once the Sudan problem was solved, but apparently there was still such lack of confidence concerning Egypt, that our people over here were not prepared to give way on what were considered certain essentials.

As you can see from the sketch map, the Canal Zone occupies a rough triangle. This is nearly all desert and extremely dull and uninteresting country to live in. Our troops are strictly confined to the area and to rules and regulations, so that it can safely be said no one is there because he likes it.

It may be asked how it is that we come to be there at all? In the Treaty of 1936 it was agreed that British troops would be stationed in a defined area on the Suez Canal to assist Egypt in guaranteeing the safe passage of international shipping and that they would hand over to the Egyptian army when it was considered that that army was capable of carrying out the responsibility alone. The treaty was to be revised in 1956. Now the 1939-45 war upset this agreement and the problem was no longer merely the safeguarding of lines of communication and international shipping,

but the maintenance of a great military base in the Middle East. This base had been developed as a necessity during the war and many millions of pounds were spent on it. There is no time now to enter into the many pros and cons of this difficult problem, but I think it would help if it was clearly understood that there are really now two questions, not just one.

The first is the safe passage of ships of all nations in time of peace —this could not be guaranteed by any agreement or any combination in time of war. Now, this is surely a matter for the United Nations, although I am aware of the great importance of the Suez Canal in the minds of our people in Australia, New Zealand and the East.

The second question is of course the military base in the Middle East. Opinion among experts is divided on the absolute necessity for this, although I believe all agree that it would be a good thing if Egypt was friendly and would participate. It seems that a settlement could be reached, and quickly, if only there was more confidence in the Egyptians. This has been stated many times officially and unofficially.

How can this confidence be inspired? It can be helped by such action by the Egyptian government as to show that it is strong enough to act against gangsters in the Canal Zone and to break away entirely from the campaign of violence, either verbal or active, against the British. Over here this does not seem to be very difficult, but it should be borne in mind that there is evidence that violence brings matters to a head if carried far enough, and this is in the minds of some Egyptians.

The failure to settle the Canal Zone question is having most serious effects both on ourselves and the Egyptians. On ourselves because of the continued drain on the British taxpayer in having to maintain large forces, and also in the diminution of our trade with Egypt. Others have been quick to jump into the Egyptian market left open by the delay in settlement and by the non-payment so far by the British Government of £10 millions due to the Egyptians this year and expected by them last January. Nobody seems to know why this payment has, so far, been withheld—it has to be paid, so why not pay it and show a willingness to help? If we intended to delay payment we should have given warning to the Minister of Finance, who was doing all he could in very difficult circumstances to restore the financial position. There is no question of an Egyptian boycott of British goods; simply, they have not had the sterling. The position, when I was in Egypt last February, was that you could not buy British goods—there were none in the shops. On the other hand, there was a Hungarian exhibition, a German exhibition and I have seen only a few days ago, in one of the principal trade journals in Egypt, that about 50 per cent. of its space is taken up with West German-Egyptian interests.

The British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt sent over a special delegation early in 1953, and quite recently the newly elected President was in London protesting against the lack of any support of British interests in Egypt from this country. There is no denying that the Egyptians themselves are partly to blame for this state of affairs, but it is not primarily the fault of the present government—they are suffering from the legacy of the past.

Another aspect of our lost influence is, as I have pointed out ever since 1949, the absence of our great civil engineering contractors from participation in major works in Egypt. There are good reasons for this withdrawal. I put ten of these up to one of the chief officers in the Egyptian National Production Council early in the year. This officer expressed his amazement that such difficulties had been encountered and said that, although he could not clear them all, nevertheless he was grateful that they had been brought to his notice.

The effects on the Egyptians are that they are not able to get on with their internal affairs nor can they inspire confidence, so badly needed, for their economic future. They are well aware of the necessity to depend on the West, yet cannot make any headway until this question is settled.

Now, what is the effect of recent events in Egypt on the Middle East and external affairs?

Here I should like to draw attention to the excellent leading column in *The Times* of June 8 under the heading " Race against Time." As this covers this question most adequately; I may usefully refer to it for my own answer. In referring to the Middle East the writer remarks on the significant changes, mentioning as the most obvious the decline of Egyptian influence; he goes on to state that Egypt has today neither the time, the money, nor the prestige to maintain the leading position she held ten years ago. This is true, but it is perhaps also true to say that she does not attach quite such importance to the Arab League as she did.

Looking to the future, it is stated that the Asiatic part of the Arab League may tend to keep its eyes on Asia, while the African part looks to Africa. I agree with the first part of this statement but not with the latter.

Egypt is the only member of the League situated in Africa and her only interest in Africa is the supply of Nile water. This of course extends as far as the Equator, but it has no military aspect at all, nor do I think the Arab League could influence any decision or agreement made between Egypt and the countries concerned. In this one respect, therefore, Egypt may be said to look towards Africa, but I submit, not as a member of the Arab League.

Apart from the desire for support in her campaign against Great Britain, Egypt is at one with the Arab world in the hatred of Israel, so if she has any trend it is towards the Asiatic side and in particular towards Saudi Arabia. This leaning towards Saudi Arabia is not difficult to understand, as apart from the dispute with Great Britain and the hatred of Israel the Egyptian Government supplies each year the Holy Carpet, and both the departure for and return from Mecca are public holidays in Cairo. It seems to me also that, in regard to the defence of the Middle East, both Egypt and the Saudi kingdom feel themselves to be rather less in the line of fire than other member States.

Following up this line of thought on the defence of the Middle East, I am saying nothing new when I say that the whole of the vast area covered by the Arab League is relatively defenceless, in the modern sense of the word, against aggression by a great power without help from outside. In this area the total population is about 40 millions, of which

over half live in the Nile valley and Delta of Egypt. It is indeed a military vacuum!

So long as a threat exists, the nations in this area will be forced to accept military assistance and present indications are that, whatever may be said otherwise, they want it from the West.

Egypt, by remaining so intransigent over the Canal Base, is doing no good to herself nor to her neighbours. The Middle East remains divided between the policy indicated by the Turco-Pakistani pact and that at present being followed by Egypt. Surely Syria, the Lebanon and Iraq would find things much easier if the Canal settlement could be reached and then be followed by a general acceptance of military assistance from the West.

There are two steps towards cohesion: one is the Egyptian settlement with Britain, and the other is an agreement between the Arabs and Israel. It is just possible that the latter could come about by a satisfactory solution of the irrigation problem at present receiving so much attention.

It is not often referred to, but there is another peaceful development that may, one day, come about between Egypt and Iraq and have far-reaching effects on both countries, namely emigration of labour from Egypt. Egypt has a large surplus agricultural population and Iraq a shortage—the territories lie reasonably close together. This possibility seems very remote at present, but with the spread of education and the pressure of economic necessity, it may come about.

Finally, as regards ourselves and the Egyptians, I consider we should give the present régime in Egypt every chance to make a success of the venture. In spite of differences amongst themselves it is generally agreed that those in power are honest and well meaning in their intentions, and whatever mistakes they have made, on balance, they have already wrought a great service to their country. Colonel Nasser has stated that he does not consider that his military party can achieve many of those things needed by the country, but he aims at bringing back the caravan from its lost way.

It seems to me useless to say that we do not yet know if the country or, as is sometimes said, the people, are behind the present government. In Egypt, a completely false impression has been given in the past that the people decide, although election results do indicate this to an outsider. If the present government is not stable, what government is? The fact is that it has been in power nearly two years; if it falls, I have yet to meet anyone who can suggest something better to take its place.

Mr. NEWHOUSE: I spent a large part of forty years in Egypt and the Sudan, so perhaps I may be allowed to make a few remarks. I agree with practically every word Mr. Ayres has said. A point which I think has not been stressed sufficiently is the failure of the late Egyptian Government to keep up with the development of Egypt. In 1920 the Minister of Public Works put forward a scheme for the development in Egypt by 1955 of the land that could be cultivated, but of course that development has not taken place. There is a considerable area in Egypt which could be very much improved. I believe about one million acres in Lower

Egypt are still swamp, and that there are three or four hundred thousand acres in Upper Egypt which are still under the old basin system of irrigation, produce one crop each year and do nothing for the rest of the year. Some of the improvements have been carried out, but the important ones have not. The Government is now marking time, having no money.

I should like to mention that the present government is one of the very few in the history of Egypt that has cared for the fellah.

The object of holding the Canal was to make it safe for international traffic in peace time. We have not been able to do it. The Egyptians, while we have had 80,000 men at the Canal in the last few years, have stopped any ships they liked, and they liked to stop any going to Israel. During the last two wars we have not been able to use the Canal at all. Why are we keeping 80,000 men, in the conditions Mr. Ayres described, sitting in that desert? Why do we do it? I think those points may emphasize the excellent address we have been given, and I am sure we ought to be very grateful to Mr. Ayres for putting the facts so clearly.

Lord BIRDWOOD: Perhaps as a rather junior soldier I may be allowed to deal with the implication that we could withdraw troops. I do so with some hesitation in the presence of General Shea and General Martin, but I would refer to the new look which the emergence of the Pakistani-Turkey-American axis gives to the problem. The object is to be able to hit very hard and quickly if someone pokes his nose out into that gap over the Iron Curtain and has a look at the oil. That problem can now, I would say as a soldier, be met to some extent by the development of air bases in Eastern Turkey and the development of bases in Pakistan, from which air forces can strike very hard and quickly. There is, it seems to me, something to take the first strain.

I am not going to say that that eliminates the need for a base, because I am quite aware that once the atom bombs have finished their work we still need infantry to hold ground. In other words, a squadron of aeroplanes cannot occupy an oilfield. A base of some kind or other is needed, but it does seem to me the first strain is taken.

Mr. PHILIPS PRICE: May I confirm what Lord Birdwood has just said? Last year I was in Turkey and had occasion to speak to several people there who were very much worried about the negotiations going on in Egypt then. We had, of course, kept them well informed about what the state of the negotiations was, but they felt they were in the front line.

I take the view, as other speakers have, that to keep 80,000 troops in the Canal Zone in the way we have been doing is just wasting our substance, and it is also a provocation to the nationalist feeling running through the Middle East, which is there and nothing will exorcize it. We should reconsider our whole defence problem in the Middle East and first and foremost consider Turkey as the main bastion of Middle East defence.

Mr. PAXTON: The speaker has not said anything about the Communists in Egypt or the Moslem Brotherhood. Could he tell us the present position?

Mr. AYRES: A reason why I have not gone into that is simply the question of time. One is limited to three-quarters of an hour and refer-

ences to the activities of the Communists and the Moslem Brotherhood simply could not be included. The Moslem Brotherhood is a very complicated question and the activities of the Communists an even more complicated question, and I really do not think I should like to discuss them at this meeting, if you do not mind.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid our time has come to an end, although the discussion could of course go on for a long time.

It just remains for me on your behalf to thank Mr. Ayres for his extraordinarily interesting lecture, so clearly given and so simple and easy to understand. (Applause.)

ANNUAL MEETING

THE Annual General Meeting of the Society was held at the Hall of the Royal Society of Arts, John Adam Street, Adelphi, W.C.2, on Thursday, June 17, 1954.

The President, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., was in the chair, and the Anniversary Lecture was given by Mr. Frank Kingdon-Ward, O.B.E., F.L.S., who spoke on "Botanical Exploration in North Burma."

The PRESIDENT, on taking the chair, said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before we proceed to the ordinary business of the Annual General Meeting, I have to bring to your notice, with deep regret, the loss the Society has suffered during the past year by the death of very distinguished members—Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, General Sir Neil Malcolm and Mr. C. S. Jarvis, all of whose lives have been described in the Society's Journal in the *In Memoriam* notices. In addition, one very tragic happening occurred only a few days ago, when Mr. Peter Hume was instantly killed by falling from the upper storey of his house, to which he had climbed in an endeavour to get in, the key of the door having been mislaid. He was employed by the B.B.C. in its Far Eastern service. He was only 36 years of age; he had been a member of our Society for fifteen years and had been twice a member of the Council. He was a very valuable member of our Society because of his great knowledge of the Far East which was always at our disposal, especially in reviewing books connected with the area. If I might strike a personal note, I knew Mr. Peter Hume very well indeed and always had a great admiration for his sterling character, his charming, unselfish nature and his great ability.

All present then stood a while in silent tribute to the memory of the late members.

The PRESIDENT then called on Group-Captain Smallwood to present the

HONORARY SECRETARIES' REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1953-54

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD, O.B.E., said: Perhaps one of the most interesting items in the report is that concerning membership. At the Annual Meeting in 1953 the membership was reported as totalling 1,767. That, I am sorry to say, was an incorrect figure because there were 112 lapsed memberships which had not been taken into account at that time. During the current year resignations and deaths have totalled 80, against which there were 83 new members and 13 lapsed memberships. That suggests a reduction in numbers, but it is not actually so because we have at present a temporary affiliation with the Iran Society which gives us an additional 120 members. We do not know how long this will last, but it is a help to us.

Twenty lectures were given during the past year and these included lectures by Dr. Lockhart on " The Oil Dispute in Persia "; Colonel Melvin Hall, of the U.S. Air Force, retired, on " Aspects of the Present Situation in Indo-China"; Mr. Harold Ingrams on " Hong Kong and its Place in the Far East "; Lord Althorp on " H.R.H. the Duchess of Kent's Tour in Malaya and the Far East "; " Mlle. Ella Maillart on " The Gosainkund "; and Sir Arthur Rucker on "Korea."

The Honorary Secretaries would like to put on record their thanks to the local honorary secretaries and other members of the Society for their useful work, particularly thanks to Mr. Cook of Qatar for the recruitment of new members, and to the other honorary secretaries for their liaison work with the head office of the Royal Central Asian Society.

The Annual Dinner was held on July 15 last. The President, Sir John Shea, presided, and the guests of the Society were the Earl and Countess of Selkirk, Sir Arthur and Lady Morse, Admiral Sir Geoffrey and Lady Oliver, Col. and Mrs. John Hunt [now Brigadier Sir John and Lady Hunt], H.E. the High Commissioner for India, Mr. B. G. Kher, H.E. the Lebanese Ambassador, Dr. Khouri, H.E. the Indonesian Ambassador and Mrs. Subandrio, Mr. and Mrs. Lionel Fraser.

On the motion of Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT, seconded by Lt.-Colonel GASTRELL, the report was adopted.

THE HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

Major E. AINGER presented the accounts and the Honorary Treasurer's report as follows:

You have before you copies of the Society's Account. The income and expenditure account is little changed from last year as regards expenses. The big change comes on the receipts side, where you will notice the figure of over £1,000 for donations received, donations for which we are more than grateful to the companies concerned.

As a result of this help, we once again show a small excess of income over expenditure after making due reserve for contingencies.

The Balance Sheet calls for little remark except to tell you that the financial position is slowly becoming stronger.

Brigadier S. H. LONGRIGG formally proposed that the accounts for the year ending December 31, 1953, be adopted.

Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of CORK AND ORRERY formally seconded the motion, and the accounts were adopted without discussion.

ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS FOR 1954-55

The PRESIDENT announced that the Chairman for the ensuing year would be Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., and that Sir Kinhahan Cornwallis, G.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., had been prevailed upon to be Vice-Chairman for a further year: Sir Horace Seymour and Maj.-General W. A. K. Fraser retire from their office of Vice-Presidents and their places are taken in accordance with the rules of the Society by the two senior members of the Council, Mr. Laurence Lockhart, Ph.D., and Sir Hugh Dow, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.: actually the second senior member,

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1953

1952	Liabilities	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	I. *Capital Funds:*			
327	Life Subscription Account ..		327 5 0	
	Entrance Fee Account	1,216 18 0		
	Add: Amount recd. 1953	78 0 0		
1,217			1,294 18 0	
	Legacy Account ..	600 0 0		
	Add: Legacy recd. 1953	250 0 0		
600			850 0 0	
97	Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund ..		96 11 0	
578	Persia Fund		578 4 10	
	Sykes Medal Fund	150 0 0		
	Add: Accum. Interest	15 10 5		
161			165 10 5	
70	Investment Reserve Fund	69 17 11		
	Add: War Damage Compensation payment received during the year	246 5 0		
		316 2 11		
	Less: Loss on sale of 3% Defence Bonds	12 0 4		
			304 2 7	
				3,616 11 10
3,050				
	II. *Income and Expenditure Account:*			
	Balance, 1st January, 1953 ..		242 7 0	
	Add: Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year to date ..		598 11 1	
243				840 18 1
—	III. *Reserve for Contingencies*			1,080 0 0
	IV. *Liabilities:*			
496	Sundry Creditors			491 12 3
3,789				£6,029 2 2

1952	Assets	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	I. *Capital Fund Investments* (at cost):			
	Persia Fund:			
537	£531 6s. 7d. 3% Savings Bonds 1965-75		537 1 6	
	General Funds:			
284	£280 12s. 0d. 3% Savings Bonds 1965-75		283 18 7	
1,407	£1,405 0s. 0d. 3% Defence Bonds 4th Issue (sold)		— — —	
—	£1,939 7s. 11d. British Gas 3½% Guaranteed Stock 1969-71 ..		1,844 0 10	
	P.O.S.B. No. 2 a/c:	£ s. d.		
162	Sykes Medal Fund	165 10 5		
45	Persia Fund ..	45 8 0		
167	General Funds ..	172 3 9		
			383 2 2	
2,602				3,048 3 1
	Note: The Market Value of the above Investments at 31st December, 1953, was approximately £2,991.			
	II. *Fixed Assets:*			
	Society Premises Account:			
	Balance as at 1st January, 1948		110 19 3	
	Add'l Expenditure since that date		48 16 0	
142				159 15 3
	III. *Current Assets:*			
480	Income Tax Repayment Claim ..		600 0 0	
11	Sundry Debtors		— — —	
	Cash:			
410	P.O.S.B. No. 1 a/c	929 17 10		
144	At Bank and in hand	1,291 6 0		
			2,221 3 10	
				2,821 3 10
3,789				£6,029 2 2

AUDITOR'S REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as shown by the books of the Society.

Dashwood House, Old Broad Street, London, E.C.2. WILLIAMS, SYSON-JONES & CO.

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 2, HINDE STREET, W.1.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1953.

1952	Expenditure	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
£	Office Expenditure:		
1,349	Salaries and National Insurance	1,238 9 4	
126	Rent, Light and Heat	129 13 10	
18	Telephone	19 1 9	
117	Stationery and Printing	73 16 10	
170	Postages	151 11 8	
226	Cleaning and Upkeep of Premises	218 7 6	
10	Audit Fee	10 10 0	
6	Insurances	6 6 3	
12	Bank Charges and Cheque Books	11 15 1	
35	Sundry Expenses	36 3 10	
2,069		1,895 16 1	
	Less:		
200	Contribution from Palestine Exploration Fund	200 0 0	
1,869		1,695 16 1	
	Journal:	£ s. d.	
970	Printing	996 14 0	
50	Postages	78 3 6	
82	Reporting	58 2 0	
		1,132 19 6	
175	Lectures and Study Group	173 13 7	
5	Library	1 5 0	
47	Legal and Professional Expenses	46 4 0	
7	Persia Fund Lecture and Subscription to "Iraq"	6 16 0	
—	Reserve for Contingencies	1,080 0 0	
3,205		4,136 14 2	
419	Excess of Income over Expenditure carried to Balance Sheet	598 11 1	
3,624		£4,735 5 3	

1952	Income	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
£			
2,156	Subscriptions	2,242 0 7	
357	Journal Subscriptions and Sales	395 1 3	
	Interest Received on:	£ s. d.	
55	Government Securities (net)	52 16 9	
22	Post Office Savings Bank	24 18 6	
—	Bank Deposit Account	7 3 11	
—	War Damage Compensation (net)	44 1 4	
		129 0 6	
475	Income Tax Repayment Claim	600 0 0	
557	Donations Received	1,023 4 6	
2	Sundry Receipts:		
	One half of the proceeds of the Assurance Policy on the life of the late Secretary	345 18 5	
3,624		£4,735 5 3	

Mr. E. J. Nathan, had by circumstances which prevented him from attending meetings regularly been obliged to retire, much to the regret of the Council.

The Council have recommended the following to fill the vacancies for the ensuing year as Members of the Council: Air Chief Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C., Lt.-Colonel E. H. Gastrell, O.B.E., and Mr. F. B. Sadler.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT proposed that these members be elected *en bloc*. This was seconded by the Earl of Cork and Orrery and carried unanimously.

The President further announced that the following having offered themselves for re-election continue as Honorary Secretaries for the ensuing year: Colonel H. W. Tobin, D.S.O., O.B.E., and Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E.

On the motion of Brigadier S. H. LONGRIGG, seconded by Major E. AINGER, the Council's recommendation was unanimously approved, following which the President declared the business of the meeting completed.

ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner of the Society was held at Claridge's, London, W.1, on Thursday, July 8, 1954. The President, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., presided and 130 members and guests were present. The guests of the Society were His Excellency the Iranian Ambassador, the Most Hon. the Marquess of Reading, C.B.E., M.C., T.D., Q.C., Minister of State, Field-Marshal Sir John and Lady Harding, Brigadier Sir John and Lady Hunt, and Mr. Tom Stobart.

Presentation of the Lawrence Memorial Medal to Brigadier Sir John Hunt, C.B.E., D.S.O.

AFTER the loyal toast had been honoured, the PRESIDENT said: I have this evening a very happy and pleasant task to perform. That is to say I have to present two Medals. The first is the Lawrence Memorial Medal. This Medal is given by the Royal Central Asian Society for work in exploration, research or letters, the exploration involving if possible some hazard. It is open to members of the British Empire for work in the countries which come inside the orbit of this Society. This year the Medal has been granted to Brigadier Sir John Hunt for the conquest of Everest, which was so happily announced in London on the day of Her Majesty's Coronation.

I believe, Sir John, that I am right in saying that in addition to the remarkable work you did on Everest, you have an added honour in that you were able to persuade the very sceptical Russians that you did actually conquer the mountain. Brigadier, it gives me great happiness on behalf of the Society to present you with this Medal. (Applause.)

The presentation was then made.

Presentation of the Sykes Memorial Medal to Mr. T. Stobart, O.B.E.

The next Medal I have to present is the Sykes Memorial Medal, given by his family in memory of Sir Percy Sykes. Sir Percy Sykes, in addition to being a fine soldier, was a traveller and an author of distinction and one of those people who through the years really upheld the Royal Central Asian Society. The Medal, which has been given by his family in his memory, is not confined to members of the British Empire but may be given by the Council to anybody who is distinguished in travel or letters, who has contributed to the knowledge of Asiatic countries, and who has helped to improve the cultural relations between the British Empire and Asiatic countries.

On this occasion the Council has given the Medal to Mr. Tom Stobart, who quite definitely added hazard in getting the wonderful pictures which he took of the Everest expedition—a perfect and lasting record of a great feat. I am so glad to give you this Medal, Mr. Stobart. I do congratulate you. (Applause.)

The presentation was then made.

Address by the President

I seem to have been talking a great deal already, but it has been the custom of this Society for the President on the occasion of this Annual Dinner to review certain happenings in the countries which come into the orbit of this Society. I have, in speaking in the previous four years, had as guests of the Society kindly sailors, soldiers and airmen, distinguished travellers and merchant princes, one at least of whom has had an intimate knowledge of one of the countries about which I attempted to speak. But tonight we have as our very honoured guest a Minister of State who knows about all the countries, past and present, and who may make a shrewd guess as to the future. You will understand, therefore, that on this occasion I approach my subject with very considerable diffidence and a silent prayer that I may walk delicately.

If I may plunge straight into the Middle East, we note the change, since we were here last year, by the practical rejection of the Egyptian leadership of the Arab League, in so far as Iraq has broken away and Pakistan has made a pact with Turkey, thus drawing herself closer to Iraq by mutual interest.

One still has to deplore the very unfortunate bickering which goes on on the Israeli-Jordan frontier. Indeed, we can say that until a better understanding is established there cannot possibly be peace in the Near East. But there is hope, because just lately a technical committee of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan has been sitting to try to arrange a scheme for irrigation in the Jordan valley which would give power and water to the Arab countries concerned and to Israel as well. I believe that there is every reason to think and to hope that agreement will be reached on this point and that this is a start of more cordial relations between Israel and Jordan.

Perhaps you might say that Israel, though she is not entirely to blame, has not been very wise on her frontier. But she has copied the wisdom of Solomon in another direction.

There is, with its base running east and west through Beersheba, and forming a triangle with the Jordan and Egyptian borders, a stretch of desert—the Negev, " the thirsty land." In the tenth century B.C. Solomon exploited this land. He mined for copper and quarried limestone; he had a port, Ezion Geber, on the Gulf of Akaba, which you will remember is the eastern arm of the Red Sea separated from the Gulf of Suez by the Sinai peninsula, a port for his imperial and overseas trade.

Following his example, modern Israel is exploiting this tract of country. She is mining for copper and has developed phosphate deposits. Beersheba, which was originally a frontier town, is now the centre of agricultural settlements which have been formed into a veritable corn belt. A grand trunk road has been driven straight down from Beersheba to Elath, on the Gulf of Akaba, which is on the site of the old Solomon port.

But what is far more important is that there have been found traces of an ancient irrigation system, which gives hope that it may be developed; and that the Negev will be able to carry the surplus population of Israel for many years to come.

I pass from there to Ceylon, where history has been made, because in

May there was a conference—I believe the first conference of its kind—of the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia. They met to ensure, if possible, closer co-operation between their countries and, probably what appealed to them most, that they might make their voice heard in international affairs.

There were so many subjects which they could have discussed with great interest—Kashmir, American aid to Pakistan, the position of the Tamils in Ceylon, and, a thing which means so much and which is of such concern to the Ceylon Government, the surreptitious immigration of Indians into Ceylon, and kindred subjects.

If what one has read in the press is correct, apparently no such discussions took place. No machinery was set up. Instead there was considerable criticism of European countries and a definite statement of " Asia for the Asians and no interference from the West."

And so I go further east and I pass on to General Templer's great achievement in Malaya. In 1952, after Sir Henry Gurney had been murdered, there was a considerable state of demoralization in Malaya. The planters who had such a stake in the country were unhappy. They seemed to be the particular objective of the terrorists; and they wondered if it was really worth while remaining in that country. The police had been very largely and quickly augmented without being properly trained and were undisciplined. Their officers were unhappy because those who had escaped during the Japanese occupation had come back and taken the senior posts in the police; and those who had been captured by the Japs and came back after rehabilitation found all the senior posts already occupied.

The people in the resettlement camps resented the fact that the terrorists had deprived them of their livelihood and sent them into the resettlement camps, and they resented the fact that when they were in the resettlement camps the British did not appear to be able to protect them properly. The only place with any high morale was the Army, but they had not yet learnt fully their jungle technique.

I remember so well when the late Lord Allenby—General Allenby as he was then—came out to take over command, prior to his victorious Palestine campaign, and visited all the camps on the borders of Palestine. His advent was described by an Australian trooper in this way: " That something Allenby flew through the something camps like a something whirlwind." I think if you took an expurgated edition of that it might possibly describe General Templer's impact on Malaya—General Templer with his quick brain, his restless energy and his breathless determination.

You cannot say that he had a really good start, because he was suspect. The people, especially the Chinese, said, " Oh, here is a soldier. He will pay attention to only the shooting war, and the political reforms which Sir Henry Gurney promised will be put in the background." There was no question that General Templer was perfectly honest in what he said. He said that the establishment of law and order came first, but he also knew perfectly well that his aim must be also to win the hearts and the minds of the people because, without that, confidence could not be established and it would be impossible to get any information. As ultimate

independence had been promised to Malaya he had the distant view of the day when self-government might be granted to Malaya.

So he began; and the first thing he did was to change the names of the resettlement camps to new villages. It may seem a little thing, possibly, but it meant he was trying to form a community spirit. Then he had village councils formed and the responsible people in the villages elected by ballot under the superintendence of the District Commissioner. Then he had them at the headquarters to give them a course of civic training, to try to teach them that government meant something more than purely issuing orders and regulations, that government was for the benefit of the people and that is what he was trying to make it.

In addition he had young Europeans from the European firms up for the same reason, to teach them what government did and to make them ready to co-operate in the forward march of Malaya.

Then, too, he enlisted the sympathy and the help of St. John Ambulance and the Red Cross, and devoted women in pairs went round the country ministering and aiding, driven in Land Rovers which had been presented by the Chinese Malayan Association. He got missionaries who had come from China and who knew the language to go into the new villages and counteract the propaganda which came from the Communists. Further, he continued his scheme of creating a common citizenship. Hitherto the only military force which Malaya owned was the Malay Regiment, consisting of Malays and officered by British officers and Malay officers. He instituted the Federation Regiment, into which everybody in Malaya could enlist. Hoping to further the interests of the Chinese, he threw open the senior posts of the Civil Service to the Chinese.

I must not forget his reorganization of the police. He got Colonel Young, that famous man who is now in Kenya, and who belongs so properly to London, to reorganize the police. Colonel Young immediately sent them to be retrained to do their proper job. With the exception of a few specially trained frontier jungle squads who went into the jungle, the police remained outside, carrying out their proper duties.

So he continued; and when he left in May he was able very justly to claim that there was in the country a solid bulwark of common purpose and goodwill, in spite of differences of view and opinion. He was able to say there were only some 4,000 to 6,000 Communist terrorists active; that they had lost most of their leaders, and found it very difficult to have these leaders replaced; and that in his judgment it was impossible now for the Communist terrorists to stage a full-scale rebellion or revolt.

When he left he was very rightly eulogized by Malcolm MacDonald, who spoke of his military victories. With regard to those military victories I should like to pay a tribute to the man who gained the victories for him—that incomparable fighter, the British soldier, who with his Gurkha comrade has become master of the jungle. We must remember, too, the many National Service boys who are in those ranks and who have fought as well as their forefathers ever fought and of whom we can be justly proud.

Malcolm MacDonald also referred to General Templer's political victories and said that, apart from the democratic institutions which came

forth under his hand in Malaya, he had hastened the development of national self-government more than had been anticipated. But when Templer left after all the experience that he had been through he said: "Unity and self-government must go hand in hand." That indeed is the conclusion of the whole matter.

If Malaya is to have a happy future, if she is to succeed as she surely can and will, it is absolutely essential that the common citizenship at which Templer aimed, citizenship of British, Malay, Chinese, Eurasians and Indians, should be an accomplished and established fact; then and then only can national self-government with surety be given to that country. (Applause.)

The Guests

Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., Chairman of the Council, in proposing the toast of the Guests, said: I have been allotted the pleasant task of welcoming our guests here tonight and of proposing the toast of the guests. We have a number of distinguished guests here from many walks of life, and although I shall try to be as brief as possible there are some of whom I must speak personally.

First, I am very glad to welcome here the distinguished representative of one of the very ancient countries in Asia, in the person of the Iranian Ambassador. We are very glad to see His Excellency here tonight on his first visit to this function of the Society, and I am sure that his presence augurs well for the continued good relations which have existed for such a long time between our two countries.

Next I should very much like to welcome Lord Reading, Minister of State at the Foreign Office. I think we are very fortunate in having Lord Reading here tonight in view of the large number of political and diplomatic conventions and excursions at which he seems to spend so much of his time. We are happy that there has been a pause in between them in which he has managed to come here, and we are grateful to him for sparing the time to come. I would assure him that it is a matter of great encouragement to us that he has come here, because an object of this Society is to give an up-to-date picture of Asia, and one of the things which I have been very pleased about in this last year is the number of his young men from the Foreign Office who have been to our lectures, which augurs well I think for the fact that we are keeping abreast of the times.

We are very sorry that Lady Reading at the last minute could not accompany him. We welcome Lord Reading very much for his own sake, but I should like to welcome him also as the son of a very distinguished Viceroy of India. His father, incidentally, arrived out in India for the first time as a sailor in a sailing ship. After that voyage I understand he gave up the sea—very much a loss to the seafaring profession but to the very great benefit of the rest of the world.

I also very much welcome the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding. Again, it is very kind of him in view of the vast amount of work he has to do to spare the time to come here. It is very apt that we should have a distinguished soldier such as the Field-Marshal in the light of the fact that such a large proportion of the Army

at the moment is in some part of Asia or else on the borders of Asia guarding the route to the Far East.

I am very glad, if I may say so, to have a Field-Marshal here, as I felt last year we had too many Admirals talking! This year, anyhow, when Sir John has finished, the score of the Army and the Navy will be equal. Next year I feel we must try to get the Royal Air Force on their feet.

Tonight we have a very fine representative of the Royal Air Force in the person of Air Chief Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst. We are very glad to welcome him here, especially as it is his first visit and he has just become a member of the Society and was recently elected a member of the Council.

Whilst dealing with the Services, we are very glad to see here also the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Sir Harold Parker. He deals with all three Services.

Reverting to the Army, we are very glad to welcome General Davies, who had a long and distinguished career in Asia, which included his commanding the Arakan Division during the war; and later Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army.

Still with the Army, you have already greeted Sir John Hunt in his capacity as the conqueror of Everest, but I should still like to welcome him as a very distinguished soldier and Deputy Commandant of the Staff College. I should like to welcome him also as a Soviet Mountaineer First Class! I hope I have given the title correctly.

I should like to welcome Sir John Dring, who started life as a soldier but, like so many others, went into the political service. He had a very distinguished career and after the Partition he became the Prime Minister to the Bahawalpar State about which quite recently we had a very interesting illustrated lecture.

Although you have already greeted Mr. Stobart, I welcome him again and would say how sorry we are that he has not been able to bring with him the Abominable Snowman! I am sure it would have enlivened the proceedings tonight.

I should very much like to welcome most sincerely all our guests and the new members of the Society who may be here for the first time, and with that I will ask the members of the Royal Central Asian Society to be upstanding. I give you the toast of our guests, coupled with the name of Sir John Harding. (Applause.)

Field-Marshal Sir JOHN HARDING, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., in reply, said: It is a very great pleasure and a very great honour for me to have been invited to reply on behalf of your guests this evening. I always understood and I was always brought up to believe that the civil power was supreme and the military power subordinate to it, and so I am a little puzzled as to why I, a soldier, should be called upon to reply when there are so many distinguished civilian guests present this evening. I am not carping at the honour you have paid me; I do appreciate it very much. That is not because I am fond of after-dinner speaking. I entirely subscribe to the idea underlying that verse in the proverb which says that in all labour there is profit but talk leadeth only to penury.

It is a very happy occasion for me to be present tonight as the pro-

fessional head of the Army, because you have chosen this occasion to do honour to Brigadier Sir John Hunt for his magnificent achievement in mastering Everest, and as a serving soldier myself I feel very proud to be here with him. We are very proud of him in the Army and I should like you all to know he is a serving soldier.

It is difficult for a serving soldier to say very much about Asia. It is an area of great strategic importance where many things are going on at present, and I am not allowed to mention any political matters in public, nor have I any wish to do so. At the same time I certainly do not wish to be labelled as a Communist or an Imperialist or even a neutralist, so I shall have to be very guarded in what I say. But I have seen a good deal of Asia one way and another, from Japan to the Middle East. I have not been to China, much to my regret, but I have nevertheless seen a great deal of that part of the world—too much, I think, to write a book about it and too little to speak with real authority on it!

I notice that one of the objects of your Society is to promote interest in Asia and in its problems and to stimulate co-operation and understanding between members of the British Commonwealth and members of Asian countries. I can think of no better or more important function in regard to the future strategic interests of Asia.

Strategy is a matter of geography, history, of terrain and climate, and of the strength and reliability of various people and nations. If you are to apply the principles of strategy correctly, whether in a cold war or a hot war, you have got to understand and know the geography and the history and all the other physical factors, and particularly to have a good working knowledge of the people of the countries with which you are dealing.

I think one of my biggest problems, when I happened to be Chief of Staff of Field-Marshal Lord Alexander, when he was Supreme Commander in the final year or so of the last war, was dealing with a certain number of important and highly placed individuals who were strongly under the impression that Vienna was in the Balkans! It did not make sense strategically and it led to certain difficulties and mistakes.

Equally I am quite certain in regard to Asia that you can make and will make very bad mistakes indeed unless you have a good understanding of the history and the geography and the philosophy and the way of life of the various people in that great land mass. I am not suggesting that we can all of us expect to understand the reasoning and philosophy and way of life of some of our Asian friends, but I do believe that unless we understand as much as we can of them we shall always get the answers to our strategic problems wrong.

I was told once when I was in the Far East by a distinguished professor who had a wide and extensive knowledge of China that the best conclusion one could come to about China was that one could not possibly hope to understand the Chinese, and if you came to that conclusion you were in a much better position than that of anyone who claimed to understand their way of thinking and reasoning and philosophy of life. I believe that is possibly very true.

I should like to add to one remark or series of remarks that your

President made, without in any way belittling the magnificent and brilliant work of General Templer in Malaya. I think you ought to remember that the foundations on which he built and on which his magnificent work was based were very largely laid by the late Sir Harold Briggs, another distinguished member of the Indian Army. It is, I think, important to pay a tribute to him for the magnificent work he did. Unfortunately, shortly after he left Malaya he died and his services are lost to the British Commonwealth in future, but he did a magnificent job and I should like to pay a tribute to what he did in laying the foundations on which General Templer was able to build.

The most interesting part of Asia at the moment is, of course, South-east Asia. Recently I had the privilege of representing the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff at a conference in Washington, where we discussed the military aspects and the problems there, and there is just one point I should like to mention now about that. An impression that I got from that conference and the conclusion that I came to was that none of the problems of Asia will be solved satisfactorily unless there is a greater degree of unity between the countries of Asia and a greater degree of solidarity between the Western Powers which have an interest in Asia, and that is as far as I am prepared to go; but anything you can do in your Society, ladies and gentlemen, to help forward, to foster and develop the feeling of unity in the countries of Asia amongst their peoples and between them and us here in this country and the people throughout the British Commonwealth will in my opinion pay a tremendous dividend not only for them but for the whole of the free world.

So, in thanking you all very much indeed on behalf of all your guests this evening for your very kind and generous hospitality and for your very good company, I should like to repeat that remark and to say that in my view the biggest service that can be rendered to Asia by this Society in future is your continuing to promote knowledge of Asia, its problems and peoples and history, of its geography and its philosophy, and your continuing to do all in your power to foster unity between the Asian countries themselves and between them and the British Commonwealth.

Thank you very much indeed. I am certain I speak for all your guests when I say how very grateful we are to you for your very kind and generous hospitality this evening and for your very good company. (Applause.)

The Royal Central Asian Society

The Most Hon. the Marquess of Reading, C.B.E., M.C., T.D., Q.C., in proposing the toast of The Royal Central Asian Society, said: May I begin, sir, by saying what a pleasure it is for me to sit at a table with you as President and how difficult it is to realize that when we first met more than thirty years ago you were already holding the high appointment of, I think, Adjutant-General in India. Nobody seeing you and hearing you tonight would easily satisfy himself that so long a period had elapsed since you held that exalted post.

You were good enough to invite me last year to attend the occasion of your Annual Dinner and I, unfortunately, was unable to accept. That

you should have asked me a second time seems to me a singular act of generosity and forgiveness. When I did accept this time, I was sent a selection of the magazine issued by your Society and my eye was at once caught by the motto which appeared upon the cover, "CORNUA LEVAT SUPER TERRAS," which I, having been given a classical education, translated for myself as "Even a super terrace can raise corns!" The moral of that presumably is that it matters not so much where you walk as how you walk, no doubt a valuable precept for all travellers and explorers like Sir John Hunt.

The title of your Society, although I am bound to say that I gather you have cast the net of your interests rather wider than the normal definition of Central Asia, is bound to stir in all our minds visions of romantic journeying, if only a combination of the Treasury and the Kremlin would make such excursions more practicable in this compulsorily static world of today.

It is, I think, not only due to the late Mr. Flecker that such names as Samarkand strike a responsive chord even in otherwise unimaginative ears, although I am not sure how rewarding would be a visit today to that area, I find it difficult to believe that Tamerlane sleeps more quietly in his tomb of jade because of the proximity of Lenin Street or even of the Maxim Gorky Park of Culture and Rest. My own impression is that neither culture nor rest made any great appeal to that ruthless and restless spirit. But, sir, even if it be not easy for the average traveller to echo the lines of Hassan, "We are the pilgrim's brother, we must go always a little further" or to "take the golden road to Samarkand," at the same time there is quite a simple solution to the problem, and that is to become a Minister at the Foreign Office. So much of our time is spent flitting through the stratosphere, I hope usefully, on our successive assignments that we are almost, I think, entitled, with apologies to the Royal Air Force, to appropriate to ourselves the motto *Per Astra ad Ardua*!

It has been my good fortune in the course of my official duties to visit these last three years a number of the countries which are included within your purview, and although I cannot tell if those visits were of value to those countries, they assuredly were to me, for I do not hold the theory that a brief visit even of only two or three days is not fully worth while. It is, to anybody holding an office such as mine, of immense value to have seen, however superficially and transiently, the people whose names have hitherto been only words in a telegram, to see the conditions in which they work and the powers and the peoples whom they serve.

More recently at Geneva I have had opportunities during these last weeks to make the acquaintance of representatives of a good many countries which come within your sphere and to establish useful and most agreeable contacts with them. It has been, as you would all imagine, an experience of immense interest.

It is, of course, regrettable that as regards Korea we were able to arrive at no solution, but you will at the same time, I hope, think it was right that we should take our stand about two fundamental points: the carrying out of general free elections, if elections there were to be, and the supervision of those elections under the general direction of the supreme

body of the United Nations. On those two points we were unable to give way and on those two points no progress could be made. But that is not the end. It was generally agreed that when time had passed and tempers had cooled a situation might well develop in which it would be possible to make a progress which we had been unable at this stage to achieve.

Certainly in the course of those weeks one learnt much, and I will admit that my knowledge of the internal affairs of the Associated States of Indo-China is considerably ampler today than it was when I first went to Geneva. I had not, for instance, realized two things of great importance in that connection, and it may be that they are unfamiliar to some of you as well. I had not, though perhaps I should have, appreciated the great difference in density of population between the three countries. You look at them on the map and you think they might be approximately the same. Yet there is Viet Nam with a population of some 24 million, Cambodia with a population of 4 million, and Laos with a population of fewer than 2 million.

I had not realized either that between Laos and Cambodia on the one hand and Viet Nam on the other there runs a very definite line of demarcation. Upon one side is a civilization which looks ethnically, socially, culturally and spiritually towards India, while on the other side is a civilization which looks correspondingly towards China. There on one side of the line you have the tendency towards South Asia and on the other towards East Asia, and those are two very dissimilar civilizations.

When one looks at the map of South and South-east Asia one realizes that it is no strange phenomenon that there has grown up in those countries a spirit of considerable nationalism. After all, taking the whole span from Pakistan across to Indonesia—with the sole exceptions of what ought to be called Thailand but what I am still old-fashioned enough to call Siam, and the British possessions of Malaya and Borneo—every one of the countries in that area has passed in these post-war days from a position of subordination to a position of independence, and it is not surprising that the doctrine of nationalism should have taken root in their midst.

Sometimes the doctrine goes beyond nationalism to continentalism. You hear talk of Asia for the Asians. If all that that means is that it is for the Governments of those countries to give priority to the interests of their own people that is a right and proper doctrine and we certainly support it. But there is one great difficulty which all those Governments have to face, and it is that there are already, and there are becoming to an increasing degree, too many Asians in Asia.

Figures are lifeless things but they can be somewhat startling. When you realize that in South-east Asia alone there reside in conditions hovering above the subsistence line something like a quarter of the population of the world, when you realize that in Indonesia alone there live more than 80 million people, when you realize that when Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai met the other day those two statesmen between them represented nearly half the population of the world, you begin to understand something of the problems of population which beset the Asian Governments.

When you take into account after that that it is not a static but a dynamic process, that the population of India is increasing by between 3 and 4 million a year, and the population of China, as I learnt on good authority at Geneva, by no fewer than 12 million in each year, you begin to realize what a task lies before those still inevitably somewhat inexperienced Governments.

It is said that peace is one and indivisible, and so in an ideal world should plenty be. But it is not. One of the main tasks of all those Governments is to strive to raise to some extent, however small, steadily the standard of living of the peoples to whom and for whom they are responsible.

In that task there is, I am convinced, a very substantial field in which the West can still be of service, provided that it is prepared to give its services when it is asked for them and not to seek to impose them.

Those countries of Asia, as we who have been in varying degrees connected with such organizations as the Colombo Plan very fully realize, do want and do appreciate particularly the technical assistance which the long-acquired knowledge of the West can put at their disposal. Indeed, that technical assistance seems to be the greatest hope for their being able to achieve their aim.

There is in this Society a great wealth of accumulated knowledge, wisdom and experience of Asia. I hope that all the members of it will concentrate their thoughts upon seeing what assistance they can give by study of these problems, if not by taking an active part to assist in the solution of them, bearing in mind always the vastness of their scale, the infinity of their diversity and the menace of their urgency.

The Society has, I know, done much in the past and I am confident that it will give the same measure of collaboration in the future, and put its richness of knowledge at the disposal of those who are anxious to take advantage of it. If it can do and will do that, it will indeed deserve well not only those of this country, not only of those of the Commonwealth, but of all the peoples who are in their varying degrees children of one world.

Ladies and gentlemen, I invite you to drink to the health of the Society and to the prosperity of its work. (Applause.)

THE THIRD DANISH EXPEDITION TO CENTRAL ASIA: ITS WORK IN THE HIMALAYAS

By H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE AND DENMARK, LEADER, 1953-54

Introduction

NO sooner had the last Great War ended, than Henning Haslund-Christensen, the well-known Danish explorer and writer, began at once to thirst after further enterprise and adventure, and to organize in consequence the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia.

An enthusiast of Mongolia, he had already been in Hailar and Chahar in 1936-37 as leader of the First Danish Expedition to Central Asia, and visited the Oret farther west during the course of the Second Danish Expedition to Central Asia in 1938-39. But this was by no means his first experience of these little-known areas; it was, on the contrary, rather the culmination of many years spent in the Far East with other Scandinavian expeditions such as those, for instance, of the late Sven Hedin. Henning Haslund spoke and understood Mongolian perfectly.

The knowledge acquired during these scientific undertakings had convinced him of two things. First that further exploration to the west of where he had left off at the outbreak of war was necessary in order fully to grasp the nature of the country and peoples that inhabit it; and secondly, that unless this exploration took place very soon, in his own words, "Asia may close up to Europe again as it has so often done before in history, and the old cultures will then completely disappear, never to rise again" (from the project of a Danish Expedition to Central Asia: *The Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia*, H. Haslund-Christensen, Copenhagen, June 18, 1946).

The idea which he put forward was that the vast, practically unknown space lying in Upper Asia between Alashan and the Pamirs and stretching over north Tibet and the Hindu Kush should be thoroughly investigated by Danish scientists of all branches. He organized his expedition in the following manner:

1. A first team consisting of anthropologists, botanists, geographers, and zoologists would work during 1948 and 1949 in Afghanistan, from Nuristan in the east to Herat in the west, under his own leadership. This would enable Denmark to extend its scientific knowledge to the south-east of the Pamirs and Iran explored respectively by Ole Olufsen in 1896-97 and C. G. Feilberg in 1936.

2. A second team, consisting of anthropologists, archæologists, geo-

graphers, meteorologists, and of scholars specializing in the comparative history of religions, starting from Sikkim in the south, would work itself up across the Tibetan plateau to Wang-yeh-fu in Alashan, where he would meet it, after having travelled by ship from Karachi to Tientsin and from there overland to the city beyond the Great Wall on the edge of the Gobi. In a letter dated March 3, 1948, Henning Haslund-Christensen asked me to lead this team, because of my knowledge of Tibet and Tibetans acquired in 1938 during an expedition to western Tibet, and because I was considerably younger he believed I would stand the high altitude of the Roof of the World better than he would. From Wang-yeh-fu we were to go on together in the direction of the Nan Shan and of the area west of the Etsin Göl, where tasks of great anthropological and archæological interest awaited us, such as, for instance, a study of the "Yellow Uigurs," still in residence in these parts. This phase of the expedition, Operation 2 as he called it, would last from 1950 to 1952.

3. "At the same time," wrote Henning Haslund, "I shall start Operation 3, the setting-out point of which will be N.W. China. The working field of this operation will be S.W. Mongolia, where I intend completing some ethnological work which I began there earlier." The journey home, once these tasks had been terminated, was to take place in separate teams. One of these was to return along the Kwen Lun Shan to Chitral and India, while the other would go by way of south Mongolia and China. I was to have accompanied the western branch, while Henning Haslund would have taken the south-eastern one. By the end of 1953, or during 1954, the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia would have been wound up.

This was a well-conceived plan. It received enthusiastic support in leading Danish circles, and its financing proved to be of no difficulty at all. (It would, perhaps, be well to mention here that since the end of the second World War, Denmark has led the field in foreign exploration, having organized to date over twenty scientific expeditions to little-known parts of the world.) With the gracious approval of H.M. the King of Denmark, the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia was placed under royal patronage.

In the autumn of 1947 Henning Haslund, accompanied by a number of Danish scientists,* set out for Afghanistan. He arrived in the capital, Kabul, on December 14 and immediately set up his headquarters in that city. The winter was spent in getting organized and in obtaining the necessary permits to travel from the Royal Afghan Government.

In the spring Nuristan was entered, while Mag. H. Siiger went to the Kaffir borderland in Chitral (Pakistan). Henning Haslund remained in Kabul and later joined up with the groups working in the south-east and central regions. But he soon returned to Kabul, where during August he sickened gradually, and was soon so tired that he had to remain indoors. His condition worsened during the first days of September and, after having been unconscious for some time, to everyone's consternation and grief he passed away during the night of September 12-13, 1948. He was laid

* Dr. Paludan, Cand. Mag. Edelberg, Magister H. Siiger, later also Prof. Johs. Humlum, Mr. and Mrs. Køie, Mag. Niels Haarløv.

to rest in the Christian cemetery of the Afghan capital, next to the tomb of Sir Aurel Stein, another great figure in the pioneering exploration of Central Asia.

Needless to say this was a stunning blow for the whole project of the expedition. On instructions from the board in Copenhagen, however, the members left leaderless in Asia carried on with their allotted tasks. During the remaining months of 1948 and the whole of 1949, they accomplished everything that had been asked of them in a quite exemplary manner. They then all travelled back home except Mag. H. Siiger who, after visiting Sikkim and Assam where he did original anthropological research work on the Lepchas and the Boros, arrived in Kalimpong in west Bengal, at the beginning of 1950. I was to join up with him here, having come from Ceylon and south India.

The tragic news of Henning Haslund's untimely death had reached me in New York, U.S.A., where I went, partly on a lecture tour and partly in order to equip myself before setting off for the task awaiting me.

I immediately wrote to Copenhagen, stressing my intention of carrying on with the plans as if nothing had happneed. In reply I received a letter from the board of the expedition, signed by its chairman, H.R.H. Prince Axel, encouraging me to do so, and asking me to contact Mag. H. Siiger when I arrived in India.

Accompanied by my wife, I then went to Ceylon and south India during 1949, during which year I completed some anthropological research work which I had started in 1939 and which had been interrupted by the outbreak of war. In January 1950, we travelled up to Kalimpong, in west Bengal, and there met Mag. H. Siiger, with whom I had been in correspondence already for some time.

In the frontier area of Himalayan west Bengal it was immediately evident that some degree of nervousness existed. There was talk of the new Government of China militarily occupying Tibet, and officials on both sides of the border seemed to be in a state of tension. Judging that, under the circumstances, it would be inopportune and probably useless to request permission to carry on with the expedition to cross Tibet as planned, after consultation with my colleague in Kalimpong I decided to apply only for a permit to visit Gyantse at the end of the trade route in Tibet.

A request for permission to do so was handed to the Political Officer in Sikkim in April 1950, after a research scholar of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, Mr. R. K. Sprigg, had sought and obtained permission to proceed there. The precedent seemed encouraging, and I had no reason to doubt that we also would be granted permission.

Unfortunately this did not prove to be the case. After interminable delays, during which reminders were continually sent to the Political Officer, a telegram was dispatched direct by me to the Tibetan Foreign Bureau in Lhasa, requesting that they reply to the application forwarded to them through Indian intermediary. Within three days an answer was received, on August 3, 1950, saying that no application had reached them. When then asked directly if they would allow a visit to Gyantse, I was

courteously asked a few days later to "kindly postpone my voyage" because of the present circumstances.

There thus seemed no alternative but for us to remain in Kalimpong, in the hope that something could be accomplished there. There was also the forlorn hope, in those days, that we should, all the same, perhaps be able to get into Tibet should events turn out otherwise than they were expected to.

And so we resigned ourselves to remaining where we were, and set to work in our immediate surroundings. Mag. H. Siiger left for Denmark during the spring of 1950, and a new leader of the expedition, Dr. Carl Krebs, was appointed from Copenhagen. The latter arrived in India in March, together with three companions.* He wrote to me from New Delhi inquiring if I thought there was any possibility of us carrying out Operation 2 as planned, in which case he would join me immediately in Kalimpong. But on my answering that I believed there to be very little chance of this being possible, he departed for the Siwalik range in the Punjab, and later crossed over into Lahul, Spiti, Rupshu, and Ladak. During the autumn, after a brief stay in Rajastan for further study, he and his companions went back to Denmark, leaving me with whatever funds they had still with them, and in sole charge of any further tasks lying ahead for the expedition.

The Work in the Himalayas

In November 1950, the awaited Chinese military occupation of Tibet began. Very soon after, the Dalai Lama, in order to be in a stronger position to negotiate with the invaders, transferred his seat of Government from Lhasa to Yatung in the Chumbi valley. At the same time, many Tibetan officials and their families, more free to move as they liked than the highest authority, came over the border into India, and settled temporarily in Kalimpong. Among them were His Holiness's mother, and Gyal-Yum Chen-mo and all her other six children. The few Europeans living in Tibet, such as Heinrich Harrer, Peter Aufschnaiter, the White Russian engineer, Niedbylov and Reginald Fox, head of the Tibetan Government's radio service, also came out on "six months' leave," never, however, to return. And a stream of refugees, arriving from China via Tibet, also came this way: a Torgut Mongol prince with his family and retainers, twenty-three Russian Old Believers, including a woman and a little girl of thirteen, and the Californian Fullbright student Bessac with the remains of the party with which he had started from Sinkiang and which had been decimated on the way.

All this made the place we had perforce settled in a most interesting and lively one. Apart from the excitement of meeting all these strange and fascinating people, there were enormous possibilities of work. Very soon we had got down to interviewing them, purchasing clothes and valuables from them which we dispatched to the National Museum in Copenhagen and, after the Indian Government had made registration of all Tibetans with the police compulsory, measuring and describing them

* Dr. Eigil Nielsen, K. M. Jensen and A. Berthelsen.

in order the better to find out what their physical racial characteristics were. We had been denied entry into Tibet, but Tibet had come to us, and under circumstances of stress which made it perhaps easier for us to obtain the results we wanted than if we had been working in the country under settled conditions.

During February 1951, I made one more attempt to enter Tibet. My cousin, King Paul I of the Hellenes, very kindly sent me his photograph and an introductory letter for the Dalai Lama. I wrote to the Court in Yatung, asking for permission to deliver these things personally to His Holiness. I should record here how very helpful the late Reginald Fox proved to be in this case. He had not yet left Tibet and was in attendance on the Tibetan Government in the Chumbi valley.

When he came to Kalimpong on a brief visit, I asked him to sound official circles with which he was in contact, and to let me know what their reaction was to my application. As was perhaps to be expected the latter was again negative. Very politely I was asked to hand over the photograph and the letter from my cousin to the Tibetan Trade Representative in Kalimpong, something which I naturally declined to do.

Some time later, both Tibetan Joint Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Dzasa Surkhang Surpa and Dzasa (monk official) Liu-shar, also came to Kalimpong. In an interview which I had with them, they expressed regret that they had not been able to allow me to deliver the Royal Message, adding that they had found it difficult to agree to this taking place because of the "unusual interest which the U.S.A. had taken in Greek affairs with the Truman Aid to Greece and Turkey and which would certainly make my presence in Yatung with a message from H.M. the King of Greece appear as a provocation to the Chinese." I was not a little surprised at this preoccupation with international politics, and I was, furthermore, astonished at the knowledge which these two Tibetan officials showed of world politics. I have since, however, become familiar with this sort of thing, and have come to learn that international politics are the real obstacle to scientific research in these areas. The height of the Himalayan barrier, the barrenness of the Tibetan high plateau, and the difficulties of supply and transport pale into insignificance when compared with this, the main impediment.

From Kalimpong we were able to obtain successfully from Tibet, through the friends whom we had made among those who had come from Lhasa and elsewhere, the medical statistics for which the Anthropological Laboratory of the University of Copenhagen had asked us, as well as the great majority of the books which had been ordered from us by the Royal Library of Denmark.

For my own personal research work into the curious organization of Tibetan society, with particular emphasis on the custom of polyandry, I was fortunate in finding and studying cases of *cha-ma-dung* (lCha-ma-gDung) marriages, in which fathers and sons share a single wife, the latter being either a step-mother of the boys or the daughter-in-law of the elder men. This was one of the principal purposes of my anthropological interest in Tibet, and it was thus fulfilled after fourteen years of waiting

—ever since my trip to western Tibet in 1938, when I first heard of this extraordinary matrimonial arrangement.

Permission to travel in Sikkim and Nepal was regularly sought from the Indian and Nepalese Governments. It seemed a sound idea to spread out laterally from where we were in Kalimpong, since we could not conduct exploration northwards. Only once, however, in either case, were we allowed to travel in those regions: once to Kathmandu and the valley of Nepal during November 1951, and to the Jelep and Nathu passes into Tibet from Sikkim in May 1952. Other requests to visit north Sikkim and eastern Nepal (Shingsa Walung) were declined on the grounds that the first was a "closed area" (presumably to foreigners, as Indians were free to go there) and that the other was in the throes of civil troubles which did not allow the Nepalese Government to "assume the responsibility" of us going there.

An interest in the legendary *Abominable Snowman* was gradually acquired during our stay in Kalimpong, and we very soon gathered the impression that some sort of unknown animal really does inhabit the higher reaches of the giant Himalayas. During the visit to the Jelep-la, at Kapup bungalow, just below the pass, a number of highly entertaining stories about the fabulous beast were collected. All requests really to set out and search for the strange animal were, however, turned down by the Indian authorities, their attitude towards our activities becoming, on the whole, more and more frustrating as time went by.

Today, in 1954, at the close of the expedition, we have been denied permission to go on measuring Tibetans during registration, all our requests for permission to travel in and around the Sikkimese and Nepalese Himalayas have been refused, and it is even with difficulty that we are able to remain in friendly contact with the Tibetan friends which we have made here in the last four years. We are thus acutely reminded of the late regretted Henning Haslund's prophetic words:

"It is essential that this work be started now, because very soon Asia may close up to Europe again as it has so often done before in history, and the old cultures will then completely disappear, never to rise again" (*op. cit.*, p. 1).

The Results

These can be divided under the following headings: anthropology (cultural and physical); photography (still and moving); sound recording; collection of artefacts and books.

When Mag. H. Siiger left for Denmark at the beginning of 1950 he already took with him a small collection of Tibetan ethnographical objects and books. The bulk of his results from the Himalayas was, however, made up of Lepcha records and books, and it was left to me in the following years to deal with the Tibetans. In 1952 I returned to Denmark for a short time and delivered to the expedition's board whatever I had collected to date. An exhibition of these things was held in Copenhagen during October of that year, at the termination of which I was requested to return to Kalimpong and to carry on for the two remaining years of the expedition. This I gladly agreed to do, as the prospects of acquiring many interesting things still seemed bright at the time.

Under the heading of Anthropology, beginning with the cultural aspect, the Tibetan language was learnt with a number of various teachers (the jester of the former Radeng Rimpoche, Regent of Tibet, murdered in 1947, the local Tibetan printer, the son of the Tibetan State Oracle, etc.); the custom of polyandry as practised in Tibet, outlined above, was exhaustively investigated; biographies, mostly of women and with the invaluable help of my wife, were taken down; a record of the Tibetan nobility was drawn up (in course of publication); the Moslems of Tibet were described in an article of the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society;* social statistics were established for 2,000 Tibetans interviewed during registration in Kalimpong; Thematic Aperception Tests (Tibetan version) and Rorschach Tests were taken in co-operation with the Indian Department of Anthropology, Calcutta; for this same department, specimens of Tibetan alcoholic beverages (*chang* and *arak*) were collected for analysis; and for Professor Rolf Stein, of Paris, records were made of the Kesar sagas as sung by professional Tibetan bards.

On the physical anthropological side, medical statistics were sought and obtained from the local hospitals and dispensaries, those in Sikkim and the three in Tibet, at Yatung, Gyantse, and Lhasa, attached to the Indian trade missions there; 3,284 Tibetans were anthropometrically measured and described as long as the work was allowed to take place during their registration with the police, the Indian Department of Anthropology with which we worked in co-operation making measurements and taking blood from 198 individuals. These Tibetans, coming as they do to Kalimpong for various reasons (trade, pilgrimage, begging, residence, etc.), give a most wonderful cross-section picture of the population of the country, people from Leh in Ladak in the west, to Tatsienlu (Kanding) in the east, and from Buriat Mongolia in the north to Kurseong in west Bengal, India, in the south, having been interviewed in the course of the work.

Under the heading of Photography, these are the results we obtained: 2,250 coloured stills and 770 black-and-white ones, of all sizes, taken with Leica, Rolleiflex, and Speed Graphic cameras, and consisting to a large extent of anthropometrical photographs taken in conjunction with the measuring of Tibetans; 4,850 feet of 16-mm. Kodachrome movie film and 2,800 black-and-white of the same, taken with a Kodak Special Cine camera and a model F one. A single coloured film was made after editing these films and those taken in south India before we moved to Kalimpong; it was shown in Europe in various capitals (mostly in Scandinavia) during our 1952 visit there.

Sound recordings were taken both for the expedition and for the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., the latter having supplied us with wire for the purpose. They included a complete recording of the Tibetan saga of King Kesar of Ling, chapter of the war against the Tajiks (Persians), a recording of the war against the Hors (Vigurs) of the same saga; *namthars* or popular Tibetan songs, sung by girls; an entire *Nyingma-pa* (Red Hat sect of lamaism) religious ceremony; the

* "The Moslems of Central Tibet," by H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark, Ll.D., C.B., vol. xxxix, parts iii and iv, July–October 1952, p. 233.

whole of a *Gelug-pa* (Yellow Hat sect) ceremony; various renderings of free Tibetan conversation; Lepcha songs; the trances of a Tibetan oracle; and the Tibetan New Year Lion Dance.

The amount of artefacts and books collected proved to be quite considerable. As alluded to earlier, this became possible when many Tibetans settled in Kalimpong in order to tide over the first onrush of Chinese troops into their country. These Tibetans have since all returned home, and it is doubtful if anything more can be acquired now under the present more settled conditions. We thus have been fortunate in being in Kalimpong exactly at the right moment.

The Ethnographical Collection of the Danish National Museum instructed us to purchase the following artefacts: a man's sheepskin coat; everyday household articles, although not of metal; articles for the care of cattle; the complete attire of a woman from central Tibet.

Of these we were successful in obtaining the latter, with an excellent set of jewels, from a distracted husband who had tragically seen his four children die of dysentery within a week, during an epidemic at Kyirong dzong in Tö, and subsequently lost his wife in childbirth at Yatung, in the Chumbi valley. He sold all her belongings in order to go on pilgrimage in India and to make offerings to the gods for the happy reincarnation of her soul.

Instead of only obtaining a man's sheepskin coat, we prevailed upon a friend to get us complete sets of nomads' clothes with all their camping paraphernalia. This he brought to us from his "own nomads" as he styled it, together with one of the spider-shaped Tibetan, black yak-hair tents.

Household articles of daily use, although not of metal, were more difficult to come by. We did, however, successfully acquire two willow-knot wood butter boxes, a large butter and tea churn, and a wooden *chang* pot of some antiquity.

Finally, recently, after trying for four years, we finally took delivery from Tibet of all articles for the care of cattle, of implements for ploughing with yaks and of many agricultural tools such as are used in the Tsang province.

As things came our way under the stress of the prevailing political circumstances, we also bought at our own expense, later to be sold to the Museum, the following items of clothing:

a Lhasa nobleman's ceremonial riding habit, complete with pronged rifle, sword, bow and quiver of arrows, gilt saddle, trappings and pendants of rank;
the uniform of a cabinet minister (shapé);
a *Gye-lu-che* habit, as worn by all officials of the 4th rank upwards;
a *Tse-trung* (monk official) uniform;
the uniform of a Colonel (*de pön*) of the Dalai Lama's Guard (*ku sung*);
the *gin-tshar* (wrap) and *ku-djam* (cloak) of the late Radeng Rimpoche;
a *sha-nag* (black hat) dancer's costume, with *rü-gyen* (human bone apron);

the clothes of a Red Sect lama, with *Wang-chä* adornments (for special ceremonies);
the complete set of clothes of a Tibetan oracle with pike, sword, and trident;
an ordinary muleteer's dress.

On demand from the National Museum, we also purchased the *chuba* (coat) of the Bhutanese Paro Pen-lop (an official of western Bhutan), a Lepcha *kom-fort-ki* or wrap made of woven nettle fibre, and a statue of Padmasambhava, the Buddhist preacher, with his two wives. We added further, an exceptionally good pair of ceremonial, lamaist spoons called *kang-sa kang-lug*, used mainly for pouring butter over pyres during the cremation of dead bodies.

All these artefacts are now on exhibition at the National Museum in Copenhagen, Denmark, and can be seen in the Ethnographical Collection's galleries.

The Royal Library had also made an order with the Expedition. They wanted the two great Canons of the Tibetan Buddhist faith, the Kan-gyur and the Tän-gyur. These we succeeded in obtaining, not without difficulty, the former taking fourteen months to be delivered to us. The latter, thanks to the assistance of a Tibetan friend, was specially printed for us at Nar-thang in Tsang, the wooden blocks of the printing-press there being first thoroughly cleaned so that a good impression was obtained. About 100 other books, both wood-block prints and manuscripts, were sent off to Denmark; they included such works as the Blue Annals of Tibet, the biography of Padmasambhava, the collected works of the reformer Tsong-kapa, the tales of Milarepa, etc. All of these are on view at the Royal Library, Copenhagen, Denmark.

Conclusion

At the end of last year, Dr. G. I. Finch, a member of the British Everest Expedition of 1922 and now Director of the National Physical Laboratory in Poona, India, told an Indian newspaper that, in his opinion, " India's Himalayan region is likely to become a favourite tourist playground " in the future.

And the British Broadcasting Corporation, in its news broadcast of November 27, 1953, after announcing the opening of a motor-road from the Indian frontier to Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, added that this would most certainly now open up this, until now, very closed country.

The Chinese armies in Tibet, on the other side of the Himalayas, are reported to be feverishly building new motorable highways towards Lhasa from many directions, including from Chumbi in the south.

These countries will undoubtedly " open up " as the B.B.C. has put it, but for whom? I doubt very much indeed that it will be for " tourists," as Dr. Finch thinks, if by that he meant, as I presume that he only could, Europeans or, better said, Westerners. For them, on the contrary, I believe, these countries will gradually close up more and more, and the Himalayas, far from becoming the " playground " which we hear about, will rather much more likely become a strictly closed area, from which

"foreigners" will be rigidly excluded and where much more grim and serious activities than "play" will take place. Bhutan has already become, if possible, even more forbidden than it was before, and even Tibetans and Indians are not allowed in today. Sikkim, once the paradise of trekkers, is virtually inaccessible, and the bungalows put there by the British Raj must be rotting away for want of use and attendance.*

It is a thousand pities, but there is nothing that can be done about it. Henning Haslund-Christensen was prophetic in his appreciation of the situation, and all that can be said about his pronouncement that "Asia may close up again as it has so often done before in history" is that this is taking place even sooner than he expected.

We were not able to carry out Operations 2 and 3 as planned for the Third Danish Expedition to Central Asia because of the countries north closing up before we got there. And those in which we have worked, as a substitute, for the last four years, seem gradually to be going the same way.

We may deem ourselves lucky to have done as much as we have in Kalimpong and the Himalayan frontier regions, and for this we must be and are very grateful to those of the present Indian Government who made it possible.

* This actually applies to Sikkim north of an east-to-west line through Gangtok.—H. W. T.

AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

By PAUL B. HENZE

I

ON December 16, 1953, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted a *Decision on the Further Development of Agricultural Producer Co-operatives*. This document, released to the Chinese public as well as the outside world on January 10, 1954, provides the most detailed information we have received on the progress of agricultural collectivization in Communist China and the Peking régime's plans for the next few years.* It also leaves little doubt as to the Chinese Communists' long-range intentions. The *Decision* states:

> . . . The Party's most fundamental task in the rural areas is to raise the productive forces in agriculture so as to educate the peasants and stimulate them to organize themselves and carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture; . . . so as to transform China's agriculture from small-scale production by individual economy to the advanced, large-scale production of co-operative economy, gradually narrowing the gap between industrial and agricultural development.

In other words, the Chinese Communists have decided to follow the course which was taken twenty-five years ago by the Russians. The Soviet Union is not once mentioned in the *Decision*, but the document is nevertheless strikingly reminiscent of similar statements and decisions which were made by the Soviets under the leadership of Stalin in the late 1920s. The Chinese seem to be aware of the lesson of the tragic Soviet experience in one respect at least. They do not plan to achieve complete collectivization at breakneck speed. By 1957 approximately 20 per cent. of all peasant households in China are to have been organized in agricultural co-operatives, and 800,000 co-operatives are to have been created. The majority of these may not be as tightly organized as the Soviet *kolkhozy*. The proportion of total cultivated area which is to be affected is not specified, but it is likely to be appreciably higher than the percentage of households to be collectivized, since the best land and the larger holdings are usually best suited for co-operative exploitation.

Collectivization began in earnest in the Soviet Union in 1929. By 1935, after six years of persuasion and pressure, the Kremlin had enrolled nearly 83 per cent. of the peasant households in the country in the collectives; a

* All quotations from the *Decision* in this paper are based on the English language text released by the New China News Agency on January 10, 1954.

year later, in 1936, 89 per cent. had joined. By 1939, the Soviet peasantry was 98 per cent. collectivized. Ninety-four per cent. of the whole cultivated area of the U.S.S.R. had already been collectivized by 1935, and this figure too rose to nearly 100 per cent. by 1939.* Thus it can be seen that though the Chinese are following the same road the Russians took twenty-five years ago, they plan to travel it only about one-quarter as fast for the time being. They have not made clear their plans for the period after 1957. In all likelihood they have not yet decided themselves. The course to be followed after 1957 will depend on the results of efforts made during the 1954-57 period. It is interesting to note while we are comparing the Chinese situation with the Russian that the Soviet Communists waited nearly ten years after the complete assumption of power to inaugurate their collectivization drive. The Chinese Communists have been in complete control of their country for less than four years. By starting earlier than the Russians and spreading the collectivization campaign over a much longer period, the Chinese no doubt hope to avoid the acute economic and social dislocations which the Soviets brought upon themselves in the early 1930s.

Soviet agriculture has not yet completely recovered from the upheaval which collectivization caused. First Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Khrushchev revealed in his historic speech in September 1953, that the total number of livestock in the U.S.S.R. had still not reached the 1928 level. He also revealed that the Russian peasantry had still not reconciled itself to the collective system and that concessions had to be made to the "spirit of material interestedness of the peasantry" if the desperately needed increases in basic agricultural production were to be achieved in the near future.† Before the Communists came to power, Russia had regularly produced large surpluses of food grains. In modern times China has never been in such a fortunate position. China under the Communists is in as precarious a food supply situation as ever. Among the factors which have made it necessary for the Chinese Communists to content themselves with a slower rate of collectivization is undoubtedly their realization that the Chinese countryside would be gripped by complete chaos if it were subjected to a Stalinist-type collectivization campaign accompanied by "de-kulakization" and mass deportations. Millions of peasants died of starvation and hardship during the early 1930s in the U.S.S.R. and famine raged in the Ukraine. These Soviet experiences would seem mild in comparison with the tens of millions who would die of starvation and confusion were a similar campaign to be carried out in the much more primitive conditions of present-day China.

II

Let us examine the present state of collectivization and the current "Three-Year Plan" on the basis of the information contained in the Central Committee's *Decision*:

* One of the best general summaries of agricultural collectivization in the U.S.S.R. is contained in Sir John Maynard's *Russia in Flux*, New York, 1948.

† N. S. Khrushchev: *O Merakh Dal'neishevo Razvitiya Sel'skovo Khozyaistva SSSR; Doklad na Plenume TsK KPSS*, September 3, 1953. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953. The speech was also published in *Pravda* on September 15, 1953.

The *Decision* speaks of the present stage of Chinese politico-economic development as a "transitional stage to socialism." Referring to the "two forms of peasant activity in production since land reform," (1) "individual economy," and (2) "mutual-aid and co-operation," the *Decision* maintains that this

> "reflects the two-sided nature of the peasants—mainly the middle peasants—as working people and private owners. Their activity in mutual aid and co-operation, based on the peasants as labouring people, shows that they can be led to socialism. Their activity in individual economy, arising from the nature of the peasants as private owners and sellers of agricultural products, indicates their spontaneous potentiality towards capitalism. The party's policy is actively and carefully to change the peasants' activity in individual economy to mutual aid and co-operation through numerous, concrete, appropriate and varied forms so as to overcome the spontaneous tendency to capitalism and gradually lead them to socialism."

According to the statistics contained in the *Decision,* 47,900,000 peasant households, or 43 per cent. of the total in all China, are now organized in mutual aid teams. There are 273,000 peasant households organized in agricultural co-operatives, and 14,000 such co-operatives now exist. By the autumn harvest of 1954, nearly 22,000 more co-operatives are to have been established. Even then barely 1 per cent. of all Chinese peasant households will have been collectivized. During the next three years the total number of argicultural co-operatives is to be multiplied nearly twenty-three times. It seems clear that there will have to be much "persuading" and "convincing" of peasants if the goal of 800,000 is to be reached. A breakdown of the figures for 1954 on a regional basis is provided:

	Present	*By Autumn Harvest* 1954
North China	6,186	more than 12,400
North-east China (Manchuria) ...	4,187	„ „ 10,000
East China	3,301	„ „ 8,300
Central-South China	527	„ „ 3,600
North-west China	302	„ „ 750
South-west China	59	„ „ 600
Total	14,562	„ „ 35,650

Though these statistics are too limited to justify very many far-reaching conclusions, they confirm what we have already assumed to be the case. The regions which the Communists are developing as the main bases of their strength—areas where collectivization of agriculture has already made the most progress—are the regions where the greatest emphasis on the creation of new agricultural co-operatives is to be placed. As the *Decision* states, collectivization of agriculture is a necessary prerequisite for Communist-style industrialization. It is natural that the Communists plan to push collectivization fastest in the areas where they are making most of their industrialization effort—North China and Manchuria. Nevertheless, in view of the relatively sparse population of China's western

regions, the figures for those areas are proportionately larger than they would at first sight seem.

It is quite possible that the Peking régime may attempt to force collectivized cotton culture in Chinese Turkestan, following the example of Moscow's successful efforts in Soviet Central Asia in the 1930s.* Manchuria already has more agricultural co-operatives than any other part of China. The first collectives established by the Chinese Communists were in this region.† The principal economic (as separate from political) aim of Communist collectivization is always to get as much of the food supply as possible under direct State control. Peking is especially anxious to secure food supplies in the North for the workers who are rebuilding and operating the war-damaged and Soviet-dismantled industries originally established by the Japanese.

The *Decision* talks of three stages of agricultural co-operation: (1) temporary and year-round mutual-aid teams; (2) agricultural co-operatives; and (3) collective farms. The first two stages are not to be considered as ends in themselves, but as steps toward the current goal—fully developed collective farms.‡ The distinctions between these three stages are not made clear. The Chinese Communists appear not to have thought through this process in specific terms as yet. Exact definitions of the different stages of collectivization will no doubt be developed as the campaign progresses, and—if Communist practice in the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European satellites is taken as a guide—these definitions will be changed as the tactical requirements of the collectivization campaign dictate.§

The *Decision* has almost nothing to say about mechanization of agriculture. In the U.S.S.R. and in the Eastern European satellites collectivization and mechanization have gone hand in hand, theoretically at least. The fact that mechanization has nowhere kept up to the pace of collectivization (including the U.S.S.R.) has been one of the principal material difficulties contributing to the malfunctioning of the collective system. Nevertheless lavish promises of further deliveries of tractors and agricultural machinery continue to be made and Soviet and satellite Communists often seem to be deluding themselves into believing that if only they can get

* See *e.g.* Sir Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire, The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, London, 1953, pp. 173-214.

† Soong Ching-ling, *The Struggle for New China* (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1952), pp. 294-310, contains interesting information on the reorganization of agriculture in several Manchurian villages during the 1947-50 period and concludes with a naïve but revealing account of the virtues and activities of one Han En, a peasant co-operative farming enthusiast, who had been leading peasants into the collective movement.

‡ As in the U.S.S.R., a further goal for the more distant future is also occasionally referred to—State farms, which in their highest form become *agrogoroda*—"agricultural cities." According to Marxist-Leninist theory this is the point at which differences between the city and the countryside, between urban and rural life, will cease to exist and peasants will become agricultural "factory workers." The Chinese, of course, have had little occasion to speak of such a Utopian stage of agricultural development. However, even the Soviets are embarrassingly vague about how and when this goal is to be reached.

§ An excellent recent summary which deals with both the theoretical and practical aspects of agricultural collectivization in the Communist orbit is the Symposium *Satellite Agriculture in Crisis*, published by Praeger, New York, 1954.

more machinery into the hands of the Machine Tractor Stations, then everything will work smoothly and bountiful crops will be harvested with a minimum investment of manpower. The Chinese cannot permit themselves any illusions of this sort. They know that they do not have the capability of mechanizing their agriculture themselves. They know that the hard-pressed Russians and satellite peoples are having serious difficulties trying to produce enough agricultural machinery to meet their own demands. The Chinese *Decision* speaks modestly and unspecifically of " the establishment of State farms, agrotechnical stations, new type farm tool stations, pumping stations, and tractor stations in various parts of the country "—that is all. Whatever success the Chinese collectives have will depend upon effective application of their one seemingly inexhaustible resource—manpower.

There is another aspect of this mechanization problem which deserves consideration—the political rôle of the Machine Tractor Stations in the Soviet and satellite systems. Soviet theoreticians have themselves always admitted the important political rôle played by the Machine Tractor Stations. The Machine Tractor Stations, more than any other aspect of the collective system, prove the essential political nature of the whole effort. A Machine Tractor Station may serve several dozen collective farms. The collective farms themselves dispose of very little machinery, and the individual farmers of almost none at all. The tractors, the sowing machines, the cultivators, harrows, mowing machines, cotton pickers, combines and threshing machines all belong to the Machine Tractor Stations. It is therefore obviously the Machine Tractor Station which decides when and how the collectives do their work. It is to the Machine Tractor Station that the collective farms deliver a major share of their output as " payment " for the work the Machine Tractor Station does for them. The Machine Tractor Station thereby becomes one of the principal State wholesale procurement agencies. Specialists of all kinds are attached to the Machine Tractor Station and are designated by the Machine Tractor Station director to work on the various collective farms in turn. Machine Tractor Stations apportion delivery quotas. Every Machine Tractor Station has a large *agitprop* department under a political officer who is in charge of ideological indoctrination of the peasantry in his area. This department holds lectures, shows films and distributes books and pamphlets on agricultural methods. It exacts pledges of plan overfulfilment from collective farms and individual peasants and distributes rewards to shockworkers, brigade leaders and collective farm chairmen who carry out their tasks well. It is therefore easy to see that when this system works according to plan (which is by no means always the case) the director of a Machine Tractor Station is one of the most influential people of his district. The M.V.D. in rural areas is based on the Machine Tractor Station. It is not yet clear how the Chinese plan to cope with the problem of political control of the countryside without some counterpart for the Machine Tractor Stations. It is undoubtedly their ultimate aim to set up a similar system. For the time being they will probably have to rely on local party cells and on village councils and other administrative organs.

III

The new *Decision* apparently does not involve any reversal of the 1950 decision to favour the kulaks, the so-called rich peasants.*

At the time of the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1950, the Chinese Communists realized clearly that agricultural production could be maintained at a relatively high level only if the independent peasants were enabled to work without interference and guaranteed a reasonable profit on their produce. Compared with conditions in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union, middle and rich peasants were promised extremely favourable treatment in China. The Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Shao-chi, stated at the time:

> " . . . The great revolutionary unity of all nationalities, all democratic classes, parties and groups and people's organizations throughout the country has already been established politically and organizationally, and the political attitude of the rich peasant in general has also undergone a change.
>
> " If the People's Government carries out a policy of preserving the rich peasant economy, the rich peasants can be won over to a neutral attitude in general and better protection can then be given to the middle peasants, thus eliminating certain unnecessary worries of the peasant during the development of production. Therefore, in the present situation, the adoption of a policy which will preserve the rich peasant economy in the coming agrarian reform is necessary both politically and economically. It will be relatively advantageous to our country and our people and in overcoming the current financial and economic difficulties.
>
> " The policy adopted by us of preserving the rich peasant economy is, of course, not a temporary but a long-term policy. That is to say, rich peasant economy will be preserved in the whole stage of New Democracy. Only when conditions mature for the wide use of mechanical farming in the organization of collective farms and for the socialist reform of the rural areas can the need for a rich peasant economy cease—and this will take a somewhat lengthy time to achieve.
>
> " That is why we advocate the preservation of a rich peasant economy at present."†

Liu's arguments were based on a very realistic appraisal of the actual situation. He went out of his way to stress the fact that the policy of " preserving the rich peasant economy " was conceived as a long-term policy. He was careful to point out that collectivization was the ultimate goal, but very indefinite about the time when concrete progress toward that goal would actually begin. The principal prerequisite for collectiviza-

* By Western standards these peasants are, of course, anything but rich. In China, as in the U.S.S.R., they are usually defined as peasants owning a few animals and tools and who possess enough land to make it necessary for them to hire outside help at certain seasons of the year.

† The Cominform Journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, July 21, 1950.

tion, at least as Liu Shao-chi saw it in 1950, would be the introduction of mechanization on a broad scale.

The capacity of the Chinese to mechanize their agriculture is not much greater in 1954 than it was in 1950. The ability of the Russians to deliver agricultural equipment to China in large quantities is not very great. Nevertheless, the Chinese have now decided to embark upon collectivization at what, given Chinese conditions, is a fairly rapid rate. In doing so, they appear to be disregarding their own earlier and far wiser conclusions. One must necessarily be sceptical of the results they are likely to achieve.*

The December 1953 agricultural *Decision* of the Chinese Central Committee gives the impression of perhaps being the result of a series of hard-fought compromises within the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party itself. The *Decision* is full of statements which even on the surface appear to contradict each other. It is said that there must be " strict adherence to the basic principle of voluntariness " in the organization of agricultural co-operatives. Nevertheless " a number of good agricultural co-operatives *must be set up* as models in every province or county where land reform has been completed."

But what if the peasants of a given province or county do not want to set up co-operatives? The State has various forms of disguised pressure at its disposal. The State will give special aid to co-operatives in the form of " low-interest loans, irrigation facilities, agrotechnical facilities and farm tool stations—this will enable the peasants to realize the benefits of this type of agriculture and will thus facilitate its development." Here we have reference to a number of devices which Communists have learned to manipulate with great skill. Concessions are made to peasants who join co-operatives; peasants who are still not tempted by these concessions soon find themselves discriminated against more and more. The State may for a while extend aid to them too, if it needs their produce badly enough. Then it stops its aid and reminds them that they can continue to receive it only if they join the co-operative. If they still refuse to join they may find their tax rates rising rapidly, or they may find that their compulsory delivery quotas are set so high that they cannot fulfil them. They may be forbidden to own private livestock, or to employ outside labour or their sons and daughters may be forced to leave and take up

* For the Soviets the policy of the Chinese Communists towards the kulaks is a rather embarrassing subject, since it contrasts so sharply with the policy the Kremlin has followed in regard to the Russian peasantry since the late 1920s. Most Russian works on Communist China treat the subject only very briefly—*e.g.* Myakin, *Kitaiskaya Narodnaya Respublika,* Voenizdat, Moscow, 1952, p. 100:

" We must carry out a change in our policy in respect to rich peasants," declared Mao Tse-tung in his report at the third plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in June 1950. " Specifically, we must change from a policy of confiscation of surplus land and property of rich peasants to a policy of supporting the economy of rich peasants in order to aid the rapid re-establishment of production in agricultural districts. This change is also conducive to isolation of the landlords and will strengthen the situation of peasants of modest circumstances and small tenant-farmers." The new law on the agrarian reform preserves private property in land and permits landowners free buying, selling and renting of their land. Efimov, *Ocherki po Novei i Noveishei Istorii Kitaya,* Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1951, pp. 525-6, treats the problem at slightly greater length but in no greater depth.

jobs elsewhere. It is an old familiar story now. It began in the U.S.S.R. more than twenty-five years ago; it is still going on in very acute form in the countries of Eastern Europe. That is what the Chinese peasants have to look forward to. It may not happen to many of them this year or next; it may well be ten or fifteen years before most of them are affected.

The Chinese régime is moving relatively slowly, as we have observed before. But if the Peking leaders remain committed to the course they have now embarked upon, the fate of the Chinese peasantry is neither difficult to foresee nor pleasant to contemplate. "Leading the peasant masses to socialism" is a phrase which in Communist terms means complete subjugation of the peasants to the narrow interests of the totalitarian State. It means that the peasant is no longer master of his time, his land, his tools or his family. He becomes merely a cog in the Communist machine and a cipher in the economic plan. The fact that the economic plan for agriculture is never fulfilled and the machine is always suffering minor breakdowns is not sufficient reason for the Communist to reconsider the whole theory. For the most important aspect of the theory is not economic considerations at all, but political control. From a short-range point of view at least, it guarantees political control.

The justification which the Chinese Central Committee offers for embarking upon the policy of collectivization is couched in classical Stalinist terms:

> . . . the general line of the Party during China's transitional period requires not only a phenomenal growth in industry but also appropriate immense growth in agriculture. However, the scattered, backward and conservative individual economy *limits the development of the productive forces in agriculture and its contradictions with socialist industrialization increasingly make themselves felt.* Small-scale agricultural production is increasingly falling behind the peasants' demand for improved living conditions and cannot meet the surge forward of the entire national economy. . . . Mutual aid and agricultural producer co-operatives, supply and marketing co-operatives and credit co-operatives are the three forms of co-operation in the rural areas. Through division of labour, these three are linked together and stimulate each other. *They are gradually linking the rural economy with national economic construction plans* and are transforming the small peasant economy on the basis of co-operation in production. (Italics mine.)

What these passages really say is that the Peking régime cannot carry out its industrialization programme unless it can bring the agricultural sector of the economy more fully under its control and continue to exploit it effectively by means of an interlocking system of State service, procurement and supply agencies which, when they have been fully developed, will leave the peasants no alternative but to dispose of their resources, time and energy as Peking directs. When this stage is reached the peasantry will be under complete economic and political control; in Com-

munist terminology, " the rural economy will be completely linked with national economic construction plans."

China has only one readily accessible and pliable internal source of capital for industrialization—the agricultural sector of the economy.* There is likewise only one major source of new industrial labour—the peasantry. At the present time the Chinese Communists appear to be having no particular difficulty recruiting new industrial labour; but as the industrialization programme progresses, labour requirements are bound to increase rapidly.

Much publicity has been given to the industrial credits the Soviets have extended to China and lavish promises of future deliveries of all sorts of capital equipment are constantly being hinted at by both Moscow and Peking. It is true that the Soviets have displayed more generosity toward their Chinese ally than they have ever displayed toward any of their satellites. Nevertheless, there is still no good reason to believe that they will be able to provide much more than a small share of the massive investment of capital that is going to be needed to industrialize China. Moscow's much publicized aid to China to date has probably done no more than compensate the Chinese for the cost of their intervention in Korea and repair partially the losses China suffered through the Soviets' slapdash dismantling of Manchurian industry in 1945. The Kremlin will most likely continue to force its hard-pressed Eastern European satellites to contribute as much as they can spare of their own resources to help build up China and North Korea.†

Full examination of this problem must await further passage of time and the accumulation of more concrete data. From the point of view of the foreseeable future, however, it appears reasonably certain that the real key to the Chinese Communists' industrialization programme is bound to be the extent of their success in organizing and exploiting the agricultural sector of their economy in such fashion as to guarantee as complete State control of food resources, technical crops and the labour supply as possible. In this way they hope to be able to distribute available food and other essential supplies to all urban areas in just sufficient quantities to ensure satisfaction of minimum consumption requirements, while draining off all extra purchasing power—*i.e.* surplus labour value—for investment in the national economic development plan.

* The following observations by E. S. Kirby in *Introduction to the Economic History of China*, London, 1954, pp. 147-148, are interesting. They are made with reference to the T'ang Dynasty: " While money-capital or circulating capital was accumulating in the hands of the temples and of foreign immigrants particularly, the fundamental form of ' capital,' the real basis of both rank and wealth, and the ultimate form of fixed capital and investment, was, however, still—the land. This has remained the case in China right up to modern times."

† There is an interesting theory that the U.S.S.R. was to a considerable extent able to offset the cost of the war materials and other supplies it had to contribute to China and North Korea to fight the Korean war by increased exploitation of the Eastern European satellites during the 1950-53 period. This effort caused severe strains in the economies of Eastern Europe and the so-called " New Course " is now designed to bring them back into balance. Nevertheless the Soviets continue, on a reduced scale, to make the satellites foot part of the bill for their contribution to the economic development of China and the reconstruction of North Korea.

There is nothing new in this technique. It is the same as the system which has been applied in the Soviet Union from the late 1920s and which has been enforced in varying degrees of intensity in the East European satellites during the last few years.

IV

Collectivization of agriculture in a Communist State is not a purely economic problem. In fact, in the final analysis, it is not an economic problem at all but a political problem. Communism is a doctrine which makes much of economic determinism. Its political conclusions are allegedly merely the result of logical analysis of "objective" economic criteria and application of economic "laws" according to "scientific" methods. Marx's basic assumptions were questionable when he made them. They have little relation to the economic realities of the modern Communist State. Marx's followers, from Engels through Stalin, have developed Communism as a revolutionary technique for seizing and maintaining power. In every country where they have established themselves, Communists have found the peasantry the most difficult element of the population to control. They have always distrusted the peasantry. Nevertheless they have realized that they must control the peasantry if they are to maintain themselves in power, for it is the peasants who produce both the food and the surplus population which a modern State must have to maintain its position in the world. The collective agricultural system was devised by the Russian Communists as a means of keeping the peasants under effective political control, as a means of preventing them from exercising the inherent political power which their economic and social position in the State naturally gives them. From a purely economic point of view the collective system has been a monstrous failure. From the political point of view it has not been as much of a success as the Communists would like it to be, but it has at least up to this point in history enabled them to attain their minimum objective—that of preventing the peasants from challenging the authority of the State in a decisive fashion.

The myth that the Chinese Communists are simply agrarian reformers, akin to the democratic populists of the West, has died hard.* If further proof were needed that it never was valid, the recent *Decision* of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party should provide it. It contains many solicitous phrases which when translated into Western terms sound both familiar and humanitarian in spirit. We must not forget, however, that there are very few of our economic slogans and political symbols to which Communists attribute the same meaning as we. One does not even have to look behind and between the words of this *Decision* to discover its real meaning. It is stated in very straightforward

* There is no more thorough an examination of the theoretical basis of Chinese Communism than Benjamin I. Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952. Mr. Schwartz states in his conclusions (p. 199): "The Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung has been . . . neither 'the vanguard of the Proletariat' in the Marxist-Leninist sense, nor a 'peasant party' in the Marxist-Leninist sense, but an élite of professional revolutionaries which has risen to power by basing itself on the dynamic of peasant discontent."

fashion. The *Decision* says that collectivization of agriculture is necessary because industrialization is necessary. Industrialization is necessary because Communist China cannot become and remain a world power unless she is industrialized. Industrialization—under Communist conditions—cannot be achieved unless the peasantry is " linked with national economic construction plans "—in other words, unless the peasantry is brought under effective political control. Communist China is not managing its affairs for the benefit of the peasantry any more than any other Communist State has ever done. It is managing its affairs for the benefit of the party oligarchy which rules the country from Peking and which is interested primarily in the maintenance and exercise of power.

THE GREAT KAZAK EPIC

By M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.

ONE of the most heroic stories in the history of Central Asia can now be told of the fate of a small but widely spread nomad population known as the Kazaks. People who try to live these days a purely pastoral and wandering life, moving with the seasons from plain to mountain and back in search of grazing, are more and more subject to the pressure of modern society to change their habits. Up-to-date methods of ranching as in Australia or on the American continent can be more productive if less picturesque, and government administrations of today are intolerant of people whom they can only with difficulty control and tax. Yet the population of Central Asia contains people who have since the dawn of history lived only this way. Many of them have succumbed to the struggle and have settled down as cultivators of the soil or have gone to work in the bazaars of market towns as carriers. Some live a half-nomad, half-settled existence. In recent years the pressure has become even more serious because the nomads are up against Communism, which has advanced since the change in China till it now dominates the heart of the continent. Non-Communist governments were more tolerant of the nomads. An exception to this was of course the first Pahlevi Shah of Persia in his dealings with the Lurs, Bakhtiaris and Kashgais in South and West Persia. But even if there was not persecution there were always disabilities placed on the nomads. Thus for years under the rule of the Tsars the Kazaks and Kirghiz of Russian Turkestan had much of their good lands taken away from them and made over to Russian settlers from Europe. Periodical revolts took place, the biggest being during the first World War, when the Tsar's Government tried to conscript the Kazaks for labour battalions behind the front. This armed revolt resulted in the massacre of several hundred thousand Kazaks. But now with the coming of Communism there is the additional ideological drive. Under the former régimes in Central Asia governments liked to control and tax, and settlers from Europe sought to acquire nomad lands. Now in addition comes the desire to indoctrinate people who as nomads would be hard to influence. Moreover a patriarchal form of society under which male heads of families (*aksakals* or grey-beards) had the main say, and sat in council to advise and even at times to elect tribal chiefs, was not to the liking of Communist commissars with ideological directives to follow laid down in Moscow and Peking. Modern society finds it hard to deal with nomads of the type which have evolved in Central Asia throughout the centuries. Other countries have had the same problems. The Turks have solved their Khurdish problem by wholesale deportations and resettlement in Central Anatolia. The British in India dealt with their North-west Frontier tribes

by subsidies and compromises. The Arabs have their problems with the Bedouins and the Khurds. Iraq has so far been the most successful Arab State in handling them. But in Central Asia there has been no compromise largely because of the coming of Communism. So a tragic, if heroic, fate has overtaken the Kazaks.

The Central Asian nomads are divided roughly into two kinds, the Kalmuks or Mongols who originally under Chinese influence became Buddhist many generations ago and speak Mongolian, and the Kazaks and Kirghiz who, though they come from the same racial stock as the Kalmuks, became Moslems under Arab influence and speak a dialect of Turkish. Most of the Kalmuks and Mongols live on the Chinese side of the great political frontier which runs north and south through Central Asia and divides the Russian from the Chinese political systems. On the other hand, the Kazaks and Kirghiz live mainly on the Russian side, but there is much overlapping. The Kirghiz are a branch of the Moslem nomad group and inhabit the Ala Tau mountains round Lake Issik Kul. The Kazaks live further north. Some two million of them live in the country between the Caspian Sea, Lake Balkash and the Chinese frontier. Some half a million live in what used to be called Chinese Turkestan and is now called Sinkiang, the country between the Altai mountains and the borders of North-west Tibet. They are divided into three tribes, the Kirei, the Naiman and the Uwak. The Naiman inhabit both the Chinese and Russian territories and the Kirei mostly the Chinese.

After the Russian Revolution little happened at first, but as the Bolsheviks got control of Russian Turkestan increasing interference with the Kazaks became the order of the day. The policy of collectivization began to be applied to their tribal flocks and herds. Many Kazaks refused to accept the new situation and migrated south. The movement started as far back as 1922, when the Bashmaks, anti-Red natives of the highlands of south Bokhara, led by the romantic Enver Pasha, held out against the Bolsheviks for a time but finally crossed the frontiers into Afghanistan and were disarmed. Some Kazaks joined this movement. Others, including Kirghiz from the Ala Tau and Kazaks from round Lake Balkash, in 1937 crossed over into China and then left via Khotan, reaching India via the Karakorams. At this time China was not Communist and Sinkiang was at times under the control of Chiang Kai Shek and at other times under native rulers. All through this time parties of Kazaks were leaving Russian Turkestan and filtering over into Afghanistan and India. So it is clear that this movement was going on for years. But it received a great impetus when the Communist revolution came in China by the victory of the Reds in the civil war in 1948. But it also made the situation of the Kazaks more serious because it enabled the new Communist powers in Sinkiang to close the passes over the Karakorams and the Pamirs into India and Afghanistan after 1951. This meant that the Kirei and part of the Naiman tribe of Kazaks who lived in the southern foothills of the Chinese Altai had no way of escape, should their lives be made intolerable, except across the frozen wastes of North-west Tibet.

Some time about 1950 the Chinese Communists began to make their life intolerable. Communist agents began to appear in the Kazaks camps

near Barkul, where their flocks were grazing in the foothills of the mountains. These agents said that the Kazaks had got to change their way of life. The Communist leaders in Urumtsi, the capital of the province, had decided that there were to be no more Hodjas or religious leaders. Tribal leaders like Janin Khan, Akli Bey, Attay Khan and Osman Bator must come to the capital as guarantee of good behaviour; all flocks and herds were now to be held in common by the tribe and a committee presided over by Communists from Urumtsi were to decide how the produce was to be divided. The Kazak children were to leave their homes and go to schools in the capital and so were to see their parents only once a year for a short time.

In this crisis in the history of their race the Kazaks decided to hold a council of *aksakals* or greybeards, the heads of families presided over by the Khan. After long deliberation they decided that they would not accept the Communist terms but would leave their ancestral homes and seek their fortunes in the free world outside the Iron Curtain. But the mountain passes to the south-west were now closed by Russian and Chinese Communists. The only way out lay south across the high plateau of North-west Tibet beyond which lay Kashmir and India. "Let us trek south towards the sun," said the wise men of the Kazaks, "and put our trust in Allah that he will save us." Thus began the last and most sensational of the Kazak treks from slavery to freedom.

So they left their pastures north of Barkul, and just as they were heading for the Tibetan frontier the Chinese Communists attacked them in force. They had rifles which they had originally got from the Chinese Nationalists and some ammunition. It was enough to enable them to fight a rearguard action with their backs to the mountains, hiding in the woods in the daytime and following *kachak yol* (hidden paths) at night. Ambushes on Communist forces enabled them to add to their stock of arms and ammunition. The magnificent marksmanship and horsemanship of the Kazaks stood them in good stead. They now split up. One lot, entering the Kansu province of China and passing to Machai Nor, a depression in the plateau with good grazing, found large encampments of Kalmuks or Buddhist Mongols. These received the Kazaks fairly well, because they disliked the Russians and associated them with Communists. They offered the Kazaks grazing ground for a time and then the latter moved on to Gazgöl, a large grazing area in the foothills of the Altyn Dag mountains. Here they met the other stream of Kazaks who had been less fortunate. They had crossed the terrible desert of Lop Nor where, in times past, the sands have advanced and engulfed ancient civilizations. The few water holes in this desert were occupied by Communist troops and most of the Kazaks had died of thirst and exhaustion. The remnants joined the other party at Gazgöl. Here the chiefs decided to rest for the winter and let their flocks recover on good pasture, while they prepared for the great trek across Tibet into India in the spring.

But they were to get no peace. In February 1951 the Communists attacked them at Gazgöl and their great military leader, Osman Bator, was killed. Collecting their flocks together hurriedly, they fought with their backs to the mountains, finally deciding to plunge into the unknown

country to the south and face the dangers of Nature rather than the danger of their human enemies. The country now that lay before them is unlike anything else in the world. It has a depth from north to south of 800 miles of high plateau at from 12,000 to 15,000 feet above sea level. No life exists here. Even the abominable snowman could not hold out. The plateau is studded with spurs of the Kuenlun range running east and west at from 16,000 to 25,000 feet. Most of the country has never even been visited by Europeans. A few British officers of the Indian Army Survey crossed parts of it at the end of last century when relations between empires were friendly. They did some rough mapping in places. Also two Russian explorers crossed another part. But most of it is marked in the map as "unexplored."

It was now February 1951, and the Kazaks had the terrible decision to make whether to surrender or face the journey in the dead of winter across this arctic wilderness. They decided on the latter, and, as they faced their terrible ordeal, they passed small parties of Tibetans, who had been grazing their yaks in some of the sheltered corries of this desolate region and were now hurrying north to winter pasture. The Kazaks asked them the way to India and they pointed south across the frozen wastes of snow, ice and rock beyond which lay the Himalayas and the valleys of Ladakh. Up to now the Kazaks had lived by killing big game—*maral* or wapiti, roedeer and ibex. But there were none of these now. They often went for days without food, but they managed to preserve in ice some haunches of venison that had been killed weeks before. They must have spent months in this way. All the children died and most of the women. The men fought on against the elements of this most inhospitable region of the world outside the Poles. Spring came at last and the summer of 1951 and this relieved their conditions somewhat. They struggled on to the south and in August of that year at last reached Leh, the chief town in the Kashmir province of Ladakh. There the Indian Government gave them shelter and food and there many of them still are, while others have passed on to Turkey, where they are among their own kith and kin. Of the 18,000 Kazaks who started out only 350 survived. These last and perhaps more are to be settled on the fertile wheat lands of Central Anatolia. Thus Turkey, true to her tradition, has once more provided a home for oppressed Moslems from Central Asia, fleeing from the Russians and now from Chinese Communists.

This is the story of the great Kazak trek, like the flight of the Kalmuks in the eighteenth century, as recorded in the famous book *The Revolt of the Tartars*. For centuries Central Asia has been the home of different peoples all equally picturesque but all equally free. The flight of the Kazaks shows what a change has been going on in recent years The tyranny that has dominated Russia for many years and the new tyranny of China is now extending inwards to the heart of the continent. That same tyranny is seeking to cross the Himalayas and break up the ancient civilizations of Southern Asia. The flight of the Kazaks away from this tyranny is an epic which the free world in Europe and Asia ought to remember.

EXPEDITION TO K.2

By CAPTAIN H. R. A. STREATHER

Lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 3, 1954, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said: Captain Streather, who has very kindly come to talk to us today, started his military career in the Indian Army and is now serving with the Gloucesters. It was during his time in India that he started to take an interest in mountain climbing and his first expedition was in 1950, the Norwegian Expedition. In 1953 he went with the American Expedition that he is going to tell us about now. He started off, as I understand it, as Transport Officer. Owing to his considerable knowledge of the people and the district, he eventually became a full member of the climbing party.

I WAS very fortunate last summer in being invited by Dr. Houston to join a party he was organizing to make a further attempt to climb K.2. He had tried in 1938 when he led an expedition to that mountain to find a route to the summit. An attempt was made in 1909; then it was reckoned to be impossible, there being no route to the summit. From 1909 there were no further expeditions until Houston's in 1938. After careful reconnaissance he thought there was a possible route up the south-east ridge.

The 1938 expedition got fairly high, but time and food ran out and they had to abandon their attempt before they reached the summit. The following year, 1939, a further American expedition tried the same route, got fairly high, but the expedition ended in tragedy.

After that came the war, and the Partition of India in 1947. Later the trouble in Kashmir made that part of the world very inaccessible.

The Karakoram range is in the north of Kashmir, in Gilgit, and the highest mountain of that range is K.2.

Last year Houston got permission to take a party out and invited me to join him as transport officer, to make arrangements for getting the party to base camp, and from then on to be a member of the climbing party.

Travel has been made much easier in that part of the world. Due to the troubles in Kashmir airfields have been built.

We started from Rawalpindi in May and flew to Skardu, the last village of any size before our trek up to our base camp.

Illustrating his talk with slides, Captain Streather continued: We were met in Skardu by the Political Agent, who is responsible for the administration there, and the village turned out to welcome us. The people of Skardu are conscious of the bitter Kashmir problem, and although their welcome was genuine I think they hoped that the Americans would take a sympathetic view with them over the Kashmir issue.

From Skardu, having repacked our loads, we set off on our march across the Indus and up the valley towards the hills. We went to Askole

and on to our base camp. For the most part our route followed a very dry and barren valley with black rock hills on both sides. The valley narrowed as we neared the high peaks.

We had to cross three rope bridges before we reached Askole. These were quite terrifying, but we all survived. We rather wondered how we should be received at Askole. Here we had to recruit coolies to carry all our equipment up the glacier.

We had a tape recorder and I recorded local villagers singing and played these songs back to them over our radio.

Continuing up the glacier for seven days, the going was very hard and we managed to cover only a few miles each day.

We had trouble with the coolies, always wanting more pay and shorter stages, but we reached base camp at the time planned.

One of the striking features of the glacier was the immense ice ships which appeared to be flowing down it.

Our porters carried loads of 60 lb. mostly in boxes similar to those used on the Everest Expedition.

On June 19 we reached our base camp, at the foot of the south face of K.2; we then sent the coolies back.

The party included Dr. Houston, who led the 1938 Expedition; Bob Bates, also a member of that expedition, who was in charge of our food and administration; Peter Schoening, a very good photographer, from Seattle, U.S.A.; George Bell, who had done some very good work the previous year with the French and who, being very tall, suffered a great deal from frost-bite; Dee Molenaar, an instructor at the American Army School of Mountain Warfare; Arthur Gilkey, who had done some very interesting work in Alaska; and Robert Craig, another instructor at the American Army School.

Another member of the party was Colonel Ata-ullah, who had his fiftieth birthday shortly after he left us. He insisted on coming as far as he could, and came to our camp 2 at about 20,000 ft. There we left him with the porters, but he still moved around touring round the glaciers. One of his trips was to go to Windy Gap at well over 20,000 ft.

The local people were very tough; at night they just squatted on the glacier, and apart from striking for more money they were on the whole very cheerful. I cannot praise too much the Hunza porters. I decided on Hunzas as it would be difficult to get Sherpas from Nepal.

We left base camp and started on a further stage up K.2 glacier to establish camp 1. As we moved up to camp 1, on our left was the south-east ridge which we were going to use as our line of approach to the summit. There would be no let-up from camp 1, about 18,500 ft., until we got on to a snow shoulder at about 25,000 ft. From here onwards camp sites were limited and we were not able to get up more than two or three tents in one place, and it was very difficult to find a site where we could all be together at the same time. For the most part we were climbing on rock, but we had quite a number of snow gullies to cross.

Camp 2 was established at one of the largest sites we were able to find on the mountain. Here, anything dropped out of the back-door of the tent would go straight down to camp 1. We found a tent which had been

left by the 1939 expedition, and quite a number of tins left by previous expeditions. One contained Ovaltine which was perfectly fresh. The oxygen was getting thin. We had walky-talkie radio sets and were able to hear the weather forecasts being sent to us each day.

Over the exposed places we put hand-lines to make the route safer for the party, which would have to move over the route probably seven or eight times, to bring our supplies forward. We were unable to have a large number of porters and many journeys had to be made between each site. There were eight of us and six porters to carry all the food and supplies we needed for the six odd weeks while on the mountain itself. The climbing was very exposed and compared somewhat with alpine climbing.

We reached camp 3 and here had more difficulty in finding any place on which to put our tents. We had to build a little platform on the rocks from which there was a sheer drop to camp 1, about 3,000 ft. below. We had our first bad weather at camp 3. Climbing above camp 3 was mostly over rock, all journeys had to be made several times to build up our forward camp sufficiently to make it safe for us to move up. From camp 3 we carried everything ourselves.

Above camp 4 we had the most difficult climbing technically. Having got up the "chimney" the route opened out and the ridge was more climbable. Camp 5 was only about 500 ft. above camp 4, but to get there was a full day's work. Camp 5 was at about 23,000 ft.; above that most of the climbing was steep, over slabs of rock covered by ice and snow which were very treacherous indeed. Reaching camp 6, we found signs of old tents and rolled up inside were sleeping bags and a few odds and ends. Looking north-east we had a wonderful view across Windy Gap, over to deserted, snow-covered peaks, a very remote part of the world, hardly mapped, scarcely travelled at all and not claimed by anybody.

We continued our climb above camp 6 to the place where we hoped to establish camp 7. This was to have been where the steep ridge ran into the snow shoulder, but we found that since previous attempts the whole snow formation had changed and no level place existed there for a camp site, so we cut out of the snow a small ledge on which we put a tent. The following day we heard over the radio from the two climbers who had remained at 7, that an excellent camp site had been found at about 800 ft. vertically above camp 7, in the area where camp 8 had been in 1938. We decided to establish this site. We moved some of the party up to camp 8, but because it was a long climb from camps 6 to 8 we decided the whole party would not go. Late in the evening Bates and I, who had remained at 7, heard over the radio that camp 8 had been established on a rather large snow shoulder. The weather had been deteriorating, but we hoped every day to get a bright spell. At last the morning dawned clear and we thought we should have a fine period, so we packed camp 6 and set out to join the others at camp 8. After three hours the weather deteriorated to appalling conditions, but we had gone too far to think of turning back so pushed on. After ten-and-a-half hours' climbing we saw tents through the driving snow and knew we had reached camp 8.

We felt we were in a strong position, there were eight of us at this

camp and we hoped the climb on the last part of the summit would be relatively easy. When Bates and I arrived at camp 8 we felt within striking distance of the summit. We had now about another 3,000 ft. to go, or rather less; all we had to do was establish one more camp at about 27,000 ft. and then go on to the summit. Some of the climbers were to remain in support from camp 8. If those who went forward were unable to make it, then two more would make a try.

We had ten days' food and fuel and we thought we could wait long enough to have four cracks at the summit. I think we felt sure one of us would make it. Our optimism was soon changed when all through the night the storm continued. The following day it blew with incredible velocity and we thought our tent would be blown off the mountain.

On the third day we heard a pathetic cry from Houston that his tent had blown down. The wind had got in and it had burst like a paper bag. Houston came to join Bates and I and Craig joined one of the other tents. Now all eight of us were in three small tents with the storm still raging outside. We were in touch with the Colonel at Base Camp by radio, and each evening he gave the same dismal forecast, storm and heavy snow. Because of the incredible wind currents we could not get our primus stoves to stay alight and were unable to melt snow and get the liquid so essential to one at that altitude. The air was very dry and one needed several quarts of liquid a day to replace the deficiency. In fact we were able to get only a cup or two of liquid each day, and in consequence were getting very dehydrated and weak. We did not have oxygen with us. The ridge being so narrow we did not feel justified in having a larger number of porters to carry the equipment which would be necessary. It was steep and the rocks were very broken and so caused considerable danger of rock fall. We had to climb together and that meant our carrying all essential food and fuel ourselves, which took many additional days.

We had arrived at camp 8 on August 2. The storm went on until on August 7 we at last had a fine morning. The sun was quite bright, and although the wind was still blowing it had stopped snowing. Two of the party were slightly frost-bitten and this was aggravated by the dehydration. We decided that Bates and I should go down as far as camp 7 to bring up some more stores.

We were very soon to realize that fate had struck a bitter blow. Gilkey had been complaining of pains in his left leg which we thought was a normal cramp. Then he collapsed and Houston, who is a doctor, found he had developed thrombo-phlebitis—a large clot of blood in a vein of his left leg. Here was a very serious situation. A man who could not walk and not likely to get better under those conditions, we felt our only course was to pack up and try to get him down.

We bundled Gilkey up in his sleeping bag, wrapped him up in a tent, and started dragging him down the route we had come. We had not given the position sufficient forethought. During the storm several feet of snow had fallen and we now realized we were in danger of starting an avalanche if we went through the new snow. If we waited until the snow hardened we might be there many days. Two of the party went off to

look for an alternative route and eventually they did find a small ridge. We got back to camp 8 and re-established it. On the following morning the storm was such that we could not move. It was the same on the 9th. On the 10th we were running short of fuel and food and part of the clot had moved from Gilkey's leg and gone to his lungs. He was coughing badly. We did not think he had much chance of living, and no chance at all up there. We had tried to go down the way we had gone up, but deep snow prevented it. The alternative was down a steep rock ridge. It was a very desperate effort, but we bundled Gilkey up and set out in the storm to get him down. Soon after midday we realized we should never get down to camp 6 that day; we should have to go to camp 7. Two men held Gilkey while the rest of us went down. We tied ropes to him and the idea was to drag him across the ice slope as he was lowered. We had just got ready to pull him, four of us, when George Bell, who was roped to me, slipped. I saw him go down very fast and did all I could to stop him, but he was very big and I was soon whisked off the slope. There was a sudden jerk and I saw several people lying about. We had fallen about 200 ft. Our ropes had all crossed in the course of the fall and we were being held by Peter Schoening, who was at the top. It was quite remarkable that he was able to hold six of us at that altitude.

Bates and I were the only two not badly hurt. Houston, with concussion, was hurt more than anyone else. George Bell lost his gloves in the fall, but one of us had a spare pair of mittens.

During this time we had had to leave Gilkey anchored on the slope while Bates and I sorted out the others. We went back hoping we could make him more comfortable. He was very heavily drugged, very ill, and I do not think he really knew much of what was happening. When we got sufficiently close to where he had been—we were both climbing without snow goggles because driven snow froze on them—we saw that Gilkey and the ropes and the ice axes had all gone. We went across the slope to make quite certain we could not be mistaken The whole surface of the slope had changed and we can only assume that in a short time an avalanche had occurred just near us and cleared them off. There were signs of broken blocks of ice on the path where the avalanche had fallen.

We went back to camp 7 and spent a most dreadful night. Four of us were in one tent and three in another. On the following morning we were pleasantly surprised to find that all seven of us could move. Houston was still very dazed, but he managed to climb down to camp 6. George Bell, who had had frost-bitten feet and hands and was practically blind through losing his glasses, somehow managed to climb, roped with us, to camp 6.

It was a further three days before we could climb and reach camp 2. The Hunza porters came to meet us, and we were given a wonderful welcome and virtually carried the last few hundred feet down to camp. We devoured tea and rice, our first square meal for ten days, and the following morning we started on our journey to base camp.

We held a short service in memory of Gilkey. We never found his body, which must be somewhere in the crevasses on the K.2 glacier.

I should like in conclusion to pay tribute to the bravery and deter-

mination of Dr. Houston and his American colleagues, and to say that the comradeship and understanding which grew up between us in the course of our adventures created for me a memory I shall always treasure.

In reply to a questioner Captain STREATHER said: Dr. Houston had an interesting theory that if one worked hard and carried one's own loads one would get acclimatized to the lack of oxygen. We spent ten days above 25,000 ft., and a month over 20,000 ft. We had no headaches and no nausea, and we felt strongly that this was largely due to the time we spent working our way slowly forward. I am sure the effect on our condition at camp 8 was due mainly to lack of liquid, dehydration, and the worrying conditions under which we were living. I do not think we suffered as much as had been expected from the lack of oxygen at high altitudes. I think we proved the ceiling of acclimatization is, in fact, somewhere around 25,000 ft., and not 21,000 or 22,000 ft. as has often been thought. I am sure that with better conditions we could have gone up to 28,000 ft. without oxygen. After the trouble with Gilkey the weather never let up at all. Even away from the mountain it was still stormy. I think the deterioration was due to dehydration rather than just lack of oxygen.

The CHAIRMAN: Our time is up. We have listened to a most wonderful story of this great expedition and I should like to thank and congratulate Captain Streather very much. He told it so graphically and made it so clear and so interesting. Apart from anything else, I feel it does everyone good to listen to a story of such incredible endurance and skill, and I hope the lessons learnt on this expedition will be of assistance to others.

IN MEMORIAM

MR. PETER HUME

THE tragic death of Mr. Peter Hume on June 14 at the age of 36 came as a shock to all who knew him. He was killed accidentally and instantly by a fall from the ledge of his flat, having climbed there in an attempt to break in, the key to the flat being mislaid. Such an attempt was characteristic of his adventurous and impetuous spirit.

Peter Hume was born in 1917 and educated at Stowe School and at Cambridge. From an early age he was attracted to China. He first went to Peking as a journalist in 1937, shortly before Japanese troops occupied the city. At that time it was extraordinarily difficult to produce news despatches out of the meagre information available there. I first remember Peter among the more enterprising newspaper men who used to pile into an enormous and aged Renault, said to have been the first car in China to make the trip to the Ming tombs and by then already minus top, minus horn and with a slipping clutch, and drive out north and west of Peking in search of evidence of the strength and depth of Japanese penetration. Even so, there was little to be seen. Evenings were spent sifting out the more outrageous rumours and finding some grains, not indeed of fact but of possibility. It was a strange period, stimulating but not easy for a young journalist. And probably few of those who worked with him then thought of Peter Hume as being only twenty.

He stayed in Peking for some time, travelling much in Mongolia and Manchuria and acting as English secretary to the Royal Danish Geographical Society's Asian Expedition. He thus saw Mongolia in the years before it was overtaken by war, to be followed by the bamboo curtain. It was a country that appealed to him, remote, wonderfully lacking in all trace of the industrial revolution, and sparsely inhabited by hospitable and kindly nomads. In Mongolia he was able to share in a life which no longer exists and is not likely to return.

In Peking he also acted as assistant editor of the *Peking Chronicle*, still in those days a well-run and interesting paper. There his exuberance was his undoing. He invented an English nobleman, a big game hunter about to visit Peking *en route* to hunt tigers in Manchuria. The announcement in the *Chronicle* of this character's arrival at the Peking Hotel caused a flurry in Peking society, and hostesses were not amused when the hoax was discovered. Neither was the editor.

During the first eighteen months of the war Peter Hume worked with the Malaya Broadcasting Corporation in Singapore. This was making the best of an impossible situation. He often found himself on his own. Undaunted, he would introduce the news broadcast, read the news in a different voice, comment on the news in still another voice, and return to his original accent to introduce a programme of music. After the fall of

Singapore he became news editor and press officer in the Chinese Ministry of Information in London.

At the end of the war he returned to Singapore with the Supreme Allied Command, working to restore a British Broadcasting service there. In 1946 he joined the B.B.C., but was soon lent by them to Unesco to enable him to return to China and report on the state of the press, wireless and other information services in the aftermath of war.

During recent years he was the editor and organizer of the B.B.C.'s Chinese programme. But his work in London did not keep him from travelling. In connection with it he toured South-east Asia last year. He also spent some time in Hongkong, where he was constantly frustrated at being so near the mainland of China and unable to penetrate there in search of first-hand information.

Peter Hume was a member of the Royal Central Asian Society for fifteen years, and twice served as a member of the Council. His knowledge of the Far East, and his ability and enthusiasm for the work of the Society, were of great value, and his character and charm made him universally popular with the members of the Society. This is not to suggest that he was interested only in the Far East. His knowledge of China and the Orient were of most value when fitted into the wider frame of his interest in Europe and the world.

The members of the Society extend their deepest sympathy to Mrs. Hume in her loss.

P. C.

NOTICES

THE Council acknowledges with gratitude back numbers of the JOURNAL from members: Vol. XXXIV, Part 1, 1947, is still urgently needed.

The following have been received:

Les Turcs a Constantinople du V^e au XV^e Siècle.

Les Apports Turcs dans le peuplement et la Civilization de l'Europe Orientale.

The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1, from the Islamic Cultural Centre, London, N.W.8.

Al Iraqi, 1954, from Baghdad College, Iraq.

Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. I, No. 1, from the University of Hongkong.

A Selected Bibliography of Articles dealing with the Middle East, 1939-1950, from the Economic Research Institute, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Sixth Year—Pakistan, 1953. Pakistan Publications, Karachi.

Types of Pastoral Nomadism in Central and South-west Asia, from the author, Elizabeth E. Bacon.

Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published, and for the accuracy of statements contained in them, rests solely with the individual contributors.

Errata.—R.C.A.S. JOURNAL for April 1954, page 145, final paragraph should read: "The Fatimides were descendants of the Prophet in a MORE direct line THAN the contemporary Khalifs of Baghdad."

REVIEWS

The Home Letters of T. E. Lawrence and His Brothers. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1954. Pp. xvi+731. Photos. 63s.

The name and fame of T. E. Lawrence have gone abroad by stages very rare in an age of relentless publicity. Rumour, long run wild, was by no means silenced by publication of *Revolt in the Desert*, but persisted in confusing the character and the achievements of Lawrence until after his death in 1935. Then came the full Arabian story in the *Seven Pillars*, followed, two years later, by *Lawrence, by His Friends*, and at last the world knew what manner of man this was. The most, it seemed, that further evidence could do would be to shed a stronger light on this or that portion of his life.

The Letters of T. E. Lawrence, published in 1928, added far more than might have been expected to the existing picture of the man. In particular, these very numerous letters illuminated the years of most immediate interest—those of his full maturity—and there were relatively few of earlier date. The volume now under review fills this lack. It does more: it reveals, in close relationship with their parents and with their eldest and youngest brothers, the personalities of three young men, of whom one was to die famous at the age of forty-six, and the other two were to be cut off by early death in their country's service—from what fulfilment who can say?

More than half of this book is devoted to letters from T. E. Lawrence hitherto unpublished, two-thirds of the remainder to letters of Will, next to him in age, and the rest to those of Frank, some four years younger. The standard of the letters is very high, and reflects a wide diversity of character in brothers who had much in common; and all disclose a most happy family circle, each member of which carried something of its atmosphere with him wherever he went: no other member of the family was long absent from the writer's thoughts. Only the main impression conveyed by each group of letters will be recorded here, and I shall resist a very strong temptation to quote from them. The letters themselves must be read.

Nearly all Frank Lawrence's letters here published were written in the Army in the early days of the first world war. With a good all-round school record behind him, he had won an exhibition at Jesus College, Oxford, and on the outbreak of war, after only a year at the University, was commissioned in the Gloucestershire Regiment from the University O.T.C. His letters give a first-rate account of a young officer's life during war training and at the front. Always practical and to the point, they reflect, at the same time, a profound religious faith, a sense of moral purpose wholly free from priggishness, and strong indications of leadership. Probably he was a born soldier: but his death in action in May, 1915, made him one with the great company of those whose gifts were never to reach maturity.

Will Lawrence was allowed more time. An exhibitioner and scholar of St. John's and a half-blue (for the half-mile), he left Oxford in 1913 with an Honours Degree in Modern History, to take up a teaching post at St. Stephen's College, Delhi. It is from India that most of the letters here presented were written, and it was India and her multifarious life that inspired some of their most admirable descriptive passages. During the vacations he managed to see much of the country, extending all the time the range of his contact with the peoples towards whom he was profoundly conscious of a mission which he could hardly define, for, though his religion was an essential part of his character, he was no evangelist. Very soon the junior schoolmaster found (not without amused astonishment) that he was consulted by people of importance on matters far outside his professional field. In the well known and the little known he inspired equal trust. His close friendships with Indians and his habit of wearing Indian clothes in their houses may in those days have raised a few Delhi eyebrows, but discriminating Britons and Indians alike could discern that here was no

truckling xenophile, to be smiled on by one race and despised by both. His letters show that he saw each man or woman as an individual, generously but with extreme clarity, and knew that the whole future of India must turn upon the relations—good, bad or indifferent—between one individual and another. The humanity and shrewdness of his opinions make these letters as fine a commentary on race relations as anyone could desire.

What Will Lawrence might have achieved had the war not claimed his life, none can say. He came home, was commissioned in the Oxford and Bucks L.I., transferred to the Royal Flying Corps as an Observer, and was killed in action in October, 1915. It is reasonable to believe that, had he survived, he might have been able at least to mitigate in some small degree the tragic conflicts which the Indian subcontinent has witnessed in our time.

To read the letters of T. E. Lawrence, published here—with an insignificant number of exceptions—for the first time, will be, for most readers of this Journal, a new experience on partly familiar ground. The letters of earliest date were written during school holidays or the University vacations, which Lawrence spent in France or, in 1909, in Syria in pursuit of his study of ancient castles. The great bulk of the letters (1910-1914) which follow were written from Syria—chiefly from Carchemish. After these come some war-time letters from Cairo and elsewhere and, finally, occasional letters of the post-war period, the last of these dated about a year before Lawrence's death. (Subsequent letters, addressed to his mother and eldest brother in China, were lost owing to the disturbed conditions in that country.)

From so rich a collection, covering about 400 pages, it is difficult to pick out individual letters as deserving of special attention: each reader must choose for himself. No one could describe places more brilliantly or people more shrewdly than Lawrence, while even his early accounts of his architectural "finds" are models of accurate observation and constructive thought.

It troubled Lawrence that his brain, unlike his brothers', outran his emotions; and that lightning speed of brain, apparent from his earliest years, is manifest in his letters. He seldom wrote one that might not have been marked "Urgent," as though he were for ever racing against time—as indeed he was. None of the three—and he least of all—had any capacity for idling. T. E. seems to have been wholly devoid of that middle part of the mind which in most men dallies with time, forms casual acquaintanceships, and is much inclined to rest from labour. His every reaction to life was immediate and definite: he accepted or rejected instantly, and to this faculty much that is best in his letter-writing is due.

For some the greatest value of this book will be in the light it throws on the closeness of T. E. Lawrence's relations with his family. His character and achievements are of course far too well known to call for any fresh summing-up in these pages. In 1936, Sir Winston Churchill, unveiling a Memorial to Lawrence at his old school at Oxford, described his life and work briefly in words which are reprinted at the beginning of this book, together with Sir Winston's letter of consent to the reproduction. "I readily give my consent," he writes. "Eighteen years have passed since those words were spoken, but now, pondering them again, I find not one to alter. . . . It is the measure of his greatness that his multiple achievement has passed beyond opinion into history."

These letters deserve a very wide circle of readers—and their young sons. The book, which carries the Book Society's recommendation, is well produced and there are forty-five excellent photographs. The proceeds of sale will go to the Altounyan Anglo-Syrian Hospital at Aleppo.

E. D.

Oil in the Middle East. By Stephen Hemsley Longrigg. Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press. Demy 8vo. Pp. 320 + 4 text maps and index. 25s.

Only an unusual combination of scholarship, ability and experience could produce two such books as Brigadier Longrigg has brought out within the space of a few months: this one and *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*.

Events in the oil world move fast, and since this book went to press there has been one major change in that Dr. Musaddeq's successors are trying to repair some of the damage his intransigence did to his country's economy. Already, however, the main lines of development in the Middle East were clear, and they are admirably traced here, where the reader will find full details for each territory, together with answers to such questions as what is the Red Line, the neutral zone, the continental shelf, and why was it that the Saudi Arabian oil concession went to the Americans.

Brigadier Longrigg rightly believes that if the British Government ever thought of using force in the Persian oil dispute they did right in refraining, but he omits what must have been the main consideration: that Britain is one of the leading members of the United Nations. The policy was sound in spite of the defect revealed by this and other disputes, that a scrupulous attitude on the part of a Great Power towards a small can be abused, since the Small Power can now commit wrong and refuse arbitration with impunity.

The charge of Imperialism so frequently brought against Britain in the Middle East should be examined in the light of information given in this book about Persian Gulf territories which are under British control. It is clear that this influence has been used without improper pressure, and that on the other hand while the government—*i.e.*, the ruler—gets fair terms, the concessionnaire is assured of just treatment and security; and in addition British efforts are used as far as possible to ensure that the population shares in the ruler's prosperity and that provision is made for the future when the oil wells will have run dry.

A question only lightly touched on in this book—the effect of the impact of Western industrialism upon the people of the Middle East—deserves a full-length study. May we hope that Brigadier Longrigg will produce it?

R. W. BULLARD.

The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. By Rene Guenon. Translated by Lord Northbourne. Luzac. 1953. Pp. 359, including index and notes. $8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$. 25s.

Here a distinguished French philosopher's nine-year-old appreciation of the state of the world in terms of the esotericism of which he was a master is translated for English readers with skill and knowledge. Difficult though the subject is, the lucidity of Guenon's exposition and its integrity of spirit have been preserved, but it must be borne in mind that the author expressly emphasizes his intention exclusively to address a limited audience "without any concern for the inevitable incomprehension of the others" who are, and still must be for a certain time to come, an immense majority." The modern tendency to decry or belittle true traditionalism is examined for establishment of the thesis that today the scientific moderns fail to show proper respect for the spiritual power of ancient faiths compared with which the pseudo-mysticism of so-called cults and cultures today have a shoddy superficiality proper to the age of mass production and mass consultation in which it vapidly strives to find recognition. As Guenon sees it, this world is now nearing the end of a Manvantara or cycle, and in fact the end of a humanity. The Manichean conception of putting Satan on the same level as God is unconsciously adopted by the "inverted spirituality" of today. The ultimate triumph of goodness is certain where in fact opposition to it does not really exist because "like all oppositions" it belongs "exclusively to a particular relative and limited domain." The end of a world in fact is the "end of an illusion." The idols of the modern fanatics of today are shown in their falsity with a gentle firmness tempering the erudition which exposes it. Particularly topical are the chapters on the "illusions of statistics," the "hatred of secrecy" and the "degeneration of coinage."

EDWIN HAWARD.

The Transfer of Power in India. By E. W. R. Lumby. George Allen and Unwin. 1954. Pp. 274; 2 maps (of the Indian Empire and of India and Pakistan before and after August 15, 1947). 18s.

Mr. Lumby began by generalizing about the reaction of Asian peoples—he himself uses the correct and unpopular term "Asiatic"—to western expansion during the last century and a half. He defines three phases. First, the traditional order hits back blindly as in the Boxer Rising, the Japanese response to Commodore Perry's réveillé and in the Indian Mutiny. Then, foreign influences having infected the intelligentsia with Western ideas of nationalism, conflict ensues on how and how far those ideas are to be applied to the subject race. At first the masses remain indifferent, pathetically content, to the passions of a political minority. But Social Democracy and Communism also come from the West and a section of the political intelligentsia incites the peasants and workers against the landlords and capitalists. (Readers of Sri Nehru's autobiography will have seen that he has one foot in the nineteenth century of Parnell and Garibaldi, the other in the century of Attlee and Lenin. Today the Congress programme combines the policies of liberal democracy and the Welfare State.) In India, Mr. Lumby observes it was the middle class which gave the impetus to the nationalism both of the Congress and of the Muslim League. Like the *Tiers État* of 1789, they ended by demanding the sovereign position in a new order.

Mr. Lumby is concerned with how they secured that sovereign position. He has clearly set out the course of events which were often as frustrating as the manœuvres of our international diplomacy today. *The Transfer of Power in India* is written in fair prose, and if it lacks colour it is because it is so objective. Its author has drawn sound and reasonable conclusions from the mass of material he has ably sifted and appraised.

Mr. Lumby does not doubt that partition was inevitable. Many British statesmen and administrators disputed almost to the end the feasibility of Pakistan. Pakistan only became the official aim of the Muslim League seven and a half years before its realization. To the Left Wing in England and liberal opinion in America the Muslim League was a reactionary tool of the Imperialists. The truth was, and it appears in these pages, that the British had imposed unity upon the subcontinent, but unity could not outlast their rule. The Muslim community, which was something much more than a minority, perceived that, once the "third power" was removed, they would be subject to the Hindu majority. The popular conviction that Islam was in danger and the sublime obstinacy of *Quaid-e-Azam* M. A. Jinnah made continued unity quite incompatible with independence. In 1937-39 the Muslims of several Provinces had experienced Congress Raj. Persecution had not been the policy of the Congress, but Hinduism instinctively aimed at "gradually absorbing a foreign faith which had established itself on Indian soil." One may compare recent pronouncements about Christian missions in the Republic of India.

Mr. Lumby gets to the roots. He shows that the Cripps Mission failed because in 1942 the Japanese were at the gate. When the Simla Conference met in June 1945, the "third power" was again able to set the pace of constitutional advance. The League's claim to speak for all Muslims in India and the claim of the Congress to speak for all Indians meant deadlock, and the negotiations on, for example, the position of an Interim Government became tedious and bitter. It was clear that the conflict between the idea of Pakistan and that of *Akhand Hindustan* could only be resolved by a British decision to divide if necessary what their ancestors had united. The decision came and was brilliantly executed by Lord Mountbatten. The last Viceroy's achievement is unlikely to be forgotten. Here we are grateful to Mr. Lumby for his tribute to Lord Wavell's valiant but unavailing endeavours.

The transfer of power was attended by carnage and the uprooting of terrified communities and recriminations which still tend to poison Commonwealth and international affairs. In his concluding chapter Mr. Lumby conjectures whether independence could not have been achieved with less bloodshed and disruption. A Hindu District Judge, about to be evacuated to the Indian Union, ruefully compared in the hearing of this reviewer the few weeks taken to partition an empire with the years a case in his Court might take to partition an estate! Under the Indian Inde-

pendence Act " the Crown's agreements with the authorities in the Tribal Areas would . . . come to an end." Mr. Lumby fails to add that this hasty legislation failed to provide for the resulting interregnum in which Political control continued for a time without legal basis. Here, however, as in other spheres, custom and common sense repaired the breach.

Some other interesting questions have not been fully discussed. These include the merits of the Radcliffe Boundary Award, still reviled by Pakistanis, and its effect upon Indian influence in Kashmir; and the possibility that the bloody partition of the Punjab might have been avoided by a Sikh-Muslim League agreement to keep the *Khalsa* together within Western Pakistan under safeguards and even privileges. Mr. Lumby rightly says that the transfer of power is still too recent for " definitive judgment," but its place in the history of Asia and the British Empire is undisputed. A fifth of the world's inhabitants, numbering some four hundred million, received national independence and Europeans became a minority in the Commonwealth of Sovereign Nations. August 15, 1947, was indeed a date " of the greatest moment " to the Commonwealth, not only " in its racial character " but " in its whole conception and purpose."

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

The Culture of South-east Asia. The Heritage of India. By Reginald Le May, Ph.D.(Cantab.). Allen and Unwin. 1954. Pp. 218, ill. 216 and map. 42s.

India and Pakistan. A general and Regional Geography. By O. H. K. Spate. With a chapter on Ceylon by B. H. Farmer. Methuen. 1954. Pp. 827. Maps and illustrations. 65s.

The Culture of South-east Asia looks at a casual glance like a specialist's book, and I first read with scepticism the statement in the blurb that it is written especially for the " intelligent layman." But it is true. Mr. Reginald Le May is clear, interesting and thoroughly readable and his most scholarly material is relieved by anecdotes and observations derived from a quarter of a century's Asian experience, during which he has served both the British Government and that of Thailand, which, like Sir Winston Churchill, he calls Siam. His lectures have been heard by members of learned societies in London concerned with the art and culture of Southern Asia, and a brief but glowing commendation is contributed by Mr. R. A. Butler, as Chairman of the Royal India and Pakistan Society. In 1938 Mr. Le May published his *Concise History of Buddhist Art in Siam.* This is a wider survey extending to Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China. In it he vividly portrays the sculpture, the temples, the civilization, of countries pervaded during the period coincident with our Middle Age by the cultural influences of Hindu maritime empires. The photographs are all of considerable æsthetic value and the absence of footnotes will be pleasing to the reader. There is a clear and serviceable map of the region.

Professor Spate's *General and Regional Geography* is less readable but monumental. It is an admirable encyclopædia probably unequalled for accurate comprehensiveness. Literature, architecture and archæology, geography and geology, ethnology and languages, races and religions, climate and resources, agriculture and industry, social, political and economic structures, all are covered both generally and with particular reference to States and Provinces, cities and districts. The known history of the great subcontinent is skilfully outlined and ends with topical reference to the historical oddity that " fragments of Portuguese and French domination survived their mighty supplanter, the British Raj." How much longer now? one may wonder. *India and Pakistan* is a *magnum opus* from the Australian National University, and it is only proper that Australians should pay increasing heed, as indeed they do, to those Asian partners of the Commonwealth and the Colombo Plan whose integrity and policies are so important to themselves. The new equality in Indo-British and British-Pakistan relations has enabled Professor Spate to write objectively without undue respect for persons or nationality. This great compendium should be on the shelves of all serious students of Asian affairs and Commonwealth relations. Though relevant perhaps more to Mr. Le May's purpose than to Professor Spate's, the

Kingdom of Ceylon is briefly but ably treated in the final chapter by Mr. B. H. Farmer, of St. John's College, Cambridge. Professor Spate's index is first class, as befits a notable work of reference. There are short and useful bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

The English Factories in India. Volume III (New Series). Bombay, Surat, and Malabar Coast. By Sir Charles Fawcett, I.C.S. (Retd.). Oxford. Pp. xiii + 436. 50s. (U.K. only).

Sir Charles Fawcett was an Indian Civilian in the scholarly tradition of his Service. This former Judge of the Bombay High Court became the editor in 1933 of the India Office Series on the Honourable East India Company's factories which now has the patronage of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. This is a weighty volume of a *magnum opus*. 422 pages are devoted to six years of the early British period of Indian history and are geographically confined to the factories and settlements then under the President and Council at Surat. These included Bombay and also Gombroon (now Bandar Abbas), just as in more recent times the Persian Gulf Residency was staffed and directed from India.

As the curtain rises Sivaji is campaigning in the Carnatic. The Mogul star has begun to wane and that of the Marathas is in the ascendant. The English are still mere merchants huddled in factory and fort; but Bombay is growing into a substantial sanctuary for the coastal people harried by the warfare of Mogul and Maratha. In 1679 the turbulent Captain Keigwin's cry "I wish to God I could draw them to a fight!" was answered. He defeated the Maratha fleet. Sardar Pannikar contends that "whoever controls the Indian Ocean has India at his mercy." The English were not yet the only sea power in Indian waters. The ships of the Marathas and of the Muslims were already heirs of a maritime tradition which has since mingled with that of the Royal Navy and the Indian Marine in the sea forces of modern India and Pakistan. But only two years after this volume closes the Company's proclaimed objective became the establishment of "such a policy of civil and military power as may be the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion." Thereafter the Court of Directors might try to restrain the territorial expansion of John Company, but British power would be stretched ever further across the sub-continent at the expense of country powers and European rivals.

This is a book for specialist study, but anyone who has fallen under the spell of India will dip in with pleasure. The maps are effective, the other illustrations passable. Part of the index has been bound in at the wrong place. Otherwise the presentation is pleasing. All will regret Sir Charles Fawcett's death in 1952 before he could see the publication of more than the first two volumes of this useful series. Finishing touches have been added to this, the third volume, by another distinguished Indian Civilian, Sir Patrick Cadell, and members of the Royal Central Asian Society will look eagerly forward to the final volume which, it is understood, he has in hand.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

The Turkic Languages of Central Asia. Translation of an article by Professor N. A. Baskakov in *Voprosy Yazykoznaniya* (June, 1952), with commentary by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 6s.

Turkic Peoples of the U.S.S.R. By Dr. Stefan Wurm. 10s.

These publications are the product of the Central Asian Research Centre, issued in association with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford. Both are in typewritten script, not in print, but are neatly presented. The second comprises four interesting maps, historical and linguistic. Professor Baskakov is an eminent Russian turcologist; Dr. Wurm, a linguistic specialist of many and diverse qualifications, lately lecturer in Altaic languages at Vienna, and now in Australia.

The argument is close, and *more Sovietico,* in places crabbed. It follows that both books are for the serious political and linguistic student. The approach throughout is from the linguistic angle, but the political reactions of language policy are ever-present to the Russian mind of today, and there is no lack of political deductions to be drawn. The second study, moreover, comprises an admirable thumb-nail sketch of the history and interrelations of the 40 or so million people of Turkish stock who stretch across the world from the Balkans in the West, over Anatolia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to the Altai and beyond in the East. But the main interest lies in the analysis of an intense research into linguistic problems as a socio-political concept, and in the light thrown on unconcealed endeavours directed towards a russification of the Turkic tongues. This effort is conscious, deliberate, and designed to achieve an effect similar to that produced by the arabization of the indigenous languages of the many peoples subjected to Islamic domination in the past. The difference is that arabization was the result of conversion to Islam, not the cause; while the Soviets seek an arbitrary and regulated russification of language as one means which shall lead to the substitution of their creed for that of Islam.

A careful reading of Professor Baskakov allows the reader to see more than once the torture of mind and spirit inflicted on a man of profound learning who finds himself under compulsion to subordinate a scholar's conscience to the cold eye of tyranny. His analysis is interrupted like a chorus by regular and not very convincing appeals to the authority of that master of linguistic science, I. V. Stalin. Indeed the Professor may now wonder whether after all he has not bowed too deep.

In detail, a fascinating feature of these studies is the revelation of the tactics adopted to undermine the old cultural tradition. First came the artificial creation of divisions between the elements which made for Turkic unity, followed by measures designed to force the *disjecta membra* into another mould. The initial step was the double change of alphabet, first from Arabic to Latin, in the twenties, then from Latin to various forms of Cyrillic about 1940. In this way not only was the effect to sever the generations one from another, but systematic differences were introduced in the Cyrillic alphabets *inter se,* as adapted for each tongue, with the political purpose of making them as different as possible in print and writing and so preventing any tendencies towards unification. But—and here lies an even more interesting point—Baskakov advocates a reversal of this process, and an assimilation of alphabets and orthography. Why?

The suggestion is that a greater uniformity of alphabet *at this stage* will immensely facilitate russification, both by the introduction of loan-words and by preparing the literate to learn Russian as their second language. At the same time, of course, it will increase the danger (from the Soviet angle) of tendencies towards unity, a danger, however, which the Russians are prepared to face as the lesser evil, and for two reasons. The first would be that the period of artificial separation has done its work in weakening feelings of ethnic homogeneity; the second that intensive russification may now be calculated in the long run further to weaken such feelings.

Those who are aware of the effect of the English language on Indian nationalism may think this a miscalculation.

A criticism of the first study might be that it lacks a Roman transliteration of Turkic words written in Cyrillic, and is therefore only comprehensible to those who know the Cyrillic alphabet.

Baskakov goes to absurd lengths in stigmatizing the Arabic and Persian terminology in Turkic languages which it is Soviet policy to replace by Russian words. He cannot even bring himself to mention Chaghatai, and he gives the following instances of "outmoded" words of Islamic tinge which (he would have it) the ordinary people cannot understand:

inqilab = revolution
jamhuriyet = republic
firqa = party
darulfanun = university
sarmayedar = capitalist
zarreh = particle
vazir = minister
jamietlik = socialism

Any one of these would be entirely familiar to any peasant or artisan in any Muslim country at any time subjected, as was Transoxiana, to an intense form of Arabo-Persian culture.

OLAF CAROE.

Russia's Educational Heritage. By William E. Johnson. Pittsburg, Pa., Carnegie Institute of Technology. 1953. Pp. 352, including index, reference notes, bibliography, 42 tables. $8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$.

This carefully documented survey of pre-Soviet educational history has been prepared by Dr. Johnson under the auspices of the Carnegie Institute. It derives from the author's three-year sojourn in the U.S.S.R., where he was able to command the assistance and informed guidance of Professor Albert P. Pinkevich, President of the Second Moscow State University and Chief of the Pedagogical Section of the All-Union Committee on Higher Education. Moreover, in his wife, Mrs. Annette Fox Johnson, he had by his side an unflagging—" if sometimes impatient "—mentor, possessed through long residence in the U.S.S.R. of an intimate knowledge of Soviet institutions.

After a chronological study—fortified by access to official records of various organs dating from the establishment of the first schools in the fifteenth-seventeenth centuries, the rise of State universities in the eighteenth century and the creation of State schools in the early part of the nineteenth century—examination of the educational heritage of the U.S.S.R. naturally proceeds in the light of the information thus marshalled.

Observers of the Soviet scene will recall how the revolution of 1917 was designed to overthrow the oppressive organs of the Tsarist régime. Included in the programme came abolition of private property, removal of press censorship—in short, a complete break with past Russian history. Nearly forty years have passed and it is possible to see how difficult it is for a nation to forget its own past which some call tradition. Broadly speaking, it now appears that between Soviet and Tsarist foreign policy in respect of Russian expansion there is little difference—indeed complete continuity. The removal of press censorship has been effected by making the whole press the virtual mouthpiece of the autocratic State. It soon was realized that Lenin, three years after the revolution, was advocating the construction of Communism "on the sum of knowledge, organizations and institutions, only on the stock of human forces and means left to us by the old society." Dr. Johnson well shows how, in the educational field, the system developed under the Tzars was turned to account by the new masters in rejection of ideas imported from abroad. Nor does he fail to remind us that the U.S.S.R.'s modern insistence on the virtue of the unanimous vote is really based on the tradition of primitive Slav folkmotes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

EDWIN HAWARD.

Tadzhikistan. By P. Luknitzki. Moscow. 1951. Pp. 367; 7 col. pictures, 115 drawings, 1 col. map, 11 maps, 62 photographs. (In Russian.)

The first impression that this book, published in Moscow, mainly serves propaganda purposes is confirmed by its perusal. The book gives a description of a country and of a people almost unknown in Europe, but of considerable importance to the Soviet Union as carriers of Communist propaganda in Central Asia. A special Tadzhik autonomous unit was motivated by the fact that these Iranian tribes in the southern parts of the former Emirate of Bokhara and of Fergana have an individuality of their own. Since the progressive occupation by Czarist Russia, which began some eighty years ago, travellers seldom and explorers never have been admitted to these regions. After the reoccupation by the Red Army the frontiers were again hermetically closed. Since 1921 only refugees escaping across the Soviet-Afghan border have brought news about Tadzhikistan. This kind of information

was original and independent, but often incorrect and too subjective. Hence this semi-official book is welcome, as it adds to our scanty knowledge of Tadzhikistan.

The author starts with historical accounts, which take us back to 2500 B.C., to the period of the Iranian, Sogdian and Bactrian Empires. But we are most interested in his description of events since 1921. Although Tadzhikistan had then only one and a half million inhabitants, it was proclaimed, in 1925, the seventh Union Republic because of a possible influence upon the 10-12 million Iranians, closely related to the Tadzhiks, who live in Eastern Persia, Northern Afghanistan and Dardistan. In order to impress these Iranians, Moscow improved the cultural and economic conditions in Tadzhikistan far more than in any other Central Asiatic republic. It was not very difficult to create here a higher standard of living and culture than that known to their neighbours, for the welfare of the tribes in the desert villages of Seistan and in the remote valleys of the Hindukush and Karakoram had always been neglected by the local administrations and the central governments in Teheran, Kabul and Srinagar.

The description of the economic and cultural improvements achieved during the last thirty years is the main task of the author, and the subject of the many illustrations. In accordance with the Communist Party programme these investments were based on social and economic collectivization. The Tadzhiks, more than many other inhabitants of the Soviet Union, resented this interference with their traditional life. The author minimizes the manifold difficulties originating from this policy and also the strength of the Tadzhik national opposition. The uprising of 1931 was a consequence of this enforced collectivization. The conflicts with the Tadzhik intellectuals in 1930/1931 and 1937/1938 arose because the intelligentsia made use of the proclaimed " nationalities " policy to gain as much independence from Moscow as possible, and they further prepared plans to extend their frontiers at the cost of their federal neighbours. These endeavours led to the removal of these leaders from high posts in the Party and Government; twice, in 1931 and 1937, the presidents, the prime ministers and a large proportion of the people's commissars as well as many other Party members were accused of being traitors and were treated accordingly. Naturally this book gives no information about the defeat which the prestige of Soviet propaganda suffered in Central Asia in consequence. But the " purges " which eliminated the critical national elements and showed Home Rule to be a fiction provided a welcome pretext for Moscow to replace unreliable native men by reliable Russians.

Investments in the local economy brought about an increase in industry and a further immigration of Russians, who filled more and more of both the higher and the lower ranks of the technical and economic staff in industry and administration. For instance, Stalinabad, the capital of the Republic, has today a population of about 100,000, more than half of which are non-Tadzhiks. In 1921, the year of the decisive battle against the Emir in this region, there was here only a kishlak, Dushambe. " Kishlak " means a winter camp for herdsmen with their herds. This penetration by Russians is the best safeguard for the Central Government against a repetition of Tadzhik deviations from the official line. On the other hand, the efficiency of pan-Iranian propaganda has been lessened.

The author underestimates the counter-influence exercised by Islamic centres outside the Soviet Union. There are among the Tadzhiks adherents of all the three great Islamic sects of Asia. But it must be admitted that the Tadzhiks were never such faithful adherents of Mahomet as, for example, the Moslem Tatars. Moreover, the faithful and the mullahs emigrated mainly in 1921 and 1931. But the existence of some anti-Soviet feeling cannot be denied. The Communist Party condemns it under the slogans " religious prejudice " and " revival of the kulaks."

In his last chapter, " On the Edge of Two Worlds," the author describes a visit which the popular Tadzhik poet M. Tursun-Zade paid to Pakistan in 1949: " We were visiting villages, talking with the peasants, very often in our own language. . . . Mostly the people we met were uneducated. They knew nothing about books, newspapers, children's writing books. With the greatest interest they heard from us about the rights of our people, about our new style of life, about the economic progress by collectivization." In Peshawar Tursun-Zade saw posters: " Take as example the Red Revolution in China." The political change in China means a secure eastern

frontier and strengthens, in Luknitzki's opinion, the position of the Tadzhik Communists among their sceptical compatriots.

Although this description of Tadzhikistan is primarily meant for Soviet citizens, especially for the Communist Youth, it should not be ignored by the student of Central Asiatic problems.

B. WAURICK.

Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archæology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Vol. XLVIII—No 1: Contributions to the Anthropology of the Caucasus, By Henry Field. Cambridge, Mass. Published by the Museum. Pp. x + 154, figs. 24 and map.

Here is a timely contribution to the complex problems of the history of man in the Caucasian peninsula. Recently a great deal of attention has been directed to this area—notably by Soviet scholars and Russian scholars in the U.S.A. In archæology, the excavations of B. A. Kuftin in the Trialeti district of Georgia have brought to light an advanced culture which seems to have been a connecting link between the Anatolian centres and the North Caucasian sites discovered at the end of the last century. Again, since 1939, the explorations of S. P. Tolstov in the Aral basin have revealed a series of cultures with connections north-westward to the Caspian and the Pontic steppes and southward to Iran and India. Most students of the history of the Aralo-Caspian region have come to attribute significance to the As and Alan peoples who have been identified (in varying degrees by different authorities) with the Sarmatians of the Classical authors. The Sarmatians were the successors of the earlier Scythians as the masters of South Russia. In the purely historical field, as distinct from the archæological, Professor Vernadsky has allowed to the As/Alans (and their congeners the Antes) a predominant rôle in the formation of the Russian people (*History of Russia,* Vol. 1—*Ancient Russia*, Yale, 1943). Although brilliantly argued, this thesis has already found some critics. In these circumstances, we may welcome Mr. Henry Field's anthropological study of the living Osetians, who are generally believed to represent a "pocket" of the descendants of the ancient As/Alans surviving on both slopes of the central section of the Caucasian chain in the area round the Daryal pass.

During 1934, Mr. Field was given facilities for examining 106 men and 50 women from Northern Osetia in Ordzhonikidze. Together with the statistical materials which he procured, he has compiled a series of extracts from leading writers on Caucasian anthropology, covering the period 1866-1934. The repetition of details in these extracts becomes rather tedious, and an analytical summary of the different views and conclusions would have been easier on the reader. In addition, the author supplies a comprehensive bibliography, including valuable references to Soviet periodicals (so difficult to come by) up to 1952. He gives useful summaries of Gilchenko, Vsevolod Miller (still the best authority on the Osetians) and Nioradze, with some citations from Bashmakov. A matter for congratulation is the fine series of original photographs which Mr. Field has provided—in contrast to the dreary reproductions of nineteenth-century plates which are all too common in recent anthropological works.

While brachycephals predominate among the Osetians, Mr. Field finds that "there appear to be dolichocephalic and brachycephalic crania, indicating the presence of two elements even in early historic times." The author cites Nioradze for the statement that the majority (67 per cent.) have dark hair and eyes and dark skins. As Carleton Coon has recently indicated, only 10 per cent. are definitely blond. "It is, of course, the latter minority, and a comparison with other Caucasic peoples, which has given the Osetians a reputation for blondism. . . . That the Osetians are the result of a mixture of Scytho-Sarmatian refugees from the plains to the north with indigenous peoples is, on the basis of the physical data, quite possible" (Coon, *Races of Europe,* p. 632).

In his *Anthropology of Iraq* (Part 2, 1951), Mr. Field has already paid some attention to the Yezidis of Shaikh Adi and Jebel Sinjar. In the present work he

devotes some space to the small Yezidi group of refugees who settled round Yerevan in SSR Armenia after World War I. With their linguistic and cult relationships in Anatolia and Syria, the Yezidis present many problems and they merit a separate and more definitive study.

Mr. Field devotes a longer section to the Jews of the Caucasus. On this group he has already published some notes in his *Contributions to the Anthropology of Iran* 1951). Apart from his measurements of over 100 Caucasian Jews, the most recent by thirty years, the author has rendered a valuable service to students in summarizing the work of earlier authorities (Miller, Pantyukhov, Elkind, Djavakhishvili and Kurdov). The Caucasian Jews, like those of Bukhara, are the descendants of very ancient immigrants. The Georgian Jews are very closely assimilated to their Christian neighbours, although it would seem doubtful that a Jewish origin can be attributed to the Khevsurs. In Dagistan, in the eighth century A.D., the Arab invaders found large numbers of Jews who had been long settled there.

According to the Georgian scholar Djavakhishvili, the Kartalinian Georgians are physically closest to the Jews: this seems to bear out the statements of Georgian chroniclers to the effect that Kartalinia was the original centre of the Jewish penetration of Georgia and other parts of the Caucasus. The Caucasian Jews, in the view of Djavakhishvili, are closely related to the aboriginal Caucasians in physical type; they differ greatly from all other Jews; hence the physical type of the Caucasian Jews bears a strong impression of assimilation with the aboriginals of the Caucasus—and not *vice versa*. Mr. Field cites the conclusion of Weissenberg (*Der jüdische Typus, Globus,* 1910) that the Caucasus has played an important rôle in the emergence of the European Jews and that the change of the original (dolicocephalic) type of the Jews took place in Europe or *en route* to Europe. It would seem that it was in the eastern Caucasus and round the north-west shores of the Caspian that Caucasians and Jews were mixed with the Turkish tribes who in the eighth century had formed the Khazar kingdom on the Volga. The Jewish element in the Khazar state was undoubtedly significant, and it would seem that it was from this centre on the Volga that Jews, stemming in earlier centuries from Caucasia, spread into Russia and Poland during the Middle Ages.

W. E. D. A.

Nationalism and Language Reform in China. By John de Francis. Princeton University Press. Pp. 306 + xi. Price $4.

The author of this book is a Chinese scholar who has already written a primer, *Beginning Chinese*. In his search for the causes of nationalism he was led to investigate the specific proposals made for the reform of Chinese writing. Further study led him to the conclusion that the subject as a whole contained two main aspects, one political, the other linguistic.

On the linguistic side, he goes back to the language reform movement of the nineteenth century and to the first attempt at phonetic transcription made by Ricci and Ruggeri about 1588. It was a missionary of Ningpo who first came to the conclusion that the spoken language is not monosyllabic; it would be perfectly easy to write it with Roman characters; and there would be "no more danger of mistaking the meaning than there is in English." Similar ideas were held by missionaries in Amoy, but S. Wells-Williams stated that "so long as there are scores of homophonous characters, the characters are indispensable in order to discriminate between them." Linguistic objections to Romanization were accompanied by opposition on political grounds. Such a system, Wells-Williams objected, would "break up the people into little clans and states." Nevertheless, alphabetic writing was widely taken up by the missionaries in the period between 1851 and 1866. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did the Chinese themselves begin to take over leadership in experimenting with the alphabetic writing of their own language. The man who came to be honoured by Chinese advocates of Chinese writing was Lu Kan-chang (1854-1928), who was a native of Tungan, near Amoy. Lu's attitude was

partly political, because the literacy of countries with simple alphabetic writing, contrasted with the low literacy prevailing in China, showed that a system of writing like his own would enable more people to become literate. In the time of the "Hundred Days' Reform" Lu prevailed on officials in the Censorate to send in a memorial for him extolling his work and urging the adoption of a phonetic system of writing in order to aid learning. The Emperor referred the matter to the Office of Foreign Affairs, but being placed under virtual house arrest by the Empress Dowager, all his intended reforms were nullified.

In the summer of 1898, Wang Chao, a Secretary of the Board of Rites, asked his superiors to pass on a memorial urging the Emperor to set up a Ministry of Education. But Wang's conservative superiors refused to send in his petition, and on the return to power of the Empress Dowager, Wang Chao was forced to flee for his life. After spending two years in Japan, he returned to China under another name, and began in 1900 several years of underground activity in Tientsin. He achieved a notable measure of success in his attempts to spread the use of his "Mandarin Phonetic Alphabet," as he called it. However, in 1903 Wang Chao was taken and was sentenced to life imprisonment. But when an amnesty was proclaimed shortly afterwards, he was given his freedom. Towards the end of 1905 the Mandarin alphabet began to come out into the open; schools were established to teach the new system of writing and it spread eventually into some thirteen provinces of China. The most active promoter of this scheme was Yüan Shih-k'ai, who ordered that every officer and enlisted man in the army should learn it.

When the Republican Government was established in 1912, it obtained as its first Minister of Education a man whose attainments as a scholar were no less great than his eminence as a liberal. Within a few months of the appointment of Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei to the Ministry of Education it adopted the phonetic alphabet, and followed this by calling a Conference on Unification of Pronunciation. But the conference was not a success. One of the basic points of disagreement was the form that the proposed phonetic script should take. Continued discussion of the matter finally brought agreement on a set of thirty-nine symbols, the *Chu Yin Tzŭ Mu*, or phonetic alphabet. In 1918, after the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the National Language Study Society induced the Minister of Education to promulgate officially the alphabet which the Conference on Unification of Pronunciation had recommended for immediate adoption five years earlier. Perhaps the greatest success of this script was its use in the Mass Education movement. In the early twenties, when James Yen was promoting his five-year plan to wipe out illiteracy, he began his experiment with the use of the phonetic script as an adjunct to characters. Yet, a quarter of a century later, hopes had dwindled to regret that no further developments had been made.

In 1925 and 1926, five experts held twenty-two meetings to elaborate a "definite system of alphabetic writing." Closely following proposals made by Y. R. Chao, they evolved a new system which they called Gwoyeu Romatzyh, or G.R. for short. The distinctive feature of this new Romanization was that it indicated tone variations by a somewhat complicated system of spelling. For "fên^{1} fên^{2} fen^{3} fen^{4}" they read "fen fun feen fenn," thus introducing tonal spelling. But despite its creation as a new instrument affecting the unification of the country, no use was made of Gwoyeu Romatzyh (G.R.) during the victorious sweep of Chinese nationalism which reached its height in the great anti-warlord drives of 1926-27, and it was not until 1928 that G.R. became somewhat more widely known. It was objected that it would take too long to learn, but there were a few short-lived journals devoted to the promotion of the new Romanization. Nevertheless, G.R. aroused perhaps even less interest than the previous attempts to reform the script. The chief objection to it was based on the method of representing tones, and some even went so far as to suggest that there was no necessity to indicate tones at all. Such objections accounted for much of the refusal of Westerners and Chinese alike to have anything to do with the system. In 1928 the Ministry of Education officially promulgated G.R. as the "second pattern of the national alphabet." The frustration engendered amongst the supporters of G.R. by their inability to rely on the aid of an enlightened dictator was heightened by the enormity of their task in attempting to promote a single national language.

The way in which the Soviet Union became involved in the problem of the

Chinese script was through the Chinese minority in Soviet territory. The problem of the Chinese script was taken up as "a most important theoretical and practical question of the cultural revolution in China." In 1928, at a meeting chiefly of Chinese students, a resolution was passed to participate in studying the problem, and a number of Chinese became interested in pursuing the matter further. Foremost among these was Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, who produced a pamphlet which began with the words, "The Chinese script is certainly too difficult for the masses and only the gentle class can have time to learn it. So that, politically and culturally, it is an enormous impediment." At first Ch'ü thought only to make a few modifications in the G.R. system, but gradually he came to the opinion that it was possible to dispense with tone representation entirely, save in a very few cases. Throughout all the Chinese communities in the Soviet Union there was a sharp debate in 1930 and 1931 on these proposals. In September 1931, a conference on the Latinization of Chinese was called which included representatives of Chinese throughout the Soviet Unoin. This conference called for the compulsory introduction of Latinization in 1932 in all Chinese schools of the U.S.S.R., printing all textbooks, etc., in the Latinized script, and the organization of campaigns to liquidate illiteracy among the Chinese on the basis of the new writing. A census being taken in 1939, however, revealed the gradual disappearance of the Chinese and also of the script which had been specially created for them, and it is known that not long after 1937 the use of "Latinxua" was discontinued.

Before long, it became clear that the position of the G.R. school towards the new scheme was one of vehement opposition; and, when the committee for the Promotion of the National Language Romanization met at its first all-national conference in the autumn of 1934, it attributed "Latinxua" to the "meddling of foreigners." Discussion ranged over a number of fundamental questions, such as the nature of the popular language and the bearing of the popular language on dialects. Throughout the country the new script was interdicted and publications dealing with the system were confiscated and suppressed.

In the 1930s, Professor T'ao Hsing-ch'ih was convinced that the new script provided a revolutionary means of bringing culture to the people. He therefore changed the name "Latinxua" for the new designation "Sin Wenz" or "New Writing," and, until his death, continued to support the "Sin Wenz" movement as the answer to Chinese cultural needs. As early as 1917, Dr. Hu Shih had stressed the need of using polysyllabic compounds in place of the terse monosyllables of the older literary style. But whereas Hu Shih was content to advocate reform, others were anxious to create a revolution in the Chinese script.

In 1937 the Sin Wenz movement offered to join hands with the G.R. movement, but no working compromise was effected between them. Gradually, the New Writing was taken up by Chinese in Annam, Malaya, the Pacific Islands, Europe, the United States and other areas. A decided opinion as to the effectiveness of the New Writing was held by the leaders of the Communist-controlled areas of China. It was estimated that in the Communist party and among Red Army officers alone at least 20,000 were able to read the Sin Wenz.

Modern spoken Chinese is polysyllabic, and today there are two forms of written Chinese: one, the classical style, has been more or less monosyllabic throughout its history; the other, the colloquial style, has been polysyllabic throughout its history, which can be traced back to the T'ang dynasty (618-906). The contemporary vernacular written style is close to the contemporary spoken style.

From the political angle, the emergence of language has occurred along with the revolutionary growth of capitalism in the middle classes. More than elsewhere in the East, Chinese ideas about nationalism have tended to gravitate towards two extreme positions. At present, a strong school of integral nationalism stands in opposition to a strong school of federal nationalism. In this, as in earlier struggles of Chinese nationalism, the problem of the Chinese script has been one of the many points of dispute. Both before and after Sun Yat-sen, there has been general agreement among the Chinese that language is a factor in nationalism. Some Chinese argue that the most important linguistic fact for China is its possession of a distinctive script which helps to distinguish its users from other nationalities. Many Chinese, however, do not favour the destruction of the traditional script as a means of writing reform, but

simply to use it in writing a literature based more or less on speech rather than on the dead literary language.

Despite the fact that there is not always complete correspondence between an individual's linguistic views and their nationalistic outlook, conditions in China appear more and more to be forcing language reformers into co-operation with one or the other of the two main schools of nationalistic thinking.

Linguistically, it is certain that alphabetic writing in China is possible; politically, it has long been in doubt. What the result will be no one can tell, but this book is an excellent survey of the position, and one which deserves careful reading.

E. D. EDWARDS.

Introduction to the Economic History of China. By E. Stuart Kirby, Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Hong Kong. George Allen and Unwin. 1954. Pp. 202. 18s.

Much has been written in the past about China from the purely historical, ethnical, cultural and other points of view, but—curiously enough, since trade has always been our main interest—little from that of the economist. This book is, primarily, a study of the ground that would have to be covered if that omission is to be repaired; the author (who would appear to be peculiarly well equipped to undertake the task himself if he can spare the time from his other duties) has not only sketched an outline of the whole work, indicating what has already been started and what would need further research, but has compiled a very full bibliography of the subject, including studies in Chinese, Japanese (and Japanese translations of other works), French and German, as well as, of course, English, of particular periods, especially in the earlier dynasties, and special subjects; and anyone who essays the formidable task of writing a comprehensive review of the whole subject will find his labours very much eased by this preliminary spade-work.

But it is much more than that. The ordinary reader will find this sketch of the economic history of 2,500 years of the utmost interest and value in understanding the general problem of China. For under his treatment Chinese history, instead of being a rather bewildering and meaningless series of cycles of rise—degeneration—fall of a number of dynasties, traces the transformation and reorientation of China from a land-locked, Western-looking kingdom to an empire which, while still Continental, tends to look increasingly towards the East; and, what is more important, shows that the rise and fall of dynasties was due not so much to the degeneration of a particular ruling race (which, indeed, often began with the second or third of a royal line, though the dynasty might survive for a further century or two) but rather to the periodical economic exhaustion of the country, due to extravagant foreign adventures and a too strict adherence to the doctrine of autarky.

It has, therefore, its lessons in connection with present-day problems and tendencies; and as he shows that most of the typical Communist ideas have been tried out in the past (and have always ended in failure) he comes to the conclusion—very comforting to those who have no sympathy with Communism—that the present experiment is a very temporary phenomenon which will soon fade out and leave no trace behind.

A. G. N. O.

A Guide to Iranian Area Study. By L. P. Elwell-Sutton. Compiled under the auspices of the Committee on Near Eastern Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies. J. W. Edwards, Ann Arbor. Michigan. 1952. Pp. 235.

It is no small achievement on Mr. Elwell-Sutton's part to have compressed so much information on so many topics into so small a space. In separate chapters, he has dealt with the geography, population and language, social evolution, history, administrative and economic structures, religion, intellectual development, literature

and the arts of Persia. The treatment of each of these subjects is necessarily brief, but it is, on the whole, clear and accurate. At the end of each chapter there are a number of useful references for further study, and there is a good bibliography at the end of the book.

It is, unfortunately, sometimes the duty of a reviewer to blame as well as praise. It is necessary, in the interests of accuracy, to point out that this book, good though much of it undoubtedly is, contains a number of inaccuracies and misstatements. For example, in the geographical chapter (No. II), the altitude of Lake Rezaieh above sea level is given as 6,000 feet, whereas it is just over 4,000. In the paragraph regarding the central plateau of Persia, it is said (p. 7) that this lies to the south of the Caspian Sea and the Karakorum; presumably, the author has confused the latter name with Qara-Qum. In the section on social evolution it would seem that the statement (p. 26) that the Persian nomads number " perhaps 15 per cent. of the population " is too low an estimate. On the following page reference is made to the late Reza Shah's attempt to settle the nomads in villages, but no indication is given as to the reason why this experiment failed.

In the chapter on intellectual development, the author very rightly emphasizes the great part played by the Persians in the wonderful intellectual activity in the Middle East between the eighth and thirteenth centuries, but he goes too far when he implies that *all* this activity was by Persians.

It is in the chronology that most of the mistakes occur. It would be tedious to draw attention to all, but mention may be made of the following:

Isma'il, the founder of the Safavi dynasty, was crowned Shah of Azarbaijan in July, 1501, not in the following year. Shah Tahmasp transferred his capital from Tabriz to Qazvin in 955 A.H. (A.D. 1548/49), not 1561, and it was in 1598, not 1600, that Shah Abbas the Great made Isfahan his capital in place of Qazvin. In another entry devoted to Shah Abbas's reign, the old error about the formation of the Shah-Sevan is repeated. When we come to the reign of Shah Abbas II, it is stated that it was in 1664 that the Cossacks, at Russian instigation, raided Mazandaran; actually, these raids did not take place until 1668/69, after Shah Abbas's death. While it is correctly stated that the Ghalzai chieftain Mir Wais died in 1715, it was his brother Abdu'l Aziz, and not his uncle Abdullah, who succeeded him as ruler of Qandahar; furthermore, it was Abdu'l Aziz and not Abdullah (who never existed) who was murdered by Mahmud, Mir Wais's son, in 1717. In the entry for 1724 it should have been stated that, by the treaty signed by Russia and Turkey in June of that year, both powers allocated to themselves large areas of Persia, Russia in the north and Turkey in the north-west and west. The young Shah Abbas III did not die in 1736 as stated on p. 141; he was deposed in that year, and lived until Riza Quli Mirza, Nadir's eldest son, had him and his father Tahmasp put to death in 1740.

When we come to recent times, there are a number of references to oil and oil concessions which show that the author has not studied the subject sufficiently. For example, General Kitabgi (not " Ketabji ") never had an oil concession covering the whole of Persia (p. 148), and W. K. D'Arcy obtained his concession (in 1901, not 1900) direct from the Persian Government, and not from General Kitabgi. The entry for 1931 stating that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company refused to revise its concession is at variance with the facts; it had for long been negotiating with the Persian Government with a view to modifying certain clauses of the D'Arcy concession or, alternatively, substituting a new concession. It was while these negotiations were still in progress that the Persian Government, by unilateral action, abruptly cancelled the concession in November 1932.

In conclusion, one may express the hope that, in a future edition, these mistakes and blemishes may be rectified; until that is done, the book cannot be given unqualified approval.

L. L.

Burma under the Japanese. By Thakin Nu, Prime Minister of Burma. Edited and translated by J. S. Furnivall. Macmillan. 1954. Pp. 132 + 4 plates. $8\frac{3}{4}'' \times 5\frac{3}{4}''$. 12s. 6d.

This is a most intriguing document. A latter-day saint let loose on a wicked world, and an oriental world at that, sailing through all the traditional obstacles of Asiatic methods by sheer force of character.

The Prime Minister wanted to write plays, not to play at politics, but again and again when shown where his duty lay he sank his private feelings in favour of public duty. Two extracts illustrate how this worked out. During an air raid a Japanese ordered to stop ran on to the bayonet of a Burmese soldier. Thakin Nu, as Foreign Minister of "Free Burma," was ordered by the Japanese Command to apologize to the Japanese Ambassador. He duly called, smiled, and drank tea and departed. No apology. The Ambassador was nonplussed. It was a diplomatic victory for Burma. Again, the next-door neighbour in Rangoon kept fowls, which a large cobra used to eat regularly. "One day Khin Maung saw the head of the snake poking out of a rat-hole near the latrine and pinned it to the ground with a dart. As soon as I heard him shouting I jumped up and got my gun. But I had gone barely halfway when it occurred to me that if I injured the snake I should be transgressing the precept, 'Thou shalt not kill,' and remembered the text 'that all living creatures are subject to their destiny.' So I turned back with the gun. Just as I was putting it away it occurred to me that if I spare the snake it will bite men. 'Fate won't save you from pricks if you tread on thorns.' So I took up the gun again and with a heavy mind set out to shoot it. But just as I was going to fire the snake shook itself free and disappeared." Such views cannot make it too easy to practise politics.

The text leaves the reader in no doubt of the methods of the "Kempetai" or Japanese Military Police and their indiscriminate tortures. Yet not once in the whole book does the author speak evil of anyone—friend or enemy. How many records by British prisoners of Japan could be so described? The final journey to Moulmein with the retreating Japs was a nightmare for everyone, particularly Thakin Nu's family. But there is no word of complaint. It was written in their book of fate, and who was he to criticize?

The translator rightly adopts the author's conversational style, and contributes a 24-page introduction which provides the atmosphere and the setting, so that even those who have never seen Burma can follow the narrative. But for those who do know the country this narrative is sheer delight, a wonderful commentary on a world one can hardly believe. If honesty of purpose can guide aright a Prime Minister, there are possibilities of Burma which may be greater than they know.

G. M. ROUTH.

"Mot Lop-nor. En flodresa på Tarim." By Sven Hedin. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag.

This book is mainly a reproduction, with certain omissions, of the first twelve chapters of Dr. Sven Hedin's book *Asien, tusen mil på okända vägar*, which was published in an English edition in 1903 under the title *Central Asia and Tibet*. There is a stimulating foreword by Dr. Gösta Attorp, in which he touches on the character and outlook of Dr. Hedin and refers to the fine descriptive writing of which he was such a master.

The book is delightfully illustrated by drawings by Sven Hedin himself, many of which have never been published before. They were chosen by Dr. Gösta Montell, who was a member of one of Hedin's expeditions. These illustrations are further indications of Dr. Hedin's genius and not only give a splendid idea of the country through which he travelled, but also of the people he met and the things he saw. One of the most charming is the portrait of Turdi Mollah and another of the head of a camel.

The account of this most enterprising journey fully justifies this new edition and one reads, enthralled, of the adventures which Dr. Hedin experienced and so vividly

describes. His building of the boat in which he floated down the Tarim until the ice made further progress impossible is in itself a story well worth telling. The hospitality and kindness which he met throughout his journey across Russia and Central Asia makes one wonder whether the world today is as happy a place as it was fifty years ago.

This book is very pleasantly printed and produced, so that it is a welcome addition to any library. An English translation with the same illustrations would be very valuable. Those responsible for giving us this volume are to be congratulated and Dr. Hedin would have been proud of it.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

The Yangtze and the Yak. By Marion H. Duncan. Pub. U.S.A. 1952. Price with maps $4.25, without maps $3.75.

At the Simla Conference in 1913-14 an abortive attempt was made to settle Sino-Tibetan frontier difficulties by the invention of " Inner Tibet "—a sort of neutral zone roughly between the upper Yangtse and the Szechwan border, in which the best man might win. In the upshot, this area, although inhabited by people of Tibetan stock and drawn to Lhasa by religious ties, came under a tenuous and patchy Chinese administration. In spite of the presence of a handful of missionaries, such as Mr. Duncan, news from Inner Tibet has never been abundant, so what can be gleaned from this book about the progress of Chinese infiltration there is of considerable value and will stimulate speculation how the Chinese Communists will deal with the individualism, the violence and the sinophobia of that restless country.

The journeys, encounters and battles which Mr. Duncan recounts (he was present throughout the siege of Batang by the Tibetans in their hostilities with the Chinese in 1932) are of great potential interest, but the clumsy style with its inexpert and tedious use of the historic present, the inadequate proof-reading and the badly reproduced photographs fail to realize the full possibilities. Even from the dim pictures and generally uninspired writing, those who know Tibet will be able to reconstruct the delight and excitement of the country and the flavour of its life, but I doubt whether the general reader will get more than a hint of the real atmosphere of Tibetan landscape and way of living. Nor should generalizations about Tibet proper be drawn from the conditions described by Mr. Duncan. The violence, blood feuds, intrigue and banditry are not characteristic of Central Tibet, and this may account largely for the failure of Lhasa to regain control east of the Yangtse.

The book includes material of a rather special interest. Mr. Duncan's careful maps and itineraries are a valuable supplement to the pioneer work of such travellers as Pereira and Teichman. The printing of place names could, with advantage, be clearer. I noticed a discrepancy from Teichman's map in the position of the She Chu between Drewo and Garthar (Taining). Mr. Duncan covered this journey three times and I assume that his version is correct, especially as it appears to agree with Pereira's map.

The description of Buddhist ritual gestures is a useful contribution to a special subject; but I see no value in the long list of English versions of Tibetan personal names.

Mr. Duncan ventures also on a new English transcription of Tibetan. He is very properly not satisfied with his use of *h* to represent a range of sounds including a glottal stop and a faintly sounded *r*; and, even allowing for peculiarities of Eastern Tibetan usage, I do not think the rest of his scheme is a reliable guide to the pronunciation of Tibetan as a whole. He uses *b* where Bell, Hannah and others use *p*; his representation of *kra, gra, tra, dra, pra* and *bra*, wherever they appear, as *dra* is far too sweeping and often misleading; and there are other points which I have no space to mention. Mr. Duncan does not always follow his own rules and, at all events, I did not find it possible accurately to reconstruct Tibetan place names from his transcriptions. It would have been better if he had given, alongside his own phonetic representation, a transcription of the Tibetan spelling in a recognized trans-

literation such as that used by the Royal Asiatic Society. His etymology of "Tachienlu" (p. 63) is not convincing. Might this not be a Minya dialect word?

Such problems need not greatly concern the general reader and these criticisms are not meant to conceal the real value of the book. It is the work of an active man with an active mind who has had many years of unusual and exciting experiences in a little-known country and who has observed carefully the ways of the tribesmen, bandits, nomads, monks, Chinese officials and settlers—and of the wild animals too—among whom he travelled. Although his was mainly a Chinese *milieu,* Mr. Duncan has been drawn to the direct, open companionship of the Tibetans, which seems to have a more sympathetic attraction for Westerners than the recondite charm of the Chinese. Mr. Duncan has a good eye for significant historical and political developments, and his book shows also something of the patience, tact, resourcefulness and toughness of fibre which are necessary if one is to live and travel, to make and keep friends in Inner Tibet.

H. E. RICHARDSON.

Tibetan Journey. By G. N. Patterson. Faber and Faber. Pp. 231. Illustrated. 15s.

This is a very interesting book of Tibetan travel by a man who spoke Tibetan and thus avoided the tiresome use of an interpreter. The author, a medical missionary working on the Tibet-China border, had to hurry to India to bring supplies of drugs and other necessities in view of the approach of the Chinese Communists which endangered the supply of such things from China. The journey was undertaken from January to March 1950 in a Tibetan winter, and the hardships of such conditions are described with much genuine feeling. Probably there could have been mitigation to some extent by travelling at night over frozen snow on the worst parts, and also by taking precautions against snow-blindness.

After a gruesome, and quite unnecessary, account of an operation on a Tibetan woman, we are taken off on the journey to India. Unfortunately we are given no clue as to the starting-point except a note on the map. There is also no indication of where we are going until on the third day out (on p. 52) we learn that the author spends the night at a village (tantalizingly nameless) on a rocky promontory above the Yangtse river. The next day the Yangtse is crossed in coracles. The location of this ferry is not given. Up to Gartok, which he reached in seven days, he was on little-known ground, though the country is mapped. Here he spent several days and made a very useful friendship with the Tibetan officer Dege Sey (Derge Se, by the recognized transliteration from Tibetan), who spoke good English which he had learnt at Ludlows' school at Gyantse. He also obtained a permit to travel and the right to *ulag*—that is, transport, supplies and accommodation. From Gartok the author was on the track of A. K., one of the most efficient of the secret explorers who were sent out by the Survey of India last century. This took him to Mijiriga (Michi Rika), at which place he picked up the tracks of other travellers. His journey through the Mishmi country was facilitated by the Indian detachments on that frontier. Here he met Captain and Mrs. Kingdon-Ward, who were on one of their many botanical explorations. No one will like reading of the high-handed methods of his escort in beating villagers and head men to make them produce transport. It is better to control these matters, particularly if you intend to return by the same road.

There is perhaps too much detail of the conversation of his retainers. This in moderation is interesting as showing aspects of Tibetan life. More information of the country traversed and especially some place names would have added to the interest, and to the value of the book for future travellers. The author had the good sense to take a respectable suit of clothes for meetings with high officials. Many travellers cut their baggage down to such an extent that this is not possible and unintentionally give offence in this respect.

This remarkable journey was started in an emergency at short notice, and under these circumstances it was due to his knowledge of the language and his determination that he got through to India.

F. M. B.

From an Antique Land. By Julian Huxley. Max Parrish. Pp. 310. Illustrated. 25s.

It is a long way from Ur to Unesco, but in this absorbing account of his travels through the Middle East in 1948 Dr. Huxley has brought them closer together than one would have thought possible.

He has read deeply, and amplified the notes he made at the time so that he has been able to give us what must be one of the most easily read and beautifully illustrated books on that part of the world. His interests are so wide that much of what he says may seem superficial, but he never fails to inspire the reader with a wish to know more and to provide an incentive for further study. Dr. Huxley is really the perfect tourist, since he has an eye for detail as well as an apparently inexhaustible supply of energy.

Whether Dr. Huxley is telling us of the cities of Phœnicia and the corn-king legends, of Petra and its strange inhabitants, or of the ruins of Baalbek and Palmyra, he always succeeds in making his subject live. In the same way he gives an interesting account of modern Turkey and its educational system and the whirling dervishes whose ceremony he was privileged to visit. The past, of course, is always in his mind, but he never forgets the present, so that the reader has a sense of the continuity of human development. One of the most interesting chapters from this point of view is that in which he describes the thoughts inspired by a visit to the Iraq Museum in Baghdad. He gives a lucid account of the various stages by which the inhabitants of Mesopotamia reached a settled and civilized economy, and shows how much the modern world owes to the ancient mathematicians and scientists of Iraq.

He discusses religion, the origin of writing, the rise and decline of the manufacture of Tyrian purple, with the same freshness as he talks of the animals, birds and flowers which he saw on his travels. It does seem, however, that he is more at home in the distant past than in more recent history, and he is more satisfying when talking of Egyptian temples than when discussing mosques and churches. This, however, is fully understandable, since not even a man of his calibre can be expected to cover every subject with the same knowledge and enthusiasm.

I have referred earlier to the illustrations in this book, which are the author's own photographs, both in colour and black-and-white. They are remarkable for their beauty and the skill with which they have been taken. In such circumstances it is a pity that the maps are not better. In one, the railway is shown as going from Teheran to Tabriz, but I believe this is still incomplete, although the plans for it have long been in existence. Another minor flaw is a number of somewhat unusual transliterations of place names—*e.g.*, Khazimain.

This book may be thoroughly recommended to anyone who wishes an enthralling introduction to the Middle East as well as to those who seek an easy and delightful way of recalling their own travels. Even the last chapter, in which the author seeks a pattern in the history of mankind and discusses human history in the light of biological development is of value, since it stimulates discussion. Whatever may be the truth, there is no doubt that a study of the history of the Middle East is encouraging as well as instructive, since what man has once done he can do again, and in this lies the author's hope for the countries which are now largely desert but were once so rich and fertile.

J. E. F. Gueritz.

Pietro's Pilgrimage. By Wilfrid Blunt. James Barrie. Pp. 320, illustrated. 21s.

Pietro della Valle was a remarkable man and not the least remarkable thing about him was his apparent ability to command unlimited funds wherever he might be. He always travelled in great state and dressed in the grandest styles. Mr. Blunt has given a well-edited account of Pietro della Valle's travels, illustrated by quotations from his letters to his friend Schiapino. At a time when travel was by no means easy,

he visited Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Persia and India. His descriptions cover everything from the Seraglio to the Descent of the Holy Fire at Jerusalem, and from the festivities arranged in Isfahan for Shah Abbas and his ladies to the immolation of a Hindu widow on her husband's funeral pyre.

The interest of this book is largely due to the vast range of Pietro's pursuits. He published the first cuneiform inscription, he dug up mummies, collected shells from the Red Sea and studied tribal habits amongst the Arabs of Mesopotamia. He was also probably the first traveller to give an account of the Sassanian Palace of Ukhaidir. To do all this today would be an achievement, but when one remembers the hardships which he underwent, it really becomes almost beyond comprehension, especially when it is considered that he frequently suffered ill-health and appears to have been somewhat of a hypochondriac. Even when he thought he was on the verge of death he still clung to the hope of further interviews with Shah Abbas, and not even war deterred him from continuing his wanderings to Goa and South India.

He married a charming and beautiful Nestorian from Baghdad, and when she died in Persia embalmed her body, so that she might still accompany him and finally rest in his native land. Such was the rapacity of the tribes through whose territory he had to pass on his way home that at one time it seemed as if all that he had left was the coffin and a few of his wife's possessions. Even he had had enough of travelling by the time he saw the Mediterranean again, as one can see from his remark: "Thus, after many years, I quitted the continent of Asia, fully resolved never to set foot upon it again unless fully armed, and began my voyage towards Italy for which I so greatly longed."

It would be difficult to decide what aspects of this book are the most interesting. One of them is certainly the character of the man himself. He must have been pompous and conceited, and was probably a bore. He may have been a dilettante, but he was a shrewd observer, as all his comments show. He apparently had no real aim or object beyond seeing strange things and new places, but his persistence was remarkable. A separate volume could easily be published upon each country that he visited, and Mr. Blunt's chief service is that he has reminded us of Pietro della Valle's existence, so that perhaps in due course we may see further books giving fuller details of his impressions of the Near East and of South India.

One cannot help comparing him with another traveller who lived nearly a hundred years earlier, namely Fernando Mendes Pinto, whose memoirs give much the same impression of Goa, although Pinto was an adventurer rather than a tourist.

The author has chosen his material well, and from this book we get a graphic picture of life three hundred years ago in countries daily becoming more important in world affairs.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Jerusalem Journey. By H. F. M. Prescott. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1954. Pp. 242, with index, plates, notes and illustrations. $8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{1}{2}''$. 18s.

The fifteenth century saw the last of the broad streams of pilgrimages from western Europe through Venice to Jerusalem. After that time the streams were reduced to trickles, partly because of the violence of Christendom's own domestic strife and partly because of the decline in the power of Venice itself. Here Miss Prescott unlocks for us the treasure of the ponderous volumes in which Friar Felix Fabri stored rich memories of his experiences as a pilgrim in search of knowledge and opportunity to do homage to the Holy Land. With unerring eye for the bright passages in the good Friar's travelogue, Miss Prescott makes it her business to sketch the background of these pilgrimages and at the same time to bring the pilgrims themselves to life in true Chaucerian vein. Those who have travelled before the coming of airliners will find that the experiences of the fifteenth-century pilgrim had much in common with their own in the early twentieth century. The anxiety lest the captain of the ship would stay too long in a port for the strength of the passengers' purses, the disharmony among the passengers themselves when confronted by com-

panions who could not summon up comradeship enough to set aside prejudices for the moment—for example, there was Margery Kempe, pious soul, whose incessant weeping and unseasonable exhortations caused friction—and other small beer of shipboard life, are perfectly reproduced. The Friar himself was as jovial, withal dutiful, a monk as could be found. He made his pilgrimage without the luxury of princes or kings (Henry IV—when Duke of Hereford—and his former enemy Thomas Duke of Norfolk had galleys all to themselves). He was cosmopolitan in his friendships and tactfully considerate in his dealings with men of other faiths. Indeed, he and his fellow-pilgrims seem to have shown a tolerance shaming the record of later and certainly these days. They were perhaps too ready to accept the yarns of seafarers met with on their journey, and Miss Prescott argues that their knowledge of geography was less accurate than that of generations just behind them. Sacred relics—their acquisition was not free from the taint of racketeering, to use a modern term—were not the only treasures brought back by the pilgrims: fine gold and linen, cypress wood chests, somehow found their way into the hold of the returning galleys, whose captains incidentally seem also to have shared in the racketeers' profits. That would not worry Friar Felix. He achieved his main pious object, to gain personal knowledge of the Holy Land, and he also thoroughly enjoyed himself as any good seasoned traveller does. In Miss Prescott's hands his story is splendidly told with wit, historical learning and vivid portraiture.

EDWIN HAWARD.

"The One Remains." A report from Palestine. By Stewart Perowne. Hodder and Stoughton. 1954. Pp. 192. Map and illustrations. 20s.

This is a moving and eloquent book about the Old City of Jerusalem, now the Arab city, and its inhabitants, its history and its life in the present day. It is written by one who knows Jerusalem, Palestine and the Middle East through and through. He has lived there for most of the last thirty years: he is a lover of archæology and he has a sense of history, and above all a sense of the destiny of Jerusalem. The title of the book comes from the Adonais of Shelley—"The One remains: the many change and pass." Mr. Perowne's theme is that the Old City's destiny is to give witness for ever.

His vivid description of life in the different sections of that City, of the bazaars, of the bus-station by Herod's Gate, of the beauties of the Rockefeller Museum and its treasures, bring a sense of nostalgia to the present reviewer, who has not been able for six years to cross the line from the New City to the Old City.

Inevitably the book is written from the point of view of one living on the other side of the line. Mr. Perowne claims that he will try to exclude all politics in his account, but when he records shooting incidents in Jerusalem, it seems axiomatic that the Jews are the aggressors. He points to the paradox that the in-gathering of the Jews in Israel has had the result that there are now no Jews left in historic Jerusalem.

In the second part of the book Mr. Perowne tells in detail of the practical schemes of the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to resettle on the land a few hundreds of the homeless Arabs who are "economic refugees" and cannot find a living in the city. He has had himself a big part in the building enterprise which the Bishop has started on the hills between Jerusalem and Jericho for the settlement of new villages. And he tells also of that most promising enterprise of Moussa Alami, once an officer in the Palestine Mandatory Administration, who, by his own devotion, has settled a number of the Refugee Arabs on 2,000 acres of what was waste land near Jericho. On his "Aladdin's Farm" he has built an industrial school and a boys' village, where over eighty of the Arab youth are taught the mysteries of agriculture, plumbing and carpentry. The farm employs some 500 of the refugees. That is a hopeful example of what can be done for resettlement by a few individuals who are resolute. But Mr. Perowne sets out fairly the difficulties which have stood in the way of a larger solution by the Relief and Works Administration of the United Nations.

The book provokes the thought: "Can this perverse segregation of the two Jerusalems endure?" Mr. Perowne writes of the faith in what his countrymen and women are now doing to alleviate Palestine's distress, of faith in the great and beneficent tradition which the present English residents of Jerusalem, like himself, inherit from their forbears who lived and worked for the country. Cannot that faith bring reconciliation?

There is an excellent map of Jerusalem, and the many illustrations are original and beautiful.

N. B.

Far Eastern Agent The Diary of an Eastern Nobody. By Donald Moore. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 224. 15s.

The author of this book shows an apparently surface knowledge of the races of peoples that he meets in his travels which is deeper than at first appears. In politics, he says, "I am Socialist or Conservative depending on which party needs to be prodded or restrained at the time the question is asked." The book consists largely of statements made by the various "men-in-the-street" with whom the author comes into contact. We read the views of the British junior mercantile assistant, the trader, the bookseller, Dutch, Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, and each one has something to say in which there are germs of truth, despite their differing conclusions. Vivid pictures are painted of life in Hongkong and Singapore, Djarkarta and Tokyo. Perhaps Indonesia presents the more depressing picture. In pre-war days it was the fashion to point to the Dutch policy in Java and Sumatra of the lowering of the colour bar as the correct way to deal with the indigenous people. Dutchmen married native women, the offspring of these unions occupied positions of responsibility—often was it said that the Dutch method was the correct one. The strict colour bar observed in India, Burma, Malaya and other British realms and protectorates was considered old-fashioned and die-hard by the Dutch colonial peoples.

This more free attitude seems to have availed them nothing, as, according to Donald Moore, today the Dutchman is nowhere, the Indonesian having replaced him almost entirely. This replacement includes an American-equipped Army, Navy and Air Force, but with the Indonesian "take-over" has come corruption, nepotism, "fixing," to a degree hitherto undreamt of.

The picture of Hongkong is perhaps of the greatest interest to the British reader. This seething ant-heap of two million people has problems peculiar to itself. The "taipan" or big business man from Great Britain still wields great power, but the wealthy Chinese are very much to be reckoned with. American influence is growing, as evidenced in cars, horn-rimmed glasses, flaring ties, etc. Untold wealth is possessed by the rich, abysmal poverty is the lot of the vast majority. Housing is indescribably crowded, but, however bad conditions are for the refugee on Hongkong Island and in the leased territories, they are an improvement on the conditions he or she has fled from. The scavenger who lives on his leaky sampan or junk seems to have reached the very nadir of civilization, if such it can be called. Sincere efforts are being made to remedy all this, but the numbers are just too great and the solution, if indeed there is one, calls for all the efforts of Socialist or Conservative. One thing we in Britain must accept is that, however much the rich Chinese in Hongkong professes to be anti-Communist, he has a sneaking pride in the advance that Communism has made on the mainland. He feels that a new world force has arisen. Only an ostrich race could refuse to recognize this.

Far Eastern Agent is strongly recommended to the Orientalist.

H. St.C. S.

Tigerland and South Sea. By Olle Strandberg. Michael Joseph. Pp. 235, illustrated. 18s.

Mr. Strandberg has given us a series of sketches of places visited by him in the East, and it is in his graphic descriptions that the enjoyment of this book lies rather than in the accuracy of the picture painted. He describes a visit to the jungles of Daspalla, and his account recalls most clearly not only the sounds of the forest but also the gaiety of the aboriginals and the music of their dances. His description of Calcutta is not pretty, but then neither is Calcutta, and if smells predominate that is no more than the truth.

From India the author went to China and the strange port of Macao. The exotic meal which ended with new-born mice dipped in honey and transferred to the mouth of the host by elegant concubines is only one amusing episode out of many.

Siam has obviously won a place in his heart, and his account of Bangkok makes one wish that one could travel to share in its delights, even if one doesn't wish to visit the opium hall so intriguingly described. Again there is a meal, which despite the dramatic fate of the soup sounds enticing.

Most interesting of all is the debunking of the paradises of the Pacific. The description of the commercialization of Hawaii and the contrast of reality with the legends of beauty on which we were all brought up is enlightening. He explains dramatically how these legends grew up as a result of visits by ships long out from their home ports and the false logic which linked nudity with loose morals. As an illustration of this he tells of the rush to visit one island (the population of which, in fact, consists of 310 old women and 40 old men) which was caused by a sensational article in the American press.

Besides humour, however, there are comments on politics and current affairs and also many well-drawn sketches such as the description of the leper colony at Molokai.

This book will provide material for thought even if it only urges the reader to check the author's facts.

J. E. F. Gueritz.

Told in the Market Place. Forty tales translated and set down by C. G. Campbell. Ernest Benn. Pp. 207. 10s. 6d.

This is the third collection of Arab stories that Major Campbell has produced and it is sad to think that his death in 1953 deprives us of the hope of others. The stories come from Iraq, Palestine and Oman. They are, like all their kind, a mixture of morals, the victory of cunning and the unexpected. One of the chief themes is the success of the poor boy either through his astuteness or his adherence to a code of conduct. There are also those that end in the just punishment of greed and wickedness.

The stories are well translated and retain their original form without being stilted or stiff. While they naturally vary in quality, they are in the main well worth recording and many are most amusing. With those previously collected they form a useful background to a study of Arab character. They conjure up in a few words clear pictures of the Middle East, and, though many are cast in the time of Haroun al Rashid, most of them contain pictures that might be of the desert or the villages of today.

Perhaps one of the most original is the Tale of the Arak which Sang, in which Abu Nawas is saved by his wits from just punishment for stealing the finest arak in Baghdad. It ends with the command of the Caliph to fill up the glasses, so it came about that a singing was heard in the Court, but the owner wept and said, "That is my arak's final song."

J. E. F. G.

Our Everest Adventure. By Brig. Sir John Hunt, C.B.E., D.S.O. Pictorial record of the great ascent. The Brockhampton Press Ltd. Pp. 128; over 150 photographs and maps. 12s. 6d.

For all those who climb or are interested in climbing this is an ideal gift. The photographs contained in the volume give more clearly than any written word the tremendous feat of the British team. They are the copyright of the Joint Himalayan Committee and the Royal Geographical Society and the Alpine Club. Strongly recommended.

K. G. P.

India and the Awakening East. By Eleanor Roosevelt. Hutchinson. Pp. 168, illustrated. 15s.

Mrs. Roosevelt has given a factual account of travels which she made in 1952 to the Middle East, Pakistan and India. Such criticisms as she makes are aimed at the former rulers of these lands and are inspired by prejudice rather than by knowledge. She was treated as an honoured guest wherever she went and accepted what she saw at its face value without being able, or perhaps willing, to come down to basic principles and causes. There is, in fact, little that is new in her account, and the chief value of this book lies in the insight which it gives into the attitude of a section of educated Americans towards world problems.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure. By E. R. Leach. Published by London School of Economics and Political Science, 1954. Pp. viii + 324. Bibliograph. Index. 35s.

This book contains the results of an intensive study of life in a Kachin village in Upper Burma in the period immediately prior to the Japanese War. The author spent the year 1939-40 in the village of Hpalang, in the Bhamo District, and from 1940 to 1945 he served in the Burma Army, in close contact with the Kachins for the greater part of that time. He thus had ample opportunity for pursuing his investigations.

Dr. Leach argues forcefully against the common view that Kachins and Shans are two races; like many anthropologists today he frowns on the whole conception of "race," and he adduces some interesting examples to show that in fact there is no real ethnic distinction between one so-called tribe and another. He points out that in many cases Kachins have become Shans by adopting the Shan language and the Buddhist religion; he refers, too, to the tendency for Kachin chiefs to adopt the manners and methods of Shan *sawbwas*. One result of these conditions is, in Dr. Leach's view, that society in this area is in a constant state of flux, and so observers have commonly been at fault in treating as a permanent situation conditions which are in fact constantly changing.

The lay reader will, however, find interest mainly in Dr. Leach's description of Kachin life and customs. The uninitiated, not trained in the science of anthropology, may begin at times to wonder whether, like so many anthropologists, the author does not lay overmuch stress on the importance of marriage and kinship customs: indeed, applying Dr. Leach's own principle, he may wonder whether the customs observed at Hpalang have really any general validity among the inhabitants of the Kachin Hills at large: Dr. Leach himself (pp. 210-1) narrows down drastically the area to which the *mayu-dama* pattern which he describes has any application, concluding that it is really confined to the Jinghpaw-speaking area, and the reader may be forgiven for wondering whether even this is not too wide a field for the type

of marriage rule on which the author lays so much stress. However, as a description of a particular Kachin village on the eve of the Japanese War the book is of very real value.

B. R. P.

Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. By G. R. Driver, M.A., F.B.A., Fellow of Magdalen College and Professor of Semitic Philology, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. xi+59. Plates I-XXIV B. $10\frac{1}{2}'' \times 16\frac{1}{4}''$. 84s. net.

It has long been known that under the Achæmenidæ Aramaic was not only the *lingua franca* of the day and the principal speech of traders from Egypt and Asia Minor to India, but also one of the official languages of the Persian Empire. The present documents are written in the official form of speech—known as *Reichsaramaeisch*—which " seems to have become general for every kind of document at this time throughout the Persian empire"; " it is used equally correctly by all the authors or scribes in this correspondence."

Driver's magnificent work is the *editio princeps* of a unique group of letters written on leather, a bag of leather, and some sealings. The find comes from Egypt, but its exact provenance and date of discovery are unknown. In 1933 it was brought to the late German scholar Dr. L. Borchardt; he later acquired it, and after his death it came into the possession of the Bodleian Library. Thirteen letters are more or less complete and there are fragments of five or six more.

The documents—assigned by Prof. Driver to the years 411/10-408 B.C.—are instructions of an official or semi-official nature issued by Arsham (the Persian satrap of Egypt) or other high-ranking Persian civil servants to subordinate Persian officers in Egypt. Of particular interest is letter VI, a sort of passport or letter of credence, which gives instructions to the local governors at the various stages of the route from the Persian capital to Egypt to supply the bearer of the document and his entourage with everything necessary for the journey. The bag, quite unique, was probably the diplomatic bag of this official, and after his arrival in Egypt it served for the custody of these very documents.

These documents are the earliest extant evidence of the use of leather as writing material in ancient Persia, and thus confirm our information from Greek literary sources. The first mention of Egyptian documents written on leather goes back to the Fourth Dynasty (*c.* 2550-2450 B.C.), and the earliest of such documents extant is a fragmentary roll of leather of the Sixth Dynasty (*c.* twenty-fourth century B.C.).

The imposing volume gives an accurate transcription and translation of such of the letters as can be reconstituted; there is an appendix regarding the personality of Arsham (Arshama, Arsames) constructed from Neo-Babylonian, Greek and Aramaic sources; and there is a complete glossary. The twenty-five plates are beyond praise. On the whole, Driver's book well illustrates the surprises that archæological and palæographical discoveries, as well as Semitic philology, have in store not only for the student of the Semitic world but also for the study of ancient Persia and the ancient Middle East. Hearty congratulations to the Oxford University Press for this splendid production of a work which is indispensable to the student of Semitic philology and palæography and indeed of the ancient Near and Middle East.

DAVID DIRINGER.

CORRESPONDENCE

August 16, 1954.

THE SECRETARY,
ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY,
LONDON, W.1.

DEAR SIR,

OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IRAN

Brigadier Longrigg's book is opportune and his painstaking assembly of the story of oil exploitation in the Middle East will be an invaluable book of reference. The assertion that it is an authoritative account of the work of the companies involved seems justified since Brigadier Longrigg was an executive of one and may well be considered to be the spokesman of others, particularly of those with whom he was closely associated. For the same reason, however, the claim to write as an " historian " must be questioned—for that, a standpoint less partial and, probably, one further removed in time from the events described is desirable.

In particular, events in Iran, as related by the author, take on a rather different aspect from that which they had for some of us. He says that the only controversial issue, immediately before the last war, was the metric tonnage calculation, but this does less than justice to a situation which already had in it so many elements of impending conflict. The tonnage term argument was the result of careless drafting. There were other inherent and more fundamental defects in the concession agreement. Lack of realism was shown in failing to relate the royalty to the increasing values of the oil products which, consequently, showed a progressive decline in their proportionate return to the Iranian Government.

It is doubtful, too, whether the extraordinary relationship in which the British Government stood to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company—at the same time the majority shareholder, important customer and tax arbiter over the Company's profits—could not be otherwise than a fatal bar to its acceptance by that other participant in the Company's profits, the Iranian Government.

The unilateral action taken necessarily by the British Government under war conditions effectually prevented the free working of the royalty terms as drawn up and, subsequently, the penal application of British taxes brought home to the Iranians, in the words of Brigadier Longrigg, " the vexed realization that the British Government received more from the Company than did the Persians." Under such circumstances, to talk of the sanctity of the written contract sounds somewhat hypocritical.

I believe that it was the almost complete failure to associate and identify the Iranians as partners in a national enterprise with the Company that finally provoked the complete schism in relations. These factors appear

to have had proper consideration and to be taken care of in the terms of the new agreement now announced, and we shall all wish the parties concerned well in their efforts for a mutually successful future exploitation.

It has been most interesting to read in Brigadier Longrigg's book other modern variants of profit sharing which seek to avoid the mistakes of the past. Perhaps most encouraging of all are those set out for Kuwait, wherein " both parties agreed to give consideration to any change in conditions which might render unfair the basis for payments now agreed upon." In this attitude, which gives due emphasis to the need for an *always* just interpretation, appears to lie the best hope for the future.

Yours truly,

(Signed) W. H. ROBERTS,

Iranian Government Auditor, 1937-1946.

THE reviewer of *Prehistoric India to 1000* B.C. has been in touch with the author, Professor Stuart Piggott, Professor of Prehistoric Archæology, Edinburgh University.

Some members might like to examine further the origins of human civilization as they emerged, probably from the Caspian area and developed in the Near and Middle East.

The following extract from the Professor's letter might prove of interest to such members:

" It makes writing a book worth while when one knows that it has interested exactly the sort of person one intended it for.

" I think the books to get on to are Gordon Childe's. *What Happened in History* is a Pelican, and a splendid one too, and the material is dealt with in greater detail in his last edition of *New Light on the Most Ancient East* (Kegan Paul). There is also a most stimulating little book by Henri Frankfort, *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, which takes a viewpoint rather different from Childe's and is concerned with the early relationship between ancient Sumer and Egypt. I wish we knew more here of recent Russian work in the Caspian region—a lot has been done but the books are difficult (or impossible) to get, and Childe is about our only archæologist who reads Russian with ease. I am hoping he is going to produce some sort of summary of this work soon, as he has just visited the U.S.S.R. and brought back a lot of inaccessible literature. Your mention of goats and mosquitoes reminds me of Sir John Myres' work on this sort of aspect of the Mediterranean civilizations, as in his last book of essays on *Geographical History in Greek Lands.*

" STUART PIGGOTT."

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